In Canada, further biographical information may be found at: AO, RG 80-2-0-328, no.20774; Instit. généal. Drouin, {d-0}Fonds Drouin numérisé,{d-1} Advent, Anglican church (Westmount, Québec), 11 nov. 1929: www.imagesdrouinpepin.com (consulted 22 Feb. 2010); UTARMS, A1973-0026/28 (49); {d-0}Ministers of the Presbyterian Church in Canada, 1875-1925: ministerial summary from Acts and proceedings of the General Assembly,{d-1} comp. Douglas Walkington, (mimeograph, [Toronto], 1987; copy at UCC-C); Univ. of Toronto, University of Toronto roll of service, 1914-1918 (Toronto, 1921).

The journal of Conrad Kirouac, named Brother Marie-Victorin, has been published as Mon miroir: journaux intimes, 1903-1920, Gilles Beaudet et Lucie Jasmin, édit. (Saint-Laurent [Montréal], 2004). His letters, all addressed to his eldest sister Adelcie, named Marie-des-Anges, have been collected under the title Confidence et combat: lettres (1924-1944) (Montréal, 1969). His 1940 speech to the Société Canadienne d{apos}Histoire Naturelle, {d-0}L{apos}Institut Botanique: vingt ans au service de la science et du pays,{d-1} has been reproduced in Rev. trimestrielle canadienne (Montréal), 26 (1940): 274-93, 432-45; 27 (1941): 76-90. A complete list of some 300 writings by Marie-Victorin can be found under {d-0}Collections documentaires{d-1} on the website of the Montreal Botanical Garden at www2.ville.montreal.qc.ca/jardin/biblio/numerique/numerique.htm (consulted 19 Feb. 2010).

Worth mentioning among the works and articles that shed light on certain aspects of his career are: Luc Chartrand, {d-0}Les amours secrètes du frère Marie-Victorin,{d-1} L{apos}Actualité (Montréal), 15 (1990), no.3: 29-34; Luc Chartrand et al., Histoire des sciences au Québec (Montréal, 1987); Pierre Dansereau, {d-0}Science in French Canada, II: scientific endeavor,{d-1} Scientific Monthly (Washington, D.C.), 59 (July-December 1944): 261-72; Dictionnaire des œuvres littéraires du Québec, sous la dir. de Maurice Lemire et al. (7v., 1980-87), 2; Yves Gingras, {d-0}Note critique: les combats du frère Marie-Victorin,{d-1} Rev. d{apos}hist. de l{apos}Amérique française (Montréal), 58 (2004-5): 87-101; F. E. Lloyd and Jules Brunel, {d-0}Frère Marie-Victorin,{d-1} Science (New York), new ser., 100 (July-December 1944): 487-88; Univ. de Montréal, Div. des arch., {d-0}Marie-Victorin: l{apos}itinéraire d{apos}un botaniste{d-1}: www.archiv.umontreal.ca/exposition/mv/expomv.htm (consulted 10 Feb. 2010); Nive Voisine, Les Frères des écoles chrétiennes au Canada (3v., Sainte-Foy [Québec], 1987-99), 2.

Bibliothèque et Arch. Nationales du Québec, Centre d{apos}arch. de Québec, Index BMS, dist. judiciaire de Québec, Saint-Cœur-de-Marie, 3 mai 1947. Instit. généal. Drouin, {d-0}Fonds Drouin numérisé,{d-1} Saint-Étienne (New Carlisle), 10 sept. 1922: www.imagesdrouinpepin.com (consulted 6 Aug. 2008). La Presse (Montréal), 14 avril 1979. Le Soleil (Québec), 2 nov. 1987. Can., House of Commons, Debates, 1960-85; Commission of inquiry concerning certain activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Report (3v., Ottawa, 1979-81). Dictionnaire des parlementaires du Québec, 1792-1992, Gaston Deschênes et al., compil. (Sainte-Foy [Québec], 1993). J. F. Duchaîne, Rapport sur les événements d{apos}octobre 1970 (Québec, 1980); Rapport sur les événements d{apos}octobre 1970: passages retenus et annexes A, B, C, et D (Québec, 1981). Pierre Duchesne, Jacques Parizeau (3v., Montréal, 2001-4), 3. Que., Commission of inquiry on organized crime, The Fight against organized crime in Québec: report and recommendations (Quebec, 1977); Legislative Assembly, Debates, 1960-68; National Assembly, Debates, 1968-85. Québec, Commission d{apos}enquête sur des opérations policières en territoire québécois, Rapport (Québec, 1981).

Bibliothèque et Arch. Nationales du Québec, Centre d{apos}arch. de Montréal, CE601-S7, 21 juin 1896; P142; Centre d{apos}arch. de Québec, E4; P379. Instit. généal. Drouin, {d-0}Fonds Drouin numérisé,{d-1} Saint-Léon (Westmount, Québec), 21 févr. 1916: www.imagesdrouinpepin.com (consulted 29 Jan. 2009). Le Devoir (Montréal), 22 avril 1911, 24 sept. 1946, 10 avril 1982. Gazette (Montréal), 17 avril 1982. New York Times, 22 Nov. 1925, 11 April 1982. Le Passe-Temps (Montréal), 25 août 1917. La Presse (Montréal), 19, 22 mai 1908; 9 févr. 1918; 27 sept. 1919; 11 sept. 1920; 22 oct. 1921; 1er sept. 1978. Le Soleil (Québec), 10 mai 1943. Annals of the Metropolitan Opera: the complete chronicle of performances and artists, ed. Gerald Fitzgerald (2v., New York and Boston, 1989). Baker{apos}s biographical dictionary of musicians, ed. Nicolas Slonimsky (New York and London, 1984). Simon Couture, {d-0}Les origines du Conservatoire de Musique du Québec,{d-1} ARMuQ, Cahiers (Québec), no.14 (mai 1992): 42-64. Guy Frégault, Chronique des années perdues ([Montréal], 1976). Bertrand Guay, Un siècle de symphonie à Québec: l{apos}Orchestre Symphonique de Québec, 1902-2002 (Québec, 2002). Cécile Huot, {d-0}Évolution de la vie musicale au Québec sous l{apos}influence de Wilfrid Pelletier{d-1} (thèse de PHD, univ. de Toulouse-Le Mirail, France, 1973); Wilfrid Pelletier: un grand homme, une grande œuvre (Montréal, 1996). Paul Jackson, Saturday afternoons at the old Met: the Metropolitan Opera broadcasts, 1931-1950 (Portland, Oreg., 1992). Irving Kolodin, The Metropolitan Opera, 1883-1966: a candid history (New York, 1966). R. C. Marsh, {d-0}The annals of the Ravinia Opera, part 4: 1927-1931,{d-1} Opera Quarterly (Chapell Hill, N.C.), 14 (1997), no.2: 57-82. Metropolitan Opera annals: a chronicle of artists and performances, comp. W. H. Seltsam, intro. Edward Johnson (New York, 1947). The Metropolitan Opera: the radio and television legacy (exhibition catalogue, Museum of Broadcasting, New York, 1986). Gilles Potvin, OSM: the first fifty years (Montreal, 1984). Agathe de Vaux, La petite histoire de l{apos}Orchestre Symphonique de Montréal (Verdun [Montréal], 1984). Wilfrid Pelletier, chef d{apos}orchestre et éducateur, réalisation de Louis Portugais, scénario de Gilles Carle (film, [Montréal], 1960).

Pelletier{apos}s discography, as well as a biography and numerous articles on musical organizations in which he participated, can be consulted at Historica-Dominion Institute, {d-0}Encyclopedia of music in Canada{d-1}: www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com (consulted 2 Dec. 2009). More than 70 of his recordings are preserved at Library and Arch. Can., {d-0}The virtual gramophone: Canadian historical sound recordings{d-1}: www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/gramophone/index-e.html (consulted 2 Dec. 2009). A complete recording of Mignon, performed 27 Jan. 1945 at the Met and conducted by Pelletier, can be found at the Metropolitan Opera, {d-0}Met player{d-1}: www.metoperafamily.org/met_player/index.aspx (consulted 6 July 2009); however, a fee is charged.

The most important event in Cannon{apos}s judicial career was his appointment on 7 April 1909 by the government of Sir Lomer Gouin as a one-man royal commission to make a general and complete inquiry into the administration of the affairs of the city of Montreal. This commission, which would also be known as the Cannon inquiry, was set up in response to pressure from a committee of citizens which, among others, included former mayor Hormisdas Laporte*, notary Victor Morin, and Senator Raoul Dandurand*. In view of the inefficient management by the committees of the city council, these citizens called for reforms in the municipal administration and especially for the creation of a board of control having the executive power. With the assistance of a secretary, lawyer Arthur Gagné, Cannon commenced his work on 19 April but adjourned it until 27 April, the date on which the inquiry really began. He held 115 sessions and heard 914 depositions, in the course of which 548 pieces of evidence were produced. His mandate required him to submit a report before 15 July, but the hearings, at which the lawyers for the citizens{s-1-unknown} committee, Joseph-Léonide Perron and Napoléon-Kemner Laflamme, acted as prosecutors, did not conclude until 14 September.

In 1847 John Flavelle, a shop clerk of Huguenot descent in Cootehill, County Cavan (Republic of Ireland), married Dorothea Dundas, daughter of a moderately prosperous Scots-Irish family. The young couple decided to forsake famine-ridden Ireland and emigrate to America {d-0}to seek their fortune in the land of promise.{d-1} They settled in Peterborough and had five children, of whom Joseph Wesley Flavelle was the youngest.

Burns attained a great deal of public acclaim in the west and across the country during his lifetime. He was awarded the rank of knight commander of the Order of St Gregory the Great by the Vatican in 1914 in recognition of his service to the Roman Catholic Church and the public. He supported the Liberal Party and in 1923 was offered a seat in the Senate, which he refused because of his heavy workload. When the offer was made again in 1931 after the death of Prosper-Edmond Lessard, he was close enough to retirement to accept; he would sit as an independent. The appointment was announced on 4 July during Calgary{apos}s huge celebration of his approaching 75th birthday. Some 750 guests attended a banquet, including {d-0}more prominent citizens, nationally known government officials, agriculturalists, heads of industrial enterprises, artists and journalists than ever gathered at a similar event of this kind in the west.{d-1} Conservative prime minister Richard Bedford Bennett*, a personal friend despite Burns{apos}s Liberal leanings and his one-time solicitor in Calgary, was unable to attend but he sent a congratulatory message. It was read before the audience along with telegrams from Governor General Lord Bessborough and the Prince of Wales, who had bought the E.P. Ranch next to Burns{apos}s Bar U. A 3,000-pound birthday cake was distributed to some 15,000 people.

These tributes were offered in recognition of Burns{apos}s business acumen but they were also acknowledgements of his work for public and charitable causes. The community-spirited action for which he is probably best known is the organizational and financial backing he provided together with Archibald James McLean, A. E. Cross, and George Lane – the {d-0}big four{d-1} cattlemen – for the first Calgary Stampede held from 2 to 5 Sept. 1912. His support of this inaugural event, a rodeo and frontier-days presentation, was just one of Burns{apos}s numerous public-spirited deeds. When a rockslide devastated the mining community of Frank (Alta) on 29 April 1903, he offered aid before anyone else. After the town of Fernie, B.C., was wiped out by fire some five years later, he sent its citizens a freight car of food. During World War I he and his company contributed $50,000 to equip the Legion of Frontiersmen. After the war he was made an honorary member of the Calgary Aero Club (now the Calgary Flying Club) {d-0}in token of … [his] interest in aviation and his gift of two airplanes{d-1} to support the war effort. He made a substantial donation to the construction of the Canadian Memorial Church, built by the Reverend George Oliver Fallis* to honour those who had served in the war. He contributed to Holy Cross Hospital in Calgary and gave 200 acres of land and a regular supply of meat to the Lacombe Home, founded by Father Albert Lacombe* in Midnapore, Alta. It is said that while the Catholic church near the Lacombe Home was being painted at his expense, he noticed the shabby condition of the nearby Anglican church and told his workers to paint it too. Besides providing free office space in one of his Calgary buildings to the Western Stock Growers{s-1-unknown} Association, Burns helped to improve western dairy herds by arranging to sell good Jersey and Holstein breeding stock to farmers on long-term payment schedules. He gave financial aid to two sisters struggling to establish the Braemar Lodge, which became an important Calgary hotel. He supported talented artists by, for example, sponsoring the operatic career of Isabelle Burnada and the musical training of Odette de Foras. When Calgary celebrated his birthday in 1931, he announced that {d-0}for each single unemployed man or woman in the city a ticket good for 50 cents, would be issued at his expense for the purchase of food and that to each married unemployed man he would give a five pound roast of beef. {s-0}I feel,{s-1-unknown} he said, {s-0}that during the Stampede celebration and on the occasion of my 75th birthday, I would like to do something for the citizens who during these difficult times [the Great Depression] are unable to obtain employment.{s-1-unknown}{d-1}

Burns stayed at his Manitoba homestead until 1885, when he turned to buying cattle full-time. His business prospered for various reasons. The railway link to the east and the growing number of settlers raised the demand for beef. But his big break came in 1887 when he was engaged by William Mackenzie, Donald Mann, and others to supply meat to their construction camps. His first contract was for the CPR{apos}s {d-0}Short Line{d-1} across Maine. It was followed by contracts for the Qu{apos}Appelle, Long Lake and Saskatchewan Railroad and Steamboat Company in 1888-89 and later for the lines out of Calgary to Edmonton and Fort Macleod, and finally for the Crowsnest Pass line. According to geographer Simon M. Evans, Burns {d-0}learned to establish a mobile slaughtering facility which could move easily as the railhead was extended. He employed a reliable butcher to prepare the meat, and handled the buying and droving himself.{d-1} Burns received financial backing from Mackenzie that helped him to buy and sell on a grander scale than would otherwise have been possible. In 1890 he built his first slaughterhouse, on the east side of the Elbow River in Calgary, and began supplying beef to the city and surrounding area. He also developed contacts with merchants in British Columbia to whom he sold both meat and wholesale livestock. He set up his own retail outlets there. To guarantee supply he bought property for a ranch in 1891 some 12 miles southeast of Olds (Alta) with Cornelius J. Duggan and started acquiring cattle both locally and from as far away as Manitoba. The ranch eventually comprised two sections (1,280 acres) of deeded land. By allowing their cattle to graze over countless acres of unclaimed land and employing neighbouring farmers to supply hay and feed in the winter, the partners were able to provide for between 20,000 and 30,000 head of cattle by 1904. In 1898 Burns diversified into mutton and pork; in the next year he purchased the McIntosh Sheep Ranch on Rosebud (Severn) Creek northeast of Calgary.

Burns{apos}s commercial enterprises continued to grow rapidly despite major obstacles. Twice his Calgary slaughterhouse was destroyed by fire. The original plant burned down in 1892 and was replaced with a property purchased from the Canadian Land and Ranch Company. This facility was opened in 1899 and enlarged in 1906. After its loss in 1913 Burns constructed an expanded, modern plant, which still stands in the Calgary stockyards as part of a performing-arts complex. In 1902 Burns had bought the string of shops and slaughterhouses owned by fellow meat marketer William Charles James Roper Hull* of Calgary. At this stage, as local journalist Leroy Victor Kelly* noted, he became the {d-0}acknowledged beef king of the West.{d-1} The deal included Hull{apos}s Bow Valley Ranche at Fish Creek south of the city. Using the ranch as support for his meat-packing business, Burns enlarged the property from 4,000 to about 12,500 acres by further land purchases and built a feedlot for 5,000 head of cattle.

What seemed to vindicate their suspicion was the fact that there appeared to be a conspiracy between Burns and the other big middleman on the ranching frontier, the firm of Gordon and Ironside of Winnipeg (Gordon, Ironside, and Fares after 1897). Just before the turn of the century William Henry Fares and George Lane, both later partners of James Thomas Gordon and Robert Ironside*, usually worked with or for Burns in purchasing livestock. Gordon and Ironside generally bought the well-finished cattle that could be marketed in eastern Canada and overseas. Even some of Burns{apos}s close friends considered this splitting of the beef market to be evidence of unfair teamwork. Thus, for instance, in 1900 Alfred Ernest Cross expressed the opinion that {d-0}there are practically only two buyers here, and in fact it nearly all comes through one as he sells the exporters to the other after buying all the beef and uses the rough stuff himself, thus leaving the seller more or less at his mercy.{d-1} At this stage Cross was prepared to forgive his friend because {d-0}he has shown far more mercy than any one could expect.{d-1} Three years later, however, he sounded less accepting. {d-0}We are trying,{d-1} he said, {d-0}to get a reasonable price, and not sell our cattle for far less than they are worth as was the case last year. What we want is to establish a fair market without any favors so that we know we can get at any time the right market value for all or any of our beef cattle and not go round with your hat in your hand at the mercy of one or two concerns.{d-1}

At this time, the route of the Canadian Pacific Railway was being surveyed near Winnipeg, which gave Burns the opportunity he needed. He got a job blasting rock, for which he received $24 a month and his board in a construction camp. After six months he had enough money to buy a team of oxen and some supplies, and returned to his homestead at Tanner{apos}s Crossing. There other settlers joined in a building bee to help him construct his first house – a small log cabin. By using his oxen to drag timber out of the woods for a lumber mill and to plough for neighbours, he was able to acquire a second quarter section. Soon afterwards he got into the freighting business and carried supplies for his neighbours to and from Winnipeg. He also began to deal in cattle, buying from local farmers and selling the animals in the city. In 1886 he tried the experiment of shipping live hogs via the newly completed CPR to eastern markets. Wanting to demonstrate that it was possible to transport livestock over long distances, railway officials were anxious to accommodate him. The company offered him six cars and the promise that if he lost money on the deal, he would receive a rebate for up to the total cost. He later called at the company{apos}s office to announce that the rebate would not be necessary.

Beyond business concerns, there was another aspect of Burns{apos}s life that was not ideal. His family situation was difficult at best. He and his wife, the daughter of a rancher from Penticton, B.C., clearly had their problems. Some evidence suggests that Burns made a genuine attempt to make his wife happy. Between 1900 (a year before his marriage) and 1903 he spent approximately $40,000 to build a family mansion on 13th Avenue West in Calgary. Neo-Gothic in design, with steeply pitched gables, ornate sandstone carvings, and a three-storey tower, Burns Manor had 18 rooms, including 10 bedrooms, 4 bathrooms, and a conservatory. Oak from eastern Canada was used extensively for the interior, while furniture imported from England and a landscaped garden helped to sustain an Old-World air. In its time Burns Manor, which had been commissioned from the prominent architect Francis Mawson Rattenbury, was probably the most luxurious dwelling in Calgary. However, it was not enough to give the Burnses a strong domestic bond. They were separated by both age and religion. When they married in 1901, Burns was 45 years old and Eileen only 27; throughout his life he strongly adhered to the Catholic faith, while she was a Protestant. Their major problem, however, seems to have been that he was addicted to work: even their wedding, at a registry office in London, was arranged to coincide with a business trip. Largely because business occupied so much of Burns{apos}s time, Eileen found her life in Calgary both lonely and unfulfilled. Unable to adjust, she went to live in California and then Vancouver. In the early 1920s she was diagnosed with cancer, and died on 7 Sept. 1923, shortly before her 50th birthday. It seems that Burns{apos}s relationship with his one child was not close. Patrick Thomas Michael did not enjoy his father{apos}s robust health, and he does not appear to have shown any sustained interest in the commercial undertakings so important to Burns. On 18 Sept. 1936 Patrick was found dead in his bed at his father{apos}s home, presumably because of a heart attack. He was 30 years old. Burns himself had suffered a stroke in 1935 (as a consequence of which his Senate seat had been declared vacant in June 1936 because of nonattendance), and died less than six months after his son. He was buried in St Mary{apos}s Cemetery in Calgary.

In France, about 1620, he had married Louise Mauger (1598–1690). Three of their children are known to us: Roberte (1621–1716) who in 1650 married the pioneer Louis Prud{apos}homme: Pierre* (1632–1714), born in France, died at Montreal; and Jean-Baptiste (1641–1728) born at Quebec, died at Montreal; both the sons were gunsmiths. Their descendants have survived to the present day. An older sister of Pierre Gadoys, Françoise, the wife of Nicolas Godé, had come to Montreal in May 1642.

After studying surgery at Orléans for at least five years, Francois Gendron went to New France in 1643. He was the first doctor known to have lived in Ontario and among the North American Indians. It was in 1644–45, from Sainte-Marie-des-Hurons, that he wrote his letters, which were published in 1660 by Jean-Baptiste de Rocoles. In the Huron country, according to the testimony of Father Ragueneau, Gendron “helped the French and the Indians with great charity . . . always lived in a very edifying manner . . . without any pay, without any profit . . . for the love of God.” He spent seven years in the Huron territory as a Jesuit donné and left for France again 23 Aug. 1650, after the destruction of the Huron country; he travelled in company with Louis Pinard and Father Pierre Pijart, and took with him an ointment for fistulas, stubborn ulcers, and cancers. Its base was a powder that came from stones which he had discovered on the shores of Lake Erie and which he called “Erie Stones” ({d-0}Pierres Ériennes{d-1}). This ointment was to make his fortune in France and in 1664 was to bring him the honour of treating the queen, Anne of Austria, who was suffering from cancer of the breast.

At the time of his voyage in 1627, if not sooner, Giffard, had built himself a “cabin” at La Canardière, in the region of Beauport, probably for hunting and fishing. Apparently he already intended to settle in the colony, since, when he came back in 1628 with Roquemont{apos}s fleet, bringing with him a considerable amount of equipment, he was captured and despoiled by the Kirkes near Tadoussac. Later the Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France recognized his attempt at colonization and indemnified him for “the losses that he incurred in this context when he was captured with the fleet.”

For months Borden had resisted the conscription agitation, fearing large-scale unrest if it was imposed. {d-0}That might mean civil war in Quebec,{d-1} as he told one of the Bonne Ententists. In May 1917, when cabinet was informed there would be conscription, Blondin and Patenaude warned that it would {d-0}kill them politically and the party [in Quebec] for 25 years.{d-1} Borden{apos}s participation in the imperial war cabinet and his keen awareness that voluntary recruiting had fallen well behind battlefield casualties had been decisive in changing his mind. Casualties in the spring of 1917 were double the number of new recruits. Being taken into the imperial government{apos}s council, participating in discussions of war and peace policy at the centre of the empire, Borden believed, heightened Canada{apos}s responsibility to do everything possible to support its soldiers. Even more important was the bond he had established with {d-0}his boys{d-1} at the front and in the long rows of hospital beds in England. When he introduced the Military Service Bill on 11 June, he asked a hushed and sombre House of Commons, {d-0}If we do not pass this measure, if we do not provide reinforcements, if we do not keep our plighted faith, with what countenance shall we meet them on their return?{d-1}

At that same cabinet meeting in May, Borden announced that he was going to ask Laurier to join him in a coalition government to support conscription. He did so a week later. Laurier hesitated, opposed to compulsion but aware that several of his English-speaking colleagues strongly supported it. Finally, on 6 June, he refused. Several members of Borden{apos}s cabinet were vastly relieved. They abhorred the idea of cooperating with the Liberals and believed that they could easily win the forthcoming election on a conscription platform without them. But Borden persisted and worked for months to achieve a coalition of his party with conscriptionist Liberals. Along the way his men rammed through two bills to rig the franchise for the coming election. The Military Voters Act made it possible to manipulate the counting of votes at the front, and the War-time Elections Act, which finally passed in late September, disenfranchised enemy aliens who had come to Canada after 1902 and extended the vote to the immediate female relatives of soldiers. This raw display of partisan determination finally tipped the scales for coalition. Dithering conscriptionist Liberals such as Arthur Lewis Watkins Sifton, Newton Wesley Rowell*, and Frank Broadstreet Carvell knew that this was their last chance and quickly signed up. The Union government was announced on Saturday, 13 October. There were seven Liberals in the new cabinet, and one more would be added before the end of the month. Doc Reid, who like dozens in the Tory caucus had thought the coalition would never happen, reportedly quipped that he would {d-0}back Borden against Job in a patience contest.{d-1}

During his first term in office Duplessis witnessed a deterioration in the province{apos}s economic situation as a result of the depression, and he attributed the mess in public finances to manoeuvres by Ottawa to restrict Quebec{apos}s borrowing power. To put the unemployed back to work, he demanded that the federal government initiate a program of public works. He agreed to support a few of them himself, such as the completion of the Montreal Botanical Garden, which Brother Marie-Victorin [Conrad Kirouac*] had requested. Ottawa was also thinking of putting in place an unemployment-insurance scheme. When the royal commission on dominion-provincial relations (the Rowell-Sirois commission) was appointed [see Newton Wesley Rowell*; Joseph Sirois*], the Duplessis government put forward the basis of its autonomist thinking, grounded on the thesis articulated by judge Thomas-Jean-Jacques Loranger* in the 1880s: the Canadian confederation stemmed from a pact between the provinces, which the federal government had to honour. In taking this stance, Duplessis presented himself as Honoré Mercier*{apos}s successor. Until World War II broke out, he would enjoy the support of his Ontario colleague, Premier Mitchell Frederick Hepburn.

E. R. Adair, “France and the beginnings of New France,” CHR, XXV (1944), 246–78. Aegidius Fauteux, La famille d{apos}Aillebout (Montréal, 1917). Ernest Gagnon, Feuilles volantes et pages d’histoire (Québec, 1910). Amédée-E. Gosselin, “Notes et documents concernant les gouverneurs d’Ailleboust, de Lauzon et de Lauzon-Charny,” RSCT, 3d ser., XXVI (1932), sect.i, 83–96.

On 20 July 1616 Champlain, together with Fathers Jamet and Le Caron, started back for France. They were going to lodge a complaint with the heads of the Compagnie des Marchands de Rouen et de Saint-Malo about the behaviour of its agents, who were hindering the spread of the gospel. This task completed, Father Le Caron sailed again on 11 April 1617; he was returning to Quebec with the title of provincial commissioner. He stayed there for one year, replacing the Recollet Jean Dolbeau who went to France, and during that time he blessed the marriage of Louis Hébert{apos}s eldest daughter Anne to Étienne Jonquet. On Father Dolbeau’s return the following year, Father Le Caron went to the Montagnais at Tadoussac; he stayed with them until 1619, acting in the double capacity of missionary and schoolmaster, as he stated himself: “I have taught the alphabet to some who are beginning to read and write fairly well. . . . In this way I have been busy running a free school in our house at Tadoussac.” In 1624 he would be able to write, referring to the seminary that the Recollets had opened at Quebec in 1620: “Our seminary would be of great assistance if we had the means to provide for everything, but given the poverty of the country, we can support only a small number of Indians.”

In this book, unlike the Nouvelle Relation, the author plays the part of a historian rather than a witness; he was not a witness of the events except for a brief episode in the third part of the work. He had necessarily to accumulate material and to have recourse to written and oral sources. His testimony will be worth what the documents he consulted are worth. But Father Le Clercq warns us that he has founded his account only upon the truth: “As truth is the soul and the very essence of history, this account does not need to seek support and authority elsewhere.” No one has seriously doubted Le Clercq’s good faith; impartial critics are of Ganong’s opinion: “Without doubt this author always intended, to my way of thinking, to tell the exact truth.” Nevertheless, with the aid of present-day documents, one cannot help pointing out here and there some more or less important errors: Le Clercq gives 1635 as the year of the founding of Trois-Rivières, and 1636 for that of Montreal; he changes Father Nicolas Viel{apos}s French companion at Rivière des Prairies into a Huron; he is in error about Father Leroux’s successor and the end of his term at Quebec. But on the whole these are not serious. The major error with which Father Le Clercq has been charged is that he criticized the Relations des Jésuites and suspected these fathers of having thwarted the Recollets’ return to New France after 1632. To what extent was he right? The question is not easily settled. What is certain is that Le Clercq took too literally certain affirmations in the Relations, and he hastened to put things in their true light with statements such as the following: “Would to God that all these churches described in the Relations were as real as the country knows them to be imaginary.” We know today that the Relations, which had been composed largely for propaganda, betray here and there pious exaggerations.

Lévesque chose a Bohemian lifestyle, chasing girls and playing poker with Jean Marchand and Robert Cliche*, two Université Laval students destined, as he was, to become famous, and he dreamed of becoming a writer. A budding playwright, he co-authored with Lucien Côté {d-0}Princesse à marier,{d-1} a {d-0}light-hearted and highly imaginative little piece,{d-1} which he had staged at the Palais Montcalm in Quebec City. The play was a monumental flop. This failure did not keep him from making a second and last foray into the world of drama. Probably in 1943 he wrote a piece for radio entitled {d-0}Aux quatre vents.{d-1} The play would not be produced until it was rediscovered half a century later; it would be published in Montreal in 1999. In this work the 20-year-old Lévesque seems pessimistic about the future of the French Canadians of his time, whom he portrayed as reduced to a people made invisible by history. {d-0}Aux quatre vents{d-1} also foreshadowed the René Lévesque of the years to come. Indeed, what would he do with his life if not spend it all trying to liberate those French Canadians - who came to regard themselves as Quebecers - from their invisibility?

At Radio-Canada, Lévesque was not restricted to his work with La Voix du Canada (which was sometimes broadcast in Canada). He could also be heard nationally. After hosting Journalistes au micro (1949-50), he would work simultaneously on La Revue de l{apos}actualité (1951-54) and La Revue des arts et lettres (1952-54), where he gave highly critical film reviews. Within a few years he established himself as one of Radio-Canada{apos}s leading lights. Imaginative but unmethodical, he loved doing on-the-spot reports. Those he wrote from Korea, where he was a war correspondent from July to September 1951, made his reputation as a great international reporter. During these years he worked closely with Judith Jasmin*, with whom he carried on a love affair. Though he did not look the part, he was considered at the time the Don Juan of Radio-Canada. There was something appealing about him. He loved women and they responded to him in kind. In October 1951 he and Jasmin were assigned to cover the visit of Princess Elizabeth and her husband, Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, to Canada. From January 1954 they were co-hosts of Carrefour, a new radio program devoted to news reports. But soon the rising medium of television shunned him. Lévesque was no Adonis. Short and balding, he had tics and smoked like a chimney. Yet his lively interview with some Russian schoolgirls on Red Square in the fall of 1955 was a sensation on the television news. Radio-Canada had assigned him for radio but also for television - just this once would not hurt - to cover the visit of Lester Bowles Pearson*, Canada{apos}s minister of external affairs and future prime minister, to the Soviet Union. When the intransigent Nikita Khrushchev mistreated Pearson in Lévesque{apos}s presence, the special correspondent for Radio-Canada got his first international scoop. In 1956, though his bosses at Radio-Canada doubted he had the looks for the job, Lévesque finally made the leap to television and quickly rose to the rank of {d-0}god of the TV screen,{d-1} to quote Georges-Émile Lapalme, leader of the provincial Liberal Party. On Point de mire, a cult program of the late 1950s, he used his passion for teaching and communicating to explain the world{apos}s great dramatic events, such as the Suez crisis and the war in Algeria. It was at this time that the born seducer began a secret love affair with a young actress who, in 1958, bore him a daughter he would never acknowledge. This extramarital paternity prompted Louise L{apos}Heureux to begin divorce proceedings, but she subsequently dropped them.

The premier did indeed have a change of heart. He was outraged by the blackmail on the part of the Toronto and Montreal bankers, who not only refused to finance nationalization but threatened to have nothing to do with government loans if the administration took over the Shawinigan Water and Power Company. The argument that increasing the debt would drive the province into bankruptcy, put forward by George Carlyle Marler and other ministers opposed to nationalization, did not hold up. Douglas Henderson Fullerton, an independent financial expert consulted by Lesage, gave him a reassuring report. If Canadian moneylenders did not want to assist in underwriting nationalization, the Americans would be only too glad to do so, since the province{apos}s debt was one of the lowest in the country. Lévesque got the same assurance from Roland Giroux*, a broker who had close ties to American financial circles. After the election, Lévesque would send him to New York with his advisers Michel Bélanger* and Jacques Parizeau to borrow the money required to finance nationalization. As for the electrical companies, they had at last given in, confining their actions to raising the stakes with respect to the monetary compensation that the government planned to pay them. If Lesage finally stopped his shilly-shallying, it was also to reaffirm his leadership, which had been damaged by his indecision. There was no better way to re-establish unity than a surprise election he was certain to win, according to the opinion poll he had secretly commissioned.

René Lévesque did not achieve his grand dream of giving his compatriots a new homeland. This was no doubt the most striking failure of his political career. He lost the referendum of May 1980, had a constitution forced on him, and gave up the traditional right of veto, three events that weakened Quebec{apos}s political position within confederation. At the time of his death, Quebecers were still Canadians, but the francophone majority no longer saw themselves as the inconsequential people of legend, inward looking and speaking a disparaged and marginalized language. As a journalist, a Liberal cabinet minister, and a sovereignist premier, by his words and deeds he liberated French-speaking Quebecers from their feeling of inferiority and gave them a shot of adrenaline, so that some day, as he predicted on the evening of his defeat in the referendum, they would keep their rendezvous with history. {d-0}I never thought I could be so proud to be Québécois as I am this evening.… We are not an insignificant people. We are perhaps something like a great people.{d-1} These famous words, spoken off the cuff in the euphoria of his victory on 15 Nov. 1976, revealed his political commitment, enabling those at the bottom who spoke French to move up in society, as his relatives and close friends recalled. But at the same time, he noted in his memoirs that Quebecers were probably the only people to have {d-0}refused such a chance to acquire full power over themselves peacefully and democratically.{d-1} Nonetheless, the epitaph written for him by poet Félix Leclerc gives a meaning to his legacy, which is not measured solely in reforms and laws. {d-0}The first page of the true, beautiful history of Quebec has just ended.… From now on, he belongs on the short list of the liberators of people.{d-1}

René{apos}s Jesuit teachers, including Charles Dubé, a cousin of the famous François Hertel [Rodolphe Dubé], pampered him, while at the same time making him aware of the nationalist ferment and its causes, the economic and social inferiority of French Canadians that was intensified by the grinding poverty of the 1930s. In his memoirs, Lévesque would acknowledge that he had liked Hertel{apos}s iconoclastic book, Leur inquiétude (Montreal, 1936), whose clear conclusion predicted that Quebec would separate from Canada some day. At a public meeting held in the seminary courtyard during the 1935 election campaign, he heard the nationalistic diatribe of Philippe Hamel*, a dentist and popular speaker for the Action Libérale Nationale, against the grip of {d-0}foreign trusts{d-1} on the lives of French Canadians. At the age of 13, he asked the existential question in the seminary{apos}s newspaper {d-0}L{apos}Envol{d-1}: Why remain French? His conclusion showed how precise his political thinking had already become and foreshadowed the realistic nationalist politician he would be, while also revealing a vaguely vengeful sentiment: {d-0}Let{apos}s demand from the Jews and the Americans, not the insignificant positions that we now hold, but the high positions to which we are entitled. From the day when that is accomplished, we will be able to call ourselves masters in our own house.{d-1}

New Carlisle at that time had a population of not quite 1,300, of whom a third were French-speaking and subject to the dictates of the great loyalist families who had fled the American revolution and settled there in the 18th century. Two distinct societies, living side by side, they were a perfect symbol of Canada{apos}s {d-0}two solitudes.{d-1} In this world, where English was required for making oneself understood, young René lost no time in becoming bilingual. He also discovered that the rich spoke English, lived in homes that looked like castles beside the modest houses of the francophones, and enjoyed a network of modern schools that showed his local one up for what it was: a {d-0}miserable shack more than a kilometre away from home,{d-1} as he put it in Attendez que je me rappelle …, the memoirs he was to publish in Montreal in 1986 (translated under the title Memoirs by Philip Stratford and published in Toronto in 1986).

In addition to the author{apos}s biography of Lévesque, worth mentioning are those by: François Aubin, René Lévesque tel quel (Montréal, 1973); Peter Desbarats, René, a Canadian in search of a country (Toronto, 1976); Michel Lévesque, René Lévesque (Montréal, 1991); Jean Provencher, René Lévesque: portrait d{apos}un Québécois (Montréal, [1973]). Three other books devoted to Lévesque are: Graham Fraser, PQ: René Lévesque & the Parti Québécois in power (Toronto, 1984); René Lévesque: l{apos}homme, la nation, la démocratie, Yves Bélanger et Michel Lévesque, édit. (Sillery [Québec], 1992); René Lévesque: textes et entrevues (1960-1987), Michel Lévesque, édit. (Sillery, 1991).

The legacy of Lévesque is diverse and associated with many great moments in the history of Quebec. As a journalist with Radio-Canada, he helped stir the interest of Quebec society in the great international questions, in a way broadening its horizons. Having become a politician during the Quiet Revolution, he was one of the driving forces for the changes that enabled Quebec to modernize and become open to the world. He made new standards an integral part of politics - honest politics - not only as a minister in Lesage{apos}s cabinet, but as premier. He rid French-speaking Quebecers of their complexes and gave them confidence in their ability by nationalizing electricity and building Hydro-Quebec.

It was fitting that the veterans, all members of the 1st Division, played a prominent role in Borden{apos}s funeral. World War I had been his greatest political challenge. In 1896 he had been unprepared when Sir Charles Tupper had asked him to run for parliament. Once he had been elected, Tupper and his son Charles Hibbert had guided and encouraged him as he moved from the back to the front benches of opposition. In 1901 he had been unprepared for party leadership. His career as opposition leader was long and conducted against formidable odds with Sir Wilfrid Laurier at the height of his powers and veteran members of his own caucus frustrating his attempts at party reform and challenging his position. In 1911 he had been unprepared for government leadership, and his first years, as a peacetime prime minister, were marked by controversy with both the Liberal-dominated Senate and his own Nationaliste followers and cabinet colleagues from Quebec. In the middle of 1914 Borden was preparing for an election, not war.

Bennett took office with action on his mind. Action he had promised and action Canada got. A special session of parliament was called for 8 September. He believed that tariffs were necessary not only to keep Canada independent of the United States but to create markets for Canadian producers, so tariff revision, steeply upward on a range of manufactured goods, was instituted. The emergency Unemployment Relief Act, providing $20 million for public works at the federal and local levels, was also passed. Parliament prorogued in two weeks. Then it was organization for the Imperial Conference in London, which was to start on 30 September and which Bennett hoped would provide a solution to Canada{apos}s economic difficulties through the establishment of a reciprocal preference in trade. The conference was mostly a Canadian idea but Canadians would be a day late for it.

On the following 26 August Champlain was already back at Saint-Malo. Towards the end of that year, 1613, he published an account of the journey that he had just made, as well as a map of New France (it included only one addition to the preceding map: the upper part of the Ottawa River). In 1614, at Fontainebleau, where he went to make a report to the king, he formed a society with the merchants of Rouen and Saint-Malo for the support of the Canadian undertaking; this company, which bound the partners for 11 years, bore the name of Compagnie des Marchands de Rouen et de Saint-Malo, and also that of Compagnie de Champlain, because of the important role played by the lieutenant of the Prince de Condé. Despite an attempt by the merchants of La Rochelle to corner the Tadoussac fur trade, business was excellent in 1614. Champlain could indulge in the fondest hopes. He was also concerned with the furtherance of religious life; with the backing of Condé and of Louis Houel, a king{apos}s secretary, he secured four Recollets, among them Denis Jamet, their first superior in Canada, and the company undertook to feed them. With them Champlain set sail from Honfleur, on 24 April 1615, and as soon as he arrived at Tadoussac, on 25 May, he set out for the Saint-Louis rapids to meet the natives. Bound by repeated promises to help them against the Iroquois, and wanting to push on with his “discoveries,” Champlain, with two Frenchmen, one of whom was perhaps Étienne Brûlé, undertook his great voyage to the Huron country. This was on 9 July 1615. He went up the Ottawa River, continuing this time beyond Allumette Island, and reached the Rivière Mataouan; then, via the Lac des Népissingues (Nipissing) and the Rivière des Français (French River), he got to the great Lac Attigouautau (Huron), which he called a freshwater sea. On 1 August he at last arrived among the Hurons, in a country whose beauty and fertility amazed him.

ASQ, Document Faribault, passim.; Séminaire, LVII. JR (Thwaites), XXVII, 314. JJ (Laverdière et Casgrain), passim. BRH, XLIX (1943), 268-72. Louis Guyon*, Étude généalogique sur Jean Guyon et ses descendants (Montreal, 1927). É.-Z. Massicotte, {d-0}Les arpenteurs de Montréal sous le régime français,{d-1} BRH, XXIV (1918), 304. [Mme Pierre [F.L.] Montagne, Tourouvre et les Juchereau ... (Québec, 1965).]

The King papers, MG 26, J, at Library and Arch. Canada (Ottawa), are remarkably complete. They include King{apos}s diaries which are of special interest because they constitute a detailed guide to his daily activities and his personality. J. W. Pickersgill and D. F. Forster, The Mackenzie King record (4v., Toronto, 1960-70), is an edited version of the wartime and post-war diaries. The first volume was produced by Pickersgill alone. In 2003 Library and Arch. Canada published a digitized version of the diaries on its website.

A member of the Cent-Associés, he came to New France in 1634 (or 1632), probably as representative of the syndicate of eight members set up to administer the company after the disaster which befell Roquemont{apos}s fleet in 1628.

The guerilla warfare being waged by the Iroquois was then at its worst. A band of Iroquois, returning from a murderous descent upon Tadoussac, stopped at the Île d{apos}Orléans to slaughter some 15 Frenchmen. Quebec was living in terror, and in the grand seneschal{apos}s circle anxiety was felt particularly about his brother-in-law, Louis Couillard de Lespinay, who was overdue from a hunting expedition. Lauson set out on 22 June 1661 with six companions to seek him, but himself fell into the hands of a troop of some 80 Iroquois. After a valiant and long struggle (during which the man for whom they had ventured out, having heard the sound of muskets, hurried vainly to Quebec to seek help), the seven Frenchmen were massacred. The next day the grand seneschal{apos}s body was found, covered with wounds and decapitated. His head had been carried off to the Iroquois country as a trophy. With his six companions, he was buried on St. John the Baptist{apos}s day in the church at Quebec.

“De la famille des Lauson,” éd. Louis-Hippolyte Lafontaine, dans Mémoires et documents relatifs à l{apos}histoire du Canada (SHM Mémoires, II, 1859), 65–96. JR (Thwaites). P.-G. Roy, Inv. concessions. T.-P. Bédard, “Le gouverneur Jean de Lauson et ses trois fils, étude historique (1651),” Nouvelles soirées canadiennes, I (1882), 55–61, 84–90, 115–22. Couillard Després, La première famille française au Canada, 266–73. Lanctot, Histoire du Canada, I. E. Lareau, Histoire du droit canadien (2v., Montréal, 1888–89), I. J.-E. Roy, Histoire de la seigneurie de Lauzon, I. P.-G. Roy, La ville de Québec, I.

During the administration of his father, an old man of about 70 years, who was incapable of waging war, Jean de Lauson{apos}s chief concern was to give the colony the benefit of his army experience. In February 1652, he made a military inspection visit to Trois-Rivières, and among other feats of arms, at the end of the following August, he took an active part in the defence of the same town, at the time of the Iroquois attack during which Governor Guillemot met his death. After his father{apos}s departure in 1656, he retired to his estate of Beaumarchais, near Beauport. He never resided in his Lauson seigneury.

Spencer Argyle Bedford is the author of Contra facts for the electors of Moosomin district: Mr. C. B. Slater{apos}s crowning falsehoods, mendacious statements and election bunkum!: Mr. Slater{apos}s single-handed game of bluff (Moosomin, [Sask., 1885]).

AM, CCA (Company Office corporation docs.), 0059/0260, GR6427, file 47A A. E. McKenzie Co. Ltd, Q-02-45-86; EC 0016 (Premier’s Office files), GR1665, 77–79; NR 0215 (Dept. of Natural Resources, Homestead files), GR2060, SW 34-2-7 w. Brandon Univ., S. J. McKee Arch. (Man.), RG 3, McS 2, 2.2, 2.2.2, file 1, tape 7. GRO, Reg. of births, Uckfield, 19 Feb. 1851. LAC, R194-40-3, files 60344, 63739; R233-34-0, Oxford North, Ont., dist.14, subdist.G: 50. Univ. of Man. Libraries, Dept. of Arch. and Special Coll. (Winnipeg), UA 15, box 30, 7 Oct. 1908. Brandon Sun, 10 July 1890. Moosomin Courier, 20 Nov. 1884; 19 Feb., 5 March, 16, 23 April, 7, 28 May, 6 Aug., 10, 17 Dec. 1885; 8 April, 10, 24 June, 15 July, 30 Sept. 1886. Nor{s-1-unknown}-West Farmer (Winnipeg), 20 Feb. 1906. Winnipeg Evening Tribune, 14 Jan. 1931. Winnipeg Free Press, 15 Dec. 1933. Can., Parl., Sessional papers, 1889–1906 (reports of the experimental farms, 1888–1905). Canadian men and women of the time (Morgan; 1898 and 1912). Directory, Man. and N.W.T., 1886–88. Directory, Winnipeg, 1882–83. M. A. C. Gazette (Winnipeg), November 1912. Man. Central Farmers{s-1-unknown} Instit., Annual report (Winnipeg), 1893: 63–65; 1895: 58; 1896: 108. Manitoba Agricultural Hall of Fame Inc. (Brandon, [1995?]). Univ. of Man., Convocation program, 1920–21; Faculty of Agriculture, 75th anniversary 1906–1981: and growing for tomorrow ([Winnipeg, 1981]).

Revisions based on: BAnQ-Q, CE301, S1, Notre-Dame de Québec (Québec) via Ancestry. Fichier Origine. Lucien Campeau. Monumenta Novæ Franciæ II (1616–34). Momentum Missionem Societatis Iesu v. XXXVII. (Rome and Quebec, 1979). Rene Jetté, Dictionnaire généalogique des familles du Québec, avec la collaboration du Programme de recherche en démographie historique de l{apos}Université de Montréal; préface de Hubert Charbonneau (Montreal, 1983). Gail Moreau-DesHarnais, “Exiles from Quebec found in the parish of St-Jacques de Dieppe during the Kirke occupation (1629–1932),” Michigan’s Habitant Heritage 24, no.2 (April 2003): 77–78.

Memorial Univ. of Nfld, Folklore and Language Arch. (St John’s), Tapes, 78-237 (Paul Mercer, interviews with Ken Hall, Mary-Ann Duggan, James Higgins, and Hugh O{apos}Neill, 1973–74). Evening Telegram (St John’s), 11 Aug. 1930. Encyclopedia of Nfld (Smallwood et al.). J. D. Higgins, “The Bard of Prescott Street” (lecture delivered to the Nfld Hist. Soc.; typescript, St John’s, 1970; copy in the Centre for Newfoundland Studies, Memorial Univ. of Nfld). Paul Mercer, “A bio-bibliography of Newfoundland songs in printed sources” (ma thesis, Memorial Univ. of Nfld, 1979), 73–81. M. P. Murphy, “The balladeers of Newfoundland,” Daily News (St John’s), 27 July, 18 Oct., 16 Nov. 1966; Pathways through yesterday, ed. G. S. Moore (St John’s, 1976), 148–65. Newfoundland songs and ballads in print, 1842–1974: a title and first-line index, comp. Paul Mercer (St John’s, 1979). Michael Taft, “The Bard of Prescott Street meets Tin Pan Alley: the vanity press sheet music publications of John Burke,” Newfoundland Studies (St John’s), 6 (1990): 56–73

Two recent collections of John Burke’s songs and ballads are available: The ballads of Johnny Burke: a short anthology, ed. Paul Mercer ([St John’s], 1974), and John White{apos}s collection of the songs of Johnny Burke, ed. W. J. Kirwin (St John’s, 1982).

Born most likely in the region of Calabria, Antonio Cordasco arrived in Canada in 1886, when the first contingents of seasonal Italian labourers appeared in the industrial landscape. His early association with railway construction, and no doubt his ambition, allowed him to move up the ranks of the Canadian Pacific Railway{apos}s work crews from labourer to foreman. It was probably as a foreman that he became active in recruiting labourers. In 1901, faced with a major labour conflict, the CPR turned to him for help, offering to pay him a dollar for each strike-breaker he delivered. He was able to meet the challenge by availing himself of contacts with labour-recruiting agencies in a number of northeastern American cities and supplied the CPR with about 2,000 men. As a result, that year he became the CPR{apos}s exclusive recruiter of Italian workers.

During the early 1900s, when the CPR undertook a major expansion of its rail system and developed natural-resource industries along its lines, it was Canada{apos}s leading employer of migrant labourers - most of them unskilled seasonal workers needed for the construction and the maintenance of rail lines. In a typical year several thousand Italian labourers were in its employ, along with several thousand belonging to a variety of other nationalities. The system of recruiting migrant labour had become known throughout North America as the padrone system. Though severely restrained in the United States by federal legislation starting in 1885, the system had been allowed to persist in Canada. Labour recruitment would become subject to strict government regulation only after 1905. During the brief period - in the late 19th and early 20th centuries - when the padrone system was most in vogue in Canada, Cordasco emerged as its leading entrepreneur, largely because of the privileged relations he had established with the CPR.

Besides satisfying the workers{s-1-unknown} need for jobs, Cordasco provided them with other services. By 1903 he had gone into banking. As a banchista (the term employed at the time for a private banker), he arranged for the transfer of earnings to families in Italy. The Corriere del Canada, a Montreal-based newspaper controlled by Cordasco early in the decade, served more as a tool for his recruiting than as a bona fide community paper. Cordasco, in fact, proved capable of launching particularly aggressive publicity campaigns in order to stave off competition from other Montreal padroni and employment agencies. In one case, on 27 Jan. 1904, he mounted a public event in which some 60 foremen and 2,000 workers marched through Montreal. At the height of the ceremony, his faithful assistants solemnly placed on his head a crown that was a replica of the one worn by the king of Italy, calling him {d-0}The King of Italian Labourers.{d-1}

In the spring of 1904 thousands of Italian labourers flocked to Montreal in response to advertisements by Cordasco and other padroni. When a late thaw delayed the beginning of the work season, the unemployed men were forced to rely on public charity. At the request of civic authorities, a federal royal commission was appointed to inquire into the immigration of Italian labourers to Montreal and the alleged fraudulent practices of employment agencies. Although several agents in the city testified, Cordasco was a prime target. The proceedings of the inquiry, headed by judge John Winchester, constitute probably the richest documentation on the workings of the padrone system. As a result of the investigation, Cordasco{apos}s reputation suffered significantly. He was drawn into a number of court battles over fees he had exacted and wages he had not paid. The inquiry also led to the termination of his relations with the CPR. Despite the collapse of his recruiting empire, he managed to pursue his activities as a banchista and he acted as a steamship agent. He had become a naturalized British subject in 1902. At his death in 1921, his private banking business was still operating; it was taken over by his son Thomas Antonio (Anthony). Another son, Charles M., had served as a lieutenant in the Royal Flying Corps during World War I and was a prominent foreign exchange broker in Montreal.

One of the most important sources of information on Antonio Cordasco{apos}s activities is Can., Royal commission to inquire into the immigration of Italian labourers to Montreal and the alleged fraudulent practices of employment agencies, Report of commissioner and evidence (Ottawa, 1905), which was published both separately and in Can., Parl., Sessional papers, 1905, no.36b. The French report has been republished as {d-0}Document: Rapport de la Commission royale sur l{apos}immigration des journaliers italiens et des procédés frauduleux des bureaux de placement,{d-1} introd. Bernard Dansereau, RCHTQ [Regroupement des Chercheurs-Chercheuses en Hist. des Travailleurs et Travailleuses du Québec], Bull. (Montréal), 22 (1996), no.1: 3-39.

BCM-G, RBMS, Notre-Dame de Montréal, 16 avril 1891; Saint-Jacques-le-Majeur (Montréal), 21 avril 1921 (mfm.). LAC, RG 31, C1, 1901, Montreal, Saint-Antoine Ward, sub-dist. A-3: 11. Directory, Montreal, 1906-21. R. F. Harney, {d-0}Montreal{apos}s king of Italian labour: a case of padronism,{d-1} Labour (Halifax), 4 (1979): 57-84. Gunther Peck, {d-0}Reinventing free labor: immigrant padrones and contract laborers in North America, 1885-1925,{d-1} Journal of American Hist. (Bloomington, Ind.), 83 (1996-97): 848-71. Bruno Ramirez, Les premiers Italiens de Montréal: l{apos}origine de la Petite Italie du Québec (Montréal, 1984). Paul Tana, Caffè Italia (video recording in French and in Italian with French subtitles, Montreal, 1985).

That spring, on 27 April, Borden was in Ottawa arguing cases and went to dinner at Sir Charles Tupper{apos}s home. It was the day that Sir Mackenzie Bowell resigned as Conservative prime minister and Tupper was about to succeed him. It was clear that there would be an election before the year was out. Tupper asked Borden to stand for Halifax with the veteran Catholic mp Thomas Edward Kenny. John Fitzwilliam Stairs, Halifax businessman and Protestant colleague of Kenny in the House of Commons, was stepping down and Tupper wanted Borden to replace him. Before Borden left the dinner party, he accepted.

These years were less idyllic for his parents, whose serious financial problems would plague them for the rest of their lives. John King was not a success as a lawyer. He lacked the aggressiveness to build up his practice, the conflicts and scandals of one of his uncles (a local newspaperman) negatively affected the family, and the German community in Berlin patronized German-speaking lawyers. His income was not enough to pay for the servants and keep up appearances, and the family was soon in debt. He became withdrawn and Isabel became frustrated and shrewish. A move back to Toronto in 1893, after Willie had started university, changed little. A lectureship at Osgoode Hall brought in some money but John King failed to get a professorship and his practice produced little income. Willie knew nothing of this situation as a child, but he was marked by the experience. He absorbed his parents{s-1-unknown} social values and came to be embarrassed by their shabby gentility; he learned as well to sense the moods of his parents and to avoid confrontation. More significantly, his mother gradually came to think of him as the person who might be able to give her the status and security her husband could never provide. It was a burden from which the young Mackenzie King would not be able to escape.

William Lyon Mackenzie King had a long political career. He was leader of the Liberal Party for 29 eventful years through the buoyant expansion of the 1920s, the depression of the 1930s, the shock of World War II, and then the post-war reconstruction, and for 21 of these years he was Canada{apos}s prime minister. His decisions during this time contributed significantly to the shaping of Canada and to its development as an influential middle power in world affairs. During his lifetime his achievements were sometimes obscured by a style notable for its compromises. After his death his political career was sometimes overshadowed by the revelation of his unsuspected personal idiosyncrasies.

As a young man King was a practising Presbyterian and, indeed, he would attend church regularly throughout his life. His correspondence and diary from his student years refer constantly to spiritual values and his personal dedication to Christian duty. If his religious views seemed sentimental and sometimes self-justifying, they were nonetheless influential. He might have been priggish but his faith also led to good works. In addition to his student activities, he participated in a men{apos}s reading club in a working class district in Toronto and he regularly visited patients at the Hospital for Sick Children. He even made a few attempts to reform prostitutes, although on these occasions his Christian motives were likely supplemented by the prurience of a repressed young man. More noteworthy was the influence on him of Arnold Toynbee{apos}s work on the Industrial Revolution, which led King to the conclusion that industrialism was the pre-eminent challenge to Christianity at the end of the 19th century. This theory attracted him to social reform but not to socialism. He saw no distinction between his religious faith and a liberal commitment to build a better society on earth, but his emphasis was on conversion, not coercion.

King{apos}s father, who had spent time in Berlin as a youth, met his future wife in Toronto when he was a university student there. Isabel Mackenzie, a daughter of William Lyon Mackenzie*, was born in the United States while he was in exile, and her early years were marked by poverty and insecurity. Matters did not greatly improve after the family returned to Toronto; Mackenzie lived as a gentleman but never earned enough money to sustain his lifestyle. For Isabel, marriage to John King, who went into law, held out some promise of financial security. King, however, decided to give up his prospects in Toronto and to return to Berlin in 1869 to practise law and it was there that Willie, as he was called, spent his childhood. Willie and his two sisters and a brother had happy memories of their early years. Woodside, the home the family rented from 1886 on the outskirts of Berlin, was an attractive brick house surrounded by a large garden. As a child Willie was healthy and active, with a self-assurance that sometimes got him into trouble and a ready smile, which often minimized his punishments. He was a good student, active in debates and sports, popular among his peers, and trusted by his elders. His family was close-knit and in later years King looked back with nostalgia to memories of family games and hymn singing with his mother at the piano.

King enrolled at the University of Toronto in 1891, taking the honours program in political science. A disciplined and well-organized student with the advantage of a good memory, he graduated with first-class honours, standing second in his class. He was not an academic grinder, however, and found time for sports, contributed to the Varsity, and spent many hours discussing the purpose of life and its moral obligations with other serious-minded students. He stood out among his classmates, was elected president of his class in his first year, and in 1895 was a leader of a student strike to protest the arbitrary dismissal of a popular professor, William Dale. He was still known as Willie to his family but at university he adopted W. L. Mackenzie King as his signature and was called Mackenzie by other students. Though the name suggests a more formal self-image, it also reflects King{apos}s closer identification with his grandfather, who even then he saw as an early champion of responsible government and political liberty. In later years a few close friends in England, including John Buchan*, called him Rex, but there would be none of this easy familiarity with his colleagues or acquaintances in Canada.

He joined the department at a crucial time in the development of industrial relations. In the early years of the 20th century the conflict between labour and capital seemed irrepressible. Trade unions offered some possibility of collective action by workers but employers could frustrate organizers and break strikes by forcing their way across picket lines through the use of injunctions, the police, or the militia. Violence seemed to be the only effective response. King saw the Labour Gazette as an important contribution to labour relations. It would publish tables of strikes and lockouts, summaries of court decisions, and regional accounts of working conditions, wage settlements, and costs of living. He knew the importance of earning a reputation for being non-partisan and with the help of his university friend Henry Albert Harper, whom he appointed assistant editor, the Gazette soon became a respected reference, though as early as 1901 it came under attack from the Canadian Manufacturers{s-1-unknown} Association.

King{apos}s success in conciliation led the government to call on him to troubleshoot a wide range of problems. He served on royal commissions dealing with industrial conflicts in British Columbia (1903), at Bell Telephone in Toronto (1907), and in the cotton industry in Quebec (1908), and with the problem of compensation to Japanese and Chinese residents arising out of riots in Vancouver (1907-8). He even undertook a quasi-diplomatic mission to London, England, to convey the concerns of American president Theodore Roosevelt and the Canadian government on the issue of Japanese immigration to North America. These were major responsibilities for a civil servant, but King still found it frustrating not to be in a position to make political decisions. Consequently, on 21 Sept. 1908, he resigned as deputy minister to devote his talents to active politics.

King{apos}s sense of Christian obligation was combined with a strong personal ambition. He nonetheless remained undecided about what profession to pursue. His father encouraged him to become a lawyer and after completing his ba at Toronto in 1895, he did take a one-year llb there. He was not interested in practising law, however. He talked of a possible career in the church or in politics, and between 1895 and 1897 he wrote for a number of Toronto newspapers, but mas at Toronto and Harvard and fellowships in political economy at the University of Chicago and Harvard seemed more likely to lead to an academic future. After a summer stint as a journalist, writing articles for the Toronto Globe on local sweatshops, he began work at Harvard on a doctoral thesis on labour conditions in the clothing industry. This scholastic pattern was interrupted by a telegram in June 1900 from William Mulock, Canada{apos}s postmaster general who was also responsible for the newly formed Department of Labour. King had already drawn Mulock{apos}s attention to the link between sweatshops and federal contracts for postbags and Mulock now offered him the editorship of the proposed Labour Gazette. King yielded to family pressure, to the attractions of financial security, and to what he saw as an opportunity for public service, and he accepted the job. He arrived in Ottawa in late July. The following month Mulock also offered him the position of deputy minister of labour, which he formally took up on 15 September.

He was now 33 years of age. His career in the civil service had been remarkably successful but he had also found time to lead an active social life. In Ottawa he was seen by many, including Governor General Lord Grey*, as a man to watch. He was a regular guest at the dinners and balls of Ottawa{apos}s elite. He enjoyed the company of women and expected to get married eventually - as a graduate student in Chicago he had proposed to a nurse - but his caution, his obligations to his family, and his reluctance to accept any fetters on his ambition probably account for his avoidance of the commitments of married life. He paid off his father{apos}s debts and regularly responded to his mother{apos}s appeals for money for clothes or housekeeping expenses. In the Gatineau hills of Quebec, north of Ottawa, he and Bert Harper had long walks, were enchanted by the area around Lac Kingsmere, read uplifting literature, and shared their spiritual concerns. Their friendship ended in December 1901 when Harper died trying to save a young woman from drowning. King wrote a touching memoir, The secret of heroism, but he never again gave himself over to a close friendship. Before Harper{apos}s death, he had acquired property at Kingsmere and built a small cottage as a refuge from the pressures of Ottawa. More and more, however, his career would overshadow his private life.

In the federal election of October 1908 King presented himself as the Liberal candidate in the riding of Waterloo North, which included Berlin. The riding had been held by a Conservative but King won it by a small margin. On 2 June 1909, soon after the first session of parliament had ended, Laurier appointed him minister of labour. King proceeded cautiously, aware that his senior colleagues saw him as an upstart and were dubious about his progressive views. On the labour front the new minister{apos}s intervention in 1910 in the Grand Trunk Railway strike, which led to the blacklisting of workers and the loss of pensions, hurt the government. At the same time, he introduced the Combines Investigation Act of 1910, which established machinery to investigate alleged restraints of trade or price manipulation and authorized fines for those operating contrary to the public interest. He also spoke of the need for a bill for an eight-hour day but his legislative activity was interrupted by the reciprocity agreement and the federal election of September 1911. The government was defeated and, more serious for King, he lost his seat because reciprocity proved to be unpopular among the industrialists and factory workers of Berlin.

King{apos}s ambitions did not stop with the Gazette. He was soon writing speeches for his minister that associated Mulock and the Liberal government of Sir Wilfrid Laurier* with a policy of fair wages for its employees; he also took the initiative to offer his services to employers and workers in the settlement of strikes and lockouts. King quickly showed a remarkable talent for conciliation. Exceptionally patient, he regularly won the confidence of leaders on both sides by listening carefully to their concerns, and he was remarkably sensitive to their unspoken hopes and fears. On many occasions he was able to devise compromises which both sides could accept. One dispute with important consequences was the coal strike in Lethbridge, Alta, in 1906 [see Frank Henry Sherman], which threatened to leave westerners vulnerable to the rigours of a prairie winter. Sent west by his new minister, Rodolphe Lemieux*, King negotiated a settlement and then went on to draft legislation to establish formal procedures to defuse similar strikes. The Industrial Disputes Investigation Act of 1907 postponed any strikes in a public utility or a mine until a conciliation board had resolved the conflict or, failing that, had published a report on the facts and suggested terms for a settlement. The act did not prohibit a strike but its original feature was to enforce a cooling-off period and to expose the disputants to the pressure of public opinion to encourage a resolution.

King{apos}s defeat was a setback but he remained committed to a political career. To earn his living he gave speeches, wrote political articles and pamphlets, and ran the Liberal Party{apos}s new central information office in Ottawa, a job that included editing the Canadian Liberal Monthly. Then, in 1914, he received an unexpected offer. John Davison Rockefeller Jr had found himself harshly criticized for a bitter miners{s-1-unknown} strike in Colorado; he knew nothing about it but was blamed because the mine belonged to his family. His response was to ask King to direct a study for the Rockefeller Foundation on industrial relations. When the two men met, they were mutually impressed. King saw a man who was naive about the obligations of employers but who seemed receptive and sincerely committed to reform, while Rockefeller saw a mentor who could guide him through this industrial quagmire. King agreed to conduct the study using the Colorado strike as a test case, and he was given permission to remain politically active in Canada. He first went to Colorado to meet the management and workers and then involved the young industrialist in negotiating a settlement, which resolved the conflicts over wages and working conditions and arranged for the election of workers to grievance committees. This negotiated plan was open to the objection that it provided for a {d-0}company union{d-1} instead of an independent union that could be less easily intimidated by management. King saw the arrangement as a necessary first step, however, and he received some credit for insisting on inclusion of the miners{s-1-unknown} right to join a union and the right of organizers to campaign for members.

Published in 1918, Industry and humanity: a study in the principles underlying industrial reconstruction (Toronto) was King{apos}s report to the Rockefeller Foundation. The book had little impact because its analysis was laboured and abstract; his arguments drew on Toynbee, James Mavor at the University of Toronto, and other theorists. His thesis, however, was a serious attempt to put industrial relations in a broader social context. A reformer but not a radical, King rejected the ideas of an inevitable class struggle. Labour, management, and capital were partners, not rivals, and conflict happened when there were grievances that the other partners did not fully appreciate. Industrial peace could be restored only if the partners recognized they had common interests and if there were structures wherein interests could be explained and understood. King broadened the debate further by arguing that the community was a fourth partner and its interests must also be considered. Industry and humanity never adequately clarified how the community{apos}s voice could be expressed in negotiations but King{apos}s theory could be used to justify government intervention if the community{apos}s interests were ignored. Even if the book attracted minimal attention, it is important for the light it throws on his subsequent success as a politician. In politics, more interest groups were involved and the issues were often more complex, but for King the basic assumption of common good was the same. Leadership did not mean imposing policies or adopting ones because they were popular. It meant a cautious and incremental approach: discussions in cabinet and caucus, which could be heated and protracted, with the leader ensuring that all points of view were presented and that a consensus would be reached.

King{apos}s private life was also disrupted during these years. He had been an eligible bachelor for many years but his emotions became more and more centred on his family. The family, however, was narrowing. One of his sisters died in 1915, followed by his father the next year. His mother became more demanding, but King idealized her; he thought of her as the only person who appreciated him and believed in his political future. By this time she was an invalid; King installed her in his Ottawa apartment in late 1916 and nursed her through a series of crises. She passed away the day after his defeat in York North, before he could get back to Ottawa. With her death King felt painfully alone. Not surprisingly, he often thought of her and felt her presence. His interest in a world beyond the material world, which had its roots in his Christian faith, was heightened by this loneliness.

Politics soon filled the void. Laurier died in February 1919, shortly after the war and before the Liberal Party had recovered from its split over conscription and crushing electoral defeat. In August, for the first time in Canada, a federal party opted for a leadership convention instead of allowing the caucus to select a new leader. William Stevens Fielding, Laurier{apos}s long-serving finance minister, would have been the obvious successor in spite of his 70 years, but he had supported the Unionists and many Liberals, especially French Canadian Liberals, would not forgive this disloyalty. King had the advantage of being young and energetic as well as a recognized expert on the disturbing social and industrial questions of the day. It was a close contest but King{apos}s loyalty to Laurier gave him the advantage. On 7 August he had the support of most of the Quebec bloc and enough backing from delegates from other regions to be chosen leader on the third ballot.

Politicians would also have to come to terms with an unstable world beyond Canada{apos}s borders. For most Canadians this adjustment meant redefining the country{apos}s relations with Britain. Canada had entered the Great War as a colony but its experience during the war had many convinced that a subservient colonial status was no longer acceptable. At the same time few wanted total independence. The options ranged from a more centralized British empire, in which Canada would have an influential role, to a loosely associated commonwealth of nations in which the emphasis would be on Canadian autonomy. The implications for Canada were far from clear but change was in the air.

The Liberal Party that had chosen King as its leader was itself deeply divided. King would have to win back the Liberals who had supported the Union government and conscription without alienating the French Canadians. At the same time he would have to make the party more hospitable to the new labour and farm groups, which meant reducing tariffs and giving more social assistance to the less privileged while retaining the support of the industrialists. The Liberal convention of 1919 did propose a forward-looking platform that favoured lower tariffs without opting for free trade and approved of unions, better working conditions, and public insurance for the sick, the aged, and the unemployed. This platform was more an aspiration than a commitment, however, one to be adopted {d-0}in so far as the special circumstances of the country will permit.{d-1} King too was cautious; in his acceptance speech he was careful to describe the platform as a {d-0}chart{d-1} and not a contract. The new leader needed to construct a majority party in a divided country but he clearly intended to move slowly.

King wanted to get into the House of Commons as soon as possible. He had a choice of ridings but in most cases he would have had to run against a farmers{s-1-unknown} party candidate. To avoid any confrontation he picked Prince, in Prince Edward Island, where he was acclaimed in October 1919. Once in the house he was careful to give W. S. Fielding a major role in the debates, a move that both reassured the conscriptionist Liberals and gave King time to familiarize himself with the current issues. He took the opportunity in 1920 to tour Ontario and the west, making a point of expressing sympathy for the farmers{s-1-unknown} problems and meeting with Progressive leaders to suggest some collaboration against the common Conservative enemy in the next election. The Progressives, who were riding a political crest, showed little interest. At the provincial level organized farmers won elections in Ontario (1919) and Alberta (1921), and were so strong in Manitoba and Saskatchewan that the Liberals there had to distance themselves from their federal counterparts in an effort to survive. It was revealing that after King was nominated in his old riding of York North for the next election, Ralph W. E. Burnaby, president of the United Farmers of Ontario, was nominated to run against him. It would not be easy to convince farmers that the Liberal Party had changed its ways.

The election of December 1921 - the first in which all women would vote - was a graphic illustration of how fragmented the country had become. Meighen was burdened with the unpopularity of the Union government and his role in guiding the conscription legislation through the house. His defence of the tariff was largely ignored in Quebec, where conscription was still vividly remembered, and attracted little support in the west or the Maritimes. Only 50 Conservatives were elected, 37 of them from Ontario. The Progressives were surprisingly successful, taking 38 of the 43 prairie seats and 24 in Ontario; among their number was Agnes Campbell Macphail*, Canada{apos}s first female mp. The Liberals achieved victory with 116 seats, a bare majority; enjoying representation from every province except Alberta, they could claim to be the only national party. With 65 of their seats from Quebec, however, the Liberals{s-1-unknown} dependence on French Canadian voters was a major concern. King had won the election and thus became prime minister (and ex officio secretary of state for external affairs); in due course, on 3 June 1922, he would be sworn to the British Privy Council, an honorific appointment he valued most because he felt it vindicated his grandfather{apos}s {d-0}great purpose & aim.{d-1}

King was still on trial. He would need to broaden the basis of Liberal support without alienating his own supporters and he would have little margin for error. His first decision was crucial. King knew that the Liberal Party had to retain the support of French Canada. He could read French but spoke it haltingly; the larger problem was more cultural than linguistic. To ensure that his government would not ignore the French Canadian point of view, he resolved that his closest colleague would come from Quebec. His choice was Ernest Lapointe, a backbencher and lawyer who had earned a reputation as a moderate Liberal and a champion of French Canadian rights. King called him to Ottawa immediately after the election, explained the role he would be expected to play, and offered him the justice portfolio to confirm his position. The most prominent figure among the French Canadians elected from Quebec was Sir Lomer Gouin, a former premier of the province, but King was suspicious of his liberalism because of his protectionist leanings and close ties with Montreal{apos}s business community. King eventually yielded to the political pressure to give justice to Gouin - Lapointe got marine and fisheries - but he made it clear that Lapointe was his chief lieutenant. This status was publicly corroborated in 1924 when Gouin resigned and Lapointe became minister of justice. King and Lapointe would work closely together for almost 20 years, until Lapointe{apos}s death in 1941.

The next issue for King was the cabinet representation from the west. This was important because he saw the cabinet as the central institution of government. Policy was expected to emerge from debates there, with ministers defending the interests of their region and King playing the role of mediator. In 1921 his task, as he understood it, was to consolidate the anti-Conservative forces, a seemingly simple undertaking. The Liberal and Progressive parties were both opposed to the high-tariff policies of the Conservatives and they both favoured greater autonomy in Canada{apos}s relations with Britain. If Progressive leaders entered cabinet, the farmers{s-1-unknown} point of view would be effectively presented and the emerging consensus would more adequately reflect a balanced national perspective. The difficulty was that the Liberal and Progressive parties both had deep internal divisions, which left their leaders with little room to manoeuvre. T. A. Crerar, the Progressive leader and mp for Marquette, Man., was tempted by the offer of a cabinet post; when he asked King for policy commitments on tariffs and railways, however, he got sympathy and understanding but no specific promises. The more radical Progressives made it clear that if he did enter the government he would not have their support. King eventually had to concede defeat and turn to elected Liberals to form his cabinet.

For the next few years the Progressives were never far from King{apos}s mind. The farmers{s-1-unknown} concerns continued to be his preoccupation and in cabinet he represented, as best he could, the interests of those who were absent. The Crowsnest Pass agreement, which gave preferential freight rates on grain moving eastward from the prairies on the railways and some commodities westward, had been suspended in 1919 in response to wartime inflation but it was restored by the government in 1922. The government also committed itself to creating a railway system out of the bankrupt lines it had acquired during the war [see William Costello Kennedy] and agreed to complete the Hudson Bay Railway to placate the farmers who wanted a shorter link to salt water. For most farmers, however, the real test would be tariff changes and here the government{apos}s record was ambivalent. Although King argued in cabinet for some dramatic gesture, he had little support and Fielding, once again minister of finance, included few tariff reductions in his budgets of March 1922 and May 1923. Some Progressives split with their party to support the first budget but it was a sign of the farmers{s-1-unknown} frustrations that all of the Progressives voted with the Conservatives against the second.

King{apos}s effort to unite the anti-Conservative forces fared better in international affairs. As prime minister, Meighen had continued Borden{apos}s policy of preserving the diplomatic unity of the empire, though at the Imperial Conference of 1921 he had opposed the renewal of Britain{apos}s alliance with Japan, recognizing that the United States had interests in the Pacific and wanting to maintain good Canadian-American relations. King too understood that imperial affairs abroad could have profound consequences for Canada. Within months the difficulties of maintaining imperial diplomatic unity were again exposed, dramatically, by the Çanak crisis. In September 1922 the Turkish government, in repudiation of a treaty it had signed with the allied powers, threatened to reoccupy the neutral zone of Çanak on the Dardanelles strait (Çanakkale Bo?azi). Britain was determined to block this action, by force if necessary. With no prior consultation it appealed to the prime ministers of the dominions to provide military support and then released a statement to the press. King, who had not received the official message, first heard of the crisis from a journalist. His response, after meeting with the cabinet, was to refuse any participation without the consent of parliament. This assertion of autonomy was in sharp contrast to Meighen{apos}s statement, in a speech in Toronto on 22 September, that Canada should have replied to Britain {d-0}Ready, aye ready; we stand by you.{d-1} King was careful to keep Crerar informed during the crisis and the Progressives openly supported his position. The Turks fortunately backed down, but the implications of Çanak could not be ignored. There would be no common imperial foreign policy if each dominion decided its own course of action.

The Imperial Conference of 1923 could not disregard this challenge. The British government, with support from Australia and New Zealand, hoped that the conference would approve a broad statement on foreign policy. King was convinced that any attempt to make binding decisions for the dominions would be an encroachment on their autonomy. The conference, as he envisaged it, was an important way to exchange information and foster understanding but it had no authority; decisions would have to be made by the parliaments. The conference{apos}s final report, which affirmed King{apos}s belief, marked a decisive step in the evolution of the British Commonwealth of Nations (a term that had received imperial statutory recognition in the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921). The affirmation was an admission that there would be no centralized empire. It left undecided how the unity of the Commonwealth might be achieved or if, indeed, the Commonwealth would survive. King had no misgivings. He believed that self-governing members of the Commonwealth shared profound social and political values and so would agree on major issues if there was no coercion. His analogy was the family: the dominions, like children, would grow up but they would not be tempted to slam doors or leave home if their autonomy was acknowledged. For him the recognition of the self-governing powers of the dominions would strengthen rather than weaken Commonwealth unity.

Among the advisers who accompanied King to the 1923 conference was Oscar Douglas Skelton, a political scientist at Queen{apos}s University in Kingston and a biographer of Laurier. He attracted King{apos}s attention by his lucid comments on Canadian autonomy and, after the conference, was persuaded by King to become a departmental counsellor in 1924 and then under-secretary of state for external affairs in 1925. The appointments confirmed King{apos}s sound judgement. Skelton had a phenomenal capacity for work and a talent for organizing material and producing memoranda or speeches of remarkable brevity and clarity. He soon became King{apos}s most trusted official. Skelton did not always agree with King - he was, for example, more sceptical about the benefits to Canada of membership in the Commonwealth - but he expressed his opinions frankly and then loyally accepted King{apos}s decisions.

External affairs, however, and King{apos}s crucial role at the Imperial Conference attracted little attention in Canada. Fortunately the political situation at home was promising. It was becoming easier to make concessions to the farmers because economic conditions were improving and because the protectionist wing of the Liberal Party had been weakened by the resignations of Fielding and Gouin for health reasons. At the same time the divisions within the Progressive Party were deepening. In 1924 the government was able to reduce some tariffs and still promise the first surplus since before the war. A few high-tariff Liberals voted against the budget but, more significantly, the moderate Progressives voted for it. King was now confident that the voters would reward his efforts and he dissolved parliament the next year.

King was wrong. He had pushed his party as far as he had dared in the direction of lower tariffs and had defended Canadian autonomy within the empire, but electoral results in October 1925 constituted a major setback. The Liberals did increase their representation in the west by 18 seats; however, this gain was offset by the loss of 10 seats in Ontario and 19 in the Maritimes, where King{apos}s courting of the Progressives was resented. The Liberals ended up with 99 seats, of which 59 were from Quebec. The Conservatives, on the other hand, gained seats in every region for a total of 116, just short of a majority. The Progressives fell dramatically to 24, although they could find some consolation in the fact that they would hold the balance of power in the new parliament.

King{apos}s plans were upset by a scandal in the Department of Customs and Excise. There had been collusion between smugglers and members of the department to run goods into Canada from the United States. King had known for some time that there were problems and had moved the minister, Jacques Bureau*, to the Senate in September 1925 and appointed a successor, Georges-Henri Boivin, to reorganize the department. The Conservatives, however, were not impressed and saw the corruption there as an opportunity to defeat the Liberals, knowing that the Progressives, who had identified their party with honest government, would find it difficult to support the administration. King avoided any debate on the scandal as long as possible but in June 1926 the house had to deal with the report of a parliamentary committee on the scandal. When the Conservatives moved a vote of censure, King arranged a series of delaying amendments but it was clear that the Progressives were divided and that the government would likely be defeated on the final vote.

King{apos}s response was to avoid the vote by asking the governor general to dissolve the house and force another election. Byng refused on the grounds that Arthur Meighen should be given a chance to form a government. Meighen was prepared to try. On 27 June King speculated in his diary on his opponent{apos}s prospects. {d-0}Meighen too will fall heir to some difficult situations - Western provinces. . . . If he seeks to carry on I believe he will not go far. Our chances of winning out in a general election are good. I feel I am right, and so am happy may God guide me in every step.{d-1} The following day King resigned. Meighen succeeded in forming a government and in passing a vote of censure but his hopes of ending the session quickly were frustrated by King{apos}s refusal to cooperate. King arranged for a series of resolutions criticizing the new government. Enough Progressives, embarrassed at having to support Meighen, backed the Liberals in a vote of no-confidence on 2 July that narrowly defeated the new government. Byng then accepted Meighen{apos}s advice and dissolved parliament.

The election of September 1926 was decisive for King{apos}s career. Support for the Liberals had declined under his leadership and now the party had the additional handicap of fighting under the cloud of the customs scandal. King, however, fought an aggressive campaign, nationally and in Prince Albert. He argued that the constitution had been violated when Byng had refused him a dissolution but granted one to Meighen. In constitutional terms, Byng was right and King was wrong. Politically, however, King was the winner. He had focused attention on Byng{apos}s decision even though many Liberals doubted whether the electorate would be interested. The outcome seemed to confirm his judgement. The constitutional issue distracted voters from the customs scandal, with King posing as the champion of Canadian autonomy against an interfering governor general. The decisive factor was the cumulative effect of King{apos}s sustained efforts over five years to regain the confidence of the dissident farmers. The moderate Progressives had concluded that they preferred a Liberal to a Conservative government and in a number of ridings had agreed to nominate a Liberal-Progressive candidate. The Liberals won 116 seats and, with the support of 10 Liberal-Progressives, would have a clear majority. King himself retained his seat for Prince Albert.

The next few years were good ones to be in office. The Canadian economy expanded as post-war recovery in Europe and prosperity in the United States increased the market for Canadian cereals, minerals, and wood products and as domestic demand grew for Canadian automobiles and other manufactured goods. The federal government could cut taxes and still reduce its debt and have a modest surplus. The provincial governments wanted financial concessions but these claims were nothing new and King{apos}s skill as a negotiator would stand him in good stead. Late in the decade there were signs of economic trouble, including weakening newsprint and grain markets and excessive stock-market speculation, but optimism proved hardy. King continued to believe that his government was performing well and that the voters would show their gratitude.

The Imperial Conference of 1926 came only two weeks after King had returned to office in September. This conference was important because it attempted to define the nature of the British Commonwealth of Nations. King did not initiate the discussions. He was prepared to live with an undefined relationship with Britain, confident that he could defend Canadian autonomy when necessary. James Barry Munnik Hertzog, the prime minister of South Africa, was more impatient: he threatened to leave the Commonwealth if the conference refused to draft a declaration that would affirm the independent status of the dominions. He had the support of Ireland but not the prime ministers of Australia or New Zealand. King played an important role as a mediator. He favoured the middle ground of a declaration of autonomy but not of independence. After two weeks of negotiations the conference agreed on a definition of Britain and the dominions: {d-0}They are autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.{d-1}

This definition did not end the debate. Hertzog interpreted {d-0}freely associated{d-1} to mean that South Africa could leave the Commonwealth if it chose to; the British did not agree. The definition was significant, however. Equal status meant that Britain could no longer assume that its foreign policy should be the policy of the Commonwealth. It also meant that Canada, like the other dominions, could develop a diplomatic service and a foreign policy of its own. The Imperial Conference of 1926 and the Statute of Westminster of 1931, which would give this new status legal definition, confirmed that the British Commonwealth of Nations would be a voluntary association, with its strength to be determined by the decisions of its respective members. Canada{apos}s diplomatic service quickly took shape. Charles Vincent Massey*, the first representative to be appointed abroad with full diplomatic status, was named envoy to the United States in November 1926. This assignment was followed by the appointment of Philippe Roy to France in 1928 and Herbert Meredith Marler to Tokyo in 1929.

Back in Canada, King had to deal with continuing regional dissatisfaction. The Maritimes were aggrieved because they were not sharing in the prosperity of the rest of the country and were convinced that federal tariffs and railway freight rates were to blame. The prairie premiers complained that federal reluctance to relinquish control of their natural resources was discriminatory. The premiers of Ontario and Quebec objected to the limitations placed on their authority to develop hydroelectric power by federal jurisdiction over navigable streams. At the Dominion-Provincial Conference of 1927 King used his conciliatory skills and held out concessions to each region if they raised no objections to the offers made to the other regions. And so the Maritimes got higher subsidies and lower freight rates, the prairie provinces got control of their natural resources without losing a compensatory subsidy, and Ontario and Quebec got the right to distribute water power developed on navigable streams. For the moment King{apos}s approach had appeased the regional demands.

This relative political harmony was linked to the prosperity of the mid 1920s but it can also be seen as the end of a long era of nation building. The three-pronged National Policy of Canada{apos}s first prime minister, Sir John A. Macdonald, had achieved its objectives. Most of the arable land offered to homesteaders on the prairies was now occupied and for the first time in half a century the federal policy of assistance to agricultural immigrants was questioned. Railway policy was also being modified. The government-owned Canadian National Railways, under the aggressive management of Sir Henry Worth Thornton*, had spent federal funds to develop an integrated railway system. The success of this investment seemed confirmed by 1928 when the operating revenues of the system exceeded the interest payments on the railways{s-1-unknown} bonds. The third prong, the tariffs, was a major subject of political debate - farmers still deemed them too high - but they were no longer a dynamic factor in the Canadian economy.

King had no new policy to substitute for the old National Policy. He did reintroduce old-age pensions after the 1926 election but he did not follow up with other measures of social security for individuals in an increasingly urban and industrial Canada. Instead of spending the increased revenue which prosperity provided, the government used its annual surplus to reduce its debt and in 1927-28 it lowered the sales and income taxes. King saw no reason to question this frugality. By reducing taxes and so reducing the costs of production, his government, he was sure, deserved credit for Canada{apos}s economic growth and he expected to be rewarded at the polls.

The Republican victory south of the border in 1928 introduced a possible complication because President Herbert Clark Hoover was committed to raising the American tariffs on farm products. King used what influence he could to change Hoover{apos}s mind. He agreed to help American agencies enforce Prohibition by making it more difficult to smuggle Canadian liquor into the United States. He also tried to take advantage of Hoover{apos}s interest in a St Lawrence River seaway by suggesting that Canada was ready to negotiate an agreement. Hoover would not change his mind. The King government responded in the federal budget of 1930 by promising countervailing rates if the American government did increase its tariffs.

By then the good times were over, though not all Canadians realized this at the time. In Canada the onset of the world-wide depression of the 1930s differed by region and by industry. The Maritimes had already entered into severe economic decline. The overproduction of pulp and paper had meant lay-offs in northern communities as early as 1927. The price of western wheat dropped in 1928. In other regions, even in 1930, there might be some concern for the future but the factories were still operating. Richard Bedford Bennett, the leader of the opposition in parliament since 1927, argued that there was a crisis and demanded that the government do something. King was not impressed. It is revealing that there is no reference in his diary to the famous stock-market crash in October 1929; it would take two more years to push the government financially to the wall. King{apos}s own investments were in government bonds and gilt-edged securities and it was easy for him in 1929 to assume that only speculators had been hurt. He also found the talk of unemployment exaggerated - in 1930 the Dominion Bureau of Statistics was only starting to register a drop - and surely next spring would bring higher prices and more jobs. It was, King believed, a temporary recession and just patience was needed.

The prime minister spent the early part of 1930 mulling over the timing of the next election and related budgetary options. What scant attention he paid to the appointment in February of Canada{apos}s first female senator, Cairine Reay Wilson [Mackay*], was of a partisan nature. On the economic front his optimism led to an uncharacteristic slip in a debate on unemployment on 3 April 1930. The Conservatives argued that the crisis was so severe that Ottawa should offer financial assistance to the provincial governments, which were responsible for unemployment relief. King pointed out that no premier had asked for help and that, in Ontario, George Howard Ferguson had even denied his province had an unemployment problem. The federal Tories, according to King, were playing partisan politics, asking him to subsidize provincial Tory governments for no good reason, and he {d-0}would not give them a five-cent piece.{d-1} He did not often deliver such an unguarded statement and the opposition would make much of {d-0}the five-cent speech{d-1} in the election called for July.

King was still confident that voters would appreciate his frugal financial policy. In the campaign he did not ignore the economic downturn but he offered caution and sound government as the appropriate response. On the other hand, Bennett, who used radio with telling effect, talked of an economic crisis and promised dramatic measures, including the use of tariffs {d-0}to blast a way into the markets that have been closed.{d-1} On the prairies, where wheat prices had dropped sharply, and in Quebec, where dairy farmers wanted protection against New Zealand butter, Bennett{apos}s appeal swung enough votes to give the Conservatives a majority. Returned in Prince Albert, King would spend the next five years in opposition.

His lifestyle was now well established. At 55, he was a confirmed bachelor with few interests outside of politics. Laurier House, the Ottawa residence he had inherited from Lady Laurier and occupied since 1923, was a comfortable, yellow-brick abode maintained by a staff that included a valet, a cook, a chauffeur, and a gardener. Peter Charles Larkin, a loyal Liberal businessman, had collected private funds to renovate it and pay for its upkeep. An elevator was installed. It took King and sometimes his invited guests to the third-floor library, where a portrait of his mother was prominently displayed. King occasionally had people for dinner but these were usually formal occasions. He was not a gregarious man and none of his colleagues and friends would visit him without an invitation. His closest friend was Mary Joan Patteson, wife of Godfroy Barkworth Patteson, a local banker with limited interests. Joan was a discreet and sympathetic woman who listened to King with patience and understanding and who rarely intruded her own problems into the discussions. King regularly talked to her over the telephone or dropped in for a visit to recount the difficulties or good fortunes of the day. The friendship was never a secret and it was a tribute to Joan{apos}s discretion and transparent dignity that no scandalous rumours about the nature of the relationship were ever taken seriously.

King{apos}s summer residence at Kingsmere was even more of a refuge than Laurier House. He expanded the property in the 1920s and 1930s and spent his summer months there to escape the sultry heat and social pressures of Ottawa. He rented a cottage on his property to the Pattesons and sometimes entertained foreign guests for lunch, but if he saw his colleagues or secretaries there it was only because he had asked them to make the trip to conduct business. King{apos}s interest in erecting artificial ruins at Kingsmere - still one of its most fascinating features - emerged in 1934, when his grandfather{apos}s house in Toronto was threatened with demolition. The Kingsmere collection actually began the following year, with a stone window frame from the Ottawa residence of the late Simon-Napoléon Parent.

If King seemed settled in his ways, he was still a lonely man and politics was not enough to fill his life completely. He had no close family ties by this time; his surviving sibling, Janet (Jennie) Lindsey Lay, lived in Barrie, Ont., but they were not intimate. As leader of the Liberal Party he kept himself at arm{apos}s length from his colleagues, who might try to presume on his friendship and might have to be jettisoned if the political winds changed. He did continue to correspond with acquaintances outside Ottawa and to talk to Joan Patteson, but this was not enough for a man who constantly needed the reassurance that he was loved. Pat, his Irish terrier, was important because Pat showed affection without making too many demands on his time. King, however, also found emotional support in more unusual ways. In 1916, after visiting the graves of his sister Isabel Christina Grace and father in Toronto, he had noted in his diary, {d-0}To me the spiritual presence of both Bell & himself was far more real than their graves which my eyes were witnessing.{d-1} His faith that his family (especially his mother) and others were somehow still watching over him became more important as time passed; he regularly saw coincidences as a sign of their presence and interpreted his dreams as evidence of their affection and support. This faith in itself did not make King unique but the need for signs of approval from the spirit world gradually led him to seek confirmation in more eccentric ways. He was intrigued by forecasts of the future based on tea leaves and his horoscope, consulted a fortune-teller, and during his years in opposition, when he had more leisure time, tried to make contact with the spirit world through other means, including the Ouija board and sessions with a medium. King occasionally expressed scepticism about the messages he received - he justified his interest by calling it psychic research - but he was still fascinated by the apparent contacts with the departed. He did not seek their political advice; his political decisions were based as always on his own analysis of situations. The content of the messages was less important than the evidence that the spirits were present and watching over him. This reassurance gave him the strength to deal with the stresses and strains and with the isolation of politics. In a paradoxical way, his eccentric links with this other world made it more possible for him to cope with the normal pressures of a political career.

The normal pressures were intensified after the 1930 election by allegations of corruption. What became known as the Beauharnois Scandal had its roots in a scheme to divert water from the St Lawrence into the Beauharnois Canal near Montreal to develop hydroelectric power. In March 1929 the King government had authorized a diversion after confirming that it would not interfere with navigability on the river. The Beauharnois Light, Heat and Power Company, however, saw this approval as only the beginning. It looked forward to a seaway with most of the St Lawrence diverted into its canal. The potential profits were enormous. The corporation, apparently concluding that it was necessary to keep the Liberals in power, funnelled more than half a million dollars into their campaign fund in 1930. This contribution proved awkward for the party when it became public knowledge after the Liberal defeat. Even more embarrassing for King was the disclosure that he had gone on a holiday to Bermuda with Wilfrid Laurier McDougald, the chairman of the Beauharnois board, and that McDougald had paid King{apos}s hotel bill and submitted it to Beauharnois on his expense account. Between June 1931 and April 1932 committees of the commons and the Senate investigated the many related allegations.

King managed to have his name cleared. McDougald explained that he had submitted his bill by mistake; nobody seemed concerned that King{apos}s acceptance of McDougald{apos}s generosity might be interpreted as a conflict of interest. The donation to the Liberal campaign was more difficult to deal with. King could argue that his government had protected the public interest when it allowed the diversion of water and had made no further commitments to the corporation, but he knew that many Canadians would remain unconvinced. Though the scandal did no long-term damage - nor did it lead to any major reforms in the financing of the party - it put the Liberals, King conceded in parliament on 30 July 1931, {d-0}in the valley of humiliation.{d-1} His solution was to isolate himself from party finances. Liberal bagmen would continue to collect and distribute campaign funds. As leader, King would not be told who the contributors were, so his political decisions would not be affected by their identity. This solution left him with a clear conscience but it still left the party largely dependent on undisclosed donations from private corporations.

Bennett, who initially acted as his own minister of finance, had to face declining revenues as well as ever stronger demands for federal aid. He raised taxes slightly but revenues declined with the economic slowdown. Further tariff increases would have little effect because the existing structure already excluded most foreign competition. Bennett{apos}s only choice seemed to be the reduction of expenditures, especially relief costs. He tried to keep aid to the provinces to a minimum by hard bargaining; in the unemployment and farm relief acts of 1931-32 he even refused to disclose the amount of federal funds available in order to negotiate more effectively. At the same time he showed his frustration with the depression by stressing law and order, denouncing strikes and demonstrations, and insisting that his administration was doing everything possible.

After King had dealt with the Beauharnois problems, he proved to be an effective opposition leader. The depression of the 1930s was of unprecedented severity in Canada. The dependence on exports of raw materials and farm products meant that Canadian providers were especially vulnerable in a world where nations raised tariffs to protect their producers. Western farmers were doubly unfortunate because not only did prices reach historic lows, but in many regions drought, rust, and grasshoppers also meant crop failures. In cities, factories closed because consumers could no longer buy. Desperate Canadians had to turn to governments when they had no other place to turn, first for food and shelter and then for any means to restore their hope. The depression brought regions and classes into conflict and encouraged demagogues to propose radical and unorthodox policies. King seemed an unlikely leader for this troubled time. He had earned a reputation for being cautious, a man of compromises and half measures. In a world where the battle seemed to be between left and right, with communism and fascism at the extremes, King looked indecisive, even colourless. Yet within five years he would be back in office, at the head of the largest majority enjoyed by any party up to that time. He kept the Liberals together while the Conservative Party disintegrated and new political parties emerged to compete for votes. It was no mean achievement. As he had explained in 1929 to a correspondent, {d-0}The supreme effort of my leadership of the party has been to keep its aims and purposes so broad that it might be possible to unite at times of crisis under one banner those parties, which for one reason or another, have come to be separated from the Liberal party.{d-1} By 1923 most Progressives would have rejoined it. In 1931-32, however, unity seemed a distant goal: the party was torn between high and low tariff factions, and on the front benches of opposition King had few strong supporters at his side.

Like Bennett, King was slow to recognize that politics would be transformed by the depression. He had begun his years in opposition convinced that his administration had not deserved defeat. The economy had flourished, he believed, because of his government{apos}s financial caution. The recession, if it was a recession, could be blamed on the speculative excesses of businessmen and on the weather cycle. The worst mistake Canada - and the rest of the world - could make was to react by raising tariffs and restricting international trade. Bennett, from King{apos}s perspective, had won election by exaggerating the threats to the Canadian economy and by rashly promising that he could somehow use the tariff to counteract international and climatic constraints. Voters, King believed, would soon learn that they had been deceived and would come to appreciate the Liberal years of frugal administration and freer trade.

King thus saw little need to reconsider or revise his political assumptions. The Conservative government was clearly in political trouble and King was content to draw attention to its difficulties. He repeatedly reminded the house of Bennett{apos}s election promises. He denounced the federal deficits as irresponsible without suggesting how budgets could be balanced. He did not object to aid to the provinces - the need was too apparent - but he did denounce the {d-0}blank cheques{d-1} parliament was asked to approve for relief, and delayed the passage of these bills over the objections of caucus members who feared constituents might conclude that the Liberals had no sympathy for those in distress. And each year, after the throne speech and the budget, he introduced amendments that blamed the depression on Bennett{apos}s high-tariff policy.

King{apos}s response reflected his fundamental commitment to finding a consensus among {d-0}liberally-minded{d-1} Canadians. He did not expect to convert the Tories, whom he believed were wedded to big business, or the socialists, who wanted a monopoly of power for the workers. Criticism from his own caucus members, however, he took seriously. He might regret their impatience but he would not ignore them. His role was to keep the party united. By 1933 he had reluctantly concluded that traditional Liberal preconceptions were not enough. If the party was to survive, it would have to face the challenge of the depression more directly. Here his talents as a conciliator would be crucial. Although lower tariffs would be part of a new Liberal platform, the most controversial issue would be inflation. King and his more conservative followers still equated inflation with theft, but, for indebted producers especially, inflation seemed the only way to meet their financial obligations. King{apos}s compromise was a government-controlled {d-0}central bank{d-1} that could modify the money supply on the basis of {d-0}public need.{d-1} He was proposing an institution, not a policy. He succeeded because the moderates saw the bank as an agency that could protect sound money and the radicals saw it as an agency that could introduce a policy of controlled inflation. The significance of this compromise should not be minimized. It recognized that the state should play a positive role in determining fiscal policy. It certainly implied more intervention than did the Bank of Canada legislated by Bennett in 1934, which was to be an agency of the chartered banks.

This new platform was quite satisfactory to King. It placed the party in the centre of the political spectrum, more open than the Conservatives to regulating business without resorting to the socialist panacea of government ownership. It was also important to King that the platform had been approved in 1933 by both the conservatives and the radicals in the Liberal caucus. Some, among them Vincent Massey, wanted to take Liberalism in different directions, and not necessarily with King at the helm. With party unity assured, King eagerly awaited the next election. Late in the 1934 session he denounced Bennett for holding on to office when he no longer had popular support and promised that if he insisted on meeting the house for a fifth session, the Liberals would obstruct and force an election. In January 1935 the political situation changed when Bennett made five radio speeches known as the New Deal broadcasts. {d-0}The old order is gone,{d-1} he told a startled audience, and he announced that he was for radical reform through government intervention. In the next session, he promised, he would introduce appropriate legislation. There was more rhetoric than substance to these broadcasts and Bennett, in contrast to King{apos}s approach to leadership, had not consulted his colleagues. Confident that it had the jurisdictional authority, the government nonetheless passed the Employment and Social Insurance Act early in 1935. Bennett certainly won the attention of Canadians who, after five years of depression, wanted to believe that a political leader could end the crisis.

The changed strategy worked. The Liberals remained united, at least in public, but the Conservatives became deeply divided. By the end of the session the government{apos}s claim to be the party of reform was discredited and in July 1935 some dissident Conservatives led by Henry Herbert Stevens* had even formed a separate Reconstruction Party. In the federal election of October the Liberals were returned with 173 seats, the largest majority on record, with members from every province, while the Conservatives were reduced to a rump of 40 members. The popular vote, however, told a different story. The Liberals received only 45 per cent, almost unchanged from the previous election. The dramatic change was the drop for the Conservatives and the support of 20 per cent for the new parties: the CCF and its socialism, Reconstruction and its emphasis on regulating business, and Social Credit and its panacea of inflation. If the choice was between {d-0}King or chaos,{d-1} as the Liberal slogan put it, a good many Canadian voters were prepared to risk chaos.

The next four years would be a difficult time for the country. For its new prime minister it would be a stern test of his political skills. His experience and confidence showed in his cabinet. King again took on external affairs. Ernest Lapointe, still his closest colleague, returned to justice. The financially conservative Charles Avery Dunning* was persuaded to become minister of finance, and from among the new mps King appointed Clarence Decatur Howe*, who had business experience, to the newly created portfolio of transport. The cabinet was recognized as an able group, and King would give his ministers a good deal of autonomy in the administration of their departments, but King, more than ever, was in charge. He set the government{apos}s agenda and chaired the cabinet discussions. After some slow improvement in economic conditions, 1937 saw another downturn, especially on the prairies, where the summer was the driest on record. Regional grievances fed on the frustrations of deferred recovery, and the government again became a popular target. The divisions within the Liberal Party, which reflected regional rivalries, were compounded by a series of international crises that threatened to involve Canada in a European war.

For King, Canada{apos}s economic problems had higher priority than international relations, but he had no simple solution to the complex challenges of the depression. Although he had shown a willingness to consider extending the role of government when party unity seemed to require it, he was still reluctant to take new initiatives. His caution meant that his government{apos}s honeymoon was brief. King{apos}s only specific election promise had been to negotiate a trade treaty with the United States. Bennett had already begun the discussions but political interests on both sides of the border had delayed matters. In November 1935, within two weeks of taking office, King was in Washington to make the best deal possible. He wisely enlisted the support of Cordell Hull, the American secretary of state and an evangelist for expanding international trade. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, however, was the key. King and Roosevelt found it easy to discuss their political concerns. Roosevelt had a talent for putting visiting heads of state at ease and King could talk knowledgeably about United States politics and politicians. In the trade details King was well prepared and he returned to Canada with a treaty, which, modest in scope, gave Canadian farm products some welcome access to the American market.

The new government, as one of its first problems, had to decide on its international obligations as a member of the League of Nations. King had supported membership - it enhanced Canada{apos}s status as a nation and provided evidence that Canada favoured the peaceful settlement of international disputes - but he had shown little interest in the debates at League headquarters in Geneva. Canada{apos}s foreign policy had been mainly confined to relations with Britain and the United States, and King expected to deal with these countries directly. Shortly after the election, however, his government was faced with a request from the League to impose economic sanctions on Italy because it had invaded Ethiopia. The cabinet agreed to apply sanctions but the discussion made it clear to King that if the League went on to propose military intervention, the cabinet and the country would be deeply divided. The request for military sanctions never came because Britain and France backed away from any confrontation with Italy{apos}s Fascist leader, Benito Mussolini. King nevertheless learned an important lesson: membership in the League might have serious political consequences for Canada. He took steps to minimize the risk. Though he affirmed, in the commons and later in Geneva, his support for the League as a necessary institution for the resolution of disputes, he bluntly rejected the idea of the League as a military alliance against aggressors. Canada, he told the League{apos}s Assembly in 1936, did not support {d-0}automatic commitments to the use of force.{d-1} Editorials in much of the Canadian press applauded. King{apos}s political faith in non-intervention, and his fear of domestic division, can be seen too in his decision to distance Canada from the Spanish Civil War in 1937 and his refusal to modify Canadian immigration regulations to admit European Jewish refugees.

He was also encouraged by a conference with the provincial premiers, in December 1935 shortly after the election. He was confident that a change in governing style would make a difference, that his emphasis on consultation would smooth relations. The premiers faced declining revenues and higher welfare costs and needed federal grants and loans to reduce their deficits. The national government had deficits of its own and hoped that provincial demands could be limited through the elimination of extravagances or duplications of welfare payments. At the conference King pleased the premiers by increasing the federal grants until the spring of 1936; his talk of a federal commission to supervise welfare payments and the possibility of constitutional amendments affecting provincial jurisdiction over social policy did not attract much attention. He had already referred Bennett{apos}s Employment and Social Insurance Act to the courts, which would strike it down as exceeding federal jurisdiction. King{apos}s objective at this stage was a federal system in which each level of government would be able to pay for its programs out of its own tax sources. He was no more precise because he had no concrete measures in mind and assumed that any new distribution of powers would emerge from discussions with the provinces.

King could claim to be standing up for civil rights in Alberta by defending the banks and the newspapers but he was less forthright in Quebec. In 1937 Maurice Le Noblet Duplessis*, the Union Nationale premier, passed the Act Respecting Communistic Propaganda (the so-called Padlock Law) to intimidate labour leaders and {d-0}agitators{d-1} by threatening to lock up their offices for any alleged communist activities. King{apos}s government, which had already repealed the section of the Criminal Code prohibiting unlawful associations, considered disallowing this act but Ernest Lapointe believed such a move would be politically disastrous for the Liberal Party in Quebec. King and his English-Canadian colleagues did not question Lapointe{apos}s political judgement and so, as King recorded in his diary in July 1938, {d-0}we were prepared to accept what really should not, in the name of liberalism, be tolerated for one moment.{d-1}

King, however, soon found that confrontation was unavoidable because, without more federal aid, some provinces faced bankruptcy. William Aberhart, Alberta{apos}s Social Credit premier since August 1935, was a populist with little concern for convention. In 1936 he could not refinance an issue of maturing provincial bonds without a federal guarantee of the interest payments. When C. A. Dunning suggested some federal supervision of provincial finances in return, Aberhart refused and extended the term for the bonds while halving the interest rates. Then, in 1937, under pressure from his backbenchers, he passed legislation to compel chartered banks to lend money to Albertans. When the newspapers criticized this measure Aberhart retaliated with a bill that obliged them to publish press releases giving the government{apos}s side of the story. King{apos}s response was to disallow the bank legislation and to refer the newspaper bill to the Supreme Court of Canada, which nullified it as unconstitutional.

Aberhart and Duplessis might show little respect for civil rights but the rift between the federal and provincial governments had a more basic cause. The provinces, dependent as they were on revenues from direct taxes, could not provide even essential social services without subsidies or loans from Ottawa. Thomas Dufferin Pattullo*, the Liberal premier of British Columbia, whose concept of liberalism embraced the provision of work and wages, committed his government to construction projects for which it had no funds. When King refused to provide money for a bridge across the Fraser River, Pattullo was furious. Ontario{apos}s Liberal premier, Mitchell Frederick Hepburn*, was critical for quite different reasons. He objected to federal grants to western provinces to finance relief measures because most of the money came originally from Ontario taxpayers. In 1937 he announced that he was no longer a {d-0}Mackenzie King Liberal.{d-1} Other premiers might be less outspoken but all of them were facing demands for social services they could not afford. If there was to be effective coordination, the onus would have to be on Ottawa. Privately King resented Hepburn and Duplessis{apos}s narrow regionalism, but it was, he reasoned in his diary in December 1937, {d-0}just as well to have these two incipient dictators out in the open. The public will soon discover who is protecting their interests and freedom. . . . We will win in a {s-0}united Canada{s-1-unknown} cry.{d-1}

The prime minister did agree to some extension of the economic role of government when he felt the political pressures could not be safely ignored. He had objected to Bennett{apos}s Canadian Wheat Board in 1935 but had accepted its operation while it disposed of the wheat it had bought up to support prices. By 1938, however, the board had sold its holdings and King proposed a return to the open market. Western farmers were incensed. They wanted a board that would give them a guaranteed minimum price, with the federal government covering any losses, and they organized a public campaign that could not be ignored. King and agriculture minister James Garfield Gardiner* reluctantly agreed to extend the board{apos}s life and to offer a minimum price that would protect the farmers from further declines.

There was one other significant increase in federal expenditures that King agreed to with reluctance. He and Dunning had initially planned a balanced budget for 1938, sure that voters would reward a financially responsible government, but some colleagues, to King{apos}s surprise, were not convinced. They wanted to create jobs to stimulate the economy. Their argument was reinforced by the theory of influential British economist John Maynard Keynes that governments could increase employment by spending when private investment was low. King, however, was swayed more by political than by economic arguments. To placate his colleagues he agreed to budget for a deficit in 1938 and again in 1939. This acceptance of contra-cyclical financing was hesitant but for King it was a major step towards using the budget more to craft fiscal policy than to balance accounts.

Lowering trade barriers still seemed a surer way of stimulating the economy. King saw a great opportunity when Cordell Hull asked him to use the Imperial Conference of 1937 as an opportunity to encourage British prime minister Arthur Neville Chamberlain to negotiate a trade agreement with the United States. King responded with enthusiasm because he firmly believed that such an agreement would strengthen the economies of Canada{apos}s closest friends and improve their relations. But he also knew that Canada would have to be involved in any negotiations because Britain could not reduce its tariffs on such American goods as apples and lumber without asking Canada to forgo some of the preference that the 1932 Ottawa agreements had guaranteed. When talks began King insisted on compensation for Canadian concessions. He drove a hard bargain. In 1938, after prolonged triangular negotiations, a treaty was signed that had some tangible benefits for each region of Canada. Both Hull and Chamberlain learned to be more sceptical about King{apos}s altruism.

By then the economic situation, frustrating as it might be, was overshadowed by the threat of a European war. As a liberal, King still favoured resolving international disputes by negotiation and he shared the widespread hostility to the {d-0}merchants of death{d-1} who profited from the arms trade. He had tried to limit expenditures on the armed forces, but by 1937 he had decided that his government could no longer ignore its obligation to defend Canada {d-0}in a mad world.{d-1} Though the British Royal Navy and the United States{s-1-unknown} Monroe Doctrine might mean that the dominion was in no immediate danger of attack, Canadian autonomy required it to take some responsibility for its own defence. Most Canadians would recognize the duty to protect their coasts, but what of the argument that Britain was Canada{apos}s first line of defence? Many Canadians, including King, accepted it; to many French Canadians it was a reminder of the coercive behaviour of the majority in the Great War. King decided to almost double the defence budget in 1937. Some Liberals were strongly opposed but they yielded to his insistence that the additional money would be spent on the navy and air force for coastal defence and not on an expeditionary force for Europe. He was not being dishonest; he was merely keeping his options open. Coastal defence was needed but he knew that augmentation of the navy and the air force would be useful as well in a European war. In 1939, with war even more likely, he again overrode opposition in the party to double the defence estimates. Canada was still unprepared for war in September of that year but King had shown more forethought than most of his followers.

By this time he had reluctantly concluded that he could not isolate Canada from a European crisis. The League of Nations had never recovered from Ethiopia and so membership no longer threatened to involve Canada in war. Membership in the Commonwealth, however, carried risks that were not so easily dealt with. King saw the danger: the country - and the Liberal Party - might again be divided. His first response was to persuade the British government to avoid entangling alliances. Germany might provoke a war, but if Britain was not drawn in Canada would not be involved. At the Imperial Conference of 1937, therefore, King encouraged the British to resist confrontations and to resolve disputes with Germany through peaceful negotiations. Though appeasement would later be denounced as yielding to an aggressor, at the time it was seen as a legitimate response to legitimate grievances. King himself visited Adolf Hitler after the conference. He warned the Führer that Canada would be at Britain{apos}s side if Britain was drawn into war, but King was optimistic. Hitler, he reported to Chamberlain, seemed to be a reasonable man.

In 1938, however, King was forced to realize that Britain would not be able to isolate itself from events. The crucial event for him was the Munich Agreement of late September, when Chamberlain helped to negotiate the cession of Czechoslovakian territory to Germany. Had negotiations failed and war ensued, King and most of his government would have been at Britain{apos}s side, though some members would have resigned. Much relieved when the agreement ended the crisis, he nevertheless recognized that war was likely and that Britain would be engaged. He was sure that most Canadians would want to be, and should be, involved. The political problem, as he saw it, was to have this decision accepted without serious divisions. In the commons on 20 March 1939, King explained his position. His government had made no commitments. If war came, parliament would decide what to do, based on Canadian interests. Here was reassurance for those who suspected the malign influence of London, but King did not stop there. {d-0}If there were a prospect of an aggressor launching an attack on Britain, with bombers raining death on London, I have no doubt what the decision of the Canadian people and parliament would be. We would regard it as an act of aggression, menacing freedom in all parts of the British Commonwealth.{d-1} Ten days later he returned to the subject of involvement, to reiterate the understanding that his government would never introduce conscription for overseas service. French Canada acquiesced. His position convinced many other Canadians too, but it did make it difficult to plan for war. In 1936, for example, Britain had proposed a joint venture to manufacture Bren machine-guns in Canada. King procrastinated because, if Britain went to war and Canada was committed to supplying the guns, it would be considered a belligerent. King eventually yielded to British pressure, however, and the contracts were signed in 1938. A British proposal to train pilots in Canada was even more controversial. King{apos}s rejection of the project in 1936 and 1938, and then his insistence on Canadian control, meant that no decision was reached before Germany invaded Poland and war was declared. There could be no effective joint planning with its Commonwealth allies if Canada made no commitments in advance.

King{apos}s strategy also meant that Canada played no part in shaping British foreign policy. King was shocked in March 1939 when Chamberlain reversed Munich and promised to defend Poland{apos}s borders, but he expressed no objections. Again there was no consultation when Britain declared war on 3 September, though this time at least King and his government were united in their support. Canada{apos}s own declaration of war was delayed because King had to assemble parliament to keep his promise that it would decide. When the Liberal-dominated commons met in emergency session, starting on the 7th, the decision that had seemed so controversial a year before was accepted on the 9th almost unanimously. King repeated the pledge he had made in parliament in March not to introduce conscription for overseas service. His strategy had disadvantages, but it did help to bring Canada into the war without irreparable division.

Now in his mid 60s, King was conscious of his age. The pressures of the depression and the international situation had exhausted him. Politics had become an endless effort to avoid disasters; in his diary King talked of retiring after winning one more election. Then came the war, which provided an overriding sense of purpose. Leadership now meant more than staying in power. For the next five years King would face political decisions that were more demanding and in many ways more important, but there was no further talk of retirement. He might be exhausted or frustrated at times, but he never questioned the importance of what he was doing. And King was still a decisive political opportunist. In 1940, when Hepburn and Conservative leader George Alexander Drew* combined in the Ontario legislature to condemn Ottawa{apos}s war effort, he seized the occasion to call an election before any spring offensive in Europe and so renewed the Liberals{s-1-unknown} federal majority for another five years.

The Canada led by King would play a significant role in the war. Convoy duty by the Royal Canadian Navy had begun immediately, in September 1939, and in December the 1st Canadian Division of the army went overseas. Isolated after the fall of France in June 1940, Britain would depend on the industrial and military might of North America for its survival. In its darkest days, Canada was a major source of troops and supplies. The United States would provide a lend-lease arrangement for materials in 1941 and then become an active ally, but Canada, in proportion to its size, made a larger contribution. Industrial production expanded rapidly and the government{apos}s generous financial arrangements made it possible for Britain to purchase Canadian food and munitions. The effort was remarkable by any standards.

King{apos}s role should not be exaggerated. The depression meant that Canada had land, resources, and workers that were underutilized and available for an initial restructuring of its economy. Canada also had the advantage of being close to Europe but far enough away not to risk invasion. With its close cultural and economic ties to Britain, it could have been a valuable ally under a number of leaders. King{apos}s political talents and experience nonetheless gave him an influence that, directly or indirectly, would shape the wartime decisions of his government. There was nothing dramatic about his leadership. He produced no Churchillian phrases to rally Canadians and none of Roosevelt{apos}s fireside chats to involve them in the issues of the day. Initially, through its focus on coastal defence, Canada was committed only to a qualified participation in the war. Canada still felt remote from Europe in geographic terms and it still harboured deep regional and cultural divisions. King{apos}s political sensitivity, made acute by decades of experience, and his skills as a conciliator were well suited to this wartime Canada.

As minister of external affairs, King had direct responsibility for maintaining the delicate balance between Canadian autonomy and commitment as Britain{apos}s ally. After war began, for example, Canada was a logical place to train aircrew; it was safe, had space for airfields and a tradition of flying, and could draw on the industrial and technical resources of North America. But how was a Commonwealth training plan to be organized and financed? King again insisted that any training be conducted under Canadian control, and here the British government was obliged to give way, though the standards and overall policy were set by the Royal Air Force. The Canadian government eventually took over most of the costs because Britain was short of dollars. The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, under an agreement of 17 Dec. 1939 that initially involved Canada, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, was an unquestioned success. Most of the Commonwealth{apos}s aircrew learned their skills here, making the scheme one of Canada{apos}s distinctive contributions to the war.

Canada{apos}s relations with the United States were more anomalous, especially because the United States was not at war until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. King{apos}s personal relations with Roosevelt helped to circumvent some of the diplomatic barriers imposed by neutrality. In early September 1939, for instance, Canada was allowed to purchase American airplanes because King had reassured Roosevelt, in a telephone conversation, that Canada was not technically at war until parliament had approved an official declaration. After the fall of France in 1940 an invitation to King from Roosevelt led to the Ogdensburg Agreement for a joint board to study continental defence. The Hyde Park Agreement in April 1941 was initiated by a telephone call from King. He explained that Canada was facing a financial crisis because it was supplying Britain on credit and so had no cash to pay for the American imports needed by Canadian manufacturers. Roosevelt agreed to ease the crisis by including, in the lend-lease agreement, exports to Canada that could be identified as components of Canada{apos}s munitions production.

King{apos}s personal contacts with Churchill and Roosevelt were nonetheless of some importance. The British and Americans were inclined to make decisions and to expect their smaller allies to accept them. Much of the planning for the production and distribution of war supplies was done by joint Anglo-American boards. The Canadian government regularly asked to be represented on boards that allocated supplies produced by Canada. Requests for representation on the Combined Food Board, to name one, were ignored. King eventually appealed directly to both Churchill and Roosevelt, and Canada was finally given a place. For other bodies, however, his appeals were not effective.

His wartime leadership in domestic affairs is less easily assessed because, although he might question his ministers{s-1-unknown} decisions, he rarely reversed them. Much therefore depended on his relations with his cabinet. In the late 1930s he had known that some of his ministers were weak or thinking of retirement, but he had hesitated to take action until the war provided the needed incentive to strengthen his government. He lured James Layton Ralston, a prominent Nova Scotia Liberal, back into politics, first as minister of finance (to replace Dunning) and then as minister of national defence, where his presence and his concern for enlisted men, dating back to the Great War, were reassuring to Canadian servicemen. King{apos}s choice for Ralston{apos}s successor in finance was James Lorimer Ilsley*, who could be a stubborn colleague but whose integrity and determination to control expenditures shaped Canada{apos}s wartime finances. Moved from transport in 1940, C. D. Howe was the central figure in munitions and supply, where his contacts with Canadian businessmen and his aggressive reliance on tax incentives and public investment stimulated a dramatic expansion of production. And when Ernest Lapointe died in 1941, King persuaded Louis-Stephen St-Laurent, an eminent Quebec City lawyer, to become minister of justice and his new Quebec lieutenant. St-Laurent had no political experience but he did have sound judgement and a gentlemanly respect for his colleagues, even when he disagreed with them. He quickly emerged as the most influential minister in the government and King{apos}s closest associate. These and the other members of the cabinet grew accustomed, under King{apos}s leadership, to discuss issues openly and to take decisions collegially. As a wartime administration they earned a reputation for competence and efficiency.

King{apos}s authority would be most seriously tested by the issue of conscription. He was determined that the split it had caused in 1917, in his party and in the country, would never happen again. From the beginning of World War II he had promised that only voluntary recruits would be sent overseas. The other party leaders had supported this policy in the election campaign of March 1940 but the fall of France a few months later posed a threat to Britain{apos}s survival. Leading Conservatives now demanded conscription, arguing with some effect that it would be fairer and more efficient than voluntary enlistment. Few French Canadians, however, were impressed by this reasoning. King resolved the controversy, for the moment, by passing the National Resources Mobilization Act, which imposed conscription only for the defence of Canadian territory. This act placated those who favoured conscription without alienating those who objected to compulsory service overseas. King did increase the size of Canada{apos}s overseas contingent but only after his military advisers assured him that voluntary recruitment would provide the necessary strength.

The next crisis came in 1942. Allied defeats in Europe and in the Pacific, including the grievous loss of two Canadian battalions in the fall of Hong Kong, had convinced many more Canadians that a full commitment to the war required conscription for overseas service. Predictably most French Canadians believed it would be a betrayal of King{apos}s promise. He found a face-saving compromise. In January he announced a national referendum on releasing the government from its pledge. The outcome of the plebiscite, held on 27 April, was disturbing. Strong support in English Canada meant that a majority of Canadians voted yes but in Quebec over 70 per cent were opposed. On conscription Canada was a country of two distinct cultures. Nevertheless, King moved quickly to repeal, through Bill 80, the section of the NRMA that restricted conscription to home defence. The resulting policy, King explained in the commons on 10 June, {d-0}may be described as not necessarily conscription but conscription if necessary.{d-1} The bill passed third reading in July.

The referendum had a sobering effect on responsible politicians, and conscription received little attention until heavy Canadian casualties were sustained after the invasion of Normandy, France, in 1944. Defence minister J. L. Ralston then decided that only conscription could provide the needed reinforcements. King did not believe conscription was necessary to win the war and desperately tried to find a compromise. When Ralston remained obdurate, King replaced him abruptly in November with Andrew George Latta McNaughton*, a retired general who King hoped would be able to attract sufficient volunteers. Only when McNaughton admitted failure a few weeks later did King, with the support of Louis St-Laurent, decide to send overseas some of the men conscripted for home defence. An order in council signed on 23 November authorized the transfer of 16,000 NRMA men, but only 2,463 would actually be posted to the 1st Canadian Army. The deliberations within cabinet over the switch to conscription had been extremely hard on King, particularly the real possibility of ministerial resignations on the 21st. That night he wrote in his diary: {d-0}I mentioned to St. Laurent . . . how very difficult it was for me all alone at Laurier House with no one to talk to and by myself to face over too long a period the kind of situation I am faced with today. He was very helpful.{d-1}

King{apos}s response was an accelerated shift to the left. In a reversal of his court reference of 1935, in 1940 the government, with provincial approval, had introduced unemployment insurance, a move strenuously opposed by Ralston on grounds of cost in wartime. In 1945 the government{apos}s financial advisers, converts to Keynesian policies, favoured increased public expenditures to create jobs and recommended family allowances and other social measures to boost consumer demand. King had misgivings about an expanded role - he still felt uneasy about government deficits - but he was sure these measures were consistent with his concern for the less fortunate. There were partisan motives too, although the self-righteous King would never have admitted it. The political pressure on the Liberal Party to compete with the CCF for votes could not be ignored. The prime minister might worry about an interventionist government encroaching on individual liberties but a Liberal government was clearly a lesser evil than a coercive socialist one. King introduced family allowances and for the election of June 1945 he campaigned on a broad program of social security. His government was handicapped by the legacy of conscription, which for different reasons had been unpopular in many parts of the country. The social program, however, was enough to redress the electoral balance and produce a narrow Liberal victory. Defeated in Prince Albert, King was returned in a by-election in Glengarry, Ont., in August.

King did not adapt easily to the post-war world. He had attended the founding conference of the United Nations at San Francisco in April-June 1945 but played only a minor role. He realistically conceded that the major powers would dominate the UN although he did argue for a {d-0}functional principle{d-1} that would give such middle powers as Canada an influence based on their contributions to the settlement of disputes. Later that year he had to face the implications of a divided world more directly when Igor Sergeievich Gouzenko, a cipher clerk in the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, revealed Soviet spying in Canada. King was too realistic to believe that Canada could isolate itself from the Cold War, but he continued to be ill at ease with the demands made on Canada for the defence of North America and western Europe. He was also dubious about the international commitments favoured by Canadian diplomats; foreign entanglements would limit Canadian autonomy. Even closer relations with the United States left King concerned at the risk of falling into a new imperial orbit. Feeling overwhelmed with external affairs, in September 1946 he transferred the portfolio to Louis St-Laurent.

The burden of politics affected King{apos}s health. Tired out, he told St-Laurent in May 1948 that he could not face another campaign. He resigned as party leader in August and as prime minister on 15 November, to be succeeded by St-Laurent. King had planned to write his memoirs but he found it exhausting to recall the stresses of his political career. His papers were still being organized when he died at Kingsmere on 22 July 1950; he was buried in the family plot at Mount Pleasant Cemetery in Toronto.

The Canada of that year bore little resemblance to the Canada of 1919, when King had started out as Liberal leader. It had become prosperous and united, proud of its domestic stability and leadership in international affairs. King{apos}s political direction had facilitated Canada{apos}s development by avoiding or minimizing confrontations and by providing political steadiness in tumultuous times. This was no mean achievement.

W. L. Mackenzie King was essentially a party leader. He operated through cabinet and caucus, relying on his political judgement and his skills as a conciliator to shape policy. He provided national leadership by creating a Liberal Party that reflected the diverse regional, economic, and ethnic interests of the country. His modus operandi meant choosing colleagues who would represent and defend these interests while accepting collegial compromises. If some groups or regions were not adequately represented within the party, it was up to King to ensure that their interests were not overlooked. The respect for consensus required patience and produced policies that were cautious and incremental. King{apos}s form of leadership also tended to ignore grievances which had no effective political podiums - he paid little attention to the plight of aboriginals or the rights of women because in his day these groups posed no threat to the party. More positively, if King{apos}s approach meant that Liberal policies might not be popular, they were at least likely to be acceptable in all parts of the country. King was not a dynamic figure but he did have the qualities needed for this form of leadership. His liberalism, his political sensitivity, his skills as a conciliator, and his driving ambition for office had kept the party and country united during three decades of dramatic challenges. It was a credit to his leadership that, even after his retirement, his party, led by former colleagues, continued in office for almost nine more years.

King{apos}s official biography has been published as R. MacG. Dawson and H. B. Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King: a political biography (3v., Toronto, 1958-76). Dawson wrote the first volume, 1874-1923, and Neatby wrote volumes two and three, 1924-1932, The lonely heights (Toronto, 1963) and 1932-1939, The prism of unity (Toronto and Buffalo, N.Y., 1976). J. L. Granatstein{apos}s Canada{apos}s war: the politics of the Mackenzie King government, 1939-1945 (Toronto, 1975) furnishes a narrative for the war years. Michael Bliss, Right honourable men: the descent of Canadian politics from Macdonald to Mulroney (Toronto, 1994), offers a more recent assessment of King as a political leader. Other publications deal with specific aspects of his life. Charlotte Gray, Mrs. King: the life and times of Isabel Mackenzie King (Toronto, 1997), is a perceptive examination of his mother and their relationship. C. P. Stacey, A very double life: the private world of Mackenzie King (Toronto, 1976), gives a detailed but tendentious account of King{apos}s relations with women. His career as an industrial consultant is analysed in Paul Craven, {d-0}An impartial umpire{d-1}: industrial relations and the Canadian state, 1900-1911 (Toronto, 1980), and in F. A. McGregor, The fall & rise of Mackenzie King: 1911-1919 (Toronto, 1962). C. P. Stacey, Arms, men and governments: the war policies of Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottawa, 1970), covers King{apos}s wartime administration.

The penitentiary records list Big Bear as 5´ 5 1/4{d-1} tall; photographs reveal him to be stocky, with a strong, craggy face. John George Donkin in his book Trooper and redskin . . . described him as “a little shrivelled-up piece of humanity . . . his cunning face seamed and wrinkled like crumpled parchment.” Yet Cameron, when referring to Big Bear, corroborated Dewdney’s evaluation of his independent personality and wrote: “Big Bear had great natural gifts. . . . Had [he] been a white man and educated, he would have made a great lawyer or a great statesman. . . . [He was] perious, outspoken, fearless.” He was indeed a great statesman, but not in the white tradition.

Sara{apos}s resignation reflected the common practice of the period that women relinquish a salaried position on their marriage. Her husband, John Campbell McLagan, was a printer who had assisted in establishing the Victoria Daily Times earlier the same year. In 1888 McLagan began the Vancouver Daily World with capital borrowed by his wife from prominent industrialist James Dunsmuir*. The couple moved to Vancouver. How much Sara was involved with the running of the paper during her husband{apos}s lifetime is not clear. She was no doubt influential in persuading him to retain her brother Samuel to design new premises for the business in 1892. She occasionally {d-0}sat on the wire{d-1} for the paper, especially on important occasions such as elections. Her level of commitment changed with her husband{apos}s illness and his death in April 1901. Sara McLagan assumed control, functioning as publisher, managing editor, editorial writer, and sometime reporter. The introduction of a woman{apos}s page as a regular feature coincided with her assumption of ownership. These Saturday pages provided lively and well written commentaries on health, childcare, nutrition, women{apos}s clubs, local politics, and other matters. Her determination to oversee directly the continued success of the largest daily paper west of Winnipeg sometimes provoked opposition from staff who resented her interference. At one point, she became involved in a court battle with the local of the International Typographical Union to affirm her right as publisher to proof-read the paper. Despite this turmoil, the paper flourished under her direction and she sold it to a group headed by Vancouver businessman Louis Denison Taylor* for $65,000 in 1905. She continued from time to time to write copy and she edited, by invitation, special women{apos}s issues of Vancouver papers. She maintained her membership in the Canadian Women{apos}s Press Club, which she had helped to found with other women journalists covering the Louisiana Purchase exposition in 1904, and was a founding member of the British Columbia Institute of Journalists.

Although Sara spent much of her life in the public eye, the private sphere also compelled her attention, as the mother of four children and stepmother to her husband{apos}s son from his first marriage. In 1908 she had returned to her parental home, Hazelbrae, in the Fraser valley to assist her recently widowed mother, oversee the management of the family farm, and support her brother John Charles in his brickworks at Clayburn. His initial missteps substantially depleted her finances. Never one to accept setbacks passively, she took advantage of wartime shortages of manpower and returned to telegraphy in 1916 while living for a short time with a daughter in California. The war exacted a heavy toll on her, with the death overseas of her only son, Patrick Douglas Maclure, in 1917 and a son-in-law on Armistice Day. Following World War I she arranged through a journalist friend, Julia Wilmotte Henshaw [Henderson*], to be appointed to the British Red Cross to assist the wounded and sick in France. Afterwards, she returned to Vancouver, where she remained until her death in 1924.

{d-0}The reliance placed upon what Government can accomplish is pathetic,{d-1} Flavelle warned in December 1922 at a dinner welcoming Sir Henry Worth Thornton, who took the CNR position (and came bitterly to regret it). By the 1920s Flavelle had lost virtually all his faith in the capacity of governments. Almost all political interference with the marketplace, including such social-welfare schemes as unemployment insurance and minimum wages, seemed to him to create distortions and unintended consequences that did more harm than good. The greatest damage was to undermine personal initiative and responsibility, and to subvert individuals{s-1-unknown} sense of duty to provide for themselves and their families, their churches, and their other volunteer communities. Flavelle was now a free-market liberal in economics and a conservative individualist in social policy. He expressed these views in occasional public addresses, many long and influential letters, and off-the-record interviews with journalists. He was widely respected as an elder and unusually articulate voice of Canadian business and conservatism. He liked to advise young businessmen to work hard, eschew material pleasures, and consider profit a by-product of doing business well.

In 1927, at the request of British friends from IMB days, Flavelle took on minor responsibilities as board chairman of the Canadian Marconi Company Limited. It was a struggling firm on the frontiers of wireless telegraphy and radio, whose stock became wildly overvalued in the market boom of the late 1920s, much to Flavelle{apos}s displeasure. He did not significantly invest in it. Shrewdly reading the markets, in June 1929 he took a handsome profit when he sold his Simpson{apos}s holdings to Wood, Gundy and Company and a group of Simpson{apos}s executives led by Charles Luther Burton*. Flavelle was neither surprised, nor, it seems, greatly inconvenienced financially by the stock-market collapse later that year and the onset of hard times.

In 1924 Flavelle became the first holder of the new position of board chairman at the Bank of Commerce, with Sir John Aird as president and general manager. After riding through tempestuous conditions in the early years of the decade, the Commerce, Simpson{apos}s, and National Trust all flourished in the good times of the late 1920s. Flavelle{apos}s old William Davies Company did not. E. C. Fox could not hold his British market share, was outmanoeuvred in Canada by J. S. McLean of Harris Abattoir, and left the industry in 1927 when McLean headed the merger that brought Davies, Harris, and other firms together as Canada Packers. McLean, who enjoyed Flavelle{apos}s confidence and respect, became his true successor as the master strategist of Canadian meat packing in an era when it was still a principal industry.

In good times and bad, Flavelle continued to be a staunch supporter of the Methodist Church of Canada, which had lost its formal identity when it merged with Presbyterian and Congregational denominations to create the United Church of Canada in 1925 [see Clarence Dunlop Mackinnon; Ephraim Scott]. Although he had always backed the union movement, he did not believe churches should mimic businesses or be overly organized. He thought the traditional spirit of Methodism was sadly diluted in the United Church, and noted that it failed to live up to its founders{s-1-unknown} hopes. As a lifelong supporter of Christian missions, he represented his church on the board of the West China Union University in Chengdu, Sichuan, and served as its chairman from 1923 to 1935. His was mainly a fund-raising function. Flavelle never visited China, but occasionally he wondered if the missionaries, whose standard of living was far higher than that of most Chinese, were retaining their old-time dedication.

Flavelle{apos}s principal role in church affairs was to provide financial support, which he did to a remarkable degree at all levels by giving money to funds for the poor, church building and restoration, bibles, pensions, distressed ministers, missionary work, and every other worthy cause. He also contributed to a wide range of secular charities, from choirs to community gardens and united appeals, children{apos}s homes to drama festivals, with especially large donations to causes at the Toronto General Hospital and the University of Toronto. As a minister friend put it, Flavelle kept {d-0}open house for beggars,{d-1} responding to pleas from friends to aid the good causes that interested them and to appeals from destitute strangers. During the Great Depression he gave important financial assistance to many needy businessmen and to down-and-outers who came to pick up food at the tradesmen{apos}s entrance to Holwood.

The Reverend Donald Bruce Macdonald, principal of St Andrew{apos}s College, a Toronto boys{s-1-unknown} school, persuaded Flavelle to become its board chairman in 1924 and subscribe liberally to the costs of moving its campus to Aurora. Flavelle{apos}s largest philanthropic donations appear to have been made to St Andrew{apos}s in the 1920s, and again in the 1930s when he almost certainly saved it from bankruptcy. He hoped it would become a great national institution, helping the children of the rich overcome the handicap of affluence. Flavelle House at St Andrew{apos}s was named after him, against his wishes. He did not court recognition of his givings, the exact extent of which will never be known, but they were a high proportion of his annual income, perhaps upwards of 50 per cent. His fragmentary papers suggest total donations of well over a million dollars in each of the interwar decades.

His contributions to political parties were regular and probably substantial - as perhaps was his fund-raising during election campaigns - but no records survive. He claimed to have always followed his mother{apos}s advice to support his political party {d-0}because if good men do not support it, bad men will.{d-1} He remained a loyal but often critical Conservative through the national party{apos}s difficult times in the 1920s, finding a more kindred spirit than Arthur Meighen or Richard Bedford Bennett* in Ontario{apos}s Conservative premier, George Howard Ferguson*. In 1928 Ferguson appointed him founding chairman of the Ontario Research Foundation, a public-private venture dedicated to advancing industrial research.

In 1931-32 he agreed to one more stint of national service as a member of the royal commission on railways and transportation, appointed by the Bennett government to find answers to the desperate problems of the faltering transcontinentals. Its recommendations were ineffectual. In 1934 Flavelle was vilified again, this time by Bennett{apos}s minister of trade and commerce, Henry Herbert Stevens*, who had launched a crusade against the buying practices of the department stores. Stevens{apos}s completely unfounded attacks on Flavelle{apos}s refinancings at Simpson{apos}s led directly to his leaving the cabinet to found the Reconstruction Party and were a particularly ignorant start to his brief career of mid-depression demagoguery.

As he coasted into semi-retirement, Flavelle had more time to pursue his lifelong love of golf and fishing. In 1907 he had built a summer mansion, Swannanoa, at Sturgeon Point in Ontario{apos}s Kawartha region, where his family had deep roots that gradually generated a large cottage colony. Flavelle enjoyed sightseeing on his numerous trips to Britain and the Continent, and he liked listening to religious music and reading about and discussing current affairs. He was a sometime gentleman farmer at Ashburnham, a farm he had bought near Oakville in 1916.

In the 1935 general election Flavelle, who had always doubted Bennett{apos}s judgement and leadership skills, supported the Liberal Party of William Lyon Mackenzie King*. He tended towards pessimism in the late 1930s, doubting the capacity of governments, the organizations that had given the world one great war and were drifting towards another, to achieve anything. Although his own faith in the long-term economic possibilities of Canada seems not to have wavered, he deplored, in 1938, {d-0}the increasing body of discontent in the provinces of this fair Dominion, to whom God had given so much and to whom we have paid so little in return.{d-1}

In January 1939 Flavelle was diagnosed with cancer of the bowel. In March he died of heart failure while travelling in the United States. The funeral service was at Holwood, with interment in Toronto{apos}s Mount Pleasant Cemetery. His formal estate totalled $6.06 million, and included bequests to many of his favourite charities, his children, and the creation of a small philanthropic foundation. Holwood was given to the University of Toronto, which renamed it Flavelle House. The baronetcy passed through Sir Ellsworth Flavelle and was extinguished on the death of his son Sir Joseph David Flavelle in 1985.

A soft-spoken, bearded, plainly dressed man all his life, he usually but not invariably was able to camouflage heartfelt emotion, a sharp temper, and personal insecurity. His marriage was uncomplicated - Clara presided gracefully over innumerable church and social functions at Holwood, but was often incapacitated by chronic health problems. Lady Flavelle died on 8 Feb. 1932, just short of their 50th wedding anniversary. Over the years, Sir Joseph became deeply disappointed that their only son, Joseph Ellsworth, showed no aptitude for business. One daughter, Clara Ellsworth, Flavelle{apos}s favourite, did have a business mind and many of her father{apos}s abilities, but she had been encouraged to expend her energies domestically and in ladies{s-1-unknown} charities.

The Sir Joseph [W.] Flavelle fonds at QUA is a large and rich collection, including much family and personal material. Flavelle{apos}s extensive correspondence as chairman of the Imperial Munitions Board and of the Grand Trunk Railway is contained in the Joseph Wesley Flavelle fonds at LAC, R1449-0-5. Important primary material on the history of the William Davies Company is found in the McLean family papers at AO, F 277, MU 1127.

These collections, supplemented by a wide range of other archival sources, including Peterborough newspapers and corporate and church minutes, are the basis for the author{apos}s study A Canadian millionaire: the life and business times of Sir Joseph Flavelle, bart., 1858-1939 (Toronto, 1978). This article is drawn from that book, which contains detailed documentation. No other significant biographical work on Flavelle has been published.

A product of the Irish Protestant diaspora, of the Methodist religion and a determined mother{apos}s training, of Canada{apos}s agricultural heartland, and of the rising city of Toronto, Sir Joseph Wesley Flavelle became an industrialist, philanthropist, and public servant of national and imperial stature. In an appreciation in Saturday Night (Toronto), journalist Hector Willoughby Charlesworth* best captured the scope of his achievement: {d-0}In the end, Sir Joseph touched the life of Canada at more points than any man of his time.{d-1}

New scholarly work on his circle and the organizations with which he was involved has tended to reflect rather than revise the account of Flavelle{apos}s activities and influence in Canadian millionaire. The history of the Methodist Church is surveyed in Neil Semple, The Lord{apos}s dominion: the history of Canadian Methodism (Montreal and Kingston, Ont., 1996); the Toronto General Hospital is presented in J. T. H. Connor, Doing good: the life of Toronto{apos}s General Hospital (Toronto, 2000); and the University of Toronto receives authoritative treatment in M. L. Friedland, The University of Toronto: a history (Toronto, 2002).

A significant literature now exists on the pre-war business climate and enterprises in which Flavelle was involved. It includes Christopher Armstrong and H. V. Nelles, Monopoly{apos}s moment: the organization and regulation of Canadian utilities, 1830-1930 (Philadelphia, 1986); Southern exposure: Canadian promoters in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1896-1930 (Toronto, 1988); Duncan McDowall, The Light: Brazilian Traction, Light and Power Company Limited, 1899-1945 (Toronto, 1988); R. B. Fleming, The railway king of Canada: Sir William Mackenzie, 1849-1923 (Vancouver, 1991); T. D. Regehr, The Canadian Northern Railway, pioneer road of the northern prairies, 1895-1918 (Toronto, 1976); G. P. Marchildon, Profits and politics: Beaverbrook and the Gilded Age of Canadian finance (Toronto, 1996); and Michael Bliss, Northern enterprise: five centuries of Canadian business (Toronto, 1987).

The history of the Shell Committee and the Imperial Munitions Board was first sketched in David Carnegie, The history of munitions supply in Canada, 1914-1918 (London, 1925). A more recent examination is Michael Bliss, {d-0}War business as usual: Canadian munitions production, 1914-18,{d-1} in Mobilization for total war: the Canadian, American and British experience, 1914-1918, 1939-1945, ed. N. F. Dreisziger (Waterloo, Ont., 1981), 43-55. The best guide to Conservative politics and the Borden government remains R. C. Brown, Robert Laird Borden, a biography (2v., Toronto, 1975-80).

The Cox enterprises - by 1900 he was simultaneously president of the Bank of Commerce, Canada Life, and Central Canada - formed an interlocking family of firms supplying financial services and entrepreneurship as Toronto aspired to challenge Montreal for Canadian business supremacy. The group expanded to include stock-brokerage services - provided by Cox{apos}s son-in-law Alfred Ernest Ames - and bond dealing through Dominion Securities, founded in 1901 and headed by Edward Rogers Wood*. Ames and another Sherbourne Street Church colleague, Harris Henry Fudger, were Flavelle{apos}s partners in the 1898 purchase of the department store founded by Robert Simpson*, which competed directly with the more famous establishment owned by their fellow Methodist Timothy Eaton*. From time to time, notably in promoting Canada Cycle and Motor, the Cox group worked with members of another prominent Methodist family, the Masseys, including Walter Edward Hart Massey*. There was a common managerial style to the {d-0}Peterborough Methodist mafia,{d-1} which involved the creation of departments in large enterprises and a stress on cost accounting. The aim was to maintain and foster individual achievement even in big firms.

The Flavelle commission, whose report in 1906 became the basis for the modernization of the institution, led to a new governing structure based on an appointed board of governors, which distanced the provincial university from direct interference by legislators. Higher levels of funding were provided, and a major building program facilitated Toronto{apos}s evolution as a diverse, multi-faculty school offering enhanced professional and graduate programs. Under a new president, Robert Alexander Falconer*, the university entered a period of extensive growth. In 1906 Flavelle was appointed to the board of governors and he received an honorary lld in recognition of his service, though he would rarely use the title.

Flavelle{apos}s leadership in rebuilding and reorganizing the TGH between 1904 and 1913 was more direct than in university matters, where he had often deferred to better-educated colleagues. He personally oversaw the decision to relocate the hospital close to the university, worked with architects Frank Darling and John Andrew Pearson on the design of the complex, lobbied for public funds and campaigned for private donations, and eventually undertook to cover the construction deficit, mostly from his own pocket. When the new TGH opened in 1913, the city had a modern hospital ready to play a leading role as a research and teaching institution closely tied to the medical faculty of the university. Flavelle continued to be chairman of the board until 1921 and a trustee for the rest of his life.

Flavelle also considered expanding into the beef business. Rather than enter it directly, his firm took a controlling interest in the Toronto-based Harris Abattoir Company. Flavelle installed energetic managers there, notably James Stanley McLean*, a mathematics and physics graduate of the University of Toronto. He had an acute ability to spot executive talent. {d-0}Flavelle{apos}s young men,{d-1} often university educated and often Methodists, came to occupy many of the highest rungs on the ladders of Canadian finance and, in some cases, politics.

Flavelle{apos}s plan to retire from active management at Davies was frustrated by the premature death in 1908 of his hand-picked successor, Frederick Smale, phd. Rising prices of hogs in Canada and vigorous competition from Danish packers in the British market began squeezing the Canadian business, which by 1910 had become only moderately profitable. Flavelle{apos}s single most unprofitable venture, however, was his experiment in idealistic journalism. The News neither captured Canadians{s-1-unknown} imagination nor succeeded in raising the tone of the country{apos}s politics. After absorbing five years of heavy operating losses, Flavelle sold the paper in 1908.

Although Flavelle depended greatly on normal market incentives and competition in the awarding of contracts, certain production needs and bottlenecks led the IMB into the innovative experiment of creating seven of its own {d-0}national factories{d-1} (modelled on British practice) to load fuses, make airplanes, and produce explosives. Some worked well [see Sir Charles Blair Gordon; Sir Frank Wilton Baillie*]; others were dismal failures. As labour markets began to tighten in 1916, the IMB, under the direction of one of Flavelle{apos}s protégés, Ontario mla Mark Howard Irish, formed a labour department to advise manufacturers on ways of attracting new classes of munitions workers, notably women. Flavelle otherwise tried to avoid becoming involved with his contractors{s-1-unknown} labour relations, but occasionally he had to exert pressure to reconcile industrial disputes. He initially resisted calls from the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada to insert fair-wage (often union-wage) clauses in all IMB contracts, and, when he eventually conceded the principle in 1917, it was found that munitions workers, who were doing very well in a period of full employment, had lost interest in the matter.

In July the report of a federal investigation of cold-storage conditions, headed by William Francis O{apos}Connor, generated sensational newspaper headlines about {d-0}Huge Margins{d-1} of profit in the bacon business and the {d-0}Millions{d-1} made by the William Davies Company. In a season of war weariness and considerable inflation, Flavelle was instantly reviled as a greedy profiteer, his lardship, a baconet, baconeer, robber baronet, several varieties of hog and hypocrite, Old Black Joe, and more. The Borden government was forced to commission a special inquiry into the packing industry. It held public hearings - Flavelle testified in October that he had no qualms of conscience and nothing to conceal - and in late November it issued a report that corrected the numerous confusions and economic illiteracies of the cold-storage investigation and exonerated the company of all charges of unethical business practice.

In 1921 he came under heavy pressure from Prime Minister Arthur Meighen* to become chief executive officer of the new, government-owned Canadian National Railways system. Flavelle had never run a railway, but since the early 1900s he had been deeply involved in railway strategizing, as an investor, banker, and interested citizen. During the war he had devoted much time to the problems of Canada{apos}s bankrupt transcontinental lines, especially Sir William Mackenzie{apos}s and Sir Donald Mann{apos}s Canadian Northern, which had threatened to drag the Bank of Commerce down with it. Flavelle had often supported the public purchase and operation of trunk railways, including the Canadian Northern, and so he seemed a logical candidate to head the sprawling system being created out of the ruins of many ventures.

After a difficult first year on his own as a commission merchant, Flavelle entered a partnership, D. Gunn, Flavelle and Company, which united Flavelle{apos}s produce business with Donald Gunn{apos}s trade in pork products - carcasses, salt pork, and ham and bacon. The enterprise flourished, making Flavelle moderately wealthy. In 1892 he was invited by a local Baptist, William Davies*, to take over management of his extensive meat-packing concern. Davies{apos}s own sons were dying of tuberculosis. Flavelle became managing director and significant shareholder in William Davies Company Limited, and immediately set out to improve the firm{apos}s performance.

John Flavelle{apos}s attempts to find steady work in stores or as a labourer were hindered by his predilection for strong drink. Dorothea, a woman of forceful character, held the family together with her earnings as a schoolteacher. She raised her three sons and two daughters to respect queen and country, worship faithfully in the Methodist Church, and work and save diligently with the hope of doing well in life. Little Joe left school at age 12 to serve as an apprentice to a general storekeeper, eventually took one year of high school, but refused a brother{apos}s offer to finance his further education and professional training. In 1876, at 18 and with support from an uncle and brothers who were thriving as merchants in nearby Lindsay, Joe bought a flour and feed store in Peterborough and entered the provisions business. He hung on his office wall the motto {d-0}Not Slothful in Business, Fervent in Spirit, Serving the Lord.{d-1}

Flavelle{apos}s ardent Methodist perfectionism expressed itself commercially not only in a commitment to hard, earnest work, but also in a passion for careful accounting and a willingness to defer gratification for the sake of future benefits. His business prospered, and by the early 1880s he was an established Peterborough citizen, Sunday school superintendent at George Street Methodist Church, active participant in local Conservative politics, and chairman of the board of trustees of the Nicholls Hospital. In 1882 he married his Sunday school sweetheart, Clara Ellsworth, daughter of a Methodist minister of loyalist background. As a merchant, he developed extensive knowledge of marketing the bounty of Ontario{apos}s flourishing farm economy - especially butter, cheese, eggs, and meat - in Canada, the United States, and abroad.

Early in 1887 Flavelle determined to relocate in Toronto, the province{apos}s economic hub, where he believed there were excellent opportunities in the produce wholesaling trade. His decision may also have been influenced by unpopularity in Peterborough resulting from his vigorous leadership of campaigns to apply and enforce the Canada Temperance Act. One of his senior business and church and temperance associates, George Albertus Cox*, also left Peterborough about the same time to concentrate on life insurance and other forms of financial intermediation in Toronto. {d-0}One of my earliest acts,{d-1} Flavelle wrote his wife in March 1887 about the move, {d-0}was to go to our Father and consecrate myself, my new business, my whole affairs to Him.{d-1} In June, after he had finally decided to make the city their home, he told Clara, {d-0}I bow my head darling, bow yours with mine and pray The Father that we may leave it better and purer than when we came, because we have walked in righteousness and Truth.{d-1}

At its east-end factory near the mouth of the Don River, the Davies firm, a pioneer in the industry, converted live hogs into cured sides of bacon, exporting most of the product to England. Canadian pea-fed bacon had found a niche in the British market as a lean, premium product. Under Flavelle{apos}s earnest, energetic management - he made a point of mastering every facet of the business - the company significantly improved its curing process by using liquid brine instead of dry salt and outpaced its Canadian competition. It also benefited from soaring British demand, low hog prices in Canada, and the brilliance of the company{apos}s London-based agent, John Wheeler-Bennett, dubbed {d-0}the Bismarck of the Bacon Trade.{d-1}

By 1900 the Davies organization was disassembling about 500,000 hogs a year, five times its 1892 input, and boasting that it was the largest pork-packing house in the British empire. High sales volume generated remarkable returns on investment, including dividends on the firm{apos}s capital that averaged more than 100 per cent per annum between 1897 and 1900. By this time Flavelle, who had been worth about $10,000 when he arrived in 1887, had become a millionaire; people started calling Toronto Hogtown.

In the late 1890s and early 1900s Flavelle expanded his business activities into many new fields of enterprise, and his community service from church work into education and health care. In most of these activities he worked with groups of like-minded associates, many of them Methodists, many from Peterborough, and many worshippers with him at Toronto{apos}s Sherbourne Street Church. The number of rich businessmen who belonged to this congregation made it the wealthiest Methodist church in Canada, nicknamed the {d-0}Millionaires{s-1-unknown} Church.{d-1}

Flavelle served as perennial superintendent of Sherbourne Street Church{apos}s Sunday school and became, along with Cox, Ames, and Fudger, a generous donor to a wide variety of Methodist causes. In 1898 he was appointed to the board of regents of Victoria University [see Albert Carman*], and with his friends he helped it add buildings and programs and take a leading role in the affairs of the federated University of Toronto. In 1901 Flavelle anticipated the spirit of the Rhodes scholarships by creating a major travelling fellowship at the university, an indication of his interest in the broader institution. The next year he was elected to the board of trustees of the Toronto General Hospital at the urging of the Gooderhams, major benefactors of the city{apos}s most important health-care institution.

In 1901 Flavelle had commissioned architect Frank Darling* to design and build a private 17-room home on land leased from the university in Queen{apos}s Park. Completed in 1902, Holwood was an English country mansion in the beaux-arts style set in the public centre of Toronto. Joseph decided to mirror his elevated social standing by reverting to the original French pronunciation of his surname - {d-0}fla-velle.{d-1} His brothers in Lindsay remained known as {d-0}flavvles.{d-1}

For some time at the beginning of the century, Flavelle was active in the burst of tramway, railway, electrical, and other corporate promotions fostered by the Cox companies and such associates as William Mackenzie*. Mackenzie, a former Canadian Pacific Railway contractor, had become an international utility magnate, the principal figure in firms ranging from the Canadian Northern Railway to the São Paulo Tramway, Light and Power Company and the Electrical Development Company of Ontario, which planned to harness Niagara Falls{s-1-unknown} power as hydroelectricity for Toronto.

Within a few years, however, Flavelle had second thoughts about becoming too involved in flotations and financial manoeuvres that appeared to him more geared to facilitating profits from insider trading than sound long-term management. He gradually distanced himself from Mackenzie, whom he considered a buccaneer, and even from Cox, whose sense of financial stewardship seemed clouded by a propensity for self-dealing and nepotism. By 1906 Flavelle had limited his business activities to the affairs of the William Davies Company, the Bank of Commerce, Simpson{apos}s, and National Trust.

At the same time he increased his commitment to public service. {d-0}Joe is I suppose as busy as ever,{d-1} his mother would observe in 1906, {d-0}doing all the good he can.{d-1} As chairman of the board of the Toronto General Hospital from 1904, he launched a campaign to rebuild it as a world-class institution. A supporter of the progressive Conservative government of James Pliny Whitney*, he turned down an invitation to run for the Ontario legislature, gave what proved to be abortive service as a crusading liquor-licence commissioner for a few months in 1905 [see John Irvine Davidson*], and in October of that year accepted a major responsibility as chairman of a provincial royal commission on the University of Toronto.

In his principal business, meat packing, Flavelle had continued to be an innovative manager. As the William Davies Company began facing intense competition in the lucrative British bacon trade, Flavelle, who became the firm{apos}s principal shareholder in 1901, further improved his curing processes and refined his accounting systems, both of which were among the most advanced in the packing industry internationally. Backing out of a 1902 deal to merge the principal Ontario meat-packing firms - he disdained his potential partners and perhaps wanted more free time for public service - he concentrated on in-house excellence while seeking new opportunities. The several local butcher shops that William Davies had created as outlets for his by-products were expanded into a major network of retail stores in Ontario and Quebec, one of Canada{apos}s first chains, and there was a brief attempt to spread into the United States. The Davies company was also a Canadian leader in industrial research and employee profit-sharing.

On the other hand, Flavelle had supported Canada{apos}s National Policy of protective tariffs from the days of Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald*. When the Liberal government of Sir Wilfrid Laurier* negotiated a reciprocity agreement with the United States in 1910, Flavelle became one of its earliest and most vigorous opponents. Many members of the {d-0}Toronto Eighteen,{d-1} Liberals headed by Sir Byron Edmund Walker* who broke with their party over reciprocity in February 1911, were close associates of Flavelle. The most notable was his general manager at National Trust, William Thomas White*, who after the general election in September became finance minister in R. L. Borden{apos}s Conservative government. In Ontario, one of the key issues of the campaign was Liberal complaints about the packing industry and high food prices.

By this time he was becoming disillusioned by the wave of criticism of private enterprise sweeping across Canada and the United States, some of which he had encouraged in his role as a volubly ethical, progressive businessman and newspaper proprietor. He found himself having to challenge farmers{s-1-unknown} complaints about his own packing industry, particularly the notion that a packers{s-1-unknown} trust or combine suppressed hog prices. He began to distrust government interference with the marketplace, such as Ontario Hydro{apos}s ruthless assault on competing private power companies [see Sir Adam Beck*], and he questioned the efficacy of regulatory and welfare schemes ranging from anti-combines laws to industry-wide workers{s-1-unknown} compensation.

Flavelle{apos}s opposition to reciprocity stemmed not only from self-interest but also from his deep commitment to Canada as a British country. As hog butcher to the empire, and a frequent visitor to England, he supported schemes for greater imperial unity, such as the Round Table movement [see Edward Joseph Kylie*], and developed numerous contacts in imperialist circles. Significantly, his belief that Canada{apos}s future would involve great economic and industrial growth seems to have caused him to refrain from advocating any system of imperial preferential tariffs, despite the aid they could have given to Canadian bacon in competition with the Danish product.

Flavelle administered the IMB much as he ran his private companies. Working without pay, he relied heavily on the volunteer services of first-rate executives (the Great War{apos}s anticipation of the {d-0}dollar-a-year men{d-1} in the next world war), developed rigorous inspection and accounting systems, and tried hard to frustrate Canadian politicians{s-1-unknown} belief that they should have a voice in apportioning contracts. Though the IMB bowed to political imperatives in deliberately spreading orders across the country, Flavelle cleaned up a serious scandal that Sam Hughes{apos}s cronyism had created with fuse contracts let in the United States, and then ran a tight, prompt, honest operation that the Ministry of Munitions found entirely satisfactory.

The IMB replaced the Shell Committee, an informal panel of Canadian manufacturers set up in 1914 by the Borden government{apos}s minister of militia and defence, Samuel Hughes*, to solicit British business. The committee{apos}s work had been severely criticized for poor contractor performance, conflicts of interest, disorganization, and possible corruption. Flavelle was given complete executive authority as chairman of the IMB - the board{apos}s other members were ciphers - and effectively became the czar of the Canadian munitions industry during the war. On his appointment, he moved temporarily to Ottawa.

The IMB served as the umbrella agency that organized and supervised the greatest industrial effort Canada had ever seen. It straightened out the mess left by the Shell Committee, administered new orders, and sought still more business. By 1917 more than 600 Canadian factories, employing more than 250,000 workers, were producing almost 100,000 shells a day. Canada that year supplied between a quarter and a third of all the ammunition used by the British artillery in France and more than half the shrapnel. The demand evolved from orders for steel shells to contracts for other components, complete rounds of ammunition, and eventually the supply of airplanes and ships. By the war{apos}s end, the IMB and its predecessor had spent $1.25 billion producing 65 million shells, 49 million cartridge cases, 30 million fuses, 35 million primers, 112 million pounds of explosives, 2,900 airplanes, 88 ships, and other assorted supplies.

Flavelle{apos}s wholehearted patriotism, his reputation, and his position as head of the IMB gave him considerable prominence on the national stage. After a visit to England and the front in late 1916, he achieved national attention for two speeches. In an emotional talk in Toronto on 12 December to munitions manufacturers grumbling about their margins, he urged them to {d-0}send profits to the hell where they belong.{d-1} In a more considered public address a few days later in Ottawa, he seemed to call for the formation of a coalition government, along British lines. Having turned down a knighthood in 1913 for his hospital work, in June 1917 Flavelle accepted a baronetcy from George V. Not surprisingly, there was talk of him becoming a minister if some kind of national coalition government was established in Canada. Just such a government would be formed in October, under Borden, but by then Flavelle was mired in controversy.

Ottawa put strict limits on meat packers{s-1-unknown} profits for the remainder of the war. Flavelle was deeply upset at having been publicly crucified in the bacon scandal. Neither the British nor the Canadian government wanted him to resign his position on the IMB, though in the Canadian election of December 1917 Borden{apos}s Union government found him a serious liability as {d-0}Flavelle, pork, and profits{d-1} became a major side issue next to conscription. A few months later parliament endorsed an order in council effectively barring Canadians from receiving hereditary titles.

The William Davies Company had done a very high volume of war business, shipping sides of bacon and canned, cooked meat to the British government. Relatively slight profit margins on high sales had led to high profits, a return on capital that reached 80 per cent in 1916. Flavelle{apos}s wartime dividend income to March 1917 was about $400,000. At a time when Canadian soldiers were being paid $1.10 a day, this income seemed excessive. No matter that it had resulted from business excellence; it was still, as the Toronto Daily Mail and Empire put it, a {d-0}little rake-off on every rasher.{d-1} Flavelle himself was too proud to disclose his wartime philanthropic givings, which almost certainly far exceeded his earnings. Completely unfounded stories - what might be called trench-born legends - also circulated, and persisted for generations, to the effect that the Davies company had sold spoiled meat to the troops.

Flavelle thus became the last Canadian domiciled in Canada to receive one. A proud man who stayed the course at the IMB and retained his outward equanimity, he was stung by the unfair, often politically motivated vilification he had had to endure. {d-0}My activity will largely pass with my duties here,{d-1} he wrote his wife in November 1918. {d-0}I can have no effective voice in any activity following the war - the great body of the press - of the public - of my own church, know me as a convicted profiteer - selfish, greedy and pressing burdens on the poor. Of course it hurts.{d-1}

Flavelle{apos}s post-war reputation as a master of business and public service quickly overpowered the lingering whiffs from the bacon scandal. After overseeing the liquidation of all IMB activities, he returned to Toronto in 1919 and gradually resumed most of his public and private responsibilities. He retired from the meat-packing industry, selling his William Davies shares in 1919 to a Davies grandson, Edward Carey Fox, and using the proceeds to acquire a controlling interest in Simpson{apos}s, which over the years had been steadily profitable.

Citing family obligations, and perhaps doubting that anyone could make the new system work, Flavelle turned Meighen down. He did agree to become chairman of the board, in May 1921, of the historic Grand Trunk Railway system, which had been taken over by the government and would soon be integrated into the CNR. Flavelle{apos}s short service at the Grand Trunk - it ended in August 1922 - illustrated the politics and perils of public ownership. His efforts to remove the dead wood at the Grand Trunk, for instance, ran into staunch interference. The one constant theme of his approach to railways was the belief that the only policy worse than government ownership was turning everything over to the Canadian Pacific to create the de facto monopoly that the Montreal-based firm frequently advocated.

Like his predecessors Marchand and Parent, Gouin sought to attract English Canadian and especially American capital into his province to ensure its economic growth. His efforts to this effect were assisted by a greatly increased demand for the natural riches of Quebec (pulpwood, minerals, hydroelectric energy). On the other hand, Gouin was not opposed to certain well-aimed government initiatives that would enable the province to benefit even more from its resources. For example, in order to stimulate the production of paper and create employment in 1910, he banned the export of pulpwood cut on crown lands. The United States countered by putting customs duties on imported paper, but Gouin was unshakeable, and a number of new paper mills were opened in the province. In 1910 he also set up the Quebec Streams Commission, which undertook the construction of works to regulate the flow of water in rivers harnessed to produce energy [see Simon-Napoléon Parent]. It was not supposed to compete with private enterprise, and Gouin refused to follow Ontario{apos}s lead in establishing public ownership of the hydroelectric industry [see Sir Adam Beck; Sir James Pliny Whitney*]. Economic growth made it possible to stabilize the province{apos}s finances. The larger federal grant, higher logging fees, the leasing of waterfalls, and the introduction of new permits and licences raised revenues from $5,340,000 in 1905–6 to $14,473,000 in 1919–20. The government could not only increase its expenditures during the same period from $5,012,000 to $13,503,000, but was able to balance its budget and even to declare modest surpluses year after year, while slightly reducing the province{apos}s per capita debt. This sound management won the enthusiastic approval of the business community.

Gouin had also vigorously championed the struggle of the Franco-Ontarians against Regulation 17, a measure adopted in 1912 that severely limited the use of French as a language of instruction in Ontario schools [see Sir James Pliny Whitney]. Gouin raised this matter in 1913, during an audience with the pope. On 11 Jan. 1915 he delivered an important speech in which he asked the government of Ontario to demonstrate justice and generosity in its dealings with the province{apos}s francophone minority. Then, on 25 January, to give resounding support to the Franco-Ontarian cause he took part in a big demonstration at the Université Laval at Quebec, along with Cardinal Louis-Nazaire Bégin, the Nationaliste Armand La Vergne*, and a number of other dignitaries. In March 1916, under his guidance, a bill introduced by Antonin Galipeault, to authorize school commissions to make contributions from their funds for patriotic, national, or school purposes, was passed. (Gouin did not want his province to make a direct grant to the Franco-Ontarians, for fear of angering their government.)

Gouin put an end to these dealings by attending the Liberal convention in August. To be sure, the Liberal platform, with its reference to lower tariffs, worried the Montreal business community and its political friends, including Gouin and Lemieux. The co-chair of the convention, Gouin supported William Stevens Fielding, who had been minister of finance in Laurier{apos}s government, in the race for the party leadership. Fielding was pro-tariff and, although he had supported conscription, he had never disowned Laurier or served in the Union government. The Quebec delegates were more in favour of William Lyon Mackenzie King*. Particularly concerned about bringing the western farmers back into the Liberal fold, King was prepared to agree to some relaxation of the tariff. He had been defeated in the general election of 1911, but had remained loyal to Laurier during the war. At Laurier{apos}s request, he had run as the Liberal candidate in the Ontario riding of York North in 1917, and had been defeated. He opposed conscription because he believed it posed a threat to national unity. King would never forgive Gouin for supporting Fielding.

There are two principal biographies of Sifton. The first is a fine, sympathetic work by his long-time friend and confidant, J. W. Dafoe, Clifford Sifton in relation to his times (Toronto, 1931). The other is the author’s study, Clifford Sifton (2v., Vancouver and London, 1981–85). The second of the two volumes contains a full bibliography, including a list of Sifton{apos}s writings. Two more recent works that are important in understanding Sifton’s career are Réal Bélanger, Wilfrid Laurier; quand la politique devient passion (Québec et Montréal, 1986), and M. F. Girard, L’écologisme retrouvé: essor et déclin de la Commission de la conservation du Canada: 1909–1921 (Ottawa, 1994). d.j.h.]§

The family{apos}s frequent changes of residence meant that Lester did not have a home town, but the values of the various places in southern Ontario where he lived were strongly defined. Alcohol was loathed, education celebrated, and the sabbath holy. Edwin was a strong imperialist whose scrapbook is filled with clippings about the royal family; his three boys shared his enthusiasm for sports and the empire. An excellent student in high school, Lester is revealed in the diary of his second year at Victoria University as a polite young man whose enthusiasm for sports exceeded his interest in his courses. He referred to his parents fondly and respectfully. His brother Marmaduke (Duke) had left university as soon as he turned 18 to fight in Europe during World War I. As the war intensified, Lester became ever more eager to volunteer. On 23 April 1915 he enlisted in the University of Toronto hospital unit and became a private in the Canadian Army Medical Corps. His younger brother, Vaughan, would soon be overseas as well.

Pearson{apos}s own war service reveals an unachieved desire for heroism. After very basic training, he had arrived at the quiet front in Salonica (Thessaloníki, Greece) on 12 Nov. 1915. Greece was neutral, but the British and French stationed troops in the region of Macedonia to minimize contact between the Bulgarians and their Austro-Hungarian allies. Almost immediately, Pearson sought transfer to the Western Front. Thanks to the intervention of the Canadian minister of militia and defence, Sir Samuel Hughes*, a fellow Methodist, a transfer to Britain finally came. After arriving in England in late March 1917, Pearson went for training to Wadham College, Oxford, where his platoon commander was the famous war poet Robert von Ranke Graves. When he finished training, he and his brother Duke decided in late summer to become aviators instead of infantry officers.

In the most glamorous and dangerous of combat roles in World War I, the aviator had a life expectancy of months. Pearson joined the Royal Flying Corps in October and began his aerial training at Hendon (London). Two months later his career ended, as he later said, {d-0}ingloriously,{d-1} when a bus struck him during a London blackout. His medical and other records indicate that the accident did not disable him, but that he broke down emotionally in the hospital and during recuperation in early 1918. He was sent home to Canada on 6 April, after a medical board declared him {d-0}unfit{d-1} for flying or observer duties because of {d-0}neurasthenia.{d-1} The war changed Pearson as it did his nation. His resentment of persons in authority, especially British officers, strengthened his democratic and nationalistic instincts. His emotional breakdown probably contributed to his tendency to keep his feelings private and to deplore irrationalism in public and personal life. The war also gave him the enduring nickname of Mike.

Pearson{apos}s own war service reveals an unachieved desire for heroism. After very basic training, he had arrived at the quiet front in Salonica (Thessaloníki, Greece) on 12 Nov. 1915. Greece was neutral, but the British and French stationed troops in the region of Macedonia to minimize contact between the Bulgarians and their Austro-Hungarian allies. Almost immediately, Pearson sought transfer to the Western Front. Thanks to the intervention of the Canadian minister of militia and defence, Sir Samuel Hughes*, a fellow Methodist, a transfer to Britain finally came. After arriving in England in late March 1917, Pearson went for training to Wadham College, Oxford, where his platoon commander was the famous war poet Robert von Ranke Graves. When he finished training, he and his brother Duke decided in late summer to become aviators instead of infantry officers.

Born on St George{apos}s Day in the year of Queen Victoria{apos}s diamond jubilee, Lester Pearson would be brought up in a home that reflected fully the ambitions and character of Canadian Methodism in the last decade of the 19th century. Although neither the Bowleses nor the Pearsons were notably religious in Ireland before they emigrated, they became enthusiastic and prominent Methodists after their arrival in Canada, in the 1820s and 1840s respectively. Pearson{apos}s paternal grandfather, Marmaduke Louis, was a well-known Methodist minister; his mother{apos}s cousin the Reverend Richard Pinch Bowles, later the chancellor of Victoria University, Toronto, had officiated at the marriage of Annie and Edwin. Edwin Pearson stepped aside from the heated debates about the Social Gospel that marked early-20th-century Methodism. Athletic and easygoing, he was a popular pastor who moved often because he received calls from other churches.

There he began work as a clerk in the fertilizer division of the Armour empire. The anti-British tone of Chicago politics, where the Irish and the Germans held sway, offended the young imperialist and business did not attract him. He told his uncle and his parents that he wanted to go to Oxford. With the help of a fellowship from the Massey Foundation, he left for St John{apos}s College in the fall of 1921. At Oxford, he achieved a solid second, but once again impressed his tutors and fellow students more with his sporting skills and his wit. He took a two-year ma degree and returned to Toronto as a lecturer in the university{apos}s department of history in 1923. In that small unit he made lasting friends, such as the future diplomat Humphrey Hume Wrong*; he also met his wife.

Maryon is one of the most interesting of the Canadian prime ministerial wives. Deeply religious as an undergraduate, she became a sceptic and, privately, a non-believer. Excited about the possibility of a life as a writer, she would never work in a paying job after her marriage. Against Pearson{apos}s enemies, she was a ferocious defender of her husband. After his death, she would be bereft and resentful of her widowhood. Yet when they were together, she was known for her barbed comments directed towards her spouse, as when she famously said, {d-0}Behind every successful man there is a surprised woman.{d-1} They fought often and both had close relationships, perhaps affairs, with others. She despised politics but would take a close interest and would influence critical decisions, especially the selection of Pearson{apos}s cabinet. Her sharp and sardonic wit wounded some, but enlivened many dinner parties. She and her husband moved together along the modernist paths of the 20th century in their choices in literature, their attitudes towards religion, and even in their methods of child rearing, but they remained grounded in the traditions of Anglo-Canadian Methodism. In a later time, they might have divorced, but they would remain a couple, forming a partnership that deeply influenced their times and their country.

After their marriage the Pearsons lived close to the university and entertained young faculty in their home. Reports vary on Pearson{apos}s success as a lecturer, but all agree that he was a major figure in the athletic activities of the university and a minor contributor to the professionalization of the field of Canadian history in the 1920s. He proposed to write a book on the loyalists and spent the summer of 1926 at the Public Archives of Canada in Ottawa. At the university, he faced a choice between accepting promotion through which he would become a major figure in the athletic department or demonstrating stronger devotion to scholarship and the classroom. Both options lacked the appeal of the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa which, under Oscar Douglas Skelton*, the under-secretary of state, was hiring bright young Canadians with advanced degrees. Wrong, Pearson{apos}s closest friend in the history department, went to Washington as a junior diplomat in the spring of 1927 and Skelton expressed interest in Pearson, whom he had met in the summer of 1926. Pearson took the foreign service examination and stood first among a distinguished group of applicants. He had, at last, a métier.

The daughter of a Winnipeg doctor and nurse, Maryon Moody enrolled in Pearson{apos}s history tutorial for the fall term of 1923 in her final year at university. The attraction was immediate and within a few weeks the professor had persuaded his pretty female student to attend a party with him. On 13 March, five weeks later, Maryon wrote to a close friend, {d-0}Don{apos}t tell a soul because we aren{apos}t telling the public till after term. I am engaged.{d-1} She admitted that she had {d-0}known him really at all well [for] a little over a month{d-1} but they {d-0}loved each other more than anything else in the world.{d-1} They were married in Broadway United Church, Winnipeg. Their son, Geoffrey Arthur Holland, who would become a diplomat, was born in December 1927 and daughter Patricia Lillian arrived in March 1929.

Hugh Llewellyn Keenleyside*, another academic who became a foreign service officer in the late 1920s, shared an office with Pearson in Ottawa after Pearson{apos}s arrival in August 1928. Pearson, he would later write, was in {d-0}good physical shape, vigorous and alert.{d-1} He was {d-0}cheerful, amusing, keenly interested in his work, ambitious for the service and for himself.{d-1} He remained so throughout his career in the department. There would be frustrations, especially with Skelton{apos}s lack of organizational skills and the idiosyncrasies of prime ministers Richard Bedford Bennett* and William Lyon Mackenzie King*. Nevertheless, Pearson{apos}s intelligence, artfully concealed ambition, good looks and health, and exceptional personal charm were qualities that identified him as an extraordinarily effective public servant and diplomat.

Pearson began his European experience badly when he advised the Canadian representative to the League of Nations, Walter Alexander Riddell, to put forward a proposal to impose sanctions on Italy after it invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in October 1935. King, who became prime minister later that month, angrily repudiated the Riddell initiative in December, but Pearson escaped blame. King and Skelton had both lost faith in the League of Nations and fretted about British policy towards European border tension and the Spanish Civil War that they feared would lead to confrontations, not only with Italy but, more dangerously, with Adolf Hitler{apos}s Germany. Pearson shared some of these concerns in 1936 and 1937, but his views differed from those of his political superiors as Hitler{apos}s ambitions grew. When King {d-0}rejoiced{d-1} at the Munich agreement of 1938 between Hitler and British prime minister Arthur Neville Chamberlain, Pearson dissented in a letter to Skelton. Munich was not a peace with honour, he wrote. {d-0}If I am tempted to become cynical and isolationist, I think of Hitler screeching into the microphone, Jewish women and children in ditches on the Polish border, [Hermann] G[ö]ring, the genial ape-man and [Paul Joseph] Goebbels, the evil imp, and then, whatever the British side may represent, the other does indeed stand for savagery and barbarism.{d-1} It was fine to be on the side of the {d-0}angels,{d-1} but Pearson knew that {d-0}in Germany the opposite spirits are hard at work. And I have a feeling they{apos}re going to do a lot of mischief before they are exorcised.{d-1}

The children, and then Maryon, returned to Ottawa, but Pearson stayed in England and worked ceaselessly to strengthen British-Canadian ties. Those times remained a cherished memory for him and their spirit is preserved in the diary of his colleague Charles Stewart Almon Ritchie* and the novel, The heat of the day (London, 1949), written by Ritchie{apos}s lover, Elizabeth Dorothea Cole Bowen. The death of Skelton, however, forced Pearson{apos}s return to Ottawa in the spring of 1941 and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in December took him to Washington as minister-counsellor in June 1942. He arrived just as the centre of wartime decision-making was shifting to Washington from London and there was no doubt that the United States would dominate in reconstructing the international system after the war. The Canadian minister to Washington, Leighton Goldie McCarthy, was weak and Pearson quickly took on the major role in representing Canada, not only to the American government but also in the numerous committees that were the birthplace of post-war international institutions. Unlike many Canadians and most Britons, he had realized as early as 1940 that power had shifted from London to Washington and that the British Commonwealth of Nations would be a secondary actor on the international stage. For Canada, the political and economic implications of these changes were enormous.

Pearson knew the United States well and admired its energy and creativity. Unlike his brother Duke, now a businessman and a Republican, he was an enthusiastic supporter of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the New Deal. He enjoyed American popular culture, especially its cinema, Broadway musicals, and, above all, baseball. Nevertheless, he thought American democracy too encumbered by major financial interests, its public life too vulgar, and its self-confidence sometimes abrasive. As Canada moved from its British past to its North American future, he anticipated many problems. Some in his department had written very negative comments on American policy, but he was always a pragmatist. In 1944 he had written: {d-0}When we are dealing with such a powerful neighbour, we have to avoid the twin dangers of subservience and truculent touchiness. We succumb to the former when we take everything lying down, and to the latter when we rush to the State Department with a note everytime some Congressman makes a stupid statement about Canada, or some documentary movie about the war forgets to mention Canada.{d-1} This advice to a junior colleague neatly defined his central approach to Canadian-American relations throughout his diplomatic and political career.

Pearson quickly captured attention, especially from the American news media. He became a minor celebrity on a radio quiz program and, significantly, a close friend of several major American journalists. His diplomatic colleagues noted his skill in presiding over committees and in July 1943 he became the chair of the United Nations Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture. The committee was to become the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN in October 1945. Pearson would decline the chance to head the new institution. From 1943 to 1946 he also chaired the important committee on supplies of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. On 1 Jan. 1945 he became Canada{apos}s second ambassador to the United States (earlier representatives had been ministers). He had become one of the foremost diplomats of the time and, in Canada, a public figure.

The Cold War between the Soviet Union and the west was young but fierce during Pearson{apos}s tenure as under-secretary. The Soviet use of the veto handcuffed the UN{apos}s Security Council and Soviet influence in eastern Europe became control as coalition governments in nations such as Czechoslovakia and Poland fell to Communism. Although the war{apos}s end did not bring depression as it had in 1919, the economic future was uncertain, since Canada{apos}s traditional European markets were either destroyed or, in the case of Britain, essentially bankrupt. Pearson took three major policy initiatives between 1946 and 1948. First, he continued to hope that the UN would gain strength and, much to King{apos}s despair, he backed UN involvement in the settlement of conflict in Korea and in other troubled areas such as Palestine. Secondly, he recognized the economic and political predominance of the United States. The shortage of American dollars in Canada was solved initially by a special arrangement and Pearson was willing to work out a free trade agreement with the Americans. King stopped the free trade negotiations, fearful of their political impact. Finally, Pearson tried to balance American influence by the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and he argued strongly for a socio-economic component to the pact. He played a major role in the discussions and persistently urged Canada{apos}s chief negotiator, Hume Wrong, to take a broad approach to the treaty. By the time the pact was finally signed in Washington in the spring of 1949, his numerous accomplishments had gained him further recognition. With the strong encouragement of King and St-Laurent, he entered politics and was appointed secretary of state for external affairs in the St-Laurent government on 10 Sept. 1948. He ran successfully for a seat in the House of Commons in a by-election in Algoma East on 25 October and retained the seat in the general election of 1949, in which St-Laurent{apos}s government won a resounding victory. He would represent the riding throughout his political career.

In the late 1940s Pearson worried that the United States would revert to pre-war isolationist tendencies and his rhetoric and policies reflected this concern. Beginning in the 1960s, critics such as Robert Dennis Cuff and Jack Lawrence Granatstein would point to Pearson{apos}s strong and, in their view, strident anti-Communist speeches and his sternly anti-Communist policies in the first years of the Cold War, a position later adopted by historian Denis Smith, political scientist Reginald Whitaker, and journalist Gary Marcuse. These revisionists would suggest that Pearson overestimated the dangers of Soviet Communism. Pearson equated Communism with Nazism. He warned, for example, that {d-0}we did not take very seriously the preposterous statements of the slightly ridiculous author of Mein Kampf. We preferred the friendly remarks of {s-0}jolly old Goering{s-1-unknown} at his hunting lodge.{d-1} Mein Kampf had been the true agenda; similarly, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin showed a gentle side to the American vice-president, Henry Agard Wallace, in 1944, but Pearson warned that the west should look at Stalin{apos}s harsh statements, {d-0}which form the basic dogma on which the policy of the USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] is inflexibly based.{d-1}

Although unhappy about the shape of the UN and, especially, the dominance of the Security Council by the great powers, Pearson did not protest as strongly as the Australians did at the San Francisco Conference, where delegates met to draw up the charter in 1945. When the new organization took form, many favoured him for the post of secretary general. He was, however, too closely identified with American interests to satisfy the Soviets. He also knew that political changes were occurring quickly in Ottawa and he did not encourage friends who wanted to promote his candidacy. King was leaving and he had already spoken with Pearson about {d-0}entering Canadian public life,{d-1} and the diplomat had the idea {d-0}very much in mind.{d-1} To assure Pearson{apos}s presence in Ottawa as King slowly took his retirement, the prime minister appointed him under-secretary of state for external affairs. Pearson returned to Ottawa in September 1946. He served under the new secretary of state for external affairs, St-Laurent. The two quickly acquired confidence in each other and shared their doubts about the weary prime minister. As a minister from the traditionally isolationist Quebec and as King{apos}s favoured successor, St-Laurent gave Pearson valuable cabinet and political support for an innovative and energetic foreign policy. He needed such backing because King was wary of Pearson{apos}s enthusiasms and his tendency to commit Canada to international agreements and institutions.

Pearson would remain Canada{apos}s minister of external affairs until the defeat of the Liberals in 1957. Historians have called his times the {d-0}golden years{d-1} of Canadian diplomacy. Although there are justifiable doubts about the glitter of the period, Pearson{apos}s own reputation retains its lustre. He had unusual freedom because of the consensus within the Liberal Party and the commons on the nature of the Soviet threat. His department was talented, strong, and well funded. The times were especially kind to him. He was a unilingual anglophone who had little experience outside London, Ottawa, New York, and Washington, but for a Canadian minister of external affairs in the 1950s little else mattered. He recognized that the rebirth of the European economies would make Canada a relatively less significant actor within the western alliance. He also acknowledged that Canada{apos}s relationship with the United States had become the principal concern of a Canadian foreign minister. He nonetheless retained his pre-war unease that the United States was sometimes an {d-0}intoxicated{d-1} nation and, in that state, {d-0}middle courses{d-1} were difficult to follow. Yet there was no doubt that the Canadian course in the Cold War years must follow closely behind the American juggernaut. Occasionally, a clever Canadian initiative could alter the course slightly, but Canada and the United States were on the same journey.

Although Pearson did not speak out publicly against the activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in harassing dissidents, he did annoy the Federal Bureau of Investigation and some Republican politicians, including Senator Joseph McCarthy. He refused to allow Soviet defector Igor Sergeievich Gouzenko to testify in the United States before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and denied that Canadian information confirmed that Harry Dexter White was guilty of espionage. (White was a senior American public servant who is now known to have been an agent of influence for the Soviets.) His refusal to dismiss Norman made John Edgar Hoover of the FBI suspicious of him. The Chicago Tribune, owned by Hoover{apos}s friend Colonel Robert Rutherford McCormick, called Pearson {d-0}the most dangerous man in the Western World{d-1} in 1953. These attacks and incidents deeply annoyed him, but they did not significantly affect his ability to work with the American administration under President Harry S. Truman and, after his taking office in 1953, under Republican president Dwight David Eisenhower.

The confidence in Pearson among senior Department of State and other American officials had come from his role in promoting the creation of the North Atlantic alliance, his support for American policy in the creation of Israel, and his encouragement of much higher Canadian defence spending after 1949. When the Korean War broke out in 1950, Canadian public opinion was not strongly in favour of Canadian participation. On 25 June, Pearson told journalists privately that he did not believe UN or American intervention would occur. Three days later, after learning that Truman had decided to intervene, he praised the United States for recognizing {d-0}a special responsibility which it discharged with admirable dispatch and decisiveness.{d-1} He, like Truman, believed that such an intervention under the leadership of the United States and the auspices of the UN - which was possible because the Soviets were boycotting the Security Council - would call the Communists{s-1-unknown} bluff and strengthen the UN, whose first years had been very disappointing. At his urging, the Canadians raised their commitment from a token naval presence to a significant involvement in the brutal ground war.

This debate about the Cold War and the threat of Communism, the so-called revisionist debate, has changed since the Cold War{apos}s end in the late 1980s. On the one hand, the opening of Soviet archives has revealed that Stalin was extraordinarily dangerous and cruel and that Soviet espionage had infiltrated Western security and foreign policy establishments more fully than revisionist historians had suggested. Pearson{apos}s evaluation of the menace was probably more accurate than his critics had thought. On the other hand, the opening of Canadian security files and greater attention to individual rights in Canadian society has drawn attention to discrimination against, and sometimes persecution of, not only political dissidents but also homosexuals in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The argument that Pearson{apos}s strident anti-Communism had contributed to the climate of fear that stifled dissent has some merit. Pearson had little patience with those who made revisionist arguments and the second volume of his memoirs is a reply to the revisionist historians of the late 1960s and early 1970s. On the question of treatment of dissidents, he would have had some sympathy because his support of Egerton Herbert Norman*, a Canadian diplomat accused by an American congressional committee of being a Communist agent, had made him very much a target of American extreme anti-Communists.

Because of the war in Korea and the perceived threat of a Communist attack on western Europe, Pearson had unusual freedom from normal political restraints. He chaired the NATO council in 1951-52 and in 1952 became the president of the UN{apos}s General Assembly. As president, he had difficulties with the Americans, for he had become a critic of their policies in Asia. Canada had followed the United States in refusing to recognize Communist China, but he had been deeply concerned about the possibility that the war in Korea would become a broad conflagration after the Chinese entered it in November 1950. When American general Douglas MacArthur, the commander of the UN forces in Korea, spoke openly about extending the war, Pearson decided that he must protest. In a famous speech to the Canadian and Empire clubs in Toronto on 10 April 1951, he said that the UN must not be the {d-0}instrument of any one country{d-1} and that others had the right to criticize American policy. He expressed his belief that {d-0}the days of relatively easy and automatic political relations with our neighbour are, I think, over.{d-1} And they were, even though Truman fired MacArthur later the same day.

While sharing the American conviction that the expansion of Communism must be halted and contained, Pearson deplored talk of {d-0}rolling back{d-1} Communism and worried about American excesses. The attack of Senator McCarthy and his allies on the Department of State was, in his view, dangerous and thoroughly irresponsible. The American policy on China especially bothered him. He told his son, soon to become a foreign service officer, that he had attempted and failed to moderate American attitudes toward China. In the winter of 1951 it seemed to him that {d-0}emotionalism has become the basis of [United States] policy.{d-1} Canada would still {d-0}follow{d-1} the Americans, but only to the extent of their strict obligations under the UN charter. The Korean War finally came to an end after Eisenhower became president. Pearson had irritated American secretary of state Dean Gooderham Acheson because of his insistence on advancing peace negotiations. Acheson{apos}s Republican successor, John Foster Dulles, was even more difficult and ideological in his approach and Pearson became more determined to find ways to end the Cold War chill, especially after the death of Stalin in 1953.

Pearson{apos}s focus remained firmly on the Soviet threat and he believed the United States was weakening itself and its response to that menace by excessive attention to Communist China. He considered recognition of Communist China, but American warnings of retaliation quickly dissuaded him. He was furious, as were the Americans, when the British, the French, and the Israelis, angry about the Egyptian takeover of the Suez Canal, secretly planned and carried out an attack in Egypt on 29 Oct. 1956. The Soviets began to talk of sending volunteers to aid the Egyptians; the Americans, who had not been informed of the plans, moved to condemn their traditional allies in the UN. The Australians backed the British; Canada, for the first time in its history, opposed a British war. Working closely with the Americans, Pearson tried to craft a solution that would end the divisions among Western allies and would reduce the tensions of a broader war. Early on Sunday morning, 4 November, the UN supported a Canadian resolution that called for the creation of a peace force. The British and French backed down. On 14 Oct. 1957 Pearson would receive the Nobel Peace Prize.

Although Pearson gained international laurels, the Canadian position on the Suez crisis met with strong criticism in English Canada. Reluctant to abandon the British ties that had been the foundation of their identity for almost two centuries, many English Canadians linked the Liberal government and Pearson with the increasing Americanization of Canada. They complained that the Liberals had favoured the Americans and had {d-0}knifed{d-1} Britain in the crisis. The irascible Conservative Charlotte Elizabeth Hazeltyne Whitton, mayor of Ottawa, quipped: {d-0}It{apos}s too bad [Gamal Abdel] Nasser couldn{apos}t help Mike Pearson to cross Elliot Lake [in his constituency] when Mr. Pearson did so much to help him along the Suez Canal.{d-1}

Despite Pearson{apos}s disagreements with the Americans, they recognized his skill and usefulness. When, in 1952, his name had come forward for the positions of NATO{apos}s secretary-general and the UN{apos}s secretary-general, the United States had supported his candidacy. He had resisted the NATO post and the Russians, as before, had rejected him for the UN appointment. He established strong personal ties with the Scandinavian countries and in the British Commonwealth he and Canada became an influential force. The Colombo Plan, which had been drawn up in January 1950, was Canada{apos}s first major commitment to assistance for developing countries and Pearson had been one of its architects. Although he thought Jawaharlal Nehru puzzling, he fostered the notion of a special relationship between Canada and India. Canada participated in the Geneva Conference of 1954 that sought, unsuccessfully, to bring peace to French Indochina. Canada became the Western voice on the International Control Commission that, again unsuccessfully, attempted to supervise and develop a peace settlement in the region. In October 1955 he was the first Western foreign minister to visit the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin. The trip, which featured a wild night of drinking and debate with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in the Crimea, did not persuade Pearson that the post-Stalin Soviet Union was a more benign state.

The Liberals, with St-Laurent as leader, Pearson as his likely successor, and a Gallup poll forecasting another solid majority, called an election for 10 June 1957. The polls were wrong; Progressive Conservative leader John George Diefenbaker{apos}s appeal to Anglo-Canadian nationalism was effective in western Canada, the Maritimes, and British Ontario. His eloquent denunciation of the Liberal minister of trade and commerce, Clarence Decatur Howe*, and the pipeline fiasco had also persuaded electors to vote Conservative. The American-born Howe had used closure to force a bill through the commons to create an American-financed pipeline which would bring western natural gas to Ontario. The Conservatives had opposed it bitterly because of American involvement and had sung {d-0}God save the queen{d-1} to emphasize their traditional British-Canadian nationalism. The Conservatives won 112 seats with over 38 per cent of the vote and the Liberals 105 seats with over 40 per cent of the vote. After some indecision, St-Laurent resigned as prime minister and as Liberal leader. Pearson was the strong favourite in the Liberal leadership race, especially after he was awarded the Nobel Prize. He became head of the party on 16 Jan. 1958.

Pearson{apos}s victory left him foolishly confident and his first efforts in the commons were feeble. When he called upon the new government to resign, Diefenbaker, with his brilliant sense of parliamentary timing, ridiculed the motion and on 1 February asked for a general election, to be held on 31 March. The Liberals were in disarray and the campaign soon revealed how effective Diefenbaker could be on the hustings and how unprepared Pearson was. Although Pearson and Diefenbaker were of similar background and age, Diefenbaker was the more energetic and convincing campaigner. The Conservatives won the most decisive victory recorded in Canadian federal politics, 208 seats compared to only 49 for the Liberals and 8 for the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. With characteristic black humour, Maryon Pearson remarked, {d-0}We{apos}ve lost everything. We even won our own seat.{d-1}

Prior to the conference, two of those friends, Gordon and journalist Thomas Worrall Kent, had been wary of each other. At the conference, they worked together to draft a progressive platform, one that reflected Kennedy{apos}s New Frontier policy and the ambitious programs of the Quebec government. Pearson became increasingly concerned about Quebec and he insisted that greater recognition of the French language and of the rights of French Canadians be part of the new Liberal platform. When Diefenbaker called a general election for 18 June 1962, many expected him to lose. The Liberal members had been extremely effective in the commons and Diefenbaker{apos}s ministers had fumbled badly. Nevertheless, the final results were 116 Conservatives, 100 Liberals, 30 Social Crediters/Créditistes, and 19 New Democrats. Despite the loss, it was a triumph for Pearson. Diefenbaker{apos}s government began to crumble. When he hesitated to support the Americans in the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, not only the Kennedy administration but also many traditional Conservatives turned against him. The confusion surrounding the acceptance of nuclear weapons caused turmoil within the Conservative Party; the minister of national defence, Douglas Scott Harkness*, was a strong proponent of acceptance and the minister of external affairs, Howard Charles Green*, a strong opponent.

The election of Jean Lesage{apos}s Liberal Party in Quebec in June 1960 presented new challenges for the Conservatives, who had won in 1958 because of strong support from the Union Nationale under Maurice Le Noblet Duplessis*. Pearson began to develop new policies that would reflect the liberalism of Lesage and, to some extent, of John Fitzgerald Kennedy, who was to become president of the United States in January 1961. In September 1960, just after the Liberals moved ahead of the Conservatives in a Gallup poll, the party held a study conference in Kingston. Pearson drew upon his network of friends in journalism, the universities, business, and politics to create a debate about the future of Canadian Liberalism and to draft a platform for the next Liberal government.

During the election campaign Pearson had promised {d-0}sixty days of decision,{d-1} but the first two months went badly. Gordon had supported Pearson financially since he had entered politics, had organized his leadership campaign, and had brought influential and capable friends into the Liberal Party. He expected to be minister of finance, but Pearson knew that many in the business community did not have confidence in Gordon{apos}s nationalistic views. Nevertheless, over his wife{apos}s objections, he made the appointment. Gordon turned to outside advisers to prepare the budget because he thought the Department of Finance would be unwilling to accept his nationalist policies. He presented his budget, with a withholding tax on dividends paid to non-residents and a {d-0}takeover tax{d-1} on foreign acquisitions of Canadian businesses, on 13 June 1963. Bureaucrats complained about his use of outside advisers and many in the business community expressed hostility toward his nationalism. The lack of western Canadian voices in the Liberal caucus meant that their traditional suspicion of Ontario-based nationalism was not often expressed in party debate. The president of the Montreal Stock Exchange, Eric William Kierans*, who would later become a nationalist ally of Gordon{apos}s, attacked the budget, claiming that {d-0}our friends in the western world{d-1} would realize that {d-0}we don{apos}t want them or their money and that Canadians who deal with them in even modest amounts will suffer a thirty percent expropriation of the assets involved.{d-1} The attack was unfair, but it and other criticisms led Gordon to withdraw the tax on foreign acquisitions on 19 June. The response was a call for Gordon{apos}s resignation by many major newspapers.

Pearson had opposed nuclear weapons for Canada, but on 12 Jan. 1963 he declared that the country must accept them because it had made a commitment to its allies in 1958 to arm the Bomarc anti-aircraft missiles located in northern Ontario and Quebec with nuclear warheads. Complaints came quickly from Quebec intellectual Pierre Elliott Trudeau* and, privately, from Walter Gordon and the young Liberal Norman Lloyd Axworthy. Pearson{apos}s announcement split the Conservatives and some ministers tried to secure Diefenbaker{apos}s resignation. They failed, but on 5 Feb. 1963 the government fell. Most expected Pearson to win the election, called for 8 April.

Pearson became prime minister on 22 April, but the majority government that public opinion polls had predicted and that he had craved eluded him. The Liberals had obtained 129 seats and the Conservatives 95, while the Social Crediters/Créditistes and New Democrats held the balance with 24 and 17 respectively. The following day he turned 66, an age when many Canadians had retired. His cabinet impressed Canadian journalists with its regional balance and broad experience. Paul Joseph James Martin* had served in parliament for 28 years. Newfoundland{apos}s John Whitney Pickersgill* was Diefenbaker{apos}s equal in the house. Gordon, Mitchell William Sharp*, and Charles Mills Drury* brought business experience. Guy Favreau*, the major Quebec minister, and Maurice Lamontagne* were respected in Quebec and Ottawa. The poor results in western Canada, however, meant weak representation from that region.

The Pearson government stumbled regularly between 1963 and 1965. Gordon never recovered from the budget debacle and Pearson proved no match for Diefenbaker in the cut and thrust of parliamentary debate. The most serious problem was Quebec representation in the cabinet. Pearson{apos}s support for the acceptance of nuclear weapons had weakened his position in Quebec. The nationalist Le Devoir (Montréal) attacked his stand and urged consideration of the New Democrats{s-1-unknown} stance opposing nuclear weapons; prominent francophones such as Trudeau and labour leader Jean Marchand* retreated from flirtation with the Liberals. The result was weak Quebec representation in Ottawa. The veteran Lionel Chevrier was the major Quebec minister even though he was, by origin, a Franco-Ontarian. Justice minister Favreau was able, but he was a political novice. Lamontagne, an excellent academic economist, was an uncertain politician. When, therefore, the increasingly nationalistic government of Jean Lesage in Quebec countered the federal government in domestic jurisdiction and, more troublingly, in international relations, the government response lacked force. Pearson{apos}s Quebec ministers seemed ineffectual and unable to face the challenge of a strong provincial government. The impact was immediate in the area of social policy, where the Liberal agenda was ambitious. The Quebec government anticipated a federal contributory pension scheme by presenting its own plan. It argued, with the support of other provinces concerned about federal intrusion into provincial domains, that it was within its rights. Despite strong opposition in the Liberal caucus and cabinet, Pearson agreed that the Quebec plan should be the starting point for a national program. Quebec could {d-0}opt out{d-1} of the national plan with compensation and could have its own scheme, aligned with the national one. He cleverly guided the agreement through the cabinet and the Canada and Quebec Pension plans would become a reality in 1966.

Despite its clumsy start and its minority status, the Pearson government implemented some social legislation over its two mandates, including the Canada Assistance Plan, which funded provincial welfare programs (1966), and the Guaranteed Income Supplement (1967). In addition, there was much more funding for university research and university capital expenditures. The government had created the Canada Student Loans Plan in 1964. Combined with provincial support for post-secondary education, these policies transformed the Canadian university system. Pearson was fortunate in that the Canadian economy was strong during his tenure as prime minister. Starting in 1965 and culminating with the creation of an apolitical Immigration Board in 1967, important changes were made to Canada{apos}s immigration policy. Under the leadership of the powerful Quebec minister Jean Marchand, who had been persuaded to join the Liberal Party and enter the cabinet, it was closely linked to the government{apos}s labour policy.

Gordon offered his resignation the next day; Pearson refused. Nevertheless, the distrust between the two friends grew. Pearson himself paid little heed to the details of the budget, but the appearance of a separatist movement in Quebec had captured his full attention. On 21 April 1963 a bomb placed by Quebec separatists had killed a janitor working in a Canadian army recruiting office. On 17 May dynamite had exploded in mail boxes in Montreal. Quebec journalist André Laurendeau* had recommended, in January 1962, a royal commission to investigate bilingualism and Pearson had promised to act. On 19 July 1963 he appointed Laurendeau and Arnold Davidson Dunton* co-chairs of the royal commission on bilingualism and biculturalism, and the so-called Quebec issue became the major domestic concern of Pearson{apos}s years in office. The royal commission was immediately controversial, although few suggested that the question of Quebec{apos}s role in Canadian confederation could be ignored. Critics, especially in the west questioned the focus on the duality of Canada and, though the commission{apos}s terms of reference provided that other ethnic groups should be studied, argued for a broader approach that reflected the diverse origins of the country{apos}s population. The seeds of multiculturalism were born.

If Canada became less American in its approach to social welfare, it became less European in its symbols. The country had no national flag and Liberals had occasionally proposed one. Despite such musings, King and St-Laurent had wisely avoided the controversial issue. Pearson, however, was determined and in 1964, against the advice of many, he insisted on pushing forward. Diefenbaker rallied British Canadians in defence of the Union Jack and the Red Ensign; Liberals told Pearson that he was creating political difficulties over a purely symbolic issue. Nevertheless, he persisted and in the commons on 15 December, with the help of the New Democrats, he managed to secure approval of a design. Liberal mp John Ross Matheson, a war veteran who championed the new flag, would later write that {d-0}the fight for a flag became a crusade for national unity, for justice to all Canadians, for Canada{apos}s dignity.{d-1} Not all Canadians agreed; many Conservative members wept and the province of British Columbia would not raise the new flag in daylight on its inaugural day. As for the French Canadians, who one might expect to have welcomed the new flag, Trudeau claimed that they did not give {d-0}a tinker{apos}s damn{d-1} about it.

This flood of legislation was broken up by a general election. The weakness of the Pearson government in the matter of Quebec representation had been made worse by scandals that left even fewer French Canadians in the cabinet. These scandals were the face of national politics that Canadians viewed in 1964 and 1965 and they did not like what they saw. There was, as journalist Peter Charles Newman would later write, a {d-0}distemper{d-1} in Canada during Pearson{apos}s time in office. Writing in 1990 about his 1968 book on the Pearson years, Newman would recall that {d-0}most of the people{d-1} he had talked with in airports, at dinner parties, and around hamburger stands were {d-0}voicing a dismay at our politics that was hardening into cynicism or despair.{d-1} The scandals were the manifestation of profound changes in the Canadian political system that occurred during the 1960s. In the case of the Mafia-linked drug dealer Lucien Rivard, ministerial assistants and even Pearson{apos}s parliamentary secretary had supported Rivard{apos}s attempt to obtain release on bail. More seriously, a ministerial assistant had tried to bribe the lawyer acting on the American request for Rivard{apos}s extradition. Justice minister Favreau was drawn into the fray when he decided not to prosecute the assistant. He told Pearson about the developing scandal in September 1964 but Pearson left the impression that he had not learned about it until November. Finally, Pearson corrected the impression in a letter to the special public inquiry, headed by justice Frédéric Dorion, which he had created to investigate the scandal. Favreau{apos}s reputation was shattered; Pearson{apos}s was damaged. Lamontagne and immigration minister René Tremblay saw their careers destroyed over their failure to pay for furniture from a bankrupt Montreal dealer. Yvon Dupuis, another Quebec minister, although later acquitted, was fired from cabinet because he faced criminal charges involving the acceptance of a bribe to accelerate the granting of a racetrack licence. In the commons, Diefenbaker{apos}s courtroom skills cut through the weak answers of the Liberal ministers and his list of French names linked with the scandals, pronounced in halting French, infuriated francophones.

Drug deals, bribes, and sleazy furniture sales were not as titillating as Canada{apos}s major political sex scandal, the so-called Munsinger affair. Gerda Munsinger had been involved with the Soviets in Germany. While living in Montreal she had had an affair with a Russian lover and, simultaneously, from 1958 to 1960 with Pierre Sévigny*, Diefenbaker{apos}s associate minister of national defence from 1959 to 1963. The relationship attracted the interest of the RCMP and wiretaps. In the heat of debate in the commons on 4 March 1966, Liberal justice minister Lucien Cardin taunted Diefenbaker about the {d-0}Monseignor case.{d-1} Rumours billowed about the involvement of a Tory minister with an apparently dead but once very sexy spy. Yet another inquiry engaged Canadians{s-1-unknown} curiosity and exposed Sévigny. Diefenbaker and Pearson had both behaved badly, the prime minister in calling for the RCMP file on Munsinger and, in Diefenbaker{apos}s view, threatening him with revelations unless the Conservative leader relented in the commons. For his part, Diefenbaker had dragged up old charges that Pearson had passed information to Communists when he was in Washington.

Although health is an area of provincial responsibility, the Liberals had promised a health care program in their platform of 1919, had dangled it before the electorate in 1945, and had made it part of the platform in 1963. The successful but very difficult creation of such a program in Saskatchewan by its socialist government in 1961 had set a standard that Pearson knew the Liberals must match, especially since the Saskatchewan premier, Thomas Clement Douglas*, had become leader of the federal New Democratic Party that year. Pearson did little to shape the Canadian Medicare program, but he did challenge the reluctant provinces, notably Ontario, to accept that Canadians must have equal access to state-provided medical services. Parliament passed the Medical Care Act in 1966 but financial exigencies postponed its operation for a year. The effect of this social legislation was to make Canada more European and less American in its approach to social welfare. There had been no counterpart to Roosevelt{apos}s New Deal, but Canada caught up quickly in the 1960s and moved well beyond the American standard.

The scandals, the bad mood in the house, and the growing divisions in the Conservative Party persuaded Liberal organizers to call an election. The economy was strong and Oliver Quayle, the American pollster hired by Gordon, reported a Liberal upsurge in the spring of 1965. Although Quayle admitted that Pearson{apos}s image was not strongly positive and that most Canadians thought he was doing only a {d-0}fair job,{d-1} 46 per cent believed that he would be a better prime minister than Diefenbaker, favoured by 23 per cent of Canadians. Faint praise indeed and enough to cause hesitations. Pearson finally called an election for 8 November after Gordon assured him that he would win a majority and that he would resign if the Liberals failed to obtain one.

Diefenbaker once again proved to be an excellent campaigner, overcoming a large Liberal lead in the initial polls. The Liberals pointed to a remarkable list of achievements: the Canada-United States Automotive Products Agreement (Autopact), the pension legislation, student loans, a revision of the tax system, greatly expanded support for post-secondary and technical education, bilingualism and biculturalism, and a more liberal immigration policy that appealed to new Canadians. Diefenbaker shifted debate away from these issues towards Lucien Rivard{apos}s {d-0}escape{d-1} from prison, the free furniture for cabinet ministers, and Pearson{apos}s lacklustre leadership. Pearson{apos}s campaign was marred by protesters and, at the final giant rally in Toronto, the failure of the sound system. In Quebec, he had recruited three candidates to rebuild the shattered Quebec front bench: journalist and social activist Gérard Pelletier*, Marchand, and, controversially because of his criticism of the Liberals{s-1-unknown} nuclear policy, Trudeau. When the campaign ended, the Liberals had won less of the popular vote than in 1963 and, with 131 of 265 seats, were denied a majority. The Conservatives had obtained 97 seats and the NDP 21, with Créditistes, Social Crediters, and independent candidates making up the balance.

Pearson offered his resignation to cabinet; it was refused. Gordon submitted his resignation to Pearson; to his disappointment, it was accepted. The Gordon team, which included Keith Davey, Richard O{apos}Hagan, James Allan Coutts, and Kent left with him. In a study of the Liberal Party, Joseph Wearing correctly suggests that the Gordon approach concentrated on urban Canada and especially Toronto, Gordon{apos}s home. It was the achievement of the group that so-called Tory Toronto would be no more; however, the aftermath of 1965 was the shift of attention and power to Montreal and Quebec.

Quebec increasingly preoccupied the government after the election of 1965. Pelletier, Marchand, and Trudeau had entered federal politics because they feared that Quebec would drift towards separation as Lesage{apos}s Liberals became increasingly nationalist. The surprising defeat of the Liberals by the Union Nationale in 1966 created a sense of crisis. The new premier, Daniel Johnson*, spoke of {d-0}equality or independence{d-1} and the defeated Liberals, especially the highly popular René Lévesque*, began to muse about an independence platform for their party. Simultaneously, the French government under Charles de Gaulle lavished attention on visiting Quebec politicians while regularly snubbing Canadian representatives. As a diplomat who had seen how the ties of the British empire came undone so quickly, Pearson believed that the French behaviour was profoundly dangerous and that Quebec{apos}s demands for its own foreign policy bore the seeds of the disintegration of Canada. Despite these doubts, which were not fully shared by his minister of external affairs, Paul Martin, Pearson accepted the demands of de Gaulle that he begin his visit during Canada{apos}s centennial year in Quebec City and that he arrive on a French warship, the Colbert.

De Gaulle toured Quebec City on 23 July 1967 and, after some controversial statements, travelled to Montreal the following day. There, on the balcony of the Hôtel de Ville, he made his famous declaration, {d-0}Vive le Québec libre!{d-1} A furious Pearson declared the remarks {d-0}unacceptable{d-1} and de Gaulle returned to France without visiting Ottawa. Although the event did not break the buoyant spirit of centennial year, it did underline the divisions within Canada. French newspapers tended to believe that Pearson overreacted while English newspapers expressed outrage. Within the government, Trudeau and several officials (notably Allan Ezra Gotlieb, Peter Michael Pitfield, Marc Lalonde, and Marcel Cadieux) met regularly to counter what they considered the drift in the federal government{apos}s policies in the face of Quebec{apos}s initiatives. They began to formulate a strong response to French support for separatism and to the constitutional demands of Quebec. With Trudeau as justice minister, the agenda shifted to, on the one hand, a more coherent constitutional program and, on the other, a more liberal social agenda that responded to the spirit of the times. Trudeau{apos}s famous statement that the government had no place in the bedrooms of the nation signalled a revolution in its attitude toward private behaviour, one that was far from the ethos of the manse where Pearson had been born or, for that matter, the Catholic home and schools of Trudeau{apos}s early years.

Pearson called a press conference for 14 Dec. 1967 and announced he would resign in the new year. The Conservatives had a new leader, Robert Lorne Stanfield*, and were ahead in the public opinion polls. Pearson{apos}s caucus and cabinet were restless as they prepared to face an election and a possible loss. More troubling to Pearson was the issue of Canadian national unity and he began to work quietly to assure that his successor came from Quebec. His first choice was Marchand, but Marchand recommended Trudeau, whose intellect had impressed Pearson, but whose political skills had not. Pearson did not designate Trudeau his successor, as King had done with St-Laurent, but he told his closest friends that Trudeau was his choice. It was, he believed, the only bet worth taking, given the challenges from Quebec. It was a bet he won. Despite his recent re-conversion to Liberalism, Trudeau won the convention and had parliament dissolved before Pearson{apos}s colleagues and foes could pay tribute to him. The journalist and former mp Douglas Mason Fisher later recalled that in April 1968, when Pearson left office, there was an atmosphere of {d-0}indifference{d-1} and {d-0}a notable keenness by his successor to separate his government distinctly from the bad Pearson years - scandals, leaks, messy, staggering parliaments and disorganized ventures.{d-1}

Because of Pearson{apos}s own distinguished background in external affairs, he had retained responsibility for a few issues in this department, delegating responsibility for the remainder to his minister, Paul Martin, and government officials. The Commonwealth was a prime ministerial gathering and there Pearson demonstrated his extraordinary diplomatic skills in dealing with Britain and others on the difficult Rhodesian and South African issues. There was one notable exception to his diplomacy: his decision in April 1965 to speak out against American bombing of North Vietnam. Pearson had had earlier meetings with President Lyndon Baines Johnson and had become concerned about Johnson{apos}s style and determination to achieve victory in Vietnam. Like other Canadians, he gave Johnson much latitude because of the difficult circumstances of his accession to power after Kennedy{apos}s assassination and because of the apparent extremist character of Barry Morris Goldwater, who had been the Republican presidential candidate in 1964. Nevertheless, the build-up of American forces in Vietnam troubled him greatly. He feared that the United States would be drawn into a long war and that the North Atlantic alliance would be fundamentally weakened. After conversations with American friends, he decided to call for a halt to the bombing. Martin and the Department of External Affairs opposed the idea, but Pearson used the occasion of an award he was to receive from Temple University in Philadelphia on 2 April 1965 to call for {d-0}a suspension of air strikes against North Vietnam at the right time{d-1} in order to provide {d-0}Hanoi authorities with an opportunity, if they wish to take it, to inject some flexibility into their policy without appearing to do so as the direct result of military pressure.{d-1} These careful words brought an invitation to meet Johnson later that day at his Camp David retreat in Maryland. There Johnson berated and swore at Pearson and made his displeasure clear to the press. Their relationship never recovered, although later, in 1966, Pearson agreed to the use of a Canadian diplomat, Chester Alvin Ronning, as a messenger to the North Vietnamese. Canada, ironically, had benefited from the increased defence purchases that came with the Vietnam War and many Americans of draft age had migrated to Canada and contributed much to Canadian life, especially in the universities. Vietnam, the race riots in Detroit and other American cities, and the assassination of President Kennedy were causes of the surge of Canadian nationalism that occurred in English Canada during the centennial year of 1967.

In 1968 Pearson became chancellor of Carleton University in Ottawa and he lectured there in history and political science until the fall of 1972. He chaired a historic commission on international development. Its report, Partners in development: report of the Commission on International Development (New York, 1969), called for a systematic transfer of resources and attention from the rich west and north to the poor south. The so-called {d-0}Pearson Report{d-1} was the first sustained evaluation of international development assistance. It deeply influenced future debate and policy. Pearson had seldom seen Trudeau after 1968 and the new government{apos}s foreign policy review, with its criticism of post-war strategies, deeply wounded him. Still, he publicly and privately supported Trudeau in the general election of 1972. By that time he knew that he would not vote again. He told his old friend Senator Keith Davey that he would not be able to share his dismay if his beloved Toronto Maple Leafs did not make the playoffs in the spring. He had known since 1970 that cancer would soon cause his death. Despite Maryon{apos}s hopes, he would not retire. On learning of his cancer diagnosis, he rushed his memoirs to publication. The first of his three volumes appeared in 1972 and was an immediate best-seller. His elegant prose and self-deprecating wit made it the finest prime ministerial memoir. It contributed to what Fisher called the rapid {d-0}hallowing{d-1} of Pearson after his death on 28 Dec. 1972.

One of the most severe critics of Pearson was his former colleague at the University of Toronto, historian Donald Grant Creighton, whose biography of Sir John A. Macdonald* Pearson had generously praised in a personal letter to Creighton. Creighton, like Pearson, was the son of a Methodist parson, a graduate of Toronto and Oxford, and a historian by training, but in the 1950s their agreement about the character of Canadian history and nationality had dissolved. For Creighton, the loss of British identity and the post-war political and economic integration with the United States were giant steps on a path leading towards Canada{apos}s disintegration. The events of the 1960s - the rise of Quebec separatism and secular nationalism, the promotion of biculturalism and bilingualism, and the deluge of American popular media - made Canada{apos}s first century a study in decline and disappointment.

It was Pearson{apos}s experience as a politician and as a diplomat that persuaded him in the 1960s that French Canada must become more integrally part of the Canadian political and economic system or it would go its separate way. Although he knew little about French Canada or about Quebec, he made Quebec{apos}s place in Canada the focus of his government, thus slowing the momentum for separation. The bitterness of Canadian politics during the mid 1960s derived in part from the sea change that came with the integration of French Canadian politics into the policy centres of the Canadian government. Never again would a Canadian cabinet have a few francophone ministers who could not speak their own language in cabinet and whose deputies dealt with them in English. After Pearson, no Canadian prime minister was unilingual. Ottawa became a different city, Canada a different country.

If he had not become Canada{apos}s prime minister, Pearson would still be a significant figure in Canadian history as the country{apos}s only Nobel Peace laureate and the most eminent Canadian diplomat. Some may cavil, as Creighton did, about Pearson{apos}s work as a diplomat, but few deny his skill and influence. His prime ministerial tenure, however, remains controversial. During his turbulent and fairly brief years in office, his governments transformed Canada. Although Canadians did not want a more open immigration policy, his governments introduced it, transforming the face of urban Canada. Although bilingualism was controversial, the Pearson governments adopted it and set the framework for an official policy that made the federal public service so different from what it had been. Although social welfare was, constitutionally, a provincial responsibility, the Pearson governments legislated boldly in the field and made Canada a country unlike its American neighbour, which had previously been the more generous North American nation in its social policies. Later in the 20th century, social disturbances in Canadian cities, separatism in the province of Quebec, and neo-conservative philosophies made some question the achievement of the Pearson years. Yet foes and friends already recognize that Pearson was a remarkable Canadian whose life and work profoundly changed the country he served.

The major primary source for this biography is the Lester B. Pearson fonds at Library and Arch. Canada (Ottawa) (MG 26, N). It contains an abundance of public papers, Pearson{apos}s correspondence with his colleagues, and a diary that he occasionally maintained. The collection is particularly good for the period between 1935 and 1948, when his career as a foreign service officer advanced quickly.

Many other manuscript collections at Library and Arch. Canada offer extensive information on Pearson. The William Lyon Mackenzie King papers (MG 26, J) have much that is relevant to any study of Pearson and there are many comments on him and his ambitions in King{apos}s diary. The Louis St-Laurent papers (MG 26, L) are less useful, but Pearson{apos}s activities in the late 1940s and early 1950s are described well in the records of the Department of External Affairs (RG 25) and in its Documents on Canadian external relations, ed. R. A. Mackay et al. (24v. to date, Ottawa, 1967-?). Because Pearson was one of the most eminent diplomats of the time, the records of the British Foreign Office and its successor, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, held by the National Arch. (London, Eng.) and the records of the American Department of State (RG 59) at the National Arch. and Records Administration (Washington) offer many comments on him and his activities. On the whole, the British documents are a richer source.

The papers of John George Diefenbaker at the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker Centre for the Study of Canada, Univ. of Saskatchewan (Saskatoon), provide a sustained criticism of Pearson{apos}s political career. Before he became a minister in the Pearson government in 1967, Pierre Elliott Trudeau had also been a frequent critic of Pearson and his remarks are found in his papers at Library and Arch. Canada (MG 26, O). Other collections with Pearson material include the Arnold Danford Patrick Heeney fonds (MG 30, E144) and especially the Walter Lockhart Gordon papers (MG 32, B44), both at Library and Arch. Canada, the Tom Kent fonds at Queen{apos}s Univ. Arch. (Kingston, Ont.), and the Bruce Hutchison fonds (MsC 22) at the Univ. of Calgary Library, Special Coll.

Pearson wrote the best prime ministerial memoirs: Mike: the memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, pc, cc, om, obe, ma, lld (3v., Toronto, 1972-75). The first volume, 1897-1948, is superb, although guarded in discussing personal affairs. The second, 1948-1957, edited by J. A. Munro and A. I. Inglis, is a solid academic account of Pearson{apos}s career as minister of external affairs. The last volume, 1957-1968, also edited by Munro and Inglis, regrettably was completed after his death and does not possess the voice and accuracy of the first two. As a public figure, Pearson also published numerous books of speeches and reflections. The best is Words and occasions: an anthology of speeches and articles selected from his papers (Toronto, 1970), which brings together some of his early essays and speeches. Others include: Democracy in world politics (Toronto, 1955), Diplomacy in the nuclear age (Toronto, 1959), Peace in the family of man: the Reith Lectures, 1968 (Toronto and New York, 1969), and The Commonwealth, 1970 (Cambridge, Eng., 1971).

There are several biographies of Pearson. The longest is John English, The life of Lester Pearson (2v., New York and Toronto, 1989-92), divided into two periods, Shadow of heaven, 1897-1948 and The worldly years, 1949-1972. Earlier biographies include Robert Bothwell{apos}s perceptive Pearson: his life and world, gen. ed., W. K. Lamb (Toronto, 1978), the popular J. R. Beal, The Pearson phenomenon (Toronto, 1964), W. B. Ayre, Mr. Pearson and Canada{apos}s revolution by diplomacy ([Montreal, 1966]), and Bruce Thordarson, Lester Pearson, diplomat and politician (Toronto, 1974). Another work that has Pearson as a principal player is the academic study by Joseph Levitt, Pearson and Canada{apos}s role in nuclear disarmament and arms control negotiations, 1945-1957 (Montreal, 1993), which should be read with G. A. H. Pearson{apos}s Seize the day: Lester B. Pearson and crisis diplomacy (Ottawa, 1993).

There are several contemporary works that deal with Pearson{apos}s controversial tenure as prime minister. P. C. Newman{apos}s two books Renegade in power: the Diefenbaker years (Toronto, [1963]) and The distemper of our times: Canadian politics in transition, 1963-1968 (Toronto, [1968]; repr. with new intro., 1990) are important in the history of Canadian journalism and are deeply informed, though highly critical. Similarly, some of Pearson{apos}s colleagues have been critical of his leadership, notably Julia Verlyn (Judy) LaMarsh in Memoirs of a bird in a gilded cage (Toronto, 1968) and W. L. Gordon in A political memoir (Toronto, 1977). P. [J. J.] Martin is more balanced in A very public life (2v., Ottawa, 1983-85), as are J. W. Pickersgill{apos}s Seeing Canada whole: a memoir (Markham, Ont., 1994), M. [W.] Sharp{apos}s Which reminds me . . . : a memoir (Toronto, 1994), and Trudeau{apos}s Memoirs (Toronto, 1993).

Among the other sources consulted are: Canada, House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa), 1948-68; D. G. Creighton, The forked road: Canada, 1939-1957 (Toronto, 1976); Douglas Fisher, {d-0}A personal view: the quick, unusual hallowing of Lester B. Pearson,{d-1} Executive ([Don Mills, Ont.]), 15 (1973), nos.7/8: 54; H. L. Keenleyside, Memoirs (2v., Toronto, 1981-82); J. R. Matheson, Canada{apos}s flag: a search for a country (Boston, 1980); Denis Smith, Diplomacy of fear: Canada and the Cold War, 1941-1948 (Toronto, 1988); and Reginald Whitaker and Gary Marcuse, Cold War Canada: the making of a national insecurity state, 1945-1957 (Toronto, 1994).

There are numerous works that touch upon the varied aspects of Pearson{apos}s career. Among the most important are Denis Smith, Rogue Tory: the life and legend of John G. Diefenbaker (Toronto, 1995), and several works by J. L. Granatstein: A man of influence: Norman A. Robertson and Canadian statecraft, 1929-68 (Ottawa, 1981), The Ottawa men: the civil service mandarins, 1935-1957 (Toronto, 1982), and Canada, 1957-1967: the years of uncertainty and innovation (Toronto, 1986). Two more specialized works also merit attention: Stephen Azzi, Walter Gordon and the rise of Canadian nationalism (Montreal, 1999), and Greg Donaghy, Tolerant allies: Canada and the United States, 1963-1968 (Montreal, 2002). Finally, the centenary of Pearson{apos}s birth brought forth an excellent compilation, Pearson: the unlikely gladiator, ed. Norman Hillmer (Montreal, 1999).

He was not, nor did he expect to be, appointed to the new cabinet as a representative of Manitoba. Dr William James Roche*, the mp for Marquette since 1896, and Robert Rogers, the master of the province{apos}s Conservative machine and a member of Premier Rodmond Palen Roblin*{apos}s cabinet, stood ahead of him, and both became ministers. Meighen{apos}s growing command of parliamentary procedure soon found an outlet, however. When the Liberals held up the government{apos}s Naval Aid Bill, Borden turned to his young Manitoba protégé to find a way out. Meighen urged the adoption of a form of closure that was already operating in the British parliament, and suggested an ingenious ploy by which the rule could be implemented in the Canadian House of Commons without sparking an even more protracted debate. Borden introduced the motion for closure on 9 April 1913; although the enraged Liberals fought it tooth and nail, their efforts were in vain. Closure was passed after two weeks of heated debate, followed three weeks later by the bill (which was defeated in the Senate). Meighen{apos}s role behind the scenes soon became known, for it was he who explained the procedural details in the commons. Opposition mps mockingly saluted him as the {d-0}Arthur{d-1} of the rule. Borden too was impressed. On 26 June Meighen was sworn in to the vacant position of solicitor general, which was then not part of cabinet.

In the commons Meighen faced not one but two new leaders. In addition to King, there was Thomas Crerar, the former Unionist minister of agriculture, who now headed a recently coalesced grouping of agrarian mps calling themselves the Progressive Party. This situation made for a highly competitive atmosphere during the 1921 session, though the government was able to sustain its position in key votes by margins of 20 to 30. In the debates over the throne speech and the budget, the Liberals challenged the government{apos}s right to continue holding office in the face of by-election defeats, but Meighen held fast. With an eye to the upcoming election, he made moderate but consistent tariff protection his constant theme. Significant legislation included bills to ratify a trade treaty with France and to complete the takeover of the Grand Trunk Railway. The severity of the post-war recession increased public discontent, while paradoxically convincing the government of the need for budgetary retrenchment. In April a royal commission was established to investigate the grain trade, a partial response to farmers{s-1-unknown} demands for the reinstitution of the post-war wheat board.

At the close of the session in June 1921, Meighen travelled with his wife to attend the Imperial Conference in London. Faced with the problem of reconciling the dominions{s-1-unknown} growing autonomy with the need for a common imperial foreign policy, the British government had decided to convene a {d-0}Peace Cabinet{d-1} meeting for the purposes of informing and consulting the senior colonies. Although defence and constitutional adjustments were discussed, the chief topic proved to be the Anglo-Japanese alliance. For almost 20 years a pact of understanding and assistance had linked the two empires. Westminster, strongly supported by Australia and New Zealand, favoured the retention of the treaty. Meighen feared its renewal would alienate the United States. As early as February 1921, supported by a prescient memorandum from Loring Cheney Christie* of the Department of External Affairs, Meighen (its ex officio minister) had recommended to the British government the termination of the alliance, followed by an international conference of Pacific powers. Supported in London by Jan Christiaan Smuts of South Africa, he carried the day. At the ensuing Washington Conference on disarmament, the alliance was replaced by a multilateral agreement.

The Çanak crisis underscored a serious political dilemma: the incompatibility of some of Meighen{apos}s deepest beliefs with the prevailing views of French-speaking Quebecers. On 9 July 1920 Henri Bourassa had condemned the new leader in Le Devoir (Montréal): {d-0}Mr. Meighen represents, in person and temperament, in his attitudes and his past declarations, the utmost that Anglo-Saxon jingoism has to offer that is most brutal, most exclusive, most anti-Canadian.{d-1} Through 1923 and 1924 there was little reason to think that Quebecers had changed their minds. The encouraging results of provincial elections and federal by-elections indicated clearly that the pendulum was swinging back to Meighen{apos}s Tories in Ontario, British Columbia, and the Maritimes, but not in Quebec. The party could not even win a by-election fought on the tariff issue in September 1924 in the once Tory riding of St Antoine, in the heart of protectionist Montreal. The Liberals retained the seat and many, including the influential Montreal Daily Star and Gazette, blamed Meighen for the debacle.

Although Meighen sought to avoid open conflict with the new leader, he was singularly unimpressed with Manion{apos}s performance. Where Meighen would have harassed the Liberals mercilessly for their tepid preparations for war, Manion simply echoed the government{apos}s pledge to avoid conscription in any conflict. On the question of railway deficits, Meighen reversed his long-standing opposition to the amalgamation of the Canadian National Railways and the CPR, and supported a Senate motion that advocated unified management. This volte-face angered Manion, who was publicly opposed to such a step. When the 1940 election campaign began, Meighen stayed out of the fray, as he had in 1935. He was not surprised at the drubbing administered to his party by the Liberals, though he regarded the King ministry with barely concealed contempt. When some Conservatives urged him to leave the Senate and reassume the leadership, however, he declined. Manion, who had lost his own seat, was replaced by Richard Burpee Hanson* of New Brunswick, who provided competent if unexciting parliamentary direction. The stiffest opposition criticism still came from Meighen, whose public and Senate speeches deplored government hypocrisy and inaction on preparations for war. {d-0}I cannot agree that we are doing our part,{d-1} he thundered in the Senate on 13 Nov. 1940.

Sensing the growing demand that he take the Conservative helm, in 1941 Meighen approached John Bracken*, the Liberal-Progressive premier of Manitoba, to see if he could be persuaded to come to Ottawa and take on the job. Though flattered, Bracken remained on the sidelines as the pressure on Meighen mounted. He despised King and despaired of ever seeing the Liberals mobilize a full war effort, but he still resisted the call, feeling himself too old at 68 to accept the challenge. King certainly did not want him back in the commons. Meighen{apos}s debating skills and grasp of administrative detail and parliamentary procedure were exceptional. King understandably regarded the possibility of his old foe{apos}s return with foreboding, as he revealed in his diary on 6 Nov. 1941: {d-0}I am getting past the time when I can fight in public with a man of Meighen{apos}s type who is sarcastic, vitriolic and the meanest type of politician.{d-1} At a party meeting in Ottawa that month, Meighen launched another blistering assault on the Liberal government{apos}s faltering war effort. Subsequently, the delegates voted by a margin of 37-13 to offer the vacant party leadership to Meighen. Citing the lack of unanimity and noting that the meeting was called for other purposes, he declined the honour. The delegates persisted and, in a subsequent motion, they unanimously requested that he accept. Reluctantly, Meighen agreed and he assumed control on 12 November, but on the condition that the Conservative Party would commit itself to {d-0}compulsory selective service over the whole field of war.{d-1} No longer would the party follow public opinion, as it had under Manion and Hanson. With Meighen back at the helm, the Conservatives would attempt to lead it.

Any student of Meighen{apos}s life and career will be indebted to the works of Roger Graham, whose magnum opus is Arthur Meighen: a biography (3v., Toronto, 1960-65). In addition, Graham edited a volume in the Issues in Canadian Hist. series, The King-Byng affair, 1926: a question of responsible government (Toronto, 1967), penned a Canadian Hist. Assoc. booklet, Arthur Meighen ([Ottawa], 1968), and contributed a fascinating analytical chapter, {d-0}Some political ideas of Arthur Meighen,{d-1} in The political ideas of the prime ministers of Canada, ed. Marcel Hamelin (Ottawa, 1969), 107-20. Graham{apos}s approach is both scholarly and laudatory. His work needs to be read alongside the first two volumes, covering 1874-1932, of R. MacG. Dawson and H. B. Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King: a political biography (3v., Toronto, 1958-76).

Meighen could not forget his own two boys in uniform: Ted was in the Royal Canadian Artillery while Max served in the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps. {d-0}I never knew what human longing was until separated by war from the sons I love so much,{d-1} he had written in March 1941. {d-0}I sit in my office just gazing on the folder with its two photos.{d-1} Such fatherly devotion gave a harder edge to his attacks on the Liberals. It was not just that he had warned of impending disaster through the 1930s. Now, his own kin were putting their lives on the line, yet the country was still not on a full war footing. Not surprisingly, he fought the by-election of 9 Feb. 1942 in York South on the issue of compulsory service. Occasioned by his need as party leader to obtain a seat - he had left the Senate on 19 January - the battle took on a decidedly nasty tone. The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation attacked him as yesterday{apos}s man and a tool of big financial interests. Officially, the Liberals stayed out of the contest but most of their foot soldiers supported Joseph William Noseworthy, the CCF standard-bearer. King played his part by announcing a national plebiscite on the issue of conscription, thus spiking the Conservative guns. Moreover, the CCF, in an appeal to working-class voters, called not just for a full war effort but for social justice after the war. Meighen met humiliating defeat in a traditional Tory riding.

To avoid censure, King decided that parliament should be dissolved and an election called. Governor General Lord Byng*, the thoroughly honourable soldier who had commanded the Canadian Corps in France, refused his request. A surprised King abruptly resigned, leaving the country without a government. When Byng offered Meighen the chance to form a ministry, he accepted, though not without misgivings. His brief administration (Canada{apos}s shortest until the 1980s) would run from 29 June to 25 September. By the rules of the day, mps who accepted cabinet appointment had to resign their seats and seek re-election. In a session where divisions were routinely decided by a handful of votes, the resignation of a dozen frontbenchers would be self-defeating. As a temporary measure, Meighen decided upon the legal, though unusual, ploy of appointing acting ministers. To become prime minister, however, he could not avoid resigning his own seat. Leadership of the Conservative forces in the commons fell to less skilled hands. The new government survived three key votes, but a motion in July by J. A. Robb, questioning the constitutional validity of Meighen{apos}s acting ministry, killed it. Citing dubious constitutional precedents, and alleging British interference, King persuaded a handful of Progressives, who only days earlier had voted to censure his government, to switch their allegiance. The Robb motion carried by a single vote, the decisive margin provided by a Progressive who broke his pairing agreement.

Arthur Meighen{apos}s paternal grandfather, Gordon, was a Presbyterian Ulsterman who left Londonderry in 1839 for Upper Canada. Five years later he acquired a farm lot in the southwest part of the province, near St Marys, where he became the local schoolmaster. At his death in 1859 his 13-year-old son, Joseph, left school to run the farm. Marriage in 1871 and six children followed in orderly progression. The oldest boy, Arthur, showed more aptitude for book learning than farm work. Accordingly, his parents moved to the outskirts of St Marys so he could attend high school without the expense of boarding. Arthur did his share of chores on the family{apos}s dairy farm; at the same time he read voraciously, maintained first-class honours, and took part in the debating activities of the school{apos}s Literary Society. His home environment, he later recollected, instilled in him {d-0}the immeasurable value of sound education and the equally limitless and permanent importance of habits of industry and thrift.{d-1} Upon graduation in 1892, he enrolled at the University of Toronto, majoring in mathematics. Unlike his more worldly contemporary William Lyon Mackenzie King*, Meighen did not cut a broad swath on campus, limiting his scope to his courses, wide reading in English, history, and science, and enthusiastic participation in the mock parliament. In 1896 he received his ba with honours in mathematics; the next year he returned to Toronto to earn teaching qualifications at the Ontario Normal College.

In the federal election four years later, Meighen himself carried the Conservative colours in Portage la Prairie. His nomination was uncontested, it being assumed that the Liberal incumbent, John Crawford, was a lock to hold the constituency. Meighen jumped into the campaign with vigour, travelling to the four corners of the riding by wagon or buggy. He proved to be an effective speaker. His opponent anticipated an easy ride on the coat-tails of Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier*. On polling day, 26 Oct. 1908, Meighen won by a narrow margin of 250 votes and he went to Ottawa, where he sat in the backbenches of the opposition led by Robert Laird Borden*. He made but two brief speeches in his first session of parliament, though they did catch Borden{apos}s attention, and scarcely more in 1910. His one significant oration that year, in connection with a proposed railway investigation, even earned the praise of Laurier, who remarked to a colleague, {d-0}Borden has found a man at last.{d-1} In 1911 Meighen burnished his credentials as a progressive prairie Conservative with speeches advocating a reduction in tariffs on farm implements and stricter limits on business trusts. He took no part in the Conservatives{s-1-unknown} obstruction in 1911 of Laurier{apos}s reciprocity bill, but he campaigned hard for his party{apos}s traditional National Policy of protection in the general election in September. Nationally, Borden led his Conservative forces to victory; in Portage la Prairie, Meighen upped his winning margin to 675 votes.

While still a backbencher Meighen had acquired a reputation as a progressive Conservative. Just prior to his appointment, he, Richard Bedford Bennett*, William Folger Nickle, and others had voted against amendments to the Bank Act that they considered harmful to prairie farmers. In his new post, Meighen found himself defending the government from his erstwhile maverick allies. Borden assigned him the task of negotiating a financial arrangement with the Canadian Northern Railway, which was teetering on the edge of bankruptcy and threatening to bring down several provincial governments and a major chartered bank with it. After several weeks of investigation and hard bargaining, Meighen and his small team of government officials presented the cabinet with a proposal: a $45 million government guarantee of Canadian Northern bonds in return for a mortgage and a significant share of common stock. The cabinet was pleased, and Meighen was asked to pilot the resulting bill through the commons. Here, in May 1914, he encountered his fiercest opposition from his fellow western Tory, Bennett, who branded him {d-0}the gram[o]phone{d-1} of Sir William Mackenzie* and Sir Donald Mann*, the entrepreneurs who had created the Canadian Northern. The bill nonetheless became law, and Meighen continued to impress Borden as a troubleshooter. On 2 Oct. 1915 the prime minister would elevate his solicitor general to cabinet rank.

Canada entered World War I united, in parliament and across the country, but the unity did not last. By 1915 partisan divisions were apparent. Chief among the contentious issues were the conduct of the war, continuing railway deficits, and the lingering question of French-language schooling. In 1912 the Ontario government under Sir James Pliny Whitney* had imposed Regulation 17, which severely limited the scope of French as a language of instruction. By 1915 this issue was poisoning federal politics, pitting English against French and draining Quebec support for the war. The government preferred to leave the matter alone - it involved provincial jurisdiction - but in April 1916 three cabinet members from Quebec, Thomas Chase-Casgrain*, Esioff-Léon Patenaude*, and Pierre-Édouard Blondin*, urged Borden to refer it to the King{apos}s Privy Council in Britain. No such action was taken. Feelings in Quebec remained strong and influential politicians there may have known of Meighen{apos}s role in drafting Borden{apos}s refusal. Meanwhile, military casualties in a war of attrition were threatening the viability of Borden{apos}s commitment in 1916 that Canada would field half a million men. Meighen favoured a selective draft, and the prime minister came to support conscription after a tour of the Western Front. Meighen was given the job of drafting the Military Service Bill, which Borden introduced in June 1917, and then shepherding it through parliament. He performed brilliantly, even clashing with the revered Laurier. {d-0}We must not be afraid to lead,{d-1} the Manitoba mp declared. Victory in the commons blinded him to Patenaude{apos}s prediction that conscription would {d-0}kill . . . the party for 25 years{d-1} in Quebec.

Borden led a Conservative government committed to a maximum war effort, but also a party whose electoral fortunes appeared grim, based on the results of recent provincial elections. The Military Service Act not only promised a solution to lagging military enlistment, it also split the opposition, with most English-speaking Liberals favouring conscription and francophone Quebecers rallying around Laurier, who stood opposed. Partisan Tories such as Robert Rogers urged a quick election, but Borden feared two things: national disunity and Laurier{apos}s campaign magic. All through the summer of 1917, with much tense negotiation, Borden had sought a coalition with pro-conscription Liberals. Meighen was by this time one of his closest confidants. Borden made him secretary of state and minister of mines in August, and Meighen and cabinet colleague John Dowsley Reid* worked closely with the prime minister on the make-up of the Union government formed in October. Both Meighen and Reid were firm on Borden continuing as leader. Meighen moved to Interior, traditionally the key western portfolio, but his status was somewhat diminished as a result of the prime minister{apos}s inclusion of three prominent western Liberals: Arthur Lewis Watkins Sifton*, Thomas Alexander Crerar*, and James Alexander Calder. Meighen gained from the exclusion of his Tory rival, Rogers, but he had to share administrative and political influence with immigration minister Calder. The alternative, an anti-conscription Liberal win in the election called for December, would be worse, he decided.

Following the Allied victory in Europe, the government had turned its attention to the demobilization of half a million Canadian troops. Meighen oversaw one of the government{apos}s main initiatives: a program to assist financially those veterans who wished to become farmers. This measure received all-party support, but another of Meighen{apos}s high-profile actions did not. When a labour dispute in Winnipeg in May 1919 [see Mike Sokolowiski*] escalated to a general strike involving more than 30,000 workers, including sympathetic postal employees, Meighen and labour minister Gideon Decker Robertson* were dispatched to the west. Their immediate objective was to restart the postal system. On 25 May an ultimatum was issued to the sympathy strikers: return to work or lose your jobs. The majority of postal workers rejected the ultimatum though, with the hiring of new workers, deliveries soon resumed. Meighen held no brief for the strikers, most of whom he considered {d-0}revolutionists{d-1} intent on overthrowing duly constituted authority. He approved the arrest of the strike leaders, and urged that any foreign-born among them be summarily deported. Shortly after the strike ended, he brought forth amendments to the Criminal Code, collectively known as section 98, to ban association with organizations deemed seditious. This section effectively inverted the normal presumption of innocence. Meighen was unrepentant; for him, preserving {d-0}the foundation of law and order{d-1} took precedence.

Meighen{apos}s first priority was to pull together a functioning party organization behind his government. The Unionist caucus meeting in July, besides choosing a leader and a name, had also hammered together a platform. Key planks included support for a moderately protective tariff, opposition to class-based or sectional appeals harmful to national unity, and firm support for the British connection, accompanied by full Canadian autonomy. By this time, several prominent Liberal Unionists had retired from the cabinet, but the government continued to rely on the voting support of 25 to 30 Liberal Unionist backbenchers. Meighen{apos}s challenge was to build a fighting force out of disparate elements. Such traditional Tories as Robert Rogers openly advocated a return to pre-war party lines, but Meighen refused to drop his new allies. Proud of the Union government{apos}s record, he was committed to broadening the base of the old Conservative Party, much as John A. Macdonald* had done in 1854 and 1867 and Borden in 1911 and 1917. Accordingly, a national organizer (William John Black) was appointed in August 1920 and a publicity bureau was established. Meighen launched a countrywide speaking tour that summer and fall, accompanied through the western provinces by Calder, the ranking Liberal Unionist. The crowds were large and seemingly receptive. Less encouraging were his efforts to rejuvenate his party in Quebec. Its organization was weak and divided, and he himself was reviled as the architect of conscription.

The National Liberal and Conservative Party was reduced to 50 seats, representing just three provinces (Ontario, New Brunswick, and British Columbia) and the Yukon. Meighen and nine cabinet colleagues were defeated in their own ridings. The Liberals, with 116 mps, would form the new government, though they fell just short of a parliamentary majority. The Progressives, with 65 members, earned official opposition status but declined the role. Some of them hoped to ally themselves with a reformed Liberal Party; others rejected party government on principle. Meighen moved quickly to position himself to face King{apos}s minority government and exploit the ambivalence among the Progressives. While King deliberated over cabinet selections, Meighen arranged for his return in January 1922 in Grenville, a safe seat in eastern Ontario. When parliament convened in March, he was seated across from King, ready to do battle. Knowing that some in his party would blame him for the defeat, he had called a meeting of mps, senators, and defeated candidates just prior to the session. This meeting unanimously endorsed his leadership and officially reclaimed the traditional party name of Macdonald and Sir George-Étienne Cartier*: Liberal-Conservative. Thus fortified, Meighen undertook to undermine the new government and its sometime Progressive allies, while reviving his own party{apos}s fortunes.

Undaunted, in parliament and on the public platform the Conservative leader continued to stress tariff protection, which he coupled with the promise of freight rate adjustments to make the package more attractive to Maritime and prairie voters. King, encouraged by a decisive Liberal win in Saskatchewan in 1922 under Charles Avery Dunning, announced a federal election for 29 Oct. 1925. The prime minister asked for a mandate to deal with four issues: the railway deficit, immigration, the tariff question, and Senate reform. Meighen immediately placed King on the defensive by demanding what solutions the Liberals proposed and by reminding voters the government had done little in four years in office. The Progressives, now led by Manitoban Robert Forke*, were a much diminished force compared to 1921, and they limited their focus to the prairies. Aided by four newly elected provincial premiers, Meighen struck a solid chord all across English Canada. In Quebec he secretly delegated control of the Conservative effort to a former colleague from pre-conscription days, E.-L. Patenaude, who campaigned at the head of a slate of Quebec Conservatives loyal to the Macdonald-Cartier tradition, but independently of the controversial Meighen. Among those in Patenaude{apos}s following was the prominent nationalist Armand La Vergne*.

Inevitably, Bracken{apos}s failure to defeat the weary Liberals in the election of 1945 reflected nearly as much on Meighen{apos}s judgement as it did on Bracken{apos}s modest gifts. Still, the Progressive Conservative Party was alive and would eventually triumph under another westerner, John George Diefenbaker*. Meighen took little part in politics after 1945. A collection of his major speeches going back to 1911 was published as Unrevised and unrepented . . . (Toronto, 1949). To his delight it garnered favourable reviews, even from Liberals. A few years later, a recording of one of those speeches, {d-0}The greatest Englishman of history,{d-1} was made into a vinyl LP and circulated to every Canadian university and every Ontario high school, courtesy of an anonymous benefactor. This speech, a tribute to William Shakespeare, had been first delivered in 1936. Meighen{apos}s speech-making declined with his advancing years, as did his attention to his investment business in Toronto. He continued to enjoy reading, golf, bridge, and lunches at the Albany Club until well into his eighties. After a short illness, he died in his sleep on 5 Aug. 1960. He was given a state funeral in Toronto and then driven slowly across Ontario to St Marys, the town of his childhood years, for burial.

His replacement as governor was Sir George William <span class="SmallCaps{d-1}>Des</span> Vœux, who reported that Shea felt the slur keenly and had been placed in a “painful and humiliating position.” Though Shea huffed about his ability to bring the government down, and the government certainly feared his influence, he did not seriously attempt to embarrass the new administration when the assembly met. Des Vœux did what he could to promote a rapprochement and the government, unwilling to upset Shea further, appointed his brother Edward, who had incongruously stayed on as colonial secretary, cashier (general manager) of the Newfoundland Savings’ Bank and president of the Legislative Council. Further, it did not try to change the transatlantic steamship agency when the contract came up for renewal.

AO, RG 80-5-0-54, no.11075. LAC, RG 31, C1, 1871, Toronto, St David{apos}s Ward, div.4: 8; 1891, Verdun, Que. Gazette (Montreal), 19 Jan. 1926. Montreal Daily Star, 19 Jan. 1926. La Presse, 20 janv. 1926. C. H. Cahn, Douglas Hospital: 100 years of history and progress (Verdun, 1981). Canadian men and women of the time (Morgan; 1912). Canadian who{apos}s who, 1910. Directory, Montreal, 1908-10. Denis Goulet et André Paradis, Trois siècles d{apos}histoire médicale au Québec; chronologie des institutions et des pratiques (1639-1939) (Montréal, 1992). Guy Grenier, {d-0}L{apos}implantation et les applications de la doctrine de la dégénérescence dans le champ de la médecine et de l{apos}hygiène mentales au Québec entre 1885 et 1930{inch} (mémoire de ma, univ. de Montréal, 1990). John Macoun, Autobiography of John Macoun, m.a. . . . , intro. E. T. Seton ([Ottawa], 1922). André Paradis, {d-0}Thomas J. W. Burgess et l{apos}administration du Verdun Protestant Hospital for the Insane (1890-1916),{d-1} Canadian Bull. of Medical Hist. (Waterloo, Ont.), 14 (1997): 5-35. Protestant Hospital for the Insane, Annual report (Verdun), 1891-1923. The roll of pupils of Upper Canada College, Toronto, January, 1830, to June, 1916, ed. A. H. Young (Kingston, Ont., 1917), 145. S. E. D. Shortt, Victorian lunacy: Richard M. Bucke and the practice of late nineteenth-century psychiatry (Cambridge, Eng., 1986).

Once the council had approved the venture, Grenfell returned to the Labrador coast with a medical staff for the summer of 1893, and hospitals were set up at Battle Harbour and Indian Harbour. On this voyage he piloted the steam-launch Princess May as far north as Nain, where he and his colleagues were greeted by the Moravian superintendent, Carl Albert Martin. Throughout the summer he encountered a population without adequate food, clothing, or medical treatment for several months of the year. Without consulting the mission, Grenfell then decided to take his annual leave to raise money in the larger Canadian cities. In Montreal he received a warm reception from such figures as Sir John William Dawson*, the recently retired principal of McGill University, and Sir Donald Alexander Smith*, who had worked in Labrador with the Hudson{apos}s Bay Company. But by the time he returned to London in the spring, he had realized that the mission was not fully behind him since the costs were steadily rising. The Canadian government had also proved resistant, rejecting requests from the British Board of Trade and Grenfell for assistance in erecting a hospital on the north shore of the Gulf of St Lawrence. A group of Montreal supporters, including Smith and Thomas George Roddick*, nonetheless refitted the steam-yacht Sir Donald for Grenfell{apos}s use.

In the summer of 1905, with the assistance of King, Grenfell unsuccessfully approached the Canadian government for a grant to build a hospital at Harrington Harbour, Que., near the Labrador coast. He secured a gift for its construction from the daughters of Montreal brewer Andrew Dow while, in Ottawa, King succeeded in his push for an annual maintenance grant. To Harrington Harbour he sent Henry Mather Hare, a Halifax surgeon with missionary experience in China, and he presented the task of funding the hospital to the new Grenfell association in Montreal. The following year he persuaded Jessie Luther, a Rhode Island artist and occupational therapist who had worked at Hull House (a centre of social activism in Chicago), to teach crafts at St Anthony in order to develop an industry for local women. The arrival of Dr John Mason Little* in 1907 also enhanced the Grenfell mission{apos}s medical reputation. An orphanage had been opened in 1906. As a result of these ventures, public accolades flowed, overwhelming the complaints of such seasoned missioners as Michael Francis Howley*, archbishop of St John{apos}s. At the urging of King, Governor General Lord Grey* recommended Grenfell for the king{apos}s birthday honours list, and in 1906 he duly became a cmg. The next year the University of Oxford made him an honorary doctor of medicine, the first such degree it had awarded.

Following the outbreak of World War I, Newfoundland began to experience financial hardship. The price of fish dropped considerably, and the costs of basic foodstuffs rose. At the same time, the Grenfell Mission{apos}s expenses climbed and donations decreased. On the positive side, in 1915 Dr Henry Locke Paddon, Grenfell{apos}s lieutenant in Labrador, opened a cottage hospital at North West River, and Dr Charles Samuel Curtis*, who would assume the management of the St Anthony hospital, appeared on the Labrador coast as a summer volunteer. That same year Grenfell, who wanted to go overseas, joined the Harvard Surgical Unit in support of the Royal Army Medical Corps, with the temporary rank of major. He arrived at the front in January 1916 and remained until late March.

Numerous public and professional honours followed, and in 1928 the students of the University of St Andrews in Scotland elected him lord rector, a largely ceremonial position he assumed in November 1929. In March of that year he had suffered a severe angina attack. He cancelled all his engagements and, with his wife, turned to the sanitarium run by Dr John Harvey Kellogg at Battle Creek, Mich. Still the mission{apos}s nominal superintendent - he was back in St Anthony that summer - he relied all the more on Anne{apos}s ability to manage the family{apos}s affairs. His production of two more books, Forty years for Labrador (Boston and New York, 1932) and The romance of Labrador (New York and London, 1934), required her heavy involvement. Further attacks drained his energy, and he experienced pain doing practically everything except walking. On Anne{apos}s initiative, they built a summer house on Lake Champlain in Vermont, where they would retire in 1935. He nonetheless remained committed to the mission and thought he could still influence affairs in Newfoundland. In 1934 he supported the formation of a government by commission [see Frederick Charles Alderdice] and was urged to consider the governorship. In January 1936 he finally wrote to the directors of the IGA to resign from the management of the mission{apos}s work. His ankles were swollen and he suffered losses of memory. To make matters worse, Anne had developed a malignant tumour. They took up residence in a cottage on St Simons Island, Ga, where Grenfell endured one health episode after another.

In 1923 Duplessis ran in a provincial election under the Conservative banner in the riding of Trois-Rivières. On 5 February he was defeated by 284 votes, after a campaign in which he had presented himself as the candidate of Trois-Rivières and a defender of municipalities{s-1-unknown} rights, a theme he would replay in the next campaign. He spent the following four years in a pre-electoral campaign, visiting many municipalities, tracking his opponent wherever he went, meeting constituents individually, remembering all their names. His win by a majority of 126 in the general election of 16 May 1927 put an end to 27 years of Liberal rule in the riding. He would be returned there in the next eight general elections, from 1931 to 1956. On 19 Jan. 1928 the novice mla delivered his first speech in the Legislative Assembly with the self-assurance of a party leader; he presented an overview of current politics, laying emphasis on the difficulties encountered by municipalities that were competing for industries, and on industrial development, which seemed to attract more attention than the progress of agriculture and small business. Along the way, he decried the disrespect for the religious character of Sunday, the rise in taxes, the lack of an inventory of forest resources, and the government{apos}s delay in imposing an embargo on the export of electricity; as well, he demanded a reorganization of the provincial police force. He made a strong impression on the whole house, even his opponents. When Premier Louis-Alexandre Taschereau stood up to shake his hand at the end of the speech, he supposedly remarked, {d-0}Keep an eye on this young man, he will go far.{d-1} Duplessis took advantage of his early years in parliament to create a network of contacts in Quebec City among both his Conservative colleagues and some members of the Liberal government.

The election of 1927 had left the Conservatives with only nine MLAs. During the party{apos}s convention on 9 and 10 July 1929, its head, Arthur Sauvé*, whose leadership was challenged by the rank and file, resigned and was replaced by Camillien Houde, the member for Montréal-Sainte-Marie, who was acclaimed. Houde, who had just become mayor of Montreal, was a rising star. Duplessis knew that Houde would be too undisciplined to be anything other than a shooting star in the sky of the capital: he would wait his turn. The two men were to be rivals for more than a decade. In the general election of 24 Aug. 1931, held in the midst of the Great Depression, and despite getting a larger share of votes than in the previous election, the Conservatives managed to add only two members to their caucus; even Houde lost his seat. He and Thomas Maher, an active Conservative supporter, wanted to contest the elections of 63 Liberal mlas. Duplessis, who had taken his riding by 41 votes, was one of the dissident members who did not want to risk having their own elections overturned, and he was criticized for his reluctance by his leader, Houde. Taschereau had the rules governing the judicial contesting of elections changed by legislation known as the Dillon act and frustrated the Conservative plan [see Henry George Carroll*]. Defeated in the Montreal mayoralty race on 4 April 1932, Houde resigned as leader of the Conservative Party on 19 September. On 7 November some Conservatives met in caucus and chose Duplessis as leader of the opposition over Houde{apos}s hand-picked heir apparent, Charles-Ernest Gault.

Duplessis now began his ascent, thanks to his talent, experience, and determination, but also as a result of the circumstances, with the Liberals undermined by the wearing effect of being in power, by corruption, and by the economic crisis. He became leader of the Conservative Party at the convention held in Sherbrooke on 4 and 5 Oct. 1933, defeating, with 332 votes to 214, the federal mp Onésime Gagnon*; the latter was supported by Houde{apos}s followers and federal and English-speaking Conservatives, while Duplessis depended, within the party, on the young advocates for provincial autonomy who recognized his leadership qualities. He would consolidate his base by rewarding those who championed him and punishing those who opposed him. This victory represented above all a vote of confidence in the man, who soon gave up his career as a lawyer. Duplessis argued his last case on 4 Jan. 1934 for the Shawinigan Water and Power Company. Until then, he had spoken out mainly in support of agricultural credit for farmers and of farming as a vocation in the province of Quebec, and he had criticized the Liberals{s-1-unknown} leniency towards the trusts and abusive monopolies, especially the electric-power companies, thereby repeating a popular theme, but with no strong personal conviction. It was in this period that he began managing to translate his talent for reading public opinion into votes at the polls. He had to flesh out his program at a time when the province was sinking deeper into the depression.

The testimony given before this committee was damning and created a scandal. On 11 June the premier asked for the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly (which precipitated an election), submitted his resignation, and handed power over to Adélard Godbout. As reported in the Quebec City Action catholique that day, Duplessis reacted sarcastically: {d-0}Mr Speaker, there is no need for me to tell you that with a regime so dissolute, dissolution was imperative.{d-1} During a meeting held at the Windsor Hotel in Montreal on 17 June, Duplessis refused to renew the 1935 agreement. The past year had confirmed him as leader of the opposition forces. The break was finalized three days later in Sherbrooke during a special caucus meeting of 33 opposition MLAs, when some stalwarts of the Action Libérale Nationale backed Duplessis. Gouin{apos}s party was unable to get organized for the electoral contest. He himself so hesitated to stand that on 10 August he arrived at the registration office one hour after the closing time for nominations. The last of his supporters either declined to run or did so as independents. Not one of them was elected. During this campaign Duplessis posed as a reformer, committed himself to attacking the {d-0}moneyed powers,{d-1} suggested measures to clean up politics, and promised as well to rescue agriculture. But in the wake of the public accounts committee hearings, he especially emphasized the corruption of the Liberal regime. The Union Nationale published Le Catéchisme des électeurs d{apos}après l{apos}ouvrage de A. Gérin-Lajoie in Montreal, a pamphlet attributed to Louis Dupire, Louis Francœur, Roger Maillet, and Édouard Masson. Modelled on Catholic publications, it sought to extol the virtues of the party in opposition while stressing the shortcomings of the Liberal government.

For Duplessis, the nationalization of electricity, or any other direct governmental intervention in the economy, was out of the question. It was mainly for this reason that he soon lost the confidence of Oscar Drouin*, Joseph-Ernest Grégoire*, and Philippe Hamel, nationalist mlas and ministers from the Action Libérale Nationale whose concerns were with economic matters. Their resignations from the Union Nationale were followed by those of René Chaloult and Adolphe Marcoux. In June 1937 Chaloult and Marcoux, along with two members of the Legislative Council, formed the Parti National, which undertook to fulfil Duplessis{apos}s unkept promises. The advent of Duplessis and the Union Nationale to power in the province represented primarily a changing of the guard. Economic liberalism would still be in the forefront, and in addition a social conservatism of a more definite ideological hue.

During the early months of 1942, while Duplessis was in hospital, the province of Quebec was in a full-blown crisis over conscription. In January, Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King* had announced a Canada-wide plebiscite to release himself from his promise not to impose conscription for overseas service. For the most part, Union Nationale mlas took a stand against conscription. Duplessis was back in the Legislative Assembly five days before the vote on 27 April and he also recommended voting against it. However, the Ligue pour la Défense du Canada, led by such rising stars as André Laurendeau*, Jean Drapeau*, and Michel Chartrand, had taken charge of the anti-conscription campaign. It was this organization that received most of the credit for the {d-0}no{d-1} victory (around 73 per cent of the vote) in the province of Quebec, a result diametrically opposite to that in the rest of Canada. The movement subsequently evolved into a political party, the Bloc Populaire Canadien, and threatened the Union Nationale{apos}s monopoly of the nationalist vote.

The term of office that lasted from 1948 to 1952 was marked by tensions in labour relations and by the appearance of serious opposition to the Duplessis regime. On 9 Aug. 1948 a group of artists, mainly from the visual arts, with Paul-Émile Borduas as their head, launched in Montreal their published collection Refus global, in which they denounced the traditionalism of Quebec society and its resistance to progress. Other centres of criticism would link the Duplessis regime{apos}s conservatism to the social, educational, economic, and political backwardness of the province. These included the Montreal journal Cité libre, founded in 1950 by Gérard Pelletier* and Pierre Elliott Trudeau*; the École des Sciences Sociales, Politiques et Économiques of the Université Laval in Quebec City, founded in 1938 on the initiative of Father Georges-Henri Lévesque*; the Montreal newspaper Le Devoir, edited since 1947 by Gérard Filion*, whose editorial team included André Laurendeau; and Radio-Canada (the French-language network of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation), which offered a platform for Duplessis{apos}s detractors. Without a leader in parliament from 1949 to 1953, except for an acting head, George Carlyle Marler*, from July 1949 to May 1950, the Liberal opposition could not take advantage of the Union Nationale government{apos}s weaknesses. All these adversaries helped portray the Duplessis regime, in a none-too-subtle manner, as a period of {d-0}great darkness.{d-1}

This strike became a symbol of two things: Duplessis{apos}s fight on the side of the employers against the unions, but also the appearance of cracks in the alliance between his regime and the Roman Catholic Church. As a result of divisions between the conservative and progressive members of the clergy, including the bishops, the 5,000 striking asbestos workers enjoyed the moral and material support of many priests, including Archbishop Joseph Charbonneau of Montreal. In addition, there was the chorus of protests from the premier{apos}s usual opponents. The strike, which was illegal, dragged on from 14 Feb. to 1 July 1949. It was marked by clashes between the strikers and the provincial police. Archbishop Maurice Roy* of Quebec was brought in as a mediator to settle the dispute, which ended with minor gains for the workers. They were given no voice in management and no steps were taken to control asbestos dust. From then on the distinction between the Catholic unions and the international unions became purely theoretical, as the textile workers{s-1-unknown} strikes in Louiseville, Valleyfield (Salaberry-de-Valleyfield), and Montreal in 1952 showed.

Another matter sullied the Chief{apos}s last years: the highly controversial conviction of the prospector Wilbert Coffin for the murder of three American hunters in 1953. Duplessis challenged the attempt by the federal minister of justice, Stuart Sinclair Garson*, to have the Supreme Court intervene in the case. He considered this action an infringement on provincial authority in the field of the administration of justice. In any event Coffin was hanged on 10 Feb. 1956, but in the eyes of those who continued to protest his innocence in the years ahead, Duplessis was his executioner.

Concerned to establish relations within the new federal government, and desiring to take revenge on the Liberals, Duplessis had discreetly extended his support and his party{apos}s resources to the Progressive Conservatives of John George Diefenbaker* in the federal elections of June 1957 and March 1958, thereby contributing to their victory. In May 1958 Lesage, an mp and former federal Liberal cabinet minister, became leader of the Quebec Liberal Party, replacing Lapalme, who would stay on as leader of the opposition until 1960.

Duplessis, with the characteristic style that so pleased voters, declared on 1 June 1959, according to his biographer Robert Rumilly, {d-0}No one loves the province of Quebec more than the man who is speaking to you.{d-1} Indeed, Duplessis cultivated his populist image, both in his appearance and by his attitude. On 3 Sept. 1959, after visiting iron mines on the north shore of the St Lawrence region, the man who had been premier for more than 15 consecutive years died of a cerebral haemorrhage in Schefferville, in a cottage belonging to the Iron Ore Company of Canada, early on the morning of 7 September, Labour Day. He was succeeded by his heir apparent, Paul Sauvé, who prepared for an election campaign on the theme of change, with the slogan {d-0}From now on.{d-1} But Sauvé himself died on 2 Jan. 1960, and it was Antonio Barrette who led the ranks of the Union Nationale to defeat at the hands of Lesage{apos}s Liberals on 22 June 1960.

Duplessis will go down in history as a man of extraordinary intelligence and memory, with an exceptional political instinct. Of average height, he had a full head of hair until the end of his life, and a prominent nose that was much caricatured. His physical appearance was ordinary. He dressed plainly, but was always well groomed. To avoid tarnishing his image as a man of the people, he never wore conspicuous hats. For the same reason, he never boasted about his reading. He stood out mainly because of his personality and his frank manner of speaking. A fearsome debater, his diction nevertheless left much to be desired. Yet he was argumentative and quick-witted. He had a gift for repartee and puns, and liked to ridicule his opponents: for example, before the public accounts committee he attacked the spending of Irénée Vautrin, the minister of colonization, game, and fisheries in Taschereau{apos}s government, after he asked to be reimbursed for the cost of his work pants, and Duplessis thereby immortalized the legendary {d-0}trousers of Vautrin.{d-1} Because he was a populist, his detractors were apt to call him a demagogue. Duplessis showed no mercy to his opponents, whose weaknesses he quickly spotted, but he could be magnanimous when he was in a position of strength. With the exception of Pierre Gravel, the curé at Boischatel, Duplessis had more accomplices than friends. But he showed almost a father{apos}s love for Paul Sauvé and confided in the Montreal Gazette{apos}s parliamentary correspondent, Abel VINEBERG. Among his most loyal colleagues were Auréa Cloutier, his long-time private secretary; Gérald Martineau, the treasurer of the Union Nationale; Joseph-Damase Bégin, his chief organizer; Émile Bouvier, a Jesuit and professor of industrial relations who tended to favour employers; and Hilaire Beauregard, assistant director and later director of the provincial police. Totally involved in politics, Duplessis had few pastimes other than his interest in music and World Series baseball. Although he did not marry, he had a number of female companions. Never much attached to material goods, he collected the works of Canadian and Quebec painters that were given to him as presents.

For the generation who knew him, Maurice Le Noblet Duplessis was a controversial figure, adulated by some, held in contempt by others. During the Quiet Revolution, his years in power were referred to as the {d-0}great darkness{d-1} and his political style as {d-0}Duplessism{d-1} or {d-0}partitocracy,{d-1} until with greater objectivity historians passed a more balanced judgement on the man and his work. In subsequent re-evaluations, his defence of provincial powers of taxation and his refusal to transfer constitutional jurisdiction in the field of pensions to the federal government have been acknowledged to have preserved, for future governments, Quebec{apos}s capacity to act. As well, more discriminating comparisons have shown that the patronage and favouritism displayed by the Duplessis regime were not exceptional and were even common practice (although not in so systematic a way) in the political mores of other North American states.

John attended the Saskatoon Collegiate Institute for two years. With his mother{apos}s encouragement he entered the University of Saskatchewan in Saskatoon in the autumn of 1912 to study arts and law. His early university record was undistinguished. He already had a political career in mind; in later years his family recalled that his ambition to be prime minister had been expressed before he was ten. In the spring of 1914 he took up a contract teaching primary school in the Wheat Heart Public School District. In October, after teaching for five months of the seven-month contract, he made an unusual arrangement to delegate completion of the school term to his uncle Edward in order to return to university. Subsequently Diefenbaker sought payment of what he claimed was a deficiency in his salary, a claim rejected by the school board and the Department of Education.

In the summer of 1906 the Diefenbakers took up their property, built a three-room frame house, a barn, and a shack, planted a garden, broke ten acres of grassland for crops, and welcomed William{apos}s bachelor brother Edward Lackner to a neighbouring homestead. The two brothers found teaching jobs at local one-room schools - William at Hoffnungsfeld and Edward at Halcyonia - and that autumn John entered grade 7 at his uncle{apos}s school. For three harsh winters the family survived on the homestead, but in 1910, after satisfying the minimal residence requirement for full title to the land, the Diefenbakers departed for Saskatoon, where William found work as a clerk in the provincial public service. In 1911 he became an inspector in the customs office, where he remained until his retirement in 1937.

William and Mary Diefenbaker were living an itinerant life when their first son, John, was born in 1895. A brother, Elmer Clive, arrived in 1897. During John{apos}s early years, the family followed William from one low-paying teaching job to another, first in Neustadt, then in Greenwood, then in Todmorden. Young John began his schooling at age four in his father{apos}s classroom. In 1903, suffering from debt and ill health, William sought a teaching post in the North-West Territories and was offered work in the Tiefengrund Public School District near the site of Fort Carlton (Sask.), halfway on the wagon route between Winnipeg and Edmonton. For two winters the Diefenbakers lived in primitive quarters attached to the rural schoolroom, supplementing their income with gifts of vegetables, sausages, and firewood from their farming neighbours. In December 1904, on payment of a $10 registration fee, William took possession of a quarter-section homestead in nearby Borden, but a lack of capital prevented him from occupying the land until the summer of 1906. In the interim, the family moved once more, to Hague for the winter of 1905-6, where William taught school and served as village secretary.

In his memoirs John Diefenbaker describes his ancestors as {d-0}dispossessed Scottish Highlanders and discontented Palatine Germans.{d-1} His paternal grandfather, George M. Diefenbacker (Diefenbach or Diefenbacher), was born in the Grand Duchy of Baden (Germany). In the 1850s he immigrated to Upper Canada, where he married and worked as a wagon maker. His son William, one of seven children, was born in April 1868, attended school in Hawkesville and Berlin (Kitchener), Ont., and received a teaching certification from the Model School in Ottawa in 1891. In May 1894 he married Mary Bannerman, whose grandparents had lost their Scottish tenancies during the land clearances of 1811-12 in Sutherland. They had been members of the third party of immigrants that Lord Selkirk [Douglas*] brought to the Red River settlement (Man.), arriving via Hudson Bay in June 1814. After one harsh winter they travelled by canoe brigade to Upper Canada and finally settled in what would become Bruce County, where their granddaughter Mary was born in 1872.

In the spring of 1915 Diefenbaker received his ba and that autumn he returned to university for an ma in political science and economics. Meanwhile, World War I had become a contest of steady slaughter on the Western Front. In March 1916 he enlisted for officers{s-1-unknown} training and was commissioned a lieutenant in the infantry. He received his ma in absentia and, after a month of lectures and drill, he undertook three months of articling in a Saskatoon law office before requesting an overseas posting in August. He sailed for England in September as a member of the 196th (Western Universities) Battalion and spent the autumn at camps in Shorncliffe and Crowborough. After a few months he was found medically unfit for service at the front and in February 1917 he returned to Canada. He was demobilized in December and denied a pension sought on grounds of disability. The military records and his own account of this episode are contradictory and were never reconciled during his lifetime; the official records suggest that he was judged unfit because of {d-0}general weakness{d-1} without demonstration of any physical disability, while he claimed to have been injured by a falling pickaxe. During the 1920s he showed gastric symptoms consistent with a possible diagnosis of psychosomatic illness in 1916-17. Similar cases of neurasthenia, more or less intense, would be common in both world wars.

After returning to Saskatoon, Diefenbaker articled in three law firms during 1918-19 and attended classes in law at the university. He received one year{apos}s credit in law school for his undergraduate courses in law and an additional year{apos}s credit as a veteran. In May 1919 he obtained his llb. At his request, the Law Society of Saskatchewan granted him two years{s-1-unknown} exemption from articling and in June 1919 he was called to the bar. He opened his first office in Wakaw, 40 miles north of Saskatoon. Wakaw was a thriving market town of 400 in a farming district settled by immigrants from central and eastern Europe. It was on the district court circuit and had easy access by rail and road to high court sessions in Saskatoon, Prince Albert, and Humboldt. The tall, thin young man with deep blue eyes and wavy black hair, dressed soberly in a dark three-piece suit, made an immediate and striking impression in the small town.

Diefenbaker{apos}s first court case involved the defence of a client accused of careless wounding with a rifle. The assailant had immediately offered first aid and turned himself in to the police. Diefenbaker argued successfully in October 1919 that the shooting was an error committed in the fading evening light. He was soon busy with other cases and within a year he was able to move to larger offices and buy a Maxwell touring car. In the fall of 1920 he was elected to the Wakaw village council for a three-year term. In his first widely noticed case, he acted on appeal for clients from the French-speaking community in the Ethier Public School District, defending two school trustees against a charge that they had violated the province{apos}s School Act by permitting teaching in French. Although the court found that the act had indeed been violated, he won the appeal in May 1922 on the technical ground that trustees could not be held responsible for the internal operations of the school. He became known as a defender of minorities and his legal fees in the case were paid by the Association Catholique Franco-Canadienne de la Saskatchewan.

Although Diefenbaker{apos}s civil case list grew, his reputation would be founded on his record as a criminal defence lawyer. In the courtroom he discovered and honed his dramatic genius. He mastered juries with his powerful and edgy voice, his penetrating stare, his waving arm and accusatory finger, his ridicule and sarcasm, and his command of evidence and the law. He identified naturally with the dispossessed and the poor, with all those who lacked the wealth, power, and confidence of the British Canadian mainstream; and he argued his cases with passion. Saskatchewan was fertile ground for these talents. In 1924 he took on a partner, Alexander Ehman, in his Wakaw office and moved his own practice to Prince Albert. Two other partners succeeded Ehman before Diefenbaker closed the Wakaw branch in 1929.

The young lawyer{apos}s father had been a supporter of Liberal prime minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier*. As a repatriated soldier, Diefenbaker had supported the Union government of Sir Robert Laird Borden* in the election of 1917, although he was opposed to the War-time Elections Act, which deprived recently naturalized Canadians of the vote. In 1921 his political affiliation was uncertain. He admired Andrew Knox, the mp for Prince Albert who had successfully shifted his candidacy from the Unionists to the Progressive Party, but he kept his own political views private. He would later say that the Liberal Party, which dominated Saskatchewan politics in the 1920s, hoped to recruit him, but claimed that {d-0}I was never keen.{d-1} In 1925 his name was proposed and rejected for nomination as a Liberal in the June provincial election, but on 6 August he was acclaimed as the Conservative candidate for Prince Albert in the forthcoming federal election. {d-0}I haven{apos}t spent a lifetime with this party,{d-1} he would reflect in 1969. {d-0}I chose it because of certain basic principles and those . . . were the empire relationship of the time, the monarchy and the preservation of an independent Canada.{d-1} But he distrusted the Ontario-centred policies of the party and disagreed publicly with its leader, Arthur Meighen*, who opposed completion of the Hudson Bay Railway and threatened to change the railway freight rates benefiting the movement of the prairie grain crop. On the hustings Diefenbaker campaigned feverishly and responded angrily to the insult that he was a {d-0}Hun.{d-1} Despite Conservative gains elsewhere in the election of 29 October, the party won no seats in Saskatchewan. In Prince Albert, Diefenbaker ran third and lost his deposit.

Despite his electoral losses Diefenbaker was beginning to attract attention elsewhere in the country. When he made his first political journey out of Saskatchewan in 1926 to address a Conservative convention in British Columbia, he was described by the journalist William Bruce Hutchison* as {d-0}tall, lean, almost skeletal, his bodily motions jerky and spasmodic, his face pinched and white, his pallor emphasized by metallic black curls and sunken, hypnotic eyes.{d-1} Yet from this {d-0}frail, wraithlike person,{d-1} continued Hutchison, {d-0}a voice of vehement power and rude health blared like a trombone.{d-1}.

The Liberal victor in Prince Albert, Charles McDonald, almost immediately resigned his seat to make way for Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King*, who had lost his own seat in York North. The Conservative Party did not nominate against him, although Diefenbaker privately encouraged the entry of an independent candidate. King won easily. In late June 1926 his government resigned in what became known as the King-Byng affair and was replaced by Meighen{apos}s Conservatives, who were defeated at once in the House of Commons. The house was dissolved for a September election. Diefenbaker stood again in Prince Albert, facing the former prime minister in a two-way contest. Once again he was at odds with his own leader, who opposed King{apos}s recently established old-age pension scheme and maintained his unpopular views on freight rates and the Hudson Bay Railway. King{apos}s Liberal Party was returned to power with an absolute majority, while the Conservatives lost all but one seat in the three prairie provinces.

Diefenbaker attended the 1927 federal leadership convention in Winnipeg that chose Calgary millionaire Richard Bedford Bennett* to replace Meighen and became Bennett{apos}s admirer as he rebuilt the national party. In Saskatchewan the Conservatives prepared to confront the entrenched provincial Liberal government, whose strength lay in its good relations with the grain growers{s-1-unknown} associations and the large, mostly Catholic, immigrant communities. The Conservatives turned elsewhere for support. From 1926 to 1928 a ragtag Canadian offshoot of the Ku Klux Klan created more than 100 local branches in the province, appealing to anti-Catholic, anti-French, and anti-immigrant sentiments. Although Diefenbaker was never a member, his party was caught up in this bigoted wave of nativism, reflecting or tolerating support for extremist views at its 1928 convention in Saskatoon and during a by-election in Arm River later that year. During the by-election campaign Diefenbaker shared the platform several times with one of the Klan{apos}s promoters, James Fraser Bryant, and at one campaign meeting he challenged Premier James Garfield Gardiner* over the {d-0}sectarian influences . . . pervading the entire education system.{d-1} The Liberal Party won by a narrow margin, but Conservatives drew the lesson that extreme claims could win votes. They carried their anti-Catholic message into the provincial election of 6 June 1929, emphasizing the issues of race, religion, language, and immigration. Diefenbaker was the Conservative candidate in Prince Albert and was promised the attorney generalship in the event of victory. He lost the contest to the sitting Liberal, Thomas Clayton Davis, but Gardiner{apos}s Liberals were replaced by a Conservative minority government dependent on Progressive support. The Klan soon disappeared from Saskatchewan.

In the summer of 1928 Diefenbaker had become engaged to Edna Brower, a vivacious Saskatoon schoolteacher. They were married three weeks after the provincial election. Edna was an immediate asset to the aspiring politician, offsetting his dour presence with her warmth and spontaneity. She was resented by Diefenbaker{apos}s mother, however, who insisted that she remain first in her son{apos}s affections. John maintained close ties with his parents, making frequent visits to Saskatoon at their call. He also played a protective and dominating role towards his brother, Elmer, who now occupied part of the Diefenbaker law office in Prince Albert as an insurance broker and minor entrepreneur. Edna was closely involved in Diefenbaker{apos}s legal life, watching and commenting on his courtroom behaviour, observing the reactions of judges and juries, and offering support and reassurance to his clients.

In the late 1920s Diefenbaker defended four men on charges of murder. In the first case, The King v. Bourdon in 1927, he appeared as junior counsel, but afterwards always acted as lead. The defendant was found not guilty. The following year, in The King v. Olson, Diefenbaker requested on appeal that a conviction for murder be quashed on the ground that the trial judge had improperly directed the jury. The judgement was sustained, but on the court{apos}s recommendation Diefenbaker petitioned for mercy, claiming that the defendant had been mentally incapable of standing trial. The federal cabinet commuted the sentence to life imprisonment. He was similarly successful in The King v. Pasowesty in having a death sentence commuted to life imprisonment. In The King v. Wysochan he defended his client by arguing that the murder had been committed by the victim{apos}s husband. The defendant was convicted, the appeal was dismissed, the federal cabinet denied a reprieve, and Alex Wysochan was hanged in the Prince Albert jail in June 1930.

Despite (and partly because of) his growing public reputation, Diefenbaker remained an outsider in the Conservative caucus, regarded by other members as aloof, temperamental, and too much the showman. In Ontario, party barons viewed him as erratic and unreliable. When he contested the leadership for the second time at the convention in the autumn of 1948, it was no surprise that he lost on the first ballot to the premier of Ontario, George Alexander Drew. On 27 June 1949 the Liberal government went to the polls under its new prime minister, Louis-Stephen St-Laurent, who campaigned on a bland program of prosperity and growth. The government{apos}s majority increased and Conservative seats fell from 67 to 41, but in Saskatchewan Diefenbaker added almost 2,000 votes to his majority and remained the sole Conservative member.

During 1945-46 Edna Diefenbaker had suffered several months of illness, identified as severe depression, but she returned to good health in 1947. In the fall of 1950, however, she was diagnosed with acute leukaemia and she died in February 1951. In the House of Commons, three mps - Arthur Laing, Howard Charles Green*, and Gardiner - offered unprecedented eulogies to a colleague{apos}s wife. For months Diefenbaker was overwhelmed by this loss. Two years later he married a childhood friend, the widowed Olive Freeman Palmer, a senior civil servant in Ontario{apos}s Department of Education. For the rest of his political career, Olive gave John her loyal support, discreetly encouraging his ambitions and reinforcing his beliefs. Her regal presence on platforms at his side gave him strength and reassurance.

The Liberal government remained complacent as it prepared for an early summer election in 1957. By contrast, Diefenbaker, despite his 61 years, injected energy and ideas into his reviving party with the assistance of his policy adviser, Merril Warren Menzies. Inspired by Menzies, and in his own visionary language, Diefenbaker put forward a program of national economic development aimed primarily at growth in the Atlantic provinces, the north, and the west. For three months he led a feverish national campaign with the assistance of campaign manager Allister Grosart, advertising director Dalton Kingsley Camp*, and the efficient organization of Leslie Miscampbell Frost{apos}s Ontario Conservative Party. In Quebec the party received discreet assistance from the Union Nationale machine of Premier Maurice Le Noblet Duplessis*. With freshly enhanced funding the party was able to contribute generously to local campaigns in all provinces. Diefenbaker{apos}s message to voters was positive, even utopian, recalling the party{apos}s role in the country{apos}s foundation under Sir John A. Macdonald*. {d-0}We intend to launch a National Policy of development in the Northern areas which may be called the New Frontier Policy,{d-1} he promised. {d-0}Macdonald was concerned with the opening of the West. We are concerned with developments in the Provinces . . . and in our Northern Frontier in particular. . . . The North, with all its vast resources and hidden wealth - the wonder and the challenge of the North must become our national consciousness.{d-1} The party campaigned on a personalized slogan, {d-0}It{apos}s time for a Diefenbaker government,{d-1} and the country awoke on 10 June to a surprise Conservative victory of 112 seats to the Liberals{s-1-unknown} 105; the CCF (with 25 seats) and Social Credit (with 19) held the balance of power. Diefenbaker took office on 17 June 1957 as leader of a minority government.

In his administration{apos}s early days Diefenbaker made a public commitment to divert 15 per cent of Canada{apos}s foreign trade from the United States to the United Kingdom. The promise would remain unfulfilled despite his government{apos}s continuing efforts to lessen dependence on the American market and to promote trade with the British Commonwealth. Beyond this initial misstep, the new government proceeded boldly with an ambitious legislative program of farm price supports, housing loans, aid for development projects across the country, tax reductions, and increases in old-age pensions and civil service salaries. Public opinion polls showed strong support for the new government. When the Liberal leader, Lester Bowles Pearson, moved a motion of no-confidence proposing that the Conservatives hand power back to the Liberals, Diefenbaker seized the occasion to request a dissolution of parliament for an election in March 1958.

In opposition Diefenbaker had been a renowned champion of civil liberties. In 1958, as prime minister, he promised to protect rights {d-0}defined and guaranteed in precise and practical terms to all men by the law of the land.{d-1} After two years of intense discussion on the merits of a constitutional amendment binding on all levels of government versus the passage of declaratory federal legislation, he opted for an ordinary act of parliament which would not become lost in controversy over amending the constitution. The bill, he declared, would serve to educate citizens on their existing rights and would act as a restraint and a guide for federal lawmakers. Diefenbaker acknowledged - in the absence of a constitutional amendment - that his bill was only a first step for Canada, but it was nevertheless a pledge to all citizens that their rights would henceforth be respected. He told the house what this change would mean for him: {d-0}I know something of what it has meant in the past for some to regard those with names of other than British or French origin as not being that kind of Canadian that those of British or French origin could claim to be.{d-1} The bill was adopted unanimously in August 1960, and in retrospect Diefenbaker regarded it as his outstanding achievement. It contained two escape clauses, one permitting parliament to override the guarantees contained in the act, providing legislation specified that it had been adopted {d-0}notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights,{d-1} and a second exemption for actions taken under the War Measures Act. The act was interpreted cautiously by the courts, but had an exemplary political importance. Under Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau*, it would be transmuted into the more comprehensive Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, containing the same exemptions. In 1960 as well, parliament extended the federal franchise to Canada{apos}s aboriginal population.

The following year the Diefenbaker cabinet dealt with another issue of conscience long troubling to the prime minister. For three years after assuming power, cabinet had reviewed every criminal conviction involving the death penalty in time-consuming and anguishing detail, confirming some sentences and commuting others. Their task was eased after passage of justice minister Fulton{apos}s amendments to the Criminal Code, which created two categories of murder and limited the death penalty to a narrow range of deliberate offences.

As the great depression deepened on the prairies into a descending spiral of drought, crop failure, debt, and unemployment, the new provincial government lost its revenues and its sense of direction. Diefenbaker{apos}s law practice in Prince Albert contracted modestly, but he was able to maintain a comfortable income throughout the 1930s. In 1932 his law partner, William G. Elder, departed in conflict, he claimed, over finances and ethics. The following year Diefenbaker recruited John Marcel Cuelenaere as an articling student. Cuelenaere would stay on as his partner until 1957 and, as a Liberal partisan, would later serve as mayor of Prince Albert, an mla, and a provincial cabinet minister.

After its electoral defeat in 1934, the Saskatchewan Conservative Party had led a ghostly existence with no more than a handful of activists. In August 1935 Diefenbaker inherited the post of acting president of the provincial party. He hesitated in calling a leadership convention until October 1936. One week before the convention he presented his candidacy and on 28 October he was acclaimed party leader, promising a platform that would be {d-0}radical in the sense that the reform program of the Honourable R. B. Bennett was radical.{d-1} The Leader-Post (Regina) commented that he {d-0}thunders forth his convictions and ideas in resonant tones of purposeful youth.{d-1} For 18 months Diefenbaker ran the party from his law office while Cuelenaere carried the firm{apos}s legal work. Diefenbaker appealed fruitlessly to the national party for financial aid and travelled the province seeking potential candidates. When a general election was called for June 1938 he was nominated in Arm River and took a personal loan to pay the nomination deposits for 21 other candidates. The party{apos}s moderately progressive program called for refinancing the provincial debt, an adjustment of farm debts, a study of crop insurance or acreage payments, and a commitment in principle to public health insurance. The Conservatives were barely visible in a campaign dominated by the incumbent Liberals, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), and the Social Credit. The Liberal government was re-elected with 38 seats against 14 opponents, none of them Conservative. The Conservative Party{apos}s vote fell to 12 per cent, but no one blamed the leader for the result. When the party met in convention four months later, Diefenbaker{apos}s resignation was unanimously refused and he remained leader by default for two more years.

During the 1930s Diefenbaker served as defence counsel in four well-publicized murder trials. In The King v. Bajer his client, a destitute young woman with two children, was found not guilty of suffocating her newborn child. He was unsuccessful in The King v. Bohun, his client being found guilty of murdering a storekeeper. The jury{apos}s recommendation for clemency was rejected and Steve Bohun was hanged in the Prince Albert jail in March 1934. After a raucous preliminary hearing in The King v. Fouquette, the crown stayed charges through lack of evidence and the murder remained unsolved. In The King v. Harms Diefenbaker called for a verdict of manslaughter in an unwitnessed alcoholic killing. John Harms was convicted of murder, but Diefenbaker successfully appealed on the ground of an improper charge to the jury. At the second trial he presented meticulous evidence of Harms{apos}s intoxication and won conviction on the reduced charge. Harms was sentenced to a prison term of 15 years.

Meanwhile, Diefenbaker continued to admire Bennett{apos}s leadership. After the prime minister announced his New Deal in January 1935, Diefenbaker wrote that Bennett{apos}s radical proposals {d-0}have given our rank and file something to enthuse over - a new hope and a new spirit.{d-1} But the federal government was divided and demoralized by the continuing depression. In July 1935 Diefenbaker turned down an offer of the federal nomination in Prince Albert. He campaigned for the party during the October election, only to see its prospects shattered once more in a national Liberal landslide. In Saskatchewan the Conservatives elected only one member in the province{apos}s 21 seats. Bennett led the opposition for another three years while King returned to the prime ministership.

As one of 40 Conservatives in the new house, Diefenbaker was appointed to the house committee on the defence of Canada regulations, reviewing wartime emergency measures. He made his maiden speech on this subject with a strong declaration of patriotism, supporting wartime restriction of liberty and calling for national registration of adult males. Under the War Measures Act, the cabinet governed for the next five years by decree, while the role of the house was reduced to approval of the annual budget and spending estimates and modest questioning of the war effort within the self-imposed limits of general loyalty. Diefenbaker quickly established himself as one of the opposition{apos}s most effective critics, emphasizing the need for conscription for overseas military service and criticizing the cabinet{apos}s contempt for the role of parliament.

Diefenbaker{apos}s political ambitions remained focused on national rather than provincial politics. By the spring of 1939 he was making tentative plans for a nomination in Lake Centre, the federal counterpart of his provincial constituency. On 15 June he was acclaimed the Conservative candidate and began intensive preparations for an election the following year. When Germany invaded Poland in September, the Conservative Party declared its solidarity with the King government{apos}s declaration of war. Arrangements for the election campaign were suspended, and commenced again only when the house was dissolved in January 1940. King campaigned confidently as a wartime incumbent, while the Conservatives under Robert James Manion* were divided and disorganized. In Lake Centre, Diefenbaker called for a statutory floor price for wheat, asserted his own loyal service in World War I, and attacked the King government for its {d-0}marked tendency towards dictatorship.{d-1} The Liberal Party won an overwhelming majority on 26 March. Manion was defeated, but Diefenbaker gained a narrow victory as one of two successful Conservatives from Saskatchewan. After five successive electoral defeats, he would never suffer another.

In the autumn of 1941 a meeting of the national party association chose the former leader, Senator Arthur Meighen, as Conservative chief. Meighen declared that he would pursue a program of coalition and resigned his senatorship to run in York South. The Liberal Party did not contest the by-election, but covertly aided the CCF candidate, who emerged victorious. This defeat - and the Liberal government{apos}s political shrewdness - left the Conservatives in confusion. While Meighen pondered a leadership convention, a group of party activists met in Port Hope, Ont., in September 1942 to draft a progressive and internationalist program that might counter the growing challenge of the CCF. The conference reaffirmed the party{apos}s belief in private enterprise and individual initiative, but also called for a wide range of social benefits and limited state intervention. When the leadership convention was scheduled for December, the chief organizers of the Port Hope conference were given prominent roles. Meanwhile, Meighen set out to arrange the draft of the Liberal-Progressive premier of Manitoba, John Bracken*, as party leader. When the convention opened in Winnipeg, four western candidates, including Diefenbaker, had declared themselves. Bracken joined the race at the last possible moment and won easily on the second ballot. Diefenbaker ran a respectable third. His nomination speech had incorporated the progressive vision of the Port Hope resolutions, together with a plea for the {d-0}preservation of Canada within the British Empire{d-1} and {d-0}the security of the common man.{d-1} He came out of the meeting with his reputation and friendships enhanced. The party had adopted a socially progressive platform satisfying to him and, at Bracken{apos}s insistence, it would henceforth be known as the Progressive Conservative Party.

Bracken led the party listlessly for three more years. Meanwhile, Diefenbaker solidified his reputation as an mp, supporting progressive causes and criticizing the government for maintaining wartime regulations in peacetime and ignoring the rights of individuals. In 1946 he proposed a bill of rights {d-0}under which freedom of religion, of speech, of association . . . freedom from capricious arrest and freedom under the rule of law{d-1} would be guaranteed. He told the house that his goal was to see {d-0}an unhyphenated nation{d-1} in which citizens of many origins and religions would be regarded and treated equally. The call for a Canadian bill of rights became his leitmotif.

Diefenbaker{apos}s candidacy was taken for granted. It was boosted by support from vigorous provincial parties in Ontario, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Manitoba. Despite brief efforts to create a {d-0}Stop Diefenbaker{d-1} campaign in Ontario, he was the instant favourite over his opponents, Donald Methuen Fleming* and Edmund Davie Fulton*. In his nomination speech Diefenbaker called on the party to banish a sense of defeatism. According to his Quebec supporter Pierre Sévigny*, {d-0}As he proceeded, the magnetism of the man, the hypnotic qualities which were to entrance a whole nation came to the fore. He spoke with an obvious sincerity and an inspired fervour.{d-1} Diefenbaker won a decisive victory on the first ballot.

Diefenbaker{apos}s 1958 platform was a simplified and more exuberant version of the party{apos}s 1957 program, involving a new vision of the nation both economic and spiritual. He preached a populist, secular faith. {d-0}Everywhere I go,{d-1} he declared, {d-0}I see that uplift in people{apos}s eyes that comes from raising their sights to see the Vision of Canada in days ahead.{d-1} Diefenbaker{apos}s rhetoric caught the public mood. His campaign swept the country in a wave of euphoric enthusiasm. The posters called for voters to {d-0}Follow John{d-1} and the electorate responded by granting the Conservatives an astonishing 208 of 265 seats, including 50 in Quebec. In his victory speech Diefenbaker declared that {d-0}the Conservative Party has become a truly national party composed of all the people of Canada of all races united in the concept of one Canada.{d-1} His {d-0}Vision{d-1} had raised public expectations beyond the possibility of satisfaction. He would need rare skill and good fortune to avoid a crashing descent from those heights.

The prime minister{apos}s initial decisions in foreign and defence policy, however, were taken confidently and decisively. They involved Canada{apos}s defence relationship with the United States, and were made in an atmosphere of cordiality with the American administration of President Dwight David Eisenhower - whose view of the threat from the Soviet Union during the Cold War was fully shared by Diefenbaker. The decisions grew naturally out of cooperation between the previous Liberal government and the United States and intensified Canadian absorption into the American military system. In July 1957 Diefenbaker and defence minister Pearkes - acting without consultation in cabinet - committed Canada to participation in the integrated North American Air Defence Agreement, known as NORAD. In 1958 Diefenbaker agreed with the United States to locate two short-range Bomarc anti-aircraft missile bases in northern Ontario and Quebec and to arm the missiles, once installed, with nuclear warheads. This decision at first caused little controversy.

In February 1959 (after ambiguous warnings had been delivered to the manufacturers in previous months) Diefenbaker announced the immediate cancellation of development of the Avro Arrow (CF-105), a Canadian-designed, advanced interceptor aircraft being built in Toronto. The Arrow decision raised questions about the government{apos}s style and judgement and eventually weakened Diefenbaker{apos}s confidence in his own political intuitions. In subsequent years the Arrow would become a cult symbol of mistakenly abandoned Canadian industrial and military opportunities, although in the cooler light of financial and military prudence the decision could easily be justified.

The Diefenbaker government{apos}s first budget, in 1958, had held the line on further spending in the face of an economic slowdown, but the prime minister{apos}s preference for aid to prairie farmers and an uncoordinated program of development projects in the Atlantic provinces and the west progressively undermined the highly conservative instincts of finance minister Fleming. Annual budgets fell into deficit. Beyond his conviction that fairness required a new concern for the poor, the unemployed, the ill, and the elderly, Diefenbaker lacked any coherent economic strategy. As unemployment continued to grow in 1959, 1960, and 1961 despite infusions of fresh public spending, he was troubled by Liberal claims that {d-0}Tory times are hard times{d-1} and haunted by memories of Bennett{apos}s loss of power in 1935. Under relentless pressure from the cabinet for expansionary policies, Fleming came to share Diefenbaker{apos}s belief that the restoration of prosperity was hindered by the Bank of Canada{apos}s restrictive interest rate policy and the outspokenness of its governor, James Elliott Coyne. For five months in 1961 Diefenbaker and Fleming engaged in an unseemly public battle with the governor, as they sought his resignation. Coyne{apos}s refusal prompted the government to introduce legislation dismissing him, but that was frustrated by a Liberal majority in the Senate. On 14 July, once Coyne was allowed to make his case before a Senate committee, he offered the resignation he had previously refused. The conflict resulted in agreements between the bank and the government to avoid similar disputes in the future, but the immediate political effect was to undermine popular faith in the competence of the Diefenbaker regime.

Despite his vehement rejection of the South African policy of apartheid, Diefenbaker was hesitant to consider exclusion of South Africa from membership in the British Commonwealth on the ground that the association should not interfere in the domestic affairs of its members. Political pressure for action intensified after disorders and a police massacre of peaceful demonstrators in Sharpeville in March 1960. At a meeting of Commonwealth prime ministers in May Diefenbaker worked with Prime Minister Macmillan to avoid a split among the leaders along racial lines. They found their escape in convenient delay. The conference offered South Africa time to revise its policies by agreeing that in the event it chose to become a republic, it would have to request consent from other Commonwealth members for readmission to the association. When South Africa{apos}s whites voted that October in favour of a republic, Prime Minister Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd announced that he would seek continuing Commonwealth membership at the meeting in March 1961. Diefenbaker arrived at that meeting carrying divided counsels on South Africa, some calling for its exclusion, some for renewal of its membership coupled with a Commonwealth statement on racial equality, and others for further delay. As the conference opened he was undecided, but at the suggestion of Bryce he advocated a declaration of principles to be adopted before a decision on South Africa{apos}s readmission. The effect would be to force a choice on South Africa rather than on the other members. When Verwoerd called for additional wording which would exclude his country{apos}s practices from blame, Diefenbaker sided with the non-white leaders in rejecting the proposal. Verwoerd withdrew the South African application and left the meeting. Following South Africa{apos}s departure, the conference dropped the effort to adopt a declaration of principles, but Diefenbaker told reporters that non-discrimination was an {d-0}unwritten principle{d-1} of the association and that it was {d-0}in keeping with the course of my life.{d-1} He accepted the outcome as the least divisive one possible and received wide praise at home and abroad for his defence of the principle of non-discrimination.

As president of the United States, Eisenhower had showed constant respect and consideration toward his northern colleague. Potential points of friction in joint defence policy and other matters were handled from Washington with amicable deference or delay. As his last official act before departing office, Eisenhower invited Diefenbaker to the White House for a ceremonial signing of the contentious Columbia River Treaty on 17 Jan. 1961. The easy political relationship died when John Fitzgerald Kennedy became president. Kennedy was young, brash, wealthy, and an eastern sophisticate whose manner grated on the prime minister. To Diefenbaker{apos}s intense annoyance, Kennedy called him {d-0}Diefenbawker{d-1} when he first became president. Although their initial meeting in Washington on 20 February was superficially cordial, Kennedy told his brother Robert Francis that {d-0}I don{apos}t want to see that boring son of a bitch again,{d-1} and the American administration began almost at once to show impatience over Canada{apos}s hesitation to negotiate agreements on dual control of the nuclear warheads intended for Canadian Bomarc missiles. When Kennedy visited Ottawa in May 1961 tensions intensified. Diefenbaker explained his political difficulty in accepting possession of nuclear warheads in the face of growing anti-nuclear sentiment across the country; Kennedy responded that failure to arm the new weapons would turn Canada into a neutralist in the Cold War. When Diefenbaker accidentally discovered a confidential White House memorandum advising Kennedy {d-0}to push{d-1} Canada on a number of issues, the prime minister chose to ignore the advice of his staff to return it, instead filing it away for potential future use against the president. (It would be leaked during the 1963 election campaign.) Formal negotiations for an agreement on the warheads made no progress in this atmosphere of distrust - although at the time Kennedy made no public complaint over Canada{apos}s hesitation.

Meanwhile, the Diefenbaker government{apos}s good relations with the British government were fading. Macmillan{apos}s initial respect cooled as Diefenbaker took an unexpectedly strong and decisive position on the subject of South African membership in the Commonwealth, and effectively disappeared when Canada criticized the British application for entry into the European Economic Community, or Common Market. Diefenbaker and his high commissioner, Drew, regarded the application as a betrayal of Canada{apos}s sentiments and economic interests and acted to subvert its success in the absence of firm trading guarantees for Commonwealth members. Diefenbaker made frequent complaints about Britain{apos}s lack of consultation with its Commonwealth partners on the subject and privately took satisfaction at hints of French intransigence. (The British application would be vetoed by President de Gaulle in January 1963.) Canadian opinion on the matter was divided, but the Canadian government{apos}s reputation was undermined by comments in the press that it had been overbearing and obstructive in its reaction to British policy.

In Quebec the Quiet Revolution was transforming the province and elsewhere appeals were mounting for fairer treatment of the country{apos}s French-speaking minority. Diefenbaker, who had neglected the French-speaking members of his own caucus, was indifferent to the signs of change. He refused to consider proposals for a royal commission on French-English relations. In Ottawa the formerly admiring press gallery had grown disillusioned and hostile as the government{apos}s record revealed an ineptitude frequently traceable to the prime minister{apos}s character. Diefenbaker{apos}s disorganization and growing indecisiveness had discouraged and divided his cabinet. When the commons was dissolved for a general election to be held on 18 June 1962, reporter James Stewart of the Montreal Star described the entire parliamentary term as {d-0}sometimes aimless, often ill-tempered, and always potentially explosive.{d-1} As the election campaign began, the government faced a major monetary crisis. A lingering recession, a series of budget deficits, an unfavourable balance in the current trade account, and general uncertainty about government policy provoked a loss of confidence in the exchange market. For weeks the Bank of Canada sold foreign reserves to maintain the value of the floating Canadian dollar and in May the cabinet was forced to devalue and peg the dollar at 92.5 cents (U.S.) in order to prevent a cascading collapse of the currency. The devaluation was cruelly caricatured by the press and the opposition during the election campaign; phoney Diefendollars or Diefenbucks passed from hand to hand.

Diefenbaker campaigned defiantly in the face of vigorous opposition from the refreshed Liberal Party, from the newly formed New Democratic Party, and in rural Quebec from the Ralliement des Créditistes, which under its charismatic leader, Réal Caouette, had been allied with the Social Credit Party since 1961. The Conservative program offered no novelty. The Toronto Globe and Mail reported that {d-0}the Conservative campaign has been essentially a one-man show with Mr. Diefenbaker the man. If they fail to win, he must take the blame; if they do win he can claim the victory, no matter how many seats they lose, for his own.{d-1} For Diefenbaker, the election results were devastating. He kept his hold on the prairies, but in the Atlantic provinces, rural Quebec, urban Ontario, and British Columbia the Conservatives lost their dominance. Five ministers were defeated. Diefenbaker held 116 seats against 100 Liberals, 30 Social Crediters/Créditistes, and 19 New Democrats. Following the campaign, a new run on the dollar required the imposition of tariff surcharges, reduced government spending, and emergency borrowing from the International Monetary Fund, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Diefenbaker retreated into weeks of seclusion before reconstructing his cabinet and reconvening parliament in the autumn.

The cabinet was directionless. Up to a third of Diefenbaker{apos}s ministers speculated openly but indecisively on the prime minister{apos}s removal. In October 1962 the Cuban missile crisis diverted everyone{apos}s attention and Diefenbaker deepened his cabinet{apos}s divisions by responding hesitantly to President Kennedy{apos}s appeal for allied solidarity. In the aftermath, ministers insisted that negotiations with the United States on the acceptance of nuclear warheads should be reopened. The sudden impact of the international crisis and the prime minister{apos}s demonstrated inability to make decisions under pressure suggested that an agreement with the United States to supply the warheads had become a matter of urgency. Negotiations quickly foundered and Washington raised the stakes by accusing the Diefenbaker government of lying and neglecting its military obligations. Diefenbaker{apos}s minister of defence, Douglas Harkness, resigned. The opposition united to condemn Diefenbaker{apos}s indecision and on 5 Feb. 1963 his government was defeated in the house.

Diefenbaker entered the 1963 election campaign with a disintegrating cabinet. Harkness, Hees, Sévigny, Fleming, Fulton, and others had resigned or retired. His supporting newspapers, the Toronto Telegram, the Globe and Mail, and all but four other papers across the country, had abandoned him. The party organization had collapsed - although his chief campaigners, Grosart and Camp, maintained their loyalty. Diefenbaker set out on the campaign trail fighting {d-0}the Bay Street and St. James Street Tories,{d-1} the American government, and his Liberal challengers. As he crossed the country in a whistle-stop campaign, greeting voters at little railway stations in the bitter cold, he was inspired by American president Harry S. Truman{apos}s {d-0}Give {s-0}em hell!{d-1} election of 1948. His rural, prairie, and small town public responded enthusiastically as he derided the Liberal Party and the American Department of State. Throughout the campaign Conservative support held steady while that of the Liberals declined until, on 8 April, Diefenbaker left Pearson five seats short of a majority. Diefenbaker resigned office and Pearson took power on 22 April, once he had received an assurance of support from six Créditiste mps. In 1963 the journalist Peter Charles Newman published his vivid, best-selling account of Diefenbaker{apos}s career, Renegade in power, the first of a new Canadian genre of popular contemporary history, which romanticized the prime minister{apos}s dramatic rise and fall.

Diefenbaker{apos}s second battle of the year was fought within his party, where he struggled to control the party office and the national association and to hold onto his own leadership. Eruptions of discontent multiplied, but in the absence of any formal system of leadership review he took for granted that his term was unlimited. Once convinced that the leader would not take voluntary retirement, the party president, Dalton Camp, proposed a reform in the party constitution to require an automatic vote on whether to hold a leadership convention subsequent to the loss of a general election. Diefenbaker met Camp{apos}s challenge with charges of back stabbing, but failed to carry the annual meeting. It agreed on a leadership convention, to be held in 1967.

For three and a half years Diefenbaker carried on as leader of the opposition under siege from elements of his own party, but aggressive and menacing towards his Liberal opponents in the house. He ferreted out one embarrassing scandal after another - all of them involving Quebec ministers. The majority of his mps, dependent on him for their success in politics, remained faithful. For eight months in 1964 Diefenbaker and his loyalists delayed approval of a new Canadian maple leaf flag because they said it lacked any historic symbols. The resolution was eventually adopted in mid December after closure was used to cut off debate. Most of Diefenbaker{apos}s Quebec mps voted with the government. Pearson, harassed and distracted by Diefenbaker{apos}s relentless attacks in the house, called an election for 8 Nov. 1965, hoping to deliver a fatal blow to his nemesis. Old Conservative foes (including Hees and Fulton) returned to the fold in the hope of a political life after Diefenbaker, while the party leader himself dreamed of returning to power. At age 70 he conducted another vigorous national campaign. Pearson could find no clear theme beyond his call for a majority government and the final destruction of his foe, but he appeared to have little taste for the battle. Once more Diefenbaker{apos}s Conservatives deprived the Liberal Party of its desired majority. The Conservatives, with 97 seats, held two more than previously, as did the Liberals with 131. The NDP, at 21 seats, gained four, while the Créditistes and Social Crediters (now separate) suffered losses.

As planning for the convention proceeded, Diefenbaker refused to confirm his candidacy. Finally, he stood for re-election in opposition to a convention resolution emerging from the party{apos}s policy conference at Montmorency falls, Que., that spoke of Canada{apos}s {d-0}two founding peoples{d-1} or {d-0}deux nations.{d-1} (The draft resolution actually described a country {d-0}composed of the original inhabitants of this land and the two founding peoples [deux nations] with historic rights, who have been and continue to be joined by people from many lands.{d-1}) {d-0}That proposition,{d-1} he told reporters, {d-0}will place all Canadians who are of other racial origins than English and French in a secondary position. All through my life, one of the things I{apos}ve tried to do is to bring about in this nation citizenship not dependent on race or colour, blood counts or origin.{d-1} Diefenbaker{apos}s vision of {d-0}One Canada{d-1} meant equality for individuals and regions, but he could not accept the notion of {d-0}founding peoples{d-1} or {d-0}nations{d-1} which seemed to include some communities while excluding others. His familiar appeal to equality - always drawing on his personal experience - did not work in a period when the country had grown more complex. On the first ballot, he ran fifth behind Stanfield, Dufferin Roblin, Fulton, and Hees. He remained on the ballot through three votes. Stanfield was chosen leader on the fourth.

Through 12 more years and four more general elections, 1968, 1972, 1974, and 1979, Diefenbaker remained in the House of Commons. For a few years his prominent claque on the Conservative backbenches made life awkward for the new leader and for the rest of his life he could rivet the house{apos}s attention and embarrass ministers with his pungent and sarcastic questions. On his 30th anniversary as an mp, in 1970, he joked that he would live as long as Moses. Six years later he was named a ch in the queen{apos}s New Year{apos}s honours list and he travelled proudly to England for the presentation ceremony at Windsor Castle. In the mid 1970s he published three volumes of ghost-written memoirs. He conducted his last election campaign in ill health during the spring of 1979, returned to Ottawa, and died at home on 16 August.

By this time, the political conflict between Diefenbaker and Pearson had become malignant. The 1966 parliamentary year began with Diefenbaker{apos}s renewed attacks on the government{apos}s integrity, prompting countercharges against his own administration for having failed to act on a matter of security. A judicial inquiry under Mr Justice Wishart Flett Spence, appointed to examine what became known as the Munsinger affair, was in effect an ex post facto investigation of the political discretion exercised by the Diefenbaker government. Diefenbaker, Fulton, and their lawyers withdrew in protest from the inquiry midway through the hearings. The final report found no breach of security, but censured Diefenbaker for having failed to dismiss his associate minister of defence, Pierre Sévigny, six years earlier when he had learned of his extramarital liaison with Gerda Munsinger, who had apparently been a low-level Soviet agent. The Globe and Mail called the inquiry{apos}s terms of reference {d-0}vague, vengeful, prosecutory . . . setting a precedent for endless witch-hunts as government succeeds government in Canada.{d-1}.

Diefenbaker{apos}s state funeral was the most elaborate in Canadian history. He had planned it meticulously in consultation with the secretary of state{apos}s department. For three days the open casket lay in the parliamentary hall of honour before it was moved in a ceremonial parade to Christ Church Cathedral for an interfaith service. From Ottawa, an eight-car funeral train carried the coffin and more than 100 passengers westwards to Prince Albert and Saskatoon, with stops both scheduled and unscheduled for crowds along the way. On the high bluffs of the South Saskatchewan River, the old chief was buried beside the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker Centre, which had been constructed on the grounds of the University of Saskatchewan to house his papers and relics. The new Conservative prime minister, Charles Joseph (Joe) Clark, delivered the graveside eulogy, describing Diefenbaker as {d-0}the great populist of Canadian politics . . . an indomitable man, born to a minority group, raised in a minority region, leader of a minority party, who went on to change the very nature of his country and to change it permanently.{d-1} The body of his late wife Olive was moved from Ottawa to lie beside him.

Diefenbaker{apos}s entire adult life was aimed at a political career. He was moved by ambition and a sense of injustice that was both personal and regional, a determination to succeed at the centre of Canadian politics in Ottawa and in doing so confirm the equal rights of those he believed had been excluded from power and influence in Canada. His attitudes were shaped in the 1920s and 1930s, when Canadian public life was dominated by a privileged circle of Ontario and Quebec politicians in the Liberal and Conservative parties. With his personal and western preoccupations, however, he failed to sense the potential grievances of the French-speaking Canadian minority, who felt similarly excluded from a full role in national life.

Commentators and historians have not been kind to Canada{apos}s 13th prime minister. J. L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer wrote that Diefenbaker{apos}s memoirs, {d-0}arguably the most mendacious ever written by a Canadian politician, burnished his own image and refought all the old battles with only one victor. . . . Yet the record remained, one of deliberate divisiveness, scandalmongering, and mistrust.{d-1} Historian Michael Bliss - perhaps slightly kinder - judged that {d-0}Diefenbaker{apos}s role as a prairie populist who tried to revolutionize the Conservative Party begins to loom larger than his personal idiosyncrasies. The difficulties he faced in the form of significant historical dilemmas seem less easy to resolve than Liberals and hostile journalists opined at the time. . . . But his contemporaries were also right in seeing some kind of disorder near the centre of his personality and his prime-ministership. The problems of leadership, authority, power, ego, and a mad time in history overwhelmed the prairie politician with the odd name.{d-1} For writer George Bowering, Diefenbaker was the wittiest of all the country{apos}s prime ministers, {d-0}and he was the most amazing campaigner anyone would ever see or hear.{d-1} But he got everyone - the Americans, the British, the Liberals, the economists, the Quebecers, and his own party establishment - mad at him.

Possessed of a rare determination that was reinforced rather than dulled by early slights and defeats, Diefenbaker had nurtured a dramatic and corrosive talent as a criminal defence lawyer which served him well as a member of the opposition, though less well as a member of government. He was a British Canadian with a sentimental attachment to the imperial connection and to Canada{apos}s parliamentary institutions. His convictions on welfare and employment policy were shaped in the 1940s by his experience of the great depression on the prairies and were broadly shared by colleagues in the Liberal and CCF parties. In his approach to fiscal and monetary policy, on the other hand, he remained an instinctive conservative, never fully absorbing the lessons of Keynesian economics.

The biography is based on the author{apos}s Rogue Tory: the life and legend of John G. Diefenbaker (Toronto, 1995), which contains an exhaustive list of primary and secondary sources. The Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker Centre for the Study of Canada, Univ. of Saskatchewan (Saskatoon), holds the Diefenbaker papers along with some photographs, films, and other documents. A selection of the letters deposited at the Centre have been published: J. G. Diefenbaker et al., Personal letters of a public man: the family letters of John G. Diefenbaker, ed. Thad McIlroy (Toronto and New York, 1985). Diefenbaker{apos}s memoirs are gathered under the general title One Canada: memoirs of the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker (3v., Toronto, 1975-77) and are divided into three periods: [1]: The crusading years, 1895-1956; [2]: The years of achievement, 1957-1962: [3]: The tumultuous years, 1962-1967. Library and Arch. Canada holds a microfilm copy of the Diefenbaker papers along with additional documentation, in particular files concerning the Diefenbaker government and various ministries. The following list mentions some of the most useful secondary sources.

Michael Bliss, Right honourable men: the descent of Canadian politics from Macdonald to Mulroney (Toronto, 1994). George Bowering, Egotists and autocrats: the prime ministers of Canada (Toronto, 1999). D. [K.] Camp, Gentlemen, players and politicians (Toronto and Montreal, 1970). John English, The life of Lester Pearson (2v., New York and Toronto, 1989-92), 2. D. M. Fleming, So very near: the political memoirs of the Honourable Donald M. Fleming (2v., Toronto, 1985), 2. Eddie Goodman, Life of the party: the memoirs of Eddie Goodman (Toronto, 1988). J. L. Granatstein, Canada, 1957-1967: the years of uncertainty and innovation (Toronto, 1986). J. L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, Prime ministers: ranking Canada{apos}s leaders (Toronto, 1999). Simma Holt, The other Mrs. Diefenbaker (Toronto and New York, 1982). Knowlton Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker: fear and loathing across the undefended border (Toronto, 1990). P. C. Newman, Renegade in power: the Diefenbaker years ([new ed.], Toronto, 1989). Patrick Nicholson, Vision and indecision (Don Mills, Ont., 1968). H. B. Robinson, Diefenbaker{apos}s world: a populist in foreign affairs (Toronto, 1989). Pierre Sévigny, This game of politics (Toronto, 1965). Dick Spencer, Trumpets and drums: John Diefenbaker on the campaign trail (Vancouver and Toronto, 1994). Thomas Van Dusen, The chief (New York and Toronto, 1968). Garrett and Kevin Wilson, Diefenbaker for the defence (Toronto, 1988).

Duplessis offered a vision of the autonomy of the province of Quebec that was criticized by his opponents, as well as by the generation that would experience the Quiet Revolution. He sought to preserve the liberal economic model that had been in place from the beginning of the 20th century. Since he refused to use the province{apos}s powers to undertake reforms, this autonomy was described as purely defensive. His nationalism was also disputed, given that he was holding back the development of the province by handing over its resources to foreign investors on terms advantageous to them, though he himself had denounced this policy when it was pursued by his predecessors.

The Lougheed–Bennett practice went slowly at first but by 1900 Calgary was growing and by 1905, when Alberta became a province, growing rapidly. Bennett was now buying and selling land, and with the firm’s retainer from the Canadian Pacific Railway, making a good thing of it. Calgary had become the centre of a large farming and ranching community. There were soon oil leases and oil companies as well. Bennett invested in William Stewart Herron*{apos}s Calgary Petroleum Products Company, of which he became director and solicitor. Under manager Archibald Wayne Dingman it struck oil in Turner Valley. Bennett also became involved with Aitken in the successful promotions that produced the Alberta Pacific Grain Company, Canada Cement, and Calgary Power. His reputation grew throughout, as an honest, versatile, clever, persistent lawyer. By 1914 he had an extremely busy and profitable practice. And R. B.'s teetotal principles would never obstruct legitimate legal business; among his clients was Alfred Ernest Cross*'s Calgary Brewing and Malting.

Bennett took office with action on his mind. Action he had promised and action Canada got. A special session of parliament was called for 8 September. He believed that tariffs were necessary not only to keep Canada independent of the United States but to create markets for Canadian producers, so tariff revision, steeply upward on a range of manufactured goods, was instituted. The emergency Unemployment Relief Act, providing $20 million for public works at the federal and local levels, was also passed. Parliament prorogued in two weeks. Then it was organization for the Imperial Conference in London, which was to start on 30 September and which Bennett hoped would provide a solution to Canada{apos}s economic difficulties through the establishment of a reciprocal preference in trade. The conference was mostly a Canadian idea but Canadians would be a day late for it.

In August 1937 the Canadian government set up one of the most important commissions in the history of Canada: the royal commission on dominion-provincial relations. Canada had undergone decisive changes since confederation. The country{apos}s population, which had been largely rural in 1867, was now mainly urban. Its economy, long dominated by agriculture, had become industrialized. This transformation entailed increased social needs and a changed role for governments. The economic crisis that had stricken the western world from 1929 put added pressure on the country to adapt to new social and economic realities. The commission had as its mandate, in part, to make {d-0}a re-examination of the economic and financial basis of Confederation and of the distribution of legislative powers in the light of the economic and social developments of the last seventy years.{d-1} By its proposals, the commission was to ensure the financial stability of the provincial governments and make it possible for comparable services and programs to be provided for all Canadians. The federal government started from the premise that there was a severe disequilibrium between the responsibilities assigned to the provinces by the constitution and the revenue allotted to them. Newton Wesley Rowell, chief justice of Ontario, became the commission chairman.

The government wanted the commission to be representative of the whole country. Thus the chairman was assisted by commissioners from each of its regions: Robert Alexander MacKay*, professor of political science at Dalhousie University, for the Maritimes; Thibaudeau Rinfret* for the province of Quebec; John Wesley Dafoe, a highly regarded editor from Winnipeg, for the prairies; Henry Forbes Angus*, professor of political economy at the University of British Columbia, for British Columbia. Rinfret, a justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, served for only a short time on the commission before he resigned for health reasons. The Canadian government then appointed Sirois to take his place. This was no random choice. Sirois was a respected constitutional expert and professional whose career had progressed at a distance from active political life. Unlike many of his contemporaries, he was not immediately seen as slavishly following a line dictated by the world of politics. The fact remains that this choice was justified, primarily, by the determination to ensure that the commission{apos}s conclusions would be accepted by the people of the province of Quebec. In a letter to Commissioner Dafoe dated 23 Nov. 1937, Rowell, relying on the testimony of two persons who knew Sirois, hinted at such an intention: {d-0}a report signed by Dr. Sirois would carry more real weight among the people of Quebec than one signed by even so distinguished a judge as Mr. Justice Rinfret.{d-1} The initiative for this appointment probably came from the influential federal justice minister Ernest Lapointe. Sirois was personally unknown to the other members of the commission at the time of his appointment, but he made a good impression on them. Rowell, who had serious health problems, resigned in November 1938 and Sirois replaced him as chairman. The commission would be known henceforth by the names of its two successive chairmen, Rowell-Sirois.

The commission{apos}s work encompassed a vast field. Its research program was developed to address three areas of concern. To ensure that the commission was well informed, experts were assigned to write a series of studies dealing with the Canadian economic system, constitutional questions, and the public accounts of the dominion and provincial governments. Some studies were prepared for the commissioners alone; others were distributed widely. In addition, the commission travelled around the country from November 1937 to December 1938 to meet provincial politicians and hold public sessions at which civil servants and representatives of various organizations were heard. Eighty-five days of hearings were held in the provincial capitals and in Ottawa, with 397 witnesses making presentations. The transcript of their statements covered 10,702 pages. In addition, 427 documents were submitted to the commission. The federal initiative was not received unanimously with enthusiasm. Fearing the federal government{apos}s invasion of the areas under provincial jurisdiction, the provinces of Quebec, Ontario, and Alberta refused to participate actively in the work. Sirois reported to the federal political authorities several times on the commission{apos}s progress. The production of its report was delayed by the sheer scale of the task. Sirois justified the tardiness in a letter to Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King on 12 July 1939: {d-0}In a project of this magnitude and this complexity, many unpredictable and uncontrollable factors have developed, so that it became impossible to adhere to the first date [set], and which make it difficult at this point to set a rigid and specific time limit.{d-1}

Despite the pitfalls, the commission finally submitted its imposing report to the government in May 1940. It was published in three volumes. The first set out the evolution and current state of Canada{apos}s federal system in terms of finances and the economy. The second, which constituted the main body of the report, included the commission{apos}s recommendations to the government. The third contained various statistical data useful for understanding the report. Among the principal recommendations were the establishment of a system of unemployment insurance, the assumption of provincial debts by the federal government, and the payment of annual grants to provinces in need of such assistance. In short, the commission took a stand directly opposed to that of the courts, which had disallowed social welfare legislation - notably, the act introducing a program of unemployment insurance - passed under the government of Prime Minister Richard Bedford Bennett. The Supreme Court of Canada and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London had in fact declared unconstitutional a law adopted by parliament in 1935 that set up a commission on employment and social insurance and put into place a national employment service, unemployment insurance, assistance for the unemployed, and other forms of social insurance and security. The decision of these courts rested on the grounds that unemployment insurance was a provincial responsibility. The increase in financial responsibilities entailed by this reorganization led to a recommendation to centralize the federal fiscal system. Indeed, the royal commission proposed that the federal government be given the authority to impose taxes on individuals and corporations, as well as succession duties.

The particular contribution of each commissioner to the writing of the report is hard to establish. Far from having acted in the background, the three commissioners, particularly Dafoe, exercised a decisive influence on the work. Economist Douglas Alexander SKELTON, the commission{apos}s secretary, who also coordinated the research, contributed greatly to shaping the report. The work of Sirois as chairman was undoubtedly demanding, since his office files show that from 1938 his notarial activity fell off sharply. There is no question that Sirois saw himself as the defender of his province{apos}s values and rights. His intervention can be detected here and there in the report. For instance, a warning is issued to the drafter of any potential federal law on unemployment insurance against encroaching {d-0}on the rights defined in the Civil Code of Quebec.{d-1} Another example is the recommendation that the government of Canada pay part of the interest on the debts of Quebec municipalities, assuming responsibilities which, in other parts of the country, fell to the provinces. Furthermore, despite the delay experienced in the work, Sirois insisted that the report be published simultaneously in English and French. In his opinion, such a move would facilitate its reception. As he wrote on 28 June 1939 to Adjutor Savard, the French-language secretary of the commission, {d-0}To act otherwise would mean exposing the report, in the province of Quebec, to criticisms that would make its usefulness rather illusory.{d-1} The sensitivity of Sirois to Quebec{apos}s concerns did not, however, prevent him from standing by his colleagues.

With the coming of the 20th century, Sirois, like many jurists, found the ideas of French sociologist and economist Frédéric Le Play persuasive. In 1905 he was one of the founders of the Société d{apos}Économie Sociale et Politique de Québec and was made its secretary. His experience in this kind of organization may have moved him to encourage young notaries not to limit themselves to a {d-0}selfish and solitary{d-1} practice of their profession, as he would note in a work published in Montreal in 1933, Les carrières, pour guider le choix des jeunes gens après leurs études classiques. He advised them instead to take an interest in social movements and get involved in political life. His personal interest in public affairs did not lead him into active politics, however, although he was recognized as a Liberal.

He was apprenticed to Weatherbe and Graham as an articled clerk for four years, {d-0}entitled to be instructed in the knowledge and practice of the Law.{d-1} In truth, he learned by doing. He was expected to prepare briefs for his masters and watch over the ordinary office affairs of their clients. Formal instruction depended upon his after-hours initiative. A diversion from the routine of the office was enlisting in the 63rd (Halifax Volunteer) Battalion of Rifles. There, in three yearly terms, he earned a meagre but welcome six dollars for twelve days of service and a fifty dollar bonus when he qualified for commission. Other companions were found at the St Andrew{apos}s Lodge of British Templars and the debating society of the Young Men{apos}s Christian Association. In September 1877 he joined Charles Hibbert Tupper*, who had a law degree from Harvard, and 23 others to sit the provincial bar examinations. Borden topped the class. He still had a year of apprenticeship before admittance to the bar and during the winter of 1877-78 also attended the School of Military Instruction in Halifax.

Borden and a classmate briefly had a practice in Halifax before he went to Kentville as the junior partner of Conservative lawyer John Pryor Chipman. Then, in 1882, Wallace Graham called him back to Halifax. John Sparrow David Thompson*, a partner in the firm since Weatherbe{apos}s promotion to the bench in 1878, had himself been made a judge. Graham and Tupper, who had become a partner in 1881, needed help, especially so because Tupper had just been elected to the House of Commons. Borden had hardly settled in when Graham assigned him a long list of cases before the provincial Supreme Court. Other work came from the firm{apos}s Conservative friends in Sir John A. Macdonald*{apos}s government in Ottawa. Borden helped prepare the government{apos}s cases in the seizure of two American fishing vessels in 1886 during the long-standing Canadian-American dispute over fishing rights in the North Atlantic. Then, early in 1888, Thompson, now Macdonald{apos}s minister of justice, invited Borden to work with him in Ottawa as deputy minister. Borden was tempted but declined, preferring to remain in practice in Halifax.

By the mid 1890s the Borden firm, now including William Bruce Almon Ritchie* and others, was among the largest in the province. The Bank of Nova Scotia, Canada Atlantic Steamship, Nova Scotia Telephone, and the bread and confectionery business of William Church Moir* were among its prominent clients. Most of Borden{apos}s work was on referral of appeals to the Supreme Court in Halifax or in Ottawa, and in 1893 he appeared for the first time before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London. He had several cases each year in Ottawa. While there he frequently visited Sir John Thompson, who had become prime minister, and other Nova Scotia acquaintances. His closest friends were the Tuppers, Charles Hibbert and his family. In the early nineties Borden and Tupper took up the new fad of bicycling and were often seen on the roads in and about Ottawa and Hull. At home in Halifax, Borden{apos}s reputation and influence in the bar steadily grew. He was elected vice-president of the Nova Scotia Barristers{s-1-unknown} Society in 1895 and became its president a year later. While he was serving in that office he and his colleague Charles Sidney Harrington played leading roles in organizing the founding meeting of the Canadian Bar Association in Montreal in 1896.

That spring, on 27 April, Borden was in Ottawa arguing cases and went to dinner at Sir Charles Tupper*{apos}s home. It was the day that Sir Mackenzie Bowell* resigned as Conservative prime minister and Tupper was about to succeed him. It was clear that there would be an election before the year was out. Tupper asked Borden to stand for Halifax with the veteran Catholic mp Thomas Edward Kenny*. John Fitzwilliam Stairs*, Halifax businessman and Protestant colleague of Kenny in the House of Commons, was stepping down and Tupper wanted Borden to replace him. Before Borden left the dinner party, he accepted.

It was an abrupt change in Borden{apos}s life and opponents would later charge that he had suddenly switched sides. What political interests he had had in his earlier years were certainly on the Liberal side - the Valley was a Liberal stronghold - and he had spoken once on behalf of his cousin the Liberal politician Frederick William Borden* in 1882. In 1886, however, he had abandoned the Liberal cause in disagreement with Nova Scotia premier William Stevens Fielding*{apos}s campaign against confederation. Several of his legal partners in Graham{apos}s firm were prominent Conservatives and when Borden took over the firm all the new associates he chose had Conservative leanings. Yet Borden himself had never before expressed any interest in running for public office. Nor was he deeply moved by the big issue in the 1896 election, the Manitoba school question [see Thomas Greenway*]. After winning the nomination he campaigned on the hardy staple of Macdonald-era Tory politics, the National Policy. This, after all, was the plank in the Conservative platform that captured the interest and support of most of his clients. On election day, 23 June, Halifax voters, for only the second time since confederation, split their ticket. Both the Conservative and the Liberal Catholic candidates were defeated. Borden and Liberal Benjamin Russell, another prominent lawyer and Protestant, were elected. Borden took his place in the commons as a member of the opposition party: Tupper and his Tory colleagues had been soundly defeated by Wilfrid Laurier*{apos}s Liberals.

Of all the members of the family it was Eunice, Robert{apos}s mother, who had the strongest influence on his upbringing and development. He later wrote that she was of {d-0}a highly-wrought nervous temperament,{d-1} {d-0}passionate but wholly just and considerate upon reflection,{d-1} and totally devoted to the welfare of her four children. Borden admired her {d-0}very strong character, remarkable energy, high ambition and unusual ability{d-1} - traits that marked his own emerging personality. Borden{apos}s reflections on his father were much more restrained. Andrew did not take to agricultural pursuits and left management of the farm to Eunice and the children. He dabbled and failed in small business ventures and in time found a comfortable sinecure as stationmaster at Grand Pré for the Windsor and Annapolis Railway. Though {d-0}a man of good ability and excellent judgment,{d-1} Robert wrote, Andrew {d-0}lacked energy and had no great aptitude for affairs.{d-1}

The contrast with his chores at home was sharp and telling. He later recalled that he never had mastered {d-0}the mysteries of building a load of hay,{d-1} and found hoeing vegetables {d-0}extremely disagreeable{d-1} and sawing cordwood for winter fires {d-0}unpleasurable.{d-1} Even on the rich bottomlands and upland fields of {d-0}the Valley{d-1} the rewards of agriculture were hard won. He never forgot that {d-0}throughout the year labour was severe and hours long.{d-1} As attached as he was to his family, Borden resolved not to spend his life as a farmer in Grand Pré. Teaching at Acacia Villa had more than its share of routine, and his failure to complete his schooling precluded study at university. Still, teaching hinted at a better way of life. Self-education, he discovered, had its own satisfactions. One learned the value of time: {d-0}To waste it seems like wasting one{apos}s future.{d-1} Discipline, hard work, persistence, patience, and a sense of humour were common enough virtues but essential to shape the ambitions of a young man determined to succeed. Borden taught at the academy for four years and then accepted Hamilton{apos}s invitation to join him at the Glenwood Institute in Matawan, N.J.

It was the first time he had ever been away from home and he was desperately lonely in the fall of 1873. But he was not alone. A ferry ride away in the great metropolis of New York his half-brother, Thomas, a sailor, and his wife lived. Other Nova Scotia friends resided in Brooklyn and he and a fellow boarder named Horner, a public-school teacher, often went to the city on weekends to visit its parks, museums, galleries, and libraries and to listen to temperance lectures. At the Glenwood Institute, he was a 19-year-old professor of classics and mathematics. Borden found the work demanding. He kept a short-lived diary and frequently recorded entries like {d-0}I worked too hard this afternoon at reports &c. I was somewhat ill this evening about 7 o{apos}clock.{d-1} He had nine different classes, most with fewer than a dozen students, and none of them particularly challenging.

The Bordens were farmers, tilling the rich tidelands rescued from the sea generations earlier by the expelled Acadians. Robert{apos}s father, Andrew, who was born in 1816, owned a substantial farm at Grand Pré. He first married Catherine Sophia Fuller, and they had a son, Thomas Andrew, and a daughter, Sophia Amelia, before her death in 1847. Three years later Andrew married Eunice Jane Laird, the daughter of John Laird, the village schoolmaster and a classical scholar and mathematician of local repute. Robert was born in 1854 and was followed by a brother, John William, a sister, Julia Rebecca, and another brother, Henry Clifford, born in 1870. John William would become a senior civil servant in the Department of Militia and Defence in Ottawa; Julia remained in Grand Pré, unmarried and living with her parents; Henry Clifford, known as Hal and Robert{apos}s favourite among the siblings, graduated from Dalhousie law school in Halifax and practised as a lawyer.

Robert Laird Borden{apos}s paternal ancestor Richard Borden left Headcorn, England, in 1638 to settle in Portsmouth, R.I. More than a century later, after the Acadians had been expelled from Nova Scotia in 1755 [see Charles Lawrence*], Richard{apos}s great-grandson Samuel Borden, a landowner and surveyor in New Bedford, Mass., was commissioned by the Nova Scotia government to survey the vacated lands and lay out plots for New Englanders intending to settle there. In 1764 Samuel received a parcel of land in Cornwallis for his work, but he returned to New Bedford. His son Perry, Robert{apos}s great-grandfather, took up the grant, beginning the establishment of Borden families in the Annapolis valley bordering on the Bay of Fundy.

Robert{apos}s education began in the village{apos}s Presbyterian Sunday school, where he was initiated into the mysteries of the Shorter Catechism, and at home, where he learned reading with his mother from the pages of John Bunyan{apos}s Pilgrim{apos}s progress. In due course, lessons with the village schoolmistress were interspersed with visits from his uncles, who introduced him to the poets Horace and Virgil. When he was nine, in 1863, his parents sent him as a day student to the local private academy, Acacia Villa School, presided over by Arthur McNutt Patterson. Patterson{apos}s mission was to {d-0}fit boys physically, morally, and intellectually, for the responsibilities of life.{d-1} Each morning began with Patterson reading a chapter of Proverbs to his charges, who then moved on to exercises in grammar, mathematics, literature, and natural philosophy. Borden excelled at Greek and Latin. Soon his instructor, James Henry Hamilton, also had him studying Hebrew. The classical poetry and literature stayed with Borden all his life. A volume in Latin or Greek, perhaps one of each, was on his bedside table until the day of his death. In 1869, when Hamilton suddenly left Acacia Villa to join a private school in New Jersey, Robert, at age 14, found himself promoted to {d-0}assistant master,{d-1} charged with taking Hamilton{apos}s place in classical studies.

In the spring of 1874, as the school year was drawing to a close, Borden surveyed his prospects. They were not encouraging; without completion of his formal education in school and college, a career in teaching would likely mean working in second-rate academies trying to inspire dull, uninterested students. Casting about, he wrote to an uncle who was a barrister in Ontario, asking for information on studying law in that province. The reply was enough to convince him that he should give the profession a try. But his mother would have nothing to do with his going to Ontario. She told him he could do just as well at home in Nova Scotia. He applied to and was accepted by the prominent Halifax firm of Robert Linton Weatherbe and Wallace Nesbit Graham. As the fall of 1874 began, Borden, always punctilious, recorded: {d-0}Commenced the study of the law by reading a small portion of [Robert Malcolm Napier] Kerr{apos}s 1873 edition of the Student{apos}s Blackstone on Saturday evening, Sept. 19 at 8.45 o{apos}clock.{d-1}

In September 1889 Robert Borden married Laura Bond, a daughter of the late Thomas Henry Bond, who had been a successful hardware merchant in Halifax. How they first met is not known, though it may have been at St Paul{apos}s Anglican Church, where she was an organist and he a regular attendant. Their courtship had begun in the summer of 1886. When they were married he was 35 and she 28. Laura was a lively, attractive, and strong-willed young woman whose interest in music and theatre complemented his in literature. Both enjoyed tennis, water sports, and especially golf. At first the Bordens rented rooms in downtown Halifax but in 1894 Borden bought a large home, Pinehurst, on Quinpool Road in the western suburbs of the city. He was now very successful in his career, and he and Laura spent several weeks in the summers of 1891 and 1893 touring in England and Europe. There were no children of the marriage but Borden{apos}s brother Hal was often with them at Pinehurst while studying at Dalhousie.

On 7 Nov. 1900 the Conservatives were soundly defeated in another general election and Tupper was ready to give up the leadership at year{apos}s end. The more obvious candidates were veteran warriors such as George Eulas Foster and Sir Charles Hibbert Tupper. But they had acquired as many rivals and enemies as friends during their long careers, and their prospects of beating Laurier in a future election were dismal. The party needed a fresh face and the Tuppers, father and son, turned to Borden. He had no enemies in the caucus and had been an able and conscientious worker in parliament. Charles Hibbert approached him in mid November, well before his father{apos}s formal resignation was announced in February. {d-0}I have not either the experience or the qualifications which would enable me to successfully lead the party,{d-1} Borden replied. {d-0}It would be an absurdity for the party and madness for me.{d-1} The Tuppers persisted and when the disheartened Tory mps and senators met in February 1901, they rallied support for their candidate. On 6 February the members, many sceptically, chose Borden as their leader. Borden played out the formalities of surprise and set two conditions. He would, he said, accept for only one year and he demanded that the party appoint a committee to search for a permanent leader. The committee was quickly forgotten and the commitment to one year was never made public.

For the next four years Borden was a backbencher, practising law in Halifax and politics in Ottawa. He disliked being away from Laura. {d-0}It is a miserable irregular life one has to lead,{d-1} he complained early in the 1896 session, {d-0}and I am more than sick of it, I can assure you.{d-1} As always, the duties of the backbencher revolved around attending to the wishes and complaints of his constituents and defending the interests of his riding when occasion demanded. Borden became involved in his work on house committees and, over time, grew more confident to speak on broader, national issues. As one of the few {d-0}new men{d-1} in the party, he was steadfast in his loyalty to his leader, Tupper, and distanced himself from the incessant bickering that characterized the Conservatives in opposition. By 1899 he had been moved to the front bench and had begun to be noticed as an emerging figure in the party.

Leading his colleagues was even more challenging. They were a fractious lot in parliament and the constituencies, cursed with long-standing rivalries and deep divisions between Catholic and Protestant, French and English, and, reflecting changing times, urban and rural factions. Though ultimately the leader had the authority to decide, party organization and party policy had evolved as prerogatives of the mps, which they jealously guarded. They chafed at Borden{apos}s tendency, throughout the opposition years, to bypass them and seek advice from outsiders, Conservative provincial premiers and prominent business leaders sympathetic to the Tory cause. One veteran of party warfare, Samuel Hughes, developed a strong affection for his leader but shared his long-serving colleagues{s-1-unknown} doubts about Borden{apos}s political skills. Borden, he observed in 1911, was {d-0}a most lovely fellow; very capable, but not a very good judge of men or tactics; and is gentle hearted as a girl.{d-1} Many mps found Borden reserved, distant, and occasionally imperious. Once, in 1913, Borden had to reprimand a colleague and then regretted it. {d-0}Wrote [John Allister Currie] a consoling letter,{d-1} he wrote in his diary. {d-0}He wept. Geo[rges] Lafontaine also wept today when I spoke kindly to him.{d-1}

Borden was influenced by the progressive ideas about democratizing political parties and using state power in the public interest that were being debated in the United States. An example was his opposition to the extravagant plans of Laurier{apos}s government, in 1903, to support the building of two more transcontinental railways, the Grand Trunk Pacific and the Canadian Northern. Borden agreed that the rapid expansion of the prairie region required new transportation routes. But the two railways, which would run for miles within a carriage ride{apos}s distance of each other, were wasteful and irresponsible. He countered with a proposal for a government-owned and -operated transcontinental railway, controlled not by private corporations but by the people of Canada. Though the Liberals easily carried the day in parliament, Borden said that in the forthcoming general election the people would have a choice, {d-0}a government-owned railway or a railway-owned government.{d-1}

It did not work. Laurier{apos}s Liberals, at the peak of their power, humiliated the Tories in the election of November 1904. They took every seat in Nova Scotia, including Borden{apos}s, swept British Columbia, and increased their majority to 64. Borden talked of resigning. But the attractions of public life had begun to grow on him: he enjoyed the recognition a party leader received and the continual association with men of affairs that political life demanded. His confidence in his performance as leader had grown and his job was unfinished. {d-0}For a long time I more than hesitated{d-1} about staying on, he would tell his friend John Stephen Willison*. But just before Christmas 1904 he decided to remain as party leader. {d-0}I have put all the hesitation and doubt behind me and I shall endeavour to do my full duty.{d-1} A vacancy was hastily found in Carleton constituency in Ontario and Laurier graciously arranged that Borden be acclaimed on 4 Feb. 1905.

Borden{apos}s most difficult problem was with his French Canadian mps. Once the backbone of the Conservative Party, the Quebec membership in caucus had been reduced to a tiny rump. Borden often thought their ideas were parochial but never went out of his way to try to understand them. Following a practice of Macdonald, he chose a lieutenant from their ranks, Frederick Debartzch Monk*. Monk, like Borden, was a lawyer who had first been elected in 1896 and, again like his chief, he was serious, earnest, and moody. Neither man got on easily with the other. Monk was a champion of growing nationalist sentiment in Quebec. Borden, who spoke competent French, was frequently impatient with his lieutenant and failed to grasp the significance of French Canadians{s-1-unknown} views on national issues that threatened their sense of identity. Nor was he able to curb the sometimes virulent antagonism of his more ardent Ontario Protestant colleagues to the Quebec Conservatives{s-1-unknown} aspirations. Monk, feeling isolated and unsupported by his leader, resigned his position in January 1904. A year later he and Borden clashed over the schools issue in Alberta and Saskatchewan. Monk wanted Borden to stand up for establishing separate schools in the new provinces while Borden, knowing they were opposed by local officials, backed the arguments for provincial autonomy. Monk, angered, said that his leader had set back the Conservative cause in Quebec by 15 years.

Borden had now lost two general elections and his party four in a row. But in 1908 the Conservatives gained 14 seats, reducing Laurier{apos}s majority to 50. Borden was more determined than ever to carry on. Many of his parliamentary colleagues had other ideas. They resented having been ignored in the planning of the Halifax Platform. They feared his ideas for developing party structures that would lessen their influence. And he had now led them to another painful defeat. They carried their discontent into the new parliament, a parliament soon dominated by two issues that challenged Canadians{s-1-unknown} views of their relationship with the United Kingdom and the United States and that triggered successive revolts against Borden{apos}s leadership within his caucus. The struggle appeared to be over Borden{apos}s determination to break the mps{s-1-unknown} dominance of party affairs by holding a national convention and establishing a counterweight of democratically controlled local organizations. But what sparked the revolts was Borden{apos}s stand on the naval question in 1909-10 and on reciprocity with the United States in 1911.

Shortly after his election it was clear that Borden{apos}s commitment to national politics was complete: he told Laura on 9 February that he was house hunting in Ottawa. The couple moved into their new home, Glensmere, on Wurtemburg Street and backing onto the Rideau River, in the summer of 1906. Borden spent much of his second term as leader developing a new platform for his party. A scheme to hold a policy convention was mooted and then shelved when Quebec Conservatives declined to attend. He turned for advice to the Conservative provincial premiers, Richard McBride* in British Columbia, Rodmond Palen Roblin in Manitoba, and James Pliny Whitney* in Ontario, to some of the new members of his caucus who shared his views, and to businessmen such as Joseph Wesley Flavelle and Sir Thomas George Shaughnessy*. He announced his Halifax Platform - in his words, {d-0}the most advanced and progressive policy ever put forward in Federal affairs{d-1} - in his home city on 20 Aug. 1907. It called, among other things, for reform of the Senate and the civil service, a more selective immigration policy, free rural mail delivery, and government regulation of telegraphs, telephones, and railways and eventually national ownership of telegraphs and telephones. The proposals received a cool reception from his parliamentary colleagues who had not been consulted and a mixed public reception among businessmen who were concerned by Borden{apos}s unorthodox ideas about state intervention in business affairs. Though he spent more than a year promoting the platform in speeches across the nation, the effort was not enough to prevent another victory by the Liberals in October 1908.

In February 1909 the Conservatives placed upon the order paper of the House of Commons notice of a resolution recommending that Canada provide for its own coastal defence, something Laurier had promised in 1902 but never acted upon. Early in March, before the resolution could be debated, a short-lived crisis in Great Britain over the relative strengths of the imperial and German navies shocked and surprised both parties. In English-speaking Canada public figures and many of the large urban dailies demanded a Canadian contribution to the sudden apparent shortfall in British Dreadnoughts. Neither Laurier nor Borden was sympathetic to this clamour. Laurier proposed an amendment to the Conservative resolution, recommending that the house approve any necessary expenditure designed to promote the organization of a Canadian naval service which would work in close cooperation with the imperial navy. It was quickly accepted by the Conservatives and the revised resolution passed unanimously at the end of March. By then, however, the demand for a contribution of Dreadnoughts had been embraced by Borden{apos}s three strongest allies, premiers McBride, Roblin, and Whitney.

In November 1910, responding to an invitation from the United States, Laurier sent his ministers of finance and customs to Washington to discuss a new Canadian-American trade arrangement. After another session there in January, the finance minister, William Fielding, announced the agreement in the house on the 26th. It was staggering in its breadth. The two nations undertook to eliminate customs duties on a long list of natural products. Then there was another long list of reduced duties on many manufactured goods. The arrangement concluded with two further lists, one Canadian and one American, of lower duties on yet more processed products of the other nation. To avoid the possibility of the agreement being defeated in the United States Senate if it was styled a treaty, it had been decided to bring it into effect by reciprocal legislation. The Conservatives, to a man, were stunned. There had never been such a challenge to their National Policy; there had never been a proposal so calculated to win the support of the vast majority of Canada{apos}s farmers, fishermen, lumbermen, and industrial workers. Laurier{apos}s party, though old, tired, and slipping badly in its organizational prowess, seemed assured of another sweeping victory; Borden{apos}s men faced a fifth deeply humiliating defeat.

In January 1910 Laurier introduced a bill to create a Canadian naval service, with ships stationed on both the Atlantic and the Pacific coasts. If required, they could be put at the service of the imperial navy in time of war. The Conservatives were deeply divided. Monk, whom Borden had reappointed as his Quebec lieutenant a year earlier, was demanding a plebiscite on the issue. Borden continued to support the concept of a Canadian naval service - though not necessarily the one proposed by the Liberals - but now also favoured immediate aid. Many other Tory members wanted a simple, outright contribution to the imperial navy. Before the session was over Laurier{apos}s proposal would be carried by his party{apos}s large majority and soon become law. In early April the Toronto Daily Star broke the story of seething discontent in the Tory caucus, claiming as many as seven different factions at war with each other. That was not true but there were three groups, the French Canadians and two small cliques of English Canadians, who were challenging Borden{apos}s authority and calling for McBride to abandon Victoria and rescue the national party in Ottawa. Borden responded by handing his resignation as party leader to the chief whip on 6 April. He had no intention of leaving. Instead, he was challenging his caucus. He addressed it for an hour on the 12th and left knowing that his allies would beat back the revolt. Shortly after noon a motion reaffirming support for him was passed by all.

The strategy worked brilliantly. On 21 Sept. 1911 the Conservatives took all seven seats in British Columbia, eight of ten in Manitoba, and seventy-three of eighty-six in Ontario. In Quebec their representation jumped from eleven to twenty-seven. Borden{apos}s Tories had won 134 seats in the House of Commons; Laurier{apos}s Liberals were returned in 87 constituencies. Borden was the new prime minister of Canada.

It was the Tory premiers who initially rallied the troops. For them the issue was not a cheaper cost of living for ordinary Canadians, it was a betrayal by Laurier of Canada{apos}s cherished ties to the empire. Robert Rogers, Roblin{apos}s minister of public works in Winnipeg, told Borden the reciprocity agreement was a {d-0}departure from Imperialism to continentalism.{d-1} Then the manufacturers, who had prospered under the protection of National Policy tariffs sustained by both Conservative and Liberal governments since 1879, took up the cause [see Sir Byron Edmund Walker*]. The Canadian Manufacturers{s-1-unknown} Association quickly developed a shadowy subordinate, the Canadian Home Market Association, to carry on a propaganda war against reciprocity. Soon important business spokesmen who had long supported Laurier{apos}s party, Zebulon Aiton Lash* and Lloyd Harris, joined Clifford Sifton*, a former minister in the Liberal cabinet, and John Willison, the Conservative editor of the Toronto News, to propose an alliance with Borden{apos}s party. Their delegation met him on 1 March, anticipating that the reciprocity issue would force a new election. What would Borden do if he won? They asked that he consult their spokesmen before appointing his cabinet and that its membership include {d-0}men of outstanding national reputation and influence{d-1} who would appeal to the {d-0}progressive elements{d-1} of the electorate. In short, they wanted representation of the anti-reciprocity Liberals in his cabinet. Borden quickly agreed and a curious coalition against the trade agreement began to emerge under his leadership.

The new government began with high hopes for a mildly progressive legislative program. From the Halifax Platform, Borden promised further reform of the civil service - Laurier had begun the process with the establishment of the Civil Service Commission in 1908 - but sidestepped the more controversial ideas of government regulation or public ownership of national franchises such as the telegraph and telephone systems. The farmers, who were the principal victims of the defeat of reciprocity, needed attention. The Canada Grain Act of 1912 established a board of grain commissioners to supervise grain inspection and regulate the grain trade, and enabled the federal government to build or acquire and operate terminal elevators at key points in the grain marketing and export system. By 1916 the government would have elevators in operation at Port Arthur (Thunder Bay), Ont., Moose Jaw, Sask., Calgary, Saskatoon, and Vancouver. A second measure provided financial support to the provinces for the purpose of encouraging agriculture. Another proposal had the backing of many manufacturers and businessmen. The government introduced a bill in 1912 to establish a tariff commission, an innovation that had been mooted in the Halifax Platform; it was to apply {d-0}scientific principles{d-1} to management of the tariff, which accounted for more than 80 percent of the government{apos}s revenue, and remove it from partisan influences. Yet another measure that year called for financial assistance to the provinces to build or improve provincial highways and begin the construction of a national highway system. All of these initiatives seemed promising and a distinct departure from the Laurier era. Then, on 18 March 1912, Borden announced that he was halting the Liberals{s-1-unknown} naval program and preparing a permanent program of his own. It was a major tactical error, enraging the opposition and leaving Canada{apos}s naval service in limbo. The Liberals, who had a huge majority in the Senate, retaliated. Borden{apos}s tariff commission was rejected in 1912 and his highways bill in 1912 and again in 1913.

Borden{apos}s cabinet mirrored the groups that had won the election under the Conservative banner. All the Conservative premiers, McBride, Roblin, Whitney, and John Douglas Hazen of New Brunswick, were offered places but only Hazen accepted, becoming minister of marine and fisheries and minister of the naval service. The other three chose to have their interests protected by surrogates. Martin Burrell, an mp and a friend of McBride, became minister of agriculture; Robert Rogers from Manitoba accepted the Department of the Interior; and Francis Cochrane* from Ontario took Railways and Canals. William Thomas White*, a talented young financier and vice-president of the National Trust Company, was the nominee of the anti-reciprocity Liberal interests. Though he had no political experience, he was appointed minister of finance and quickly became a close friend and trusted colleague of Borden. There was no shortage of veteran Tories waiting to be called. George Foster, deeply hurt that he did not get Finance, took Trade and Commerce. Sam Hughes unblushingly wrote to Borden celebrating his credentials - {d-0}I get the name of bringing success and good luck to a cause{d-1} - and was rewarded with the patronage-rich Department of Militia and Defence. John Dowsley (Doc) Reid*, who had been a leader in the caucus revolts against Borden, was named minister of customs. From Quebec, Monk represented the Nationaliste forces as minister of public works and Louis-Philippe Pelletier* and Wilfrid-Bruno Nantel were selected from the more traditional Bleu wing of Conservative support. English Quebec was recognized by Charles Joseph Doherty{apos}s appointment as minister of justice.

A large majority of his caucus, led by its more recent members from the business class such as Herbert Brown Ames*, George Halsey Perley, and Albert Edward Kemp*, supported Borden{apos}s developing strategy. But a group of veteran Tories, including Monk and his friends, were appalled by Borden{apos}s pact with Sifton and the anti-reciprocity Liberals and denounced it in a stormy March caucus. Borden again threatened to resign, triggering a petition asking him to carry on. Sixty-five members signed; twenty did not. For a second time in a year opposition in his caucus had been crushed just as the prospects for eventual electoral victory looked better than they had in 15 years. In the House of Commons the party obstructed progress on the reciprocity bill. After a two-month adjournment to allow Laurier to attend an imperial conference, the Liberals lost control of the commons, abandoned their bill, and dissolved the house on 29 July. Borden and his coalition allies campaigned across English-speaking Canada on the slogan {d-0}Canadianism or Continentalism.{d-1} Their appearances in Quebec, Laurier{apos}s fortress, were few. In a tacit understanding the fight there was left to Monk, his Nationaliste friend Henri Bourassa* (a roommate of Borden years before), and Monk{apos}s parliamentary colleagues. For them the issue was not reciprocity, it was Laurier: Laurier and his Naval Service Act, Laurier and his capitulations to English Canadian interests through the years, Laurier and his alleged corrupt dominance of politics in Quebec.

The same day that Borden suspended the naval plan Winston Churchill, Britain{apos}s first lord of the Admiralty, announced a new construction program for the Royal Navy to counter a growing threat from Germany. Once again the contribution-minded Tories in English-speaking Canada demanded action, and Borden, Hazen, Doherty, and Pelletier soon left for consultations in London; Monk refused to go. In the fall of 1912 Borden told his colleagues that his permanent naval plan was postponed and he was going to make a contribution of Dreadnoughts. The debate among them dragged on for some weeks, with Monk again insisting that there must first be a plebiscite. On 18 October, realizing his position was hopeless, he resigned from cabinet. On 5 December Borden introduced his Naval Aid Bill, which was to provide $35 million for the construction of three Dreadnoughts to be placed {d-0}at the disposal of His Majesty the King for the common defence of the Empire.{d-1} Borden expected something significant in return. He was convinced that support for the imperial cause had to be recognized by Canada having a voice in the determination of imperial foreign policy. Following his conversations in London he believed he had received that concession and announced to the house that {d-0}no important step in foreign policy would be undertaken without consultation with . . . a representative of Canada.{d-1}

The debate in the house also went on for weeks, becoming ever more acrimonious. After an all-night session in March, Borden recorded, {d-0}Our men angry at end and both sides wanted a physical conflict. Primeval passions.{d-1} Then, on 9 April, for the first time in the Canadian parliament, the government introduced closure and a month later the bill passed. But the {d-0}gagged{d-1} opponents had their revenge. The Senate rejected the Naval Aid Bill at the end of May [see Sir James Alexander Lougheed*]. Canada{apos}s naval service was in suspension, its emergency contribution to the Royal Navy dead. The impasse would continue in June 1914, when the Senate rejected a bill, unanimously passed in the commons, to increase its numbers so as to give adequate representation to the western provinces. With partisan bitterness at a peak and good portions of its legislative program crippled, the Tories called out the battalions for a snap general election. Borden had one plank to put to the people: a pledge to amend the constitution and have an elected Senate. However, the weakness of the party in Quebec and in Manitoba, where Roblin won only the barest of majorities in July, combined with the illness of Whitney in Ontario, caused him to draw back.

On 22 June 1914 the king had awarded Borden the gcmg. Late in July, he and Laura escaped Ottawa{apos}s summer heat for a vacation in Muskoka. It was short-lived. On Friday morning, 31 July, Borden was on a train rushing for Toronto. The next day he was in his Ottawa office and on Tuesday evening, 4 Aug. 1914, at 8:55 a cable from London arrived during an emergency cabinet meeting. Canada was at war.

The war was greeted with enthusiasm. Prominent men of affairs competed for recognition of their contributions to the war effort. Robert Rogers guaranteed to support the dependants of members of the Fort Garry Horse who joined up. Clifford Sifton donated a battery of armoured cars, and Andrew Hamilton Gault* raised a battalion of ex-soldiers, the Princess Patricia{apos}s Canadian Light Infantry, that were the first Canadian troops to land in France. The Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire solicited funds for a hospital ship. And Sir Richard McBride surprised both the Admiralty and Ottawa when he used provincial funds to purchase two submarines being built for the Chilean navy in Seattle and had his operatives slip them over the border just as the United States neutrality laws were coming into effect.

In Ottawa, the government was unprepared for war. So was the nation. The only member of cabinet with any military experience, and it was chequered, was Sam Hughes. Key departments of the public service, Finance, Justice, Trade and Commerce, and Labour each had fewer than one hundred employees as late as March 1915. Small arms - the Ross rifle - were manufactured in Canada but there was no capacity, or manpower, to produce heavy armaments. A much-touted war book, quickly implemented, barely hinted at what a government at war needed to do. But by Sunday, 9 August, the basic orders in council had been proclaimed, and a war session of parliament opened just two weeks after the conflict began. Legislation was quickly passed to secure the nation{apos}s financial institutions and raise tariff duties on some high-demand consumer items. The War Measures Bill, giving the government extraordinary powers of coercion over Canadians, was rushed through three readings. Finally, the Canadian Patriotic Fund was set up to assume responsibility for assistance to the families of soldiers. With complete support from Laurier and his party, the government{apos}s war legislation was in place in just five days.

The centrepiece of the effort was recruiting the force that Canada would send to the front. Hughes abandoned a mobilization plan that had been drawn up by the chief of the general staff, Colonel Willoughby Garnons Gwatkin*, and turned recruiting over to the more than 200 local militia commanders. Chaos reigned while Hughes went on to contract businessman William Price* to build a training site from scratch at Valcartier, near Quebec City. In less than three weeks the camp had been established and thousands of troops had arrived. A division had been offered as Canada{apos}s contribution; many more men were at Valcartier and, while Hughes strutted and dithered, Borden decided late in September to send them all to England. The men were not trained and would spend months on Salisbury Plain in winter learning the rudiments of warfare [see Sir Edwin Alfred Hervey Alderson*]. The fear in the government, and the country, was that the Canadians would not get to the front in time: it was widely anticipated that the war would be over by Christmas. On 18 Dec. 1914 Borden told the Halifax Canadian Club that {d-0}there has not been, there will not be, compulsion or conscription.{d-1}

The eagerly awaited {d-0}decisive battle{d-1} that would crush the Germans never happened. Almost immediately the Western Front settled into years of ghastly skirmishes and inconclusive trench warfare. In April 1915, when the 1st Division fought its first major battle, at second Ypres, Canadians became acquainted with the growing casualty lists that appeared in urban dailies and rural weeklies from Nova Scotia to British Columbia. Recruiting for a second division had begun as the first was crossing the Atlantic. The authorized force level of the Canadian army rose again and again: 150,000 in July 1915; 250,000 in October 1915; and finally 500,000 in January 1916. Throughout, Hughes left the responsibility decentralized in the local units and military districts: his department remained on the sidelines. The recruits, very largely from Canada{apos}s towns and cities, came by the thousands - until mid 1916. By then the war effort in factory and field was running at full capacity and labour shortages were appearing on production lines and farmsteads alike. By then, too, the reality of a war of attrition had been grasped. Potential recruits had a choice not open to many in 1914 and early 1915 when unemployment had reached serious levels: there was a very dangerous job available at $1.10 a day in France and another at unprecedented wages in the home-front war economy. By July 1916 the seemingly endless flow of recruits had become a mere trickle: 8,389 men. In April and May 1917, especially in the aftermath of Vimy Ridge, just over 11,000 men enlisted. The days of volunteerism were over.

The government{apos}s approach to the war effort at home paralleled the volunteerism of military recruiting. Worried that an already troubled economy might collapse because of {d-0}uncertain conditions,{d-1} Borden and White had opted for {d-0}business as usual.{d-1} In 1915 White rejected calls for direct taxation. It would cost too much to implement, he said, and would intrude upon a tax field traditionally used by the provinces. After the London market closed at the end of 1914, White, reluctantly and complaining about the high rates charged, turned to New York for bond issues in 1915, 1916, and 1917. He did not believe that the Canadian market was big enough to sell major issues. But a very tentative offering of $50 million in 1915, spurred by the escalating costs of the war, was doubly subscribed. Much larger issues in 1916 and 1917 were equally successful and a Victory Loan of $300 million in 1918 brought in $660 million. In the manufacturing sector Sam Hughes{apos}s hastily appointed Shell Committee vied for munitions orders from the Allied governments. The Canadian government{apos}s contracts for the many needs of its soldiers were dispersed by Militia and Defence and other departments in the partisan ways that had been practised for decades. Then minor scandals in early 1915 persuaded Borden to set up the War Purchasing Commission under Edward Kemp, now minister without portfolio. It took over the contracting for Canada{apos}s military expenditures and for all British and Allied orders for war supplies except munitions. Scandals also struck the Shell Committee, and in November 1915 it was shut down and replaced, as contractor for munitions, by the Imperial Munitions Board under the leadership of Joseph Flavelle.

These were the first manifestations of change. Others followed as war production in the factories and on the farms of Canada began to grow. In response to an urgent need for foodstuffs in Europe, Borden{apos}s government commandeered the 1915 wheat crop. In 1917 skyrocketing prices led to the establishment of the Board of Grain Supervisors of Canada under Robert Magill*, which took marketing of the crops of 1917 and 1918 away from the private grain companies. It was succeeded by the Canadian Wheat Board with the same mandate for the 1919 crop. Also in 1917, a food controller, William John Hanna*, was appointed to regulate the production and distribution of Canada{apos}s food supplies and a fuel controller, Charles Alexander Magrath*, was given the power to regulate the distribution and price of fuels and the wages of coalminers in Alberta and Nova Scotia. A year earlier, responding to increasing concern about war profiteering by Canada{apos}s businesses, Borden and White had reversed themselves on the tax issue and imposed the nation{apos}s first direct impost, the business profits war tax. It was politically motivated. So too was the income war tax, grudgingly introduced by White in 1917 as a companion to the Military Service Act, ostensibly to conscript the excesses of the nation{apos}s wealth to match the forced enlistment for military service. The rates were deliberately low and affected only a minority of people, and the impact of the two direct taxes on the government{apos}s revenue was insignificant. Both, as well, were temporary, intended to end with the end of the war. The profits tax expired in 1920 but was revived in World War II and the income tax would become the federal government{apos}s largest permanent source of revenue. In 1916 the deep and long-lasting problems of the new transcontinental railways were temporarily alleviated through government loans; the crisis was finally resolved the following year with the takeover of the Canadian Northern Railway [see Sir William Mackenzie*; Sir Donald Mann] and the initial steps toward nationalization of the Grand Trunk-Grand Trunk Pacific system [see Edson Joseph Chamberlin*]. The Canadian National Railways, government-owned and operated by an arm{apos}s-length board, would incorporate both lines with other government railways. In short, by 1917 precedent and tradition had been abandoned; business as usual had given way to remarkable government intervention in the economy.

Dramatic and unanticipated changes also took place in policy towards military manpower and in imperial relations. Borden made his first wartime visit to Britain and France in 1915. In Paris he visited President Raymond Poincaré and received the grand cross of the Legion of Honour. In London the government of Herbert Henry Asquith was welcoming and cordial but refused to concede any possibility of consultation on war policy. That was true also in 1916 as Borden wrestled with the chaotic administration of military manpower in Canada and Britain under Hughes. Eventually, in the fall of 1916, Hughes, in London, deliberately defied Borden{apos}s instructions for management of the overseas forces. Borden stripped him of his responsibilities and, in response to Hughes{apos}s bitter reaction, fired him in November. Hughes was replaced in Ottawa by Edward Kemp, and in London a new ministry of overseas military forces was established with George Perley, Canada{apos}s acting high commissioner, as its minister.

In December the new British prime minister, David Lloyd George, initiated a revolutionary change in the United Kingdom{apos}s relations with its dominions. He desperately needed more fighting men but realized that the time had come to give the dominions and India some say in the direction of the war. {d-0}They are fighting not for us,{d-1} he was reported as saying, {d-0}but with us.{d-1} In the spring of 1917 Borden, the leader of the senior dominion, attended the first imperial war cabinet and conference. Between regular visits to Canada{apos}s soldiers in military hospitals, Borden participated in war-cabinet discussions of a wide range of matters including possible peace terms. At meetings of the conference he and his brilliant young legal adviser, Loring Cheney Christie*, led the passage of Resolution IX, which called for a post-war constitutional conference to {d-0}provide effective arrangements for continuous consultation in all important matters of common Imperial concern, and for such necessary concerted action, founded on consultation, as the several Governments may determine.{d-1}

For months Borden had resisted the conscription agitation, fearing large-scale unrest if it was imposed. {d-0}That might mean civil war in Quebec,{d-1} as he told one of the Bonne Ententists. In May 1917, when cabinet was informed there would be conscription, Blondin and Patenaude warned that it would {d-0}kill them politically and the party [in Quebec] for 25 years.{d-1} Borden{apos}s participation in the imperial war cabinet and his keen awareness that voluntary recruiting had fallen well behind battlefield casualties had been decisive in changing his mind. Casualties in the spring of 1917 were double the number of new recruits. Being taken into the imperial government{apos}s council, participating in discussions of war and peace policy at the centre of the empire, Borden believed, heightened Canada{apos}s responsibility to do everything possible to support its soldiers. Even more important was the bond he had established with {d-0}his boys{d-1} at the front and in the long rows of hospital beds in England. When he introduced the Military Service Bill on 11 June, he asked a hushed and sombre House of Commons, {d-0}If we do not pass this measure, if we do not provide reinforcements, if we do not keep our plighted faith, with what countenance shall we meet them on their return?{d-1}

Back in Canada, Borden met his cabinet on 17 May and told them that he was ready to introduce conscription. The pressure to impose compulsory service had been building for more than a year, especially among more well-to-do English Canadians convinced that Quebeckers were slackers who refused to do their part. In 1916 the Toronto-based Bonne Entente movement, organized by John Milton Godfrey* and Arthur Hawkes, sought but failed to win Quebeckers over to a greater military contribution to the war effort. The more strident Win-the-War movement in 1917 openly agitated for conscription and a coalition government to enforce it. Quebeckers were not impressed. They were angered that Borden{apos}s government had failed to support their demands for redress of the grievance felt by Franco-Ontarians as a result of the Whitney government{apos}s imposition of Regulation 17 on their schools [see Philippe Landry*]. This 1912 regulation had abolished the use of French as a language of instruction beyond form one (the first two years of instruction). In Ottawa the dispute was particularly heated as resistance to the regulation grew year by year, leading the government of William Howard Hearst* to put the Ottawa school board in trusteeship in 1915 [see Samuel McCallum Genest]. In February 1916, nearly five thousand angry French Canadians marched in protest to Borden{apos}s office and demanded federal intervention in the dispute. Borden said he would {d-0}see what could be done.{d-1} He did nothing, firmly convinced that the dispute was strictly a provincial matter. Then in April his three French Canadian ministers, Pierre-Édouard Blondin*, Thomas Chase-Casgrain*, and Esioff-Léon Patenaude* pleaded to have the dispute referred to the Privy Council in Britain. He refused, calling their request {d-0}foolish.{d-1} In May Liberal mp Ernest Lapointe*{apos}s resolution in the commons recommending to the Ontario legislature {d-0}the wisdom of making it clear that the privilege of the children of French parentage of being taught in their mother tongue be not interfered with{d-1} was soundly defeated with {d-0}loud cheers{d-1} by the Tory majority. Ominously, five of Borden{apos}s members voted for the resolution and eleven of Laurier{apos}s caucus voted with the majority. Borden{apos}s view that intervention was unconstitutional was sound, but his insensitivity to French Canadians{s-1-unknown} concerns and to the pleas of his Quebec colleagues, and his adamant refusal to intervene with the Conservative government in Toronto, all but eroded what limited support his government had in Quebec. The increasingly strident clamour for conscription made matters even worse and sharpened the growing division between French and English in Canada.

At that same cabinet meeting in May, Borden announced that he was going to ask Laurier to join him in a coalition government to support conscription. He did so a week later. Laurier hesitated, opposed to compulsion but aware that several of his English-speaking colleagues strongly supported it. Finally, on 6 June, he refused. Several members of Borden{apos}s cabinet were vastly relieved. They abhorred the idea of cooperating with the Liberals and believed that they could easily win the forthcoming election on a conscription platform without them. But Borden persisted and worked for months to achieve a coalition of his party with conscriptionist Liberals. Along the way his men rammed through two bills to rig the franchise for the coming election. The Military Voters Act made it possible to manipulate the counting of votes at the front, and the War-time Elections Act, which finally passed in late September, disenfranchised enemy aliens who had come to Canada after 1902 and extended the vote to the immediate female relatives of soldiers. This raw display of partisan determination finally tipped the scales for coalition. Dithering conscriptionist Liberals such as Arthur Lewis Watkins Sifton*, Newton Wesley Rowell*, and Frank Broadstreet Carvell* knew that this was their last chance and quickly signed up. The Union government was announced on Saturday, 13 October. There were seven Liberals in the new cabinet, and one more would be added before the end of the month. Doc Reid, who like dozens in the Tory caucus had thought the coalition would never happen, reportedly quipped that he would {d-0}back Borden against Job in a patience contest.{d-1}

The angry debates that accompanied passage of the Military Service Act, the accusations and recriminations in both parties over coalition, were but preludes to the bitterness of the election campaign that began in November. The Manitoba Free Press (Winnipeg) declared that {d-0}a vote for Laurier is a vote for the Kaiser.{d-1} Sir John Willison{apos}s paper, now the Toronto Daily News, published a front-page map of Canada: English-speaking Canada was coloured in red, Quebec in black. In Quebec, Albert Sévigny*, Borden{apos}s minister of inland revenue, was driven from a platform amidst revolver shots and flying stones. After he took refuge in a hotel, the building{apos}s windows were smashed and Sévigny had to escape by sneaking out the back door. The campaign of insinuation, intimidation, and violence came to an end on voting day, 17 December. The Unionists won a huge majority of 114 Conservative and 39 Liberal members. Laurier{apos}s Liberals won 82 seats, 62 of them in Quebec and only 2 in western Canada. The disgraceful attempts to fix the vote were a price Borden had been willing to pay. So was the fact that both the great national parties had split - the Grits over conscription, the Tories over the necessity of coalition. For Borden the election of 1917 was a confirmation of {d-0}a solemn covenant and a pledge{d-1} he, and Canada, had made to the soldiers at the front.

In June 1918 Borden and several colleagues had returned to London for the second set of meetings of the imperial war cabinet and conference. He was angry that he had not been consulted before the Canadian Corps had suffered huge losses at Passchendaele and threatened Lloyd George that he would send no more troops to the front if such a situation arose again. More serious still, he had received reports throughout the war critical of the performance of the British high command and of British military planning, reports that reached a peak in his consultations with Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur William Currie, commander of the Canadian Corps. At the second meeting of the war cabinet Borden gave an impassioned speech detailing the faults of the high command. It resulted in appointment of a prime ministers{s-1-unknown} committee which held intensive hearings with officials and senior commanders about the war effort. Its draft report, completed in mid August, gloomily forecast that the war could go on until at least 1920, perhaps longer. It reinforced the commitment to participation by the dominions in war policy and highlighted the need for the civil authorities to exert control over their military commanders. But the report was outdated before it was discussed. Allied forces, spearheaded by Canadian and Australian troops, had attacked at Amiens, launching the final offensive that carried on as Borden returned to Canada.

The Union government moved quickly to implement its most important undertakings. Foremost was support for the war effort. The first men called up under the Military Service Act had been required in October to register for service, though in keeping with Borden{apos}s promise not to introduce conscription until an election had been held, they were not to be sent for training until January 1918. The continuing process resulted in hundreds of thousands of petitions across Canada for exemptions and Easter-weekend riots in Quebec City in 1918 [see François-Louis Lessard*]. In due course just under 100,000 single men, aged 20 to 22, would be conscripted. In parliament the War Appropriation Act, for a half-billion dollars, was approved. The enfranchisement of women, partially granted in 1917 as a partisan political ploy, was extended to include all eligible females for the purposes of national elections. A new Civil Service Act quickly passed to start the process of removing the outside service - federal government employees serving beyond the nation{apos}s capital - from appointment by patronage. The Dominion Bureau of Statistics was organized to provide the kinds of systematic information about the nation{apos}s population, social structure, and economy that had been so deficient during the early years of the war. The government also established daylight saving time. The parliamentary session ended in May with a heated debate, initiated by William Folger Nickle*, over the abolition of hereditary titles in Canada. Borden was in agreement: {d-0}They are very unpopular and entirely incompatible with our institutions,{d-1} he observed. In fact, a March order in council, then under consideration by the British government, had prescribed not only that hereditary titles be abolished but that, except for military distinctions, honours not be conferred on residents of Canada without the approval or the advice of the Canadian prime minister. Later, in mid July, the government belatedly announced a war labour policy which forbade strikes and lockouts for the duration while assuring employees of the right to organize and guaranteeing female workers equal pay for equal work.

His colleagues in Ottawa were in trouble. The Liberal and Conservative Unionists were squabbling over White{apos}s 1919 budget and arguing over how to deal with the Winnipeg General Strike [see Mike Sokolowiski*]. The strikers were put down with force on {d-0}Bloody Saturday,{d-1} 21 June. When White{apos}s budget had come to a vote two days earlier, 12 Liberal Unionists joined the opposition. Then White, exhausted by the incessant demands of the war, resigned on 1 August. The next day Liberal Unionist Frank Carvell left. His fellow Liberal Thomas Alexander Crerar* had quit in June over the budget. Conservatives Doherty, Foster, and Burrell also talked of leaving. Other members of the coalition hoped to transform the Union government into a new political party and looked to Borden to lead them. But the prime minister had also had enough. Since 1914 he had responded to the challenges of leadership with an energy and zest that contrasted with his more detached approach to governing in the pre-war years. His soldiers, his country, and the Allied cause had been worth every ounce of effort he could summon. After seeing his government through ratification of the Treaty of Versailles in a short fall session of parliament, and after making provision for the appointment of a Canadian to deal with Canadian affairs at the British embassy in Washington, he was done. {d-0}At the end,{d-1} he recorded, {d-0}I was very tired.{d-1}

On 27 October Lloyd George summoned him back to Britain to prepare for possible peace talks. Two days later Borden replied that {d-0}the press and the people of this country take it for granted that Canada will be represented at the Peace Conference.{d-1} Lloyd George was sympathetic but predicted {d-0}difficult problems.{d-1} When Borden arrived in London, he proposed that Borden, as the leader of the senior dominion, represent all the dominions at any conference that took place. Borden refused. In December it was agreed that dominion and Indian representatives would be present when questions directly relating to their interests were at stake and that one of the five members of the British delegation at the peace talks would always be from the dominions or India. A month later, after the conference had assembled at Paris, Lloyd George persuaded American president Woodrow Wilson and French premier Georges Clemenceau that Canada, Australia, South Africa, and India would have two delegates and New Zealand one at its plenary meetings. Borden recognized that these were more matters of form than substance and that representation was {d-0}largely a question of sentiment.{d-1} But, he told Laura, {d-0}Canada got nothing out of the war except recognition.{d-1} It was a point worth pressing to its logical conclusion: formal acknowledgement of Canada{apos}s international status. On 6 May 1919, as discussions on the membership of the League of Nations were drawing to a close, a memorandum by Borden argued that Canada, as a member, should have the right to be elected to the League{apos}s council. Lloyd George, Wilson, and Clemenceau agreed and added that Canada should also be eligible for election to the governing body of the International Labour Organization. Five days later he was on his way home. It was Charles J. Doherty and Arthur L. Sifton who signed the Treaty of Versailles on Canada{apos}s behalf.

Sir Robert Borden lived another 17 years. He and Laura remained at Glensmere, where they entertained friends and he took great pleasure in working in his wildflower garden on the bank of the Rideau. In season the couple regularly played golf. There were frequent dinner parties, evenings of bridge, and, in the twenties, the novelty of radio broadcasts. Laura continued her work with various volunteer associations while Borden read and wrote in his library. Two valuable constitutional studies were published: his 1921 Marfleet lectures at the University of Toronto, Canadian constitutional studies (Toronto, 1922), and his 1927 Rhodes lectures at Oxford, Canada in the Commonwealth: from conflict to cooperation (Oxford, 1929). In 1928 he began his memoirs, a manuscript that was nearly finished when he died; it would be published in a hefty two volumes by his nephew, Henry Borden, shortly after his death. Henry would also edit and publish a series of Borden{apos}s Letters to limbo (Toronto, 1971), his reflections on politics, literature, friends, and a host of other subjects which he had written in the 1930s.

Borden was very well off and the couple{apos}s life in Ottawa was as comfortable as it was quiet and understated. In 1901, when he had become party leader, he had had a substantial income from his law firm. That continued until 1905 and was the foundation for a broad range of premium securities in his portfolio. In 1922 he had assets of $800,000, a large sum for the time, and an average annual income of about $30,000; all his expenses, including considerable support for family members and annual trips to the south in late winter, were about $17,000. His fee for a 1922 arbitration of a dispute between Britain and Peru supplemented his income as did his acceptance of the presidency of the Crown Life Insurance Company and Barclays Bank (Canada) in 1928. In 1932 he became the chairman of Canada{apos}s first mutual fund, the Canadian Investment Fund. {d-0}There is nothing that oppresses me,{d-1} he reported to Lloyd George. {d-0}Books, some business avocation, my wild garden, the birds and the flowers, a little golf, and a great deal of life in the open - these together make up the fullness of my days.{d-1}

Sir Robert Laird Borden died in early Thursday morning of 10 June 1937. A thousand Great War veterans in mufti lined the procession route from Glensmere to All Saints{s-1-unknown} Church for a funeral on Saturday afternoon. He was buried in Beechwood Cemetery in Ottawa.

His doctors advised that he should leave politics immediately. On 16 Dec. 1919 he told his cabinet he was going to resign. Led by Newton Rowell, they pleaded with him the next day to stay in office but take a vacation for a year. Unwisely, he agreed. It did not work. Even on vacation in the south, he was, after all, the leader of the government and could not dismiss the responsibilities of his office. Nor could his colleagues leave him alone. He returned to Ottawa in May and finally announced his retirement to his caucus on Dominion Day, 1920. Caucus then asked him to choose his own successor. It was an unusual request. Both national parties had procedures for changes in leadership. The Tories were long accustomed to selecting a leader in their caucus. In the Liberal Party Laurier{apos}s death in February 1919 had led to the calling of a national convention, which elected William Lyon Mackenzie King* as leader. But the Union government was of neither party and of both. It had no procedure and was as dependent on Borden in leaving as it had been upon him when he formed it. Borden asked each member to indicate to him their three choices for leader. He then recommended White, who adamantly refused. In due course Arthur Meighen*, deeply troubled that he had not been the first choice, was persuaded by Borden to lead the coalition and assume the prime ministership on 10 July 1920.

It was fitting that the veterans, all members of the 1st Division, played a prominent role in Borden{apos}s funeral. World War I had been his greatest political challenge. In 1896 he had been unprepared when Sir Charles Tupper had asked him to run for parliament. Once he had been elected, Tupper and his son Charles Hibbert had guided and encouraged him as he moved from the back to the front benches of opposition. In 1901 he had been unprepared for party leadership. His career as opposition leader was long and conducted against formidable odds with Sir Wilfrid Laurier at the height of his powers and veteran members of his own caucus frustrating his attempts at party reform and challenging his position. In 1911 he had been unprepared for government leadership, and his first years, as a peacetime prime minister, were marked by controversy with both the Liberal-dominated Senate and his own Nationaliste followers and cabinet colleagues from Quebec. In the middle of 1914 Borden was preparing for an election, not war.

By 1917 the last vestiges of hesitation in Borden{apos}s leadership were gone, displaced by a firm and at times stubborn resolve to commit his government and his nation to whatever contributions of men and machines were needed to win the war. In the aftermath of the Canadian victory at Vimy Ridge on Easter Monday 1917, Borden abandoned his promise of no conscription and led the effort to pass the Military Service Act. With his Quebec support nearly exhausted that spring, he sought, and failed, to persuade Sir Wilfrid Laurier to join him in a coalition to enforce conscription. He persisted, much to the dismay of a sizeable portion of his caucus, and eventually crafted a coalition of Conservatives and Liberal Unionists which crushed the Liberal Party in the bitter election of December 1917. The political cost was enormous: the Conservative Party{apos}s support in Quebec was destroyed and would not be recovered for decades to come. Moreover, Unionist support in western Canada was ephemeral and vanished at the first hints of peace.

Borden{apos}s most lasting contribution grew out of his deep commitment to the war effort and his long-standing belief that Canada had the capacity and was entitled to control its own external affairs in both peace and war. Dominion autonomy and the transformation of the empire into the new British Commonwealth of Nations was born of the Great War. Lloyd George provided the opportunity. Borden and his legal adviser, Loring Christie, seized it. Canada{apos}s soldiers, Borden believed, had earned it. His duty, his responsibility to them and to Canada, was to achieve it. Recognition of Canada{apos}s right to craft its own external policy, to have its own diplomatic representation in foreign capitals, to have full membership in the League of Nations, and to play a leading role in development of the Commonwealth were the rewards of Borden{apos}s persistent campaign for equal status. General Jan Christiaan Smuts of South Africa, a strong supporter in London and Paris, told Borden in 1927, {d-0}You were no doubt the main protagonist for Dominion Status.{d-1}

After the initial excitement of August 1914 passed, Borden and his colleagues were worried that Canada{apos}s soldiers would not get to the front in time and hurried them to a winter of training on Salisbury Plain. At home his government proceeded with caution and reserve, attempting, as far as possible, to maintain the stance of business as usual. The War Measures Act gave the administration extraordinary powers but it used them sparingly. It tinkered with tariff rates to raise badly needed revenue; it distributed the largesse of hundreds of contracts for war supplies by the tried and true methods of patronage and favouritism; and Borden tried, and failed, to gain access to imperial war planning. What success the government had was in recruiting; young men continued to volunteer in huge numbers throughout most of 1915.

Compulsion for overseas service was echoed by vigorous use of the powers of the state at home. The nationalization of the transcontinental railways was begun. Borden{apos}s government regulated food and fuel distribution and controlled fuel prices and miners{s-1-unknown} wages. It imposed a {d-0}temporary{d-1} direct tax on incomes, both personal and business. It forbade both strikes and lockouts. And, with the support it enjoyed from the Liberal Unionists, it reformed the federal civil service. Compared with the exercise of state power during World War II, the actions of Borden{apos}s government in World War I were almost amateurish. In the context of the time, however, they were breathtakingly bold.

It was clear by 1916 that the war was not going to end any time soon: Canada{apos}s soldiers, now two divisions, were bogged down with their Allies in the dirty trenches of the Western Front. Their casualty rates were appalling and the first cries for conscription were heard on the home front. Borden resisted, fearing compulsion would divide the war effort there, which was producing the goods of war, from food to wagons to munitions, at an unprecedented pace. But the first steps away from business as usual had begun. The domestic market for war bonds had been tapped and had surpassed all expectations. The government introduced the first measure of direct taxation at the federal level in Canada{apos}s history. It also took the first modest steps toward resolving the long-standing fiscal problems of the new transcontinental railways.

Sir Robert Borden had not the magnetism of Laurier, the daring flair of Macdonald. He was an uncommonly reserved person for a national political leader, a man who believed that his often stodgy public persona was the country{apos}s business but his private life belonged to his very close friends and family. He was, throughout his political career, less interested in politics than in policy. He was devoted more to his nation than to his party. His determination and commitment to lead Canada through the Great War made him the only Allied leader to stay in office throughout the conflict, an accomplishment of which he was very proud. Lloyd George called him {d-0}a sagacious and helpful counsellor{d-1} who was {d-0}always the quintessence of common sense.{d-1} Borden would have liked that.

R. C. Brown, Robert Laird Borden: a biography (2v., Toronto, 1975-80), provides a complete list of the manuscript and printed sources for the subject{apos}s life and career. Among the more important published works are Borden{apos}s Letters to limbo, ed. Henry Borden (Toronto and Buffalo, N.Y., 1971) and Robert Laird Borden: his memoirs, ed. Henry Borden (2v., Toronto, 1938), and John English{apos}s Borden: his life and world (Toronto, 1977) and The decline of politics: the Conservatives and the party system, 1901-20 (Toronto, 1977).

ANQ-Q, CE301-S4, 19 déc. 1863; S100, 19 juill. 1887; P412; P433; P1000, D2348. Arch. de l{apos}Assemblée Nationale (Québec), Commission royale re Abittibi, copie de la preuve, 1907–8; Procès-verbaux des séances, 1908. Arch. du Collège de Lévis, Qué., Corr. entre Wilfrid Laurier et Adélard Turgeon; Fichier des étudiants. Barreau du Québec (Montréal), Tableau de l{apos}ordre des avocats, 1900–1. Bibliothèque de l{apos}Assemblée Nationale (Québec), Service de la recherche, dossiers des parlementaires; Service de la reconstitution des débats, Débats, 1930–31 (texte manuscrit). Cimetière de la Paroisse Saint-Étienne (Beaumont, Qué.), Pierre tombale d{apos}Adélard Turgeon. NA, MG 26, G (mfm. at ANQ-Q). Le Devoir, 14 nov. 1930. L{apos}Événement, 20 août, 10 sept., 6–7 juin, 29 oct. 1907. Le Nationaliste (Montréal), 27 mars 1904; 9–10, 16, 30 juin, 7, 14, 21, 28 juill., 27 août, 22, 29 sept., 20, 27 oct., 3, 10, 17 nov., 15 déc. 1907; 18 mai 1908; 17 janv., 21 nov. 1909. La Patrie, 15 juill.–5 nov. 1907. Le Soleil, 27 nov. 1897; 4 oct. 1902; 23 nov., 21 déc. 1904; 17 mai, 26 août 1905; 30 juin 1906; 25 juin, 10 sept., 18, 24, 28 oct., 5 nov. 1907; 24 juill. 1908; 5 févr. 1914; 8 juill. 1916; 8, 28 juin 1922; 7 avril 1928; 14 nov. 1930. Georges Bellerive, Orateurs canadiens-français aux États-Unis; conférences et discours (Québec, 1908). C.-M. Boissonnault, Histoire politique de la province de Québec (1867–1920) (Québec, 1936). Canadian album (Cochrane and Hopkins), vol.2. Canadian men and women of the time (Morgan; 1898). P.-A. Choquette, Un demi-siècle de vie politique (Montréal, 1936). Cyclopædia of Canadian biog. (Rose and Charlesworth), vol.3. Dîner offert à l{apos}honorable Adélard Turgeon par ses amis de Lévis à l{apos}occasion de son départ pour Québec au Club de la garnison, jeudi, le 26 septembre 1901 (Lévis, 1901). Directories, Quebec, 1880–91, 1916–21; Quebec and Levis, 1889–1916. BCF. DPQ. P. A. Dutil, “The politics of progressivism in Quebec: the Gouin ‘coup’ revisited,” CHR, 69 (1988): 441–65. Encyclopaedia of Canadian biography . . . (3v., Montreal and Toronto, 1904–7), vol.1. J. Hamelin et al., La presse québécoise, vols.2–3. Hector Laferté, Derrière le trône: mémoires d{apos}un parlementaire québécois, 1936–1958, Gaston Deschênes, édit. (Sillery, Qué., 1998). Charles Langelier, Souvenirs politiques; récits, études et portraits (2v., Québec, 1909–12). “Le Nationaliste” devant la justice de son pays, condamné au maximum de la pénalité; remarques indignées et émues du juge: il regrette de ne pouvoir prononcer une sentence d{apos}emprisonnement (Québec, [1907?]). 1905, the settler{apos}s guide: province of Quebec (Quebec, 1905). Hélène Pelletier-Baillargeon, Olivar Asselin et son temps (2v. paru, [Montréal], 1996– ). Prominent men of Canada: a collection of persons distinguished in professional and political life, and in the commerce and industry of Canada, ed. G. M. Adam (Toronto, 1892). Qué., Assemblée Législative, Débats, 1890, 1892–1909. A.-B. Routhier, Québec et Lévis à l{apos}aurore du XXe siècle (Montréal, 1900). P.-G. Roy, À travers l{apos}histoire de Beaumont (Lévis, 1943); Les avocats de la région de Québec (Lévis, 1936 [i.e. 1937]). Robert Rumilly, Hist. de la prov. de Québec; Honoré Mercier et son temps (2v., Montréal, 1975). Gustave Turcotte, Le Conseil législatif de Québec, 1774–1933 (Beauceville, Qué., 1933). Univ. Laval, Annuaire, 1885–88. Un ministre canadien à Mortagne: réception de l{apos}honorable Turgeon, ministre des Terres et Forêts de la province de Québec, par la Société percheronne d{apos}histoire et d{apos}archéologie; Discours de M. Charles Turgeon, professeur à la faculté de droit de l{apos}université de Rennes (Bellême, France, 1905). J. S. Willison, Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberal party: a political history (2v., Toronto, 1903), 2: 34–35.

Gradually Fielding assumed the position of elder statesman in the Liberal party, second only to Laurier and increasingly seen as the heir apparent. Several things facilitated his ascendancy. A pragmatic, ambitious, tactful man of flexible political principles, he was a conscientious and able administrator, though inclined to procrastinate. He was also a man of blameless private and public morality, in striking contrast to some of his more high-spirited colleagues, two or three of whom Fielding felt deserved prison terms. Despite his lengthy political service he remained a relatively poor man; money did not stick to his hands. In the view of his political opponents he possessed, as Bilkey commented, {d-0}the not uncommon combination of personal rectitude and political dishonesty.{d-1} He was also a survivor; for quite apart from his personal virtues, by 1905 all the strong provincial leaders, those who had made Laurier{apos}s first administration {d-0}the ministry of all the talents,{d-1} had left the cabinet. When Laurier failed to replace them with comparable men, except for Allen Bristol Aylesworth* and the youthful William Lyon Mackenzie King*, Fielding came to be regarded as Laurier{apos}s right-hand man, and his logical successor.

While many political analysts regarded Fielding as Laurier{apos}s rightful successor, others felt that he could never become leader owing to his lack of support in Quebec. Until 1905 Fielding{apos}s record on provincial rights and moderate tariff policy had won him a favourable reputation in Quebec; however, his support for Clifford Sifton{apos}s opposition to the education guarantees in the Autonomy Bills of 1905 and for the Naval Service Bill of 1910, which provided for the establishment of a small Canadian navy, eroded that reputation. It was the Autonomy Bills, introduced into the house following Laurier{apos}s triumphant 1904 re-election, that generated the most bitter feelings against Fielding in Quebec. In these draft bills, designed to provide a constitutional framework for the provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta, Laurier had guaranteed the two provinces separate schools. Sifton, Laurier{apos}s minister of the interior and {d-0}the Napoleon of the West,{d-1} refused to accept this provision and resigned from the cabinet in protest. Fielding supported Sifton, and threatened resignation. In the face of the opposition of his two most powerful colleagues, one from the east and the other from the west, Laurier was obliged to revamp the bills. French Canadian colleagues in the house resented Fielding{apos}s strategic intervention in this controversy, partly owing to his reputed sensitivity to religious and linguistic issues in his own province. With Sifton out of the way, Fielding became Laurier{apos}s undisputed second in command and his most obvious successor.

While Fielding{apos}s Montreal sojourn may have restored his links with the city{apos}s business community, World War I further soured his relationship with French Canada. The problem was his support for conscription and his perceived betrayal of Laurier. Throughout the conscription crisis, Fielding consistently sought a middle way where there was no middle way, perhaps cynically seeking political advantage. In the spring of 1917 he drafted a letter, which he never published, justifying Laurier{apos}s refusal to join a coalition government. In it he pleaded with his intended readership for an understanding of French Canada{apos}s opposition to compulsory military conscription and called for a referendum to decide the issue. But when western Canadian Liberals began making their peace with Sir Robert Laird Borden*{apos}s Conservatives, Fielding (aware that Laurier was contemplating resignation from the party{apos}s leadership) publicly endorsed the formation of a national government, while withholding his approval of Borden{apos}s proposed terms for it. In October, when support for Borden{apos}s Union government grew among western and Ontario Liberals, Fielding again revised his position and sought to persuade Nova Scotia Liberals to join the Union movement to avoid being isolated. Although he refused a Unionist cabinet post, Fielding endorsed the decision of Alexander Kenneth Maclean*, another Nova Scotian Liberal, to enter Borden{apos}s government, gave Borden his full support, and in the election in December was returned unopposed as a Unionist in Shelburne and Queens. He insisted upon sitting on the cross-benches, however, thereby offending many Liberal Unionists.

Nevertheless, Fielding made a remarkably strong showing at this gathering. Laurier had called for a national convention immediately after the war, to reunite the party and give it a post-war policy direction. Upon his death in February 1919, the convention became a six-person leadership contest. Although King and Fielding protested their lack of interest in the position, they were the principal contenders and they offered Liberals a stark generational and ideological choice. Fielding{apos}s hesitations in seeking the leadership were based on his fear that Laurier loyalists in Nova Scotia and Quebec would spoil his chances, and his strong opposition to the radical platform that had been adopted by the convention in its first two days. When at last he agreed to stand, he threatened, should he be chosen leader, to have his leadership ratified by the parliamentary caucus on the condition that he would not be bound by the program. Opposition to Fielding came from various corners, {d-0}quite the fiercest{d-1} from his former cabinet colleagues Sydney Arthur Fisher, Sir Allen Aylesworth, Frank Oliver*, and George Perry Graham*, some seeing him as the tool of Montreal{apos}s St James Street businessmen. Fielding{apos}s greatest support came from the conservative members of his party, such as George H. Murray, Sir Lomer Gouin, Louis-Alexandre Taschereau*, John Oliver, William Melville Martin*, and Walter Edward Foster*, from Montreal business interests, and from those who felt his candidacy was essential to the party{apos}s unity. With their support he pushed the convention to a third ballot, which King won by only 38 votes. According to Adam Kirk Cameron, a close friend and confidant of Laurier and a Fielding supporter, Fielding obtained a {d-0}very heavy vote from Ontario and the West . . . and a surprisingly large vote from the province of Quebec, notwithstanding the Autonomy Bills and his attitude toward conscription.{d-1} But in Cameron{apos}s view Fielding {d-0}was defeated for leadership of the Liberal party by the people of Nova Scotia,{d-1} whose delegates had cast over half of the 38 votes separating the two candidates against Fielding. They had also run Daniel Duncan McKenzie, the interim party leader and a Nova Scotian, to prevent Nova Scotia votes going to Fielding. During the course of the ballot Lady Laurier asked Cameron to inform the convention that Fielding was her late husband{apos}s choice for leader. Anxious to restore party unity, Laurier, it appears, had concluded that Fielding would be best placed to heal the party{apos}s wounds.

Winona had worked actively in the community for a range of social reforms. She spoke with Beynon Thomas in May 1914 in favour of {d-0}a more rigid enforcement of the Factory Act in places where women and children are employed{d-1} and stressed the need to appoint a woman factory inspector. She campaigned for a colleague in the MPEL, Fred Dixon, in his sucessful bid for a seat as an independent Labour candidate in the provincial election of July 1914. At the People{apos}s Forum, a series of weekly lectures and discussions organized by James Shaver Woodsworth*, she spoke in 1914 on {d-0}Women in industrial and profesional life.{d-1} She would address the Forum again in 1915 and 1918 and she would lecture at the Labour Church [see William Ivens*] in 1919.

[This biography draws heavily on newspapers, in particular La Presse, where Joseph-Pierre Gadbois worked as a sports writer between 1904 and 1908. Many unsigned articles which appeared in the paper from 1907 to 1910 are undoubtedly his, among them “Les tournois athlétiques de la Presse,” a series of 165 columns published between 14 Oct. 1907 and 9 July 1908. A large number of items concerning Gadbois can also be found in La Presse from 1893 to 1930. Other useful newspaper accounts include the following: L{apos}Autorité nouvelle (Montréal), 25 janv. 1914; Le Canada (Montréal), 24 avril, 3 sept. 1903; 8–9 avril, 24 juin, 3 sept. 1918; 11, 21 févr., 6, 24 mars 1919; 10–11, 17, 22, 24 mai, 4, 8 juin 1926; 23, 25 août 1930; Le Cultivateur (Montréal), 13 mai 1893; Le Devoir, 15 mai, 21 juill. 1914; 16 nov. 1915; 14 juill. 1916; 20 avril 1918; 23 août 1930; Le Journal (Montréal), 14 juin 1902; La Minerve, 11, 16 oct., 6 nov. 1897; Le Nationaliste (Montréal), 16, 23 janv., 6, 20, 28 nov., 4 déc. 1910; 12, 19, 26 mars, 2 avril, 7 mai, 4, 11, 18 juin, 23 juill., 27 août 1911; 25 févr., 3, 10, 24 mars, 14, 28 avril, 5, 19 mai 1912; 14 juin 1914; La Patrie, 16 mars, 24 avril, 9 juin 1903; 30 mars, 1er avril 1929; 23, 25 août 1930; Le Réveil (Montréal), 5 janv., 31 août 1915; and Le Soleil, 22, 24–25, 29–30 juin, 2–3, 7–8 juill., 24 août, 15 oct. 1908; 26, 28, 30 avril, 6 mai, 16 juin, 9 juill., 21 oct. 1909; 28 mai 1914. g.j.]

Of French Canadian and Scottish parentage, Charles Gauthier received his early education from the Brothers of the Christian Schools in Alexandria. Later he attended Regiopolis College in Kingston, from which he graduated with high honours in 1863; he subsequently studied theology at the Grand Séminaire in Montreal. On 24 Aug. 1867, at St John the Baptist Church in Perth, Ont., he was ordained by Bishop Edward John Horan* of Kingston. He served as professor of rhetoric and director of Regiopolis College until 1869, when Horan made him pastor of St John the Evangelist parish in Gananoque, a charge that included missions at Howe Island, Lansdowne, Jones Falls, and Brewers Mills. In 1875 he was transferred to Westport and then, upon the accession of Bishop John O{apos}Brien, to St Mary{apos}s parish in Williamstown. He spent 11 years there, during which time he opened a new parish at nearby Glen Nevis (which he also administered), constructed a new rectory in Williamstown, built mission churches in Lancaster (1885) and Martintown (1886), and liquidated the debt of St Mary{apos}s. Moved to Brockville in 1886, he acted as regional dean and, after 1891, as vicar general for the archdiocese of Kingston. His fluency in English, French, and Gaelic enabled him to communicate with its principal linguistic groups.

Gauthier{apos}s pastoral skills, good humour, and financial acumen were acknowledged by his fellow priests when, in an unprecedented step, 37 of them met and selected him as their choice to succeed Archbishop James Vincent Cleary*, who had died in February 1898. Kingston{apos}s clergy were fearful that the Vatican might appoint the bishop of Waterford and Lismore, in Ireland, to succeed the Irish-born Cleary, instead of a Canadian who understood the diocese and its needs. Their petition may have influenced the Canadian bishops{s-1-unknown} recommendation to Pope Leo XIII, who named Gauthier archbishop on 29 July. He was consecrated in Kingston on 18 October.

Like the priests who supported him, many Kingstonians regarded Gauthier as moderate in both politics and temperament - a striking contrast to his predecessor. {d-0}The choice of Msgr. Gauthier has been hailed throughout the country, as a special grace of divine Providence,{d-1} exclaimed Archbishop Joseph-Thomas Duhamel* of Ottawa. {d-0}For me, I consider it a gift of God.{d-1} The new archbishop continued the energetic pace he had set as a parish priest. Within his diocesan boundaries, which extended west from Dundas County to just beyond the Trent River and from Lake Ontario to Algonquin Park, he administered 41,384 Catholics, who constituted 16 per cent of the diocese{apos}s entire population. His frequent travels throughout the diocese and familiarity with its growing towns and villages made it easier for him to approve the construction of new churches and rectories, and renovations of ageing ones, in such centres as Odessa (1898), Ormsby and South Mountain (1899), Lombardy (1900), Frankford (1901), Lansdowne (1901), Merrickville (1902), Lanark (1903), Marmora (1904), Toledo (1907), and Enterprise (1908). His episcopate was also marked by the construction of St Francis{s-1-unknown} Hospital in Smiths Falls, St John{apos}s Convent in Perth, and St Mary{apos}s of the Lake Orphanage in Kingston, and renovations to Kingston{apos}s Hôtel Dieu hospital.

Gauthier{apos}s Kingston years were devoid of the sectarian tension that had earned the city the nickname the Derry of Canada [see John Gaskin*]. His own actions won him respect among its Protestants. When St George{apos}s Cathedral was gutted by fire in 1899, for example, he was one of the first to offer sympathy and financial aid to Anglican archbishop John Travers Lewis*. Although he contributed to the atmosphere of toleration and commented on the absence of Protestant proselytizing in his diocese, he still worried that local Catholicism was being endangered by mixed marriages, increased socializing with Protestants, and Catholic attendance at public schools. For Gauthier, the establishment of Catholic schools {d-0}wherever possible{d-1} was the surest way to strengthen the Catholic minority in a largely Protestant province. In 1901, 4,000 out of 6,000 Catholic children of school age were enrolled in the diocese{apos}s separate schools; the remaining 2,000, according to Gauthier, lived in areas with no access to Catholic schools. By the end of his tenure new ones had been created in Belleville, Tweed, and Chesterville.

His interest in separate schools extended beyond his diocese. He quickly became a respected leader among the bishops on the issues of teachers{s-1-unknown} qualifications, textbooks, and school-tax reform. In 1904 justice Hugh MacMahon ruled that members of Catholic religious orders who were employed as teachers in Ontario must obtain qualifications commensurate with provincial standards. Archbishops Gauthier, Duhamel, and Denis O{apos}Connor* of Toronto, however, were alarmed that many sisters and brothers might leave their teaching posts rather than attend classes in the {d-0}Protestant{d-1} atmosphere of the provincial normal schools. Believing that the members of orders were already well qualified, through teachers{s-1-unknown} conventions and experience, Gauthier and his colleagues appealed MacMahon{apos}s decision to the Supreme Court of Canada and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, but without success. When John Seath*, Ontario{apos}s superintendent of education, produced legislation early in 1907 that required the proper certification of teaching sisters and brothers, Gauthier opposed the plan, fearing the closure of at least four convents in his diocese and the demise of Catholic schools that employed religious. Declaring the bill {d-0}odious and unjust,{d-1} he appealed directly to Premier James Pliny Whitney* to allow the teachers to be certified without further qualification. With the passage of the act on 20 April 1907, Gauthier and his colleagues conceded defeat and began working to ensure that the teaching members adapted to the three levels of certification.

The Kingston archbishop{apos}s influence in ecclesiastical politics was complemented by the attention shown him by the apostolic delegate to Canada, Monsignor Donato Sbarretti y Tazza. Their close relationship - Sbarretti sought Gauthier{apos}s advice and assistance on several occasions - was fortunate for the English-speaking bishops as they moved to exert their influence over the church west of the Ottawa River. Gauthier was known to be vehemently opposed to French Canadian clerical nationalists and, as Bishop Thomas Joseph Dowling reported Gauthier{apos}s position to Rome, their {d-0}impertinent interference with the affairs of English speaking provinces.{d-1} As an integral part of their struggle for control, Gauthier and other English-speaking bishops attempted to secure their own candidate each time a see became vacant. In partnership with McEvay and Archbishop Edward Joseph McCarthy of Halifax, in 1909 Gauthier acquired the services of Father Henry Joseph O{apos}Leary* as the anglophone bishops{s-1-unknown} agent at the Vatican. With O{apos}Leary{apos}s aid and Sbarretti{apos}s confidence, Gauthier and his group were successful in several appointments, including that of Michael Francis Fallon* as bishop of London in 1909. Long admired by Gauthier, this controversial cleric was loathed by Franco-Ontarians, particularly in Essex County, for his opposition to bilingual schools.

The {d-0}bishop maker{d-1} became a victim of his own success. In August 1910 the Vatican named him archbishop of Ottawa, a position left vacant since the death of Duhamel in June 1909. This appointment came in spite of the fact that Gauthier{apos}s name did not appear among the original terna (list of candidates) for Ottawa and that Gauthier himself had recommended the {d-0}broadminded{d-1} Bishop Joseph-Médard Emard for the difficult task of administering this explosive archdiocese. Out of 266 priests and brothers there, only 30 were not of French origin. Moreover, for much of the decade, French- and English-speaking Catholics in Ottawa had been bitterly divided over who would control the bilingual University of Ottawa and the Ottawa Separate School Board. Infighting among the board{apos}s trustees over teachers{s-1-unknown} qualifications and spending had prompted the court case that had led to the provincial law on certification. By 1910 demands for the improvement of bilingual schools, spearheaded by the Congrès d{apos}Éducation des Canadiens Français de l{apos}Ontario [see Napoléon-Antoine Belcourt*], had further polarized the church along linguistic lines in eastern Ontario. In Ottawa, Protestants stood on the sidelines and watched with interest as the various Catholic factions waged war in school-council chambers, in the press, and from the pulpits.

Gauthier{apos}s colleagues knew full well the trouble that faced him. His fellow bishops in Ontario passed a motion of {d-0}confidence and good will{d-1} as he embarked on the most difficult task of his career. Bishop Paul La Rocque of Sherbrooke, Que., offered his {d-0}condolences{d-1} in English. In a similar vein, Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier* expressed his concern about the {d-0}overwhelming{d-1} burden placed on his good friend, and his regret that some Catholics had been critical of the Vatican{apos}s decision. Francophone Catholics in the archdiocese were distressed by the appointment of Gauthier, whom they considered an anglophone with a French surname. This reaction had been anticipated by Sbarretti, who had received the papal bulls authorizing the appointment in August 1910 but, to avoid too much attention to a controversial selection, withheld the news until after the International Eucharistic Congress in Montreal in September. In speculating about the appointment in Le Devoir on 19 July, Henri Bourassa* had neatly summarized the opinion of French Canadian nationalists when he asserted that Gauthier was {d-0}French in name, English in language and education,{d-1} of advanced age, and appointed only to secure {d-0}the definitive nomination of an English-speaking bishop.{d-1} Contrary to Fergus McEvay{apos}s prediction in November that {d-0}the crazy opposition{d-1} would dissipate, the anger did not subside. When Gauthier was installed at Notre-Dame Basilica on 21 Feb. 1911, both the Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste and the Association Canadienne-Française d{apos}Éducation d{apos}Ontario refused to attend.

By 1914 the situation at the school board had deteriorated. French trustees defied Regulation 17 and, as a result, English-speaking trustees sought an injunction to prohibit the francophones from raising debentures for independent schools and paying salaries to unqualified teachers. In June 1915, after an acrimonious election and bitter confrontations between local priests, the board shut its schools. In September they were reopened by order of the Ontario Supreme Court, and the new premier, William Howard Hearst*, appointed a three-person commission to run the board and ensure its adherence to the provincial regulation. English-speaking clergy and laity lined up in support of the commission, while their French-speaking co-religionists condemned it and francophone bishops appealed to Pope Benedict XV to defend French-language education rights. In 1916 the pope responded with an encyclical, Commisso divinitus, which instructed Gauthier{apos}s flock to settle their differences peacefully and not imperil their schools. Neither this intervention nor the mediatory efforts of archbishops Paul Bruchési* of Montreal and Neil McNeil* of Toronto ended the crisis. Later that year, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council upheld Regulation 17 but ruled the Ottawa School Commission illegal, and attempts were made to reconstitute the original board.

During the crisis Gauthier had become increasingly estranged from the francophone Catholics of his diocese. He was notably absent from the biannual congresses of the ACFEO, despite the presence of other bishops, and his francophone priests expressed their disgust at his inability to rein in actions of the English-speaking Catholics. Gauthier tried to maintain a middle course. He instructed his clergy in unequivocal terms to desist from any public discussion of these {d-0}vexed questions.{d-1} In 1917, in the wake of the papal encyclical and the validation of Regulation 17 by the courts, Gauthier and the Ontario bishops issued a joint pastoral urging Catholics to {d-0}obey all the just laws and regulations enacted from time to time by civil authorities{d-1} and English-speaking Catholics in particular to consider {d-0}sympathetically{d-1} the {d-0}aspirations and requests{d-1} of French Canadian Catholics. The bishops acknowledged the ambiguities of Regulation 17 but endorsed its legality, and echoed the pope by asking that Catholics facilitate {d-0}an equitable teaching of the French language together with a thorough acquisition of English.{d-1} Despite these pleas, the tension in the Ottawa board continued, and local priests continued to complain about the tactics of {d-0}the other side.{d-1}

Shortly before Christmas 1921 Gauthier was rushed to the Ottawa General Hospital, where he died of uraemia at 2:35 a.m. on 19 Jan. 1922. He was buried in Notre-Dame Basilica. His funeral was attended by Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King*, members of his cabinet, numerous bishops, over 500 clergy and religious, a legion of lay leaders, and his brother and two sisters. In eulogies, former adversaries in the bilingual schools controversy now acknowledged him as a {d-0}true friend of the separate schools,{d-1} while non-Catholics paid tribute to him as a loyal citizen who had stirred up {d-0}the patriotic spirit of his parishioners{d-1} during the Great War. Given the challenges of his life and his enormous pastoral contribution, the most fitting tribute came from the Ottawa Citizen, which remarked that he had lived up to his motto, In fide et lenitate. Charles Hugh Gauthier had indeed been strong in faith and gentle in administration.

AO, F 5; RG 80-8-0-863, no.9268. Arch. of the Archdiocese of Kingston, Ont., Gauthier papers. Arch. of the Archdiocese of Ottawa, Blessed Sacrament parish papers; Gauthier papers; Toronto corr. Arch. of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Toronto, ME (McEvay papers); O (O{apos}Connor papers). Archivio Segreto Vaticano (Rome), Delegazione apostolica del Canadà, 157.37; Secretaria di Stato. LAC, RG 31, C1, 1871, Kenyon Township, Ont., div.2: 31. L{apos}Action catholique (Québec), 19 janv. 1922. Canadian Freeman (Kingston), 22 June 1898. Catholic Record (London, Ont.), 2 April, 16 July, 3 Sept. 1898. Catholic Register (Toronto), 26 Oct. 1916, 26 Jan. 1922. Le Devoir, 19 juill. 1910, 22 févr. 1911. Le Droit (Ottawa), 24 janv. 1922. Ottawa Citizen, 19 Jan. 1922. Ottawa Evening Journal, 19 Jan. 1922. La Presse, 24 janv. 1922. La Semaine religieuse de Montréal, 26 janv. 1922. La Semaine religieuse de Québec, 2 févr. 1922. Canadian men and women of the time (Morgan; 1912). Canadian R.C. bishops, 1658-1979, comp. André Chapeau et al. (Ottawa, 1980). Robert Choquette, L{apos}Église catholique dans l{apos}Ontario français du dix-neuvième siècle (Ottawa, 1984); La foi: gardienne de la langue en Ontario, 1900-1950 (Montréal, 1987); Language and religion: a history of English-French conflict in Ontario (Ottawa, 1975). L. J. Flynn, Built on a rock: the story of the Roman Catholic Church in Kingston, 1826-1976 (Kingston, 1976). Hector Legros and Sœur Paul-Émile [Louise Guay], Le diocèse d{apos}Ottawa, 1847-1948 (Ottawa, [1949]). M. G. McGowan, The waning of the green: Catholics, the Irish, and identity in Toronto, 1887-1922 (Montreal and Kingston, 1999). Planted by flowing water: the diocese of Ottawa, 1847-1997, ed. Pierre Hurtubise et al. (Ottawa, 1998).

John S. Hendrie attended the Hamilton grammar school and in 1872 he was sent to Upper Canada College in Toronto, where he excelled in mathematics and rugby. On graduation he went to work for the Great Western Railway as a civil engineer. He joined his father and uncle in carting and engineering in the late 1870s, occasionally as a project engineer on lines in Ontario and Michigan. In 1895 he became manager and then vice-president of the Hamilton Bridge Works Company Limited, a reorganization of a firm started by his father to produce bridges, railway turntables, powerhouses, and sheds. By the first decade of the new century, its proficiency in structural steel had led it into the supply of equipment for the electrical power and telecommunications industries. Hendrie, who assumed the presidency after his father{apos}s death in 1906, became known for his {d-0}aggressive and skillful{d-1} managerial qualities. His business career also included service with the Bank of Hamilton – he became a director in 1903 and president in 1914 – and directorships in Great-West Life Assurance and Mercantile Trust.

His father{apos}s considerable success had made the family one of Hamilton{apos}s wealthiest. Within the city{apos}s civic culture, militia rank was a test of social respectability, and in December 1883 J. S. Hendrie was commissioned a captain in the Hamilton Field Battery. Promoted major in June 1894, he was chosen to command an artillery contingent at the celebration in 1897 of Queen Victoria{apos}s diamond jubilee in England. In September 1903 he was promoted lieutenant-colonel and given command of the 2nd Brigade of Artillery; he would retire in 1909. A president of the Ontario and Canadian artillery associations, in 1907 he was made a commander of the Royal Victorian Order. In addition, he had been a founder of the Hamilton Patriotic Fund in 1899, during the South African War, and served as its chairman from 1906 until it merged with the Canadian Patriotic Fund during World War I. The English Canadian search for national identity in an imperial context was expressed by a keen interest in the War of 1812. Hendrie{apos}s wife was vice-president in 1905 of the Women{apos}s Wentworth Historical Society [see Sara Galbraith Beemer*], which had long advocated the commemoration of the battle site at Stoney Creek. John{apos}s own efforts to create a park there, along with his militia service, led to his appointment to the National Battlefields Commission in 1908.

Meanwhile, Hendrie had entered politics. In December 1900, when Frank E. Walker, the Tory candidate and front runner in Hamilton{apos}s mayoralty race, dropped out, he was approached. Disinclined at first to accept the nomination – his reluctance was genuine, not feigned – he changed his mind, and turned his lack of political experience to advantage in a campaign where the municipal debt was a major issue. His reputation as an efficient businessman was cited by the pro-Tory Hamilton Spectator as his key credential, and Hendrie promised the application of {d-0}business methods{d-1} to the administration of Hamilton. Elected on 3 Jan. 1901, he cut both its debt and its taxes. The mayor generally served two terms, with an understanding between the Grits and the Tories that an incumbent could seek his second term unopposed. In the 1902 election, however, opposition came from socialist candidate William Barrett, who received a quarter of the votes. Though easily re-elected, Hendrie remained concerned about this support: {d-0}a capitalist looking for a place to locate a manufacturing concern will avoid a socialist city every time,{d-1} he told the Spectator.

In anticipation of the provincial election on 29 May 1902, Hendrie was nominated as the Tory candidate for Hamilton West in preference to Edward Alexander Colquhoun, the sitting mpp. Hendrie handily defeated Colquhoun (who ran as an independent), Grit candidate Stephen Frederick Washington, and socialist Robert Roadhouse. Though the Liberal government of George William Ross* was returned, the Tories emerged as the party of Ontario{apos}s cities and in 1905 they swept the scandal-plagued Ross government from power. Premier James Pliny Whitney* offered Hendrie the position of minister of public works but he declined, preferring to serve as a minister without portfolio and chairman of the legislature{apos}s railway committee or, as the Toronto Globe put it, {d-0}virtually acting Minister of Railways.{d-1}

Hendrie was returned in Hamilton West with declining majorities in the elections of 1908, 1911, and 1914. In September 1914 he succeeded his fellow Hamiltonian Sir John M. Gibson as lieutenant governor of Ontario. One reason for his selection was his personal wealth (his father had left an estate worth $2.3 million). His affluence enabled him to maintain a residence in Toronto until the completion there of a new government house, which the Hendries would occupy at the end of 1915. On the announcement of the king{apos}s birthday honours on 3 June 1915, Hendrie was created a kcmg. He frequently used his position to further the war effort. At the opening of the Canadian National Exhibition in August 1915, for instance, he reconfirmed his {d-0}life-long{d-1} belief in the militia; though he found the term conscription a {d-0}misnomer,{d-1} he firmly supported {d-0}universal training and service for all.{d-1} In addition, he continued to be involved in volunteer endeavours such as the Canadian Patriotic Fund, the Speakers{s-1-unknown} Patriotic League, and the Hamilton Recruiting League, and he chaired the provincial Organization of Resources Committee, established in 1916 to maximize Ontario{apos}s contribution to the war. In 1917 the University of Toronto recognized his work by awarding him a lld. One of his last functions was a dinner for the Prince of Wales at Government House on 25 Aug. 1919. He retired from public life in November and returned to his Hamilton home, Strathearn, where he would continue to enjoy affiliations with local clubs, the masonic lodge, and the Presbyterian Church.

[For a detailed account of sources consulted at the Canadian Bankers{s-1-unknown} Assoc. Arch. (Toronto), please refer to J. [A.] Turley-Ewart, {d-0}Gentleman bankers, politicians and bureaucrats: the history of the Canadian Bankers{s-1-unknown} Association, 1891–1924{d-1} (phd thesis, Univ. of Toronto, 2000). j.a.t.-e.]

PAM, HBCA, D.38/53: f.229; D.38/57: ff.396d–97. Manitoba Free Press, 13 Oct. 1903; 11 Nov. 1911; 16 Feb., 11, 28 Dec. 1912; 16 Aug. 1913; 6 April 1914; 15 Nov. 1918; 20 Feb. 1924. Winnipeg Free Press, 19 Feb. 1972. Winnipeg Telegram, 13 Oct., 13 Nov. 1903; 22 July 1904; 20 June, 30 July 1914; 29 Sept. 1917; 18 Nov. 1919. Winnipeg Town Topics, 10 Oct., 19 Dec. 1903; 6 Jan., 10 Nov. 1906. Winnipeg Tribune, 3 Feb., 2 July, 15 Oct., 5 Nov. 1896; 14 Oct., 17 Dec. 1903; 16 July 1914; 19 Feb. 1924. Marilyn Baker, The Winnipeg School of Art: the early years ([Winnipeg], 1984). V. G. Berry, Vistas of promise, Manitoba, 1874–1919: November 1st, 1987–January 17th, 1988 (exhibition catalogue, Winnipeg Art Gallery, 1987). George Bryce, Our Canadian prairies: being a description of the most notable plants of Manitoba . . . (Toronto, [1895]). Manitobans as we see {s-0}em, 1908 and 1909 (Winnipeg, 1909)

The first part of Gabrielle Roy{apos}s life, which would provide her with a rich source of unforgettable memories and images as a novelist, was spent in Manitoba, to which her parents, both natives of the province of Quebec, had come at the end of the 19th century. Léon Roy had acquired a homestead in the so-called Pembina Mountain district in 1883. In 1886 he married 19-year-old Mélina Landry; the Landrys, who were originally from the Joliette region, had settled in the west a few years earlier. Soon after their marriage, Léon went into business, and he became increasingly active in the Liberal Party, an involvement that got him into trouble within his community. When Wilfrid Laurier* finally came to power in Ottawa in June 1896, Roy was hired as a government agent to welcome newly arrived settlers at Immigration Hall in Winnipeg and help them get established on the lands made available by the Department of the Interior. In 1897 he and his wife therefore moved to St Boniface, near Winnipeg, a town with a largely francophone, Catholic population that was the centre of French Canadian life in western Canada. When they settled in St Boniface, the Roys had five children: Joseph (b. 1887), Anna (b. 1888), Agnès (b. 1891), who would die of meningitis when she was 14, Adèle (b. 1893), and Clémence (b. 1895). Four others soon followed: Bernadette (b. 1897), Rodolphe (b. 1899), Germain (b. 1902), and Marie-Agnès (b. 1906), who died four years later, shortly after Léon Roy had a fine large house built for his family on Rue Deschambault in a new section of St Boniface.

Apart from the new freedom (particularly in religious matters) that Gabrielle found by living away from home, far removed from her native setting, her stay in England was marked by two notable events. First, she met a young Canadian of Ukrainian origin with whom she had her first real experience of passion. Their relationship did not last, however, for psychological reasons - Gabrielle was frightened by the physical and emotional dependence involved, which in her view ran counter to her desire for personal fulfilment. Perhaps there were ideological ones too, since the Stephen in question belonged to a network of Ukrainian nationalists engaged in a struggle against Joseph Stalin{apos}s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that made it necessary for him to be away frequently and, in the context of the period, rendered him an {d-0}objective{d-1} ally of the Nazis. Gabrielle{apos}s sympathies, formed in the Manitoba of the 1930s, were rather with social-democratic and liberal ideals. She also reached a turning point in her career, a choice that would shape the rest of her life. In the summer of 1938, having resigned herself to the fact that she had neither the talent nor the voice to become an actress, Roy - as she would relate in her autobiography - discovered her true vocation. Staying in the little town of Upshire, in suburban London, at the home of her new friend Esther Perfect, who cared for her every need, she settled down seriously to write, and to write in French, which henceforth would be the sole language of her literary career. Initially, she produced only brief, inconsequential texts, short stories that she filed away and accounts based on her European experiences, some of which were published in a St Boniface newspaper. However, the fact that three of her articles were accepted by a well-known Parisian magazine convinced her that she had made the right choice and that her talent was real. She knew then that she would be a writer and she would never deviate from her path.

Roy{apos}s contributions to Le Bulletin des agriculteurs allowed her to indulge in her love of travel and brought her the financial security to live more comfortably - sometimes at the Ford Hotel in Montreal, sometimes in Rawdon, in the house of a lady who took her in as a boarder. They also gave her time to work on a novel she had begun by 1941 or 1942, and a first version of it was completed in the summer of 1943 in the Gaspé, where she usually spent her holidays. Its title was Bonheur d{apos}occasion. Set in the Saint-Henri district of Montreal during the winter and spring of 1940, the plot focuses on the story of a French Canadian family, the Lacasses, and especially on the mother, Rose-Anna, and her daughter Florentine. More broadly, the novel paints a striking picture of working-class life, as the people in Saint-Henri struggle against unemployment, poverty, and rootlessness; ironically, it is the war that offers them a chance to escape.

Published in June 1945 by the Société des Éditions Pascal, Bonheur d{apos}occasion was enthusiastically received by both the general public and the Montreal and Toronto critics, who praised the novel{apos}s realism and the quality of her writing as heralding a renewal of Canadian literature. But very quickly, its success spread much further. The English translation, brought out in New York in 1947 under the title The tin flute, was selected as book-of-the-month by the Literary Guild - an American book club - in May that year, with a print run of 700,000. Then a Hollywood company bought the cinema rights for $75,000 (but the script was never turned into a film, and years later the rights were acquired by a Canadian producer whose movie did not come out until 1983). Republished in France by Flammarion in the autumn of 1947, Bonheur d{apos}occasion became the first Canadian novel to win a major prize on the Parisian literary scene when it was awarded the Prix Femina, and as a result would be translated into ten other languages in years to come. For Gabrielle Roy, these events constituted a far greater reward than she could ever have imagined for her years of effort to produce a work of quality and earn a place in the literary world. Above all, the success of Bonheur d{apos}occasion completely transformed her life. Once an obscure journalist working for a farm magazine, she had become, overnight, a celebrity, showered with honours and money, hounded by interviewers, admired by thousands of readers, and hailed by the critics as a novelist of the first rank.

Once she had her grade 12 diploma, like many other gifted young women of the time Roy decided to become a teacher, a career that was both honourable and well paid. In September 1928, a couple of months before her father{apos}s death, she enrolled in a one-year course at the Provincial Normal School in Winnipeg. The following spring, even before obtaining the teacher{apos}s certificate that she was awarded on 27 June 1929, she went to work for a few weeks as a supply teacher in Marchand, a remote village in eastern Manitoba. But her first real appointment was to a rural school in Cardinal, a village in the region where her parents had been married and where her Landry uncles and aunts still lived. She taught there for the 1929-30 school year. In the fall of 1930 she was hired by the St Boniface School Board to teach at the Institut Collégial Provencher, a school for boys run by the Marianists, who gave her one of the first-year classes. She taught solely in English and would stay there for seven years.

The timing was propitious, since Montreal was then experiencing an exciting time of change; conditions brought about by World War II and the advent of Adélard Godbout*{apos}s Liberal Party to power combined to produce a lively climate receptive to new ideas and lifestyles, along with a rapid expansion of the press and the publishing industry. Thus it was as a freelance journalist and author of short-stories that Gabrielle Roy made her debut as a writer. Living in small rented rooms, mixing unobtrusively with artists and journalists located downtown, getting bit parts in radio dramas, she endeavoured to place her articles in various periodicals, to both earn her keep and have time for engaging in a more ambitious project. Having got a regular column on the women{apos}s page of the Montreal weekly Le Jour, of which Jean-Charles Harvey* was the editor, she published short stories in La Revue moderne, a Montreal magazine whose literary editor, Henri Girard, became her patron (and maybe her lover). But it was above all as a reporter that Roy began to be noticed, when the Montreal periodical Le Bulletin des agriculteurs, having published a few of her pieces, commissioned her to write major series of articles that were spread over several issues and drew an increasingly wide audience. Four series based on documentary research but especially on personal observation appeared in this journal between 1941 and 1945: {d-0}Tout Montréal{d-1} (1941, four articles), a striking portrait of life in that city in its most varied and contemporary aspects; {d-0}Ici l{apos}Abitibi{d-1} (1941-42, seven articles), in which the journalist accompanied a group of Madelinots who had resettled in the Abitibi region of northwestern Quebec; {d-0}Peuples du Canada{d-1} (1942-43, seven articles), a series of sketches of small communities she visited during a trip to western Canada, when she saw her mother for the last time; and finally {d-0}Horizons du Québec{d-1} (1944-45, fifteen articles), depicting the social and economic life of various regions of the province.

When she moved to Quebec City, Roy was only 43; yet it could be said that the essential part of her biography was over, in the sense that no major event would change the course of her life in any striking or significant way. Of course, she continued to travel a great deal, with trips to France (1955, 1963, 1966, 1973-74), Louisiana (which she visited in 1957 with her friend the painter René Richard and his wife), Arizona (1964, 1970-71), Florida (1967-68, 1968-69, 1978-79), Saskatchewan (1955), and, above all, Manitoba, since, after her sister Bernadette died in 1970, she was frequently called back to her native province to care for her other sister, Clémence, who could not look after herself. But these were uneventful journeys, undertaken solely to escape the rigours of winter or maintain family ties. The rest of her time was divided between the apartment in the Château Saint-Louis and a little house she had acquired in 1957 in the Charlevoix region, at Petite-Rivière-Saint-François, where she spent every summer, enjoying the mountain and the river, and writing. Of course she had many friends and correspondents (including Jean-Paul Lemieux and his wife, Adrienne Choquette*, Madeleine Bergeron, and her translator, Joyce Marshall); but these were strictly private, untroubled relationships. Certainly, she took an interest in contemporary social and political developments in the province of Quebec. She was delighted to witness the Quiet Revolution, educational reforms, and the emancipation of women, but was deeply disturbed by the rise of the sovereignist movement, especially during the 1970 October Crisis and on the eve of the referendum of 20 May 1980. On the other hand, she was sceptical about political engagement on the part of writers, and took care not to intervene in public debates except on one occasion, during the visit of French president Charles de Gaulle, whose speech she condemned in the press. A similar discretion marked Roy{apos}s relations with the literary world. She kept up with new books as they appeared, read the reviews of her own work, and corresponded with fellow writers and her readers, but she avoided social gatherings, refused most requests for interviews, and never made public appearances. In short, her daily concerns and worries were of a strictly domestic and private nature, and she conducted her life on a single principle - to preserve her health and serenity so she could be free to focus on the only thing that mattered to her: the books to be written, the stories and the creatures of her imagination. All in all, there was something monastic about her existence; she was a woman determined to keep apart from the world, whose life was completely bound up with her endeavour to produce a carefully crafted body of work.

Although Stephansson had written some poetry before moving to Alberta, it was during his years on the Canadian prairies that he honed his craft, marrying traditional Icelandic metre (as well as experimenting with new metres) to the philosophy of the American freethinkers. His long view of history and man{apos}s place in it is evident in his poem {d-0}Staddur a grothrarstoth{d-1} [At the forestry station] of 1917:

Despite controversy, Stephansson was well respected as a poet. Writing only in Icelandic, he excelled at intricate metaphors, wonderful imagery, and neologism. Much of his verse romanticized Iceland and its history; {d-0}þó þú langförull legðir{d-1} [Song to Iceland] of 1903 has been set to music and is considered an important national song. The narrative {d-0}A ferð og flugi{d-1} [En route] of 1898, an excellent example of his descriptive ability, tells of the immigrant experience crossing the prairies by train in mid winter:

Other themes include the value of hard work, adversity as challenge, and the transience of life. Much of his verse dwells on the beauty of the Alberta landscape, and in Iceland he became known as Klettafjallaskadið, or the poet of the Rocky Mountains. The first three volumes of his collected works, Andvökur [Sleepless nights], were published in 1908-9 in Winnipeg. Stephansson{apos}s bitter satire and his use of archaic words and convoluted style generated criticism, but Andvökur also brought new exposure and popularity, which led to reading tours of North Dakota, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan in 1908-9 and the west coast in 1913. The greatest honour came in 1917 when the people of Iceland invited him to return for a four-month tour; he was regarded by many there as the best Icelandic poet to have emerged since the 13th century. With the publication of two more volumes in 1923 and a sixth posthumously in 1938, his output fills more than 2,000 pages, making him one of Canada{apos}s most prolific poets.

A complete bibliography of the works of Stephan Gudmundur Stephansson can be found in the author{apos}s study, written under the name J. W. McCracken, Stephan G. Stephansson: the poet of the Rocky Mountains ([Edmonton], 1982). Translated examples of his writings are in [S. G. Stephansson], Selected prose & poetry, trans. Kristjana Gunnars (Red Deer, Alta., 1988), and Selected translations from {d-0}Andvökur{d-1}, ed. Jane Ross (Edmonton, 1982).

Rowell{apos}s rise in the legal profession was accompanied by increasing prominence in the Methodist Church and in the Liberal Party. In November 1889 he had been designated a Methodist lay preacher, in 1892 he was the youngest man ever elected a lay delegate to the church{apos}s Toronto Conference, and he was in constant demand as a lay preacher and champion of the temperance movement. Despite a rather thin, high-pitched voice and a reputation in some quarters for excessive seriousness and an addiction to statistics, he could command audiences in diverse settings. He spoke on behalf of younger Liberals at a testimonial dinner when Sir Oliver Mowat* retired from the premiership in 1896. In the federal election held on 7 Nov. 1900 he was defeated in York East, near Toronto, by Conservative William Findlay Maclean*. A primary issue in the contest was Canada{apos}s part in the South African War. Although Rowell thought otherwise, he did not publicly deviate from Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier*{apos}s assurances that sending volunteers to South Africa would not be a precedent. Rowell believed that participation in the conflict could demonstrate Canada{apos}s growing importance in the empire, and the fact that English and French soldiers were fighting side by side might break down cultural barriers. Ironically, his campaign was weakened by English-French acrimony arising from the attitudes and utterances of Quebec mp Joseph-Israël Tarte*.

The reason for the patriotic ban of liquor sales and the enfranchisement of women was not far to seek. A few weeks after the 1914 election Canada was in Britain{apos}s war against Germany. Rowell was active in establishing bipartisan agencies to mobilize Ontario{apos}s war effort. In speeches he frequently declared that working-men could not be asked to sacrifice their lives unless their society{apos}s post-war conditions were to be better than those of the present, when 65 per cent of the population owned only 5 per cent of the wealth. He saw Canada{apos}s initial response to the war as magnificent, but recruiting became more difficult, especially in Quebec. Early in 1916 he welcomed Prime Minister Sir Robert Laird Borden*{apos}s announcement that the armed forces would be increased to 500,000. Laurier had agreed to a one-year parliamentary extension to avoid an election that would exacerbate tensions caused by attitudes towards recruitment and the war that placed Quebec in opposition to the rest of Canada.

Admiring the way Rowell accepted his defeat was Nellie Langford, who had graduated with a degree in modern languages from Toronto{apos}s Victoria University in 1896. Her father was the Reverend Alexander Langford, in whose home Rowell had been a welcome visitor over some years. Their marriage in June 1901 was followed by a honeymoon in Britain, where they visited places of religious and literary interest. They were in London in September for the third Ecumenical Methodist Conference. To delegates from around the world Rowell delivered a passionate speech on the mission of Canadian Methodism to connect the Britons and North Americans, {d-0}the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race ... one in Providential design and purpose for the world{apos}s evangelisation.{d-1} He enjoyed the opportunity to meet church leaders and listened to debates on how Methodist social concerns should be expressed in an industrial society. Soon after his arrival in Toronto he had begun working at the Fred Victor Mission, which promoted welfare and evangelism among the poor and was financed chiefly by Hart Almerrin Massey*, and he was active in the fight against Sunday streetcars, which was finally lost in 1900. He became superintendent of Metropolitan Church{apos}s Sunday school shortly after his marriage; at the 1902 General Conference he opposed any change to the Methodist discipline with its proscription of dancing, card-playing, and theatre-going, and he was against making it easier for women to be elected to church courts. Faith was important in the home he built in the exclusive Rosedale district in 1904: there were family prayers before breakfast, and the children, William Langford and Mary Coyne, listened to their father tell Bible stories on Sunday evenings. Religious certainty provided consolation when, in 1908, his second son, Edward Newton, died suddenly and inexplicably at the age of seven months.

On 27 May 1918 Borden, with Rowell, Calder, and Meighen, sailed from New York to attend meetings of the imperial war cabinet and the Imperial War Conference in London. The prime minister wished to demonstrate his commitment to equal representation between Conservatives and Liberals, and valued Rowell{apos}s knowledge on foreign affairs. Rowell departed for home at the end of July after visiting Canadian forces in France and devoting weeks of strenuous effort to gathering useful information. He concluded that what Borden already believed was correct: British politicians, bureaucrats, and generals had little to teach their Canadian counterparts about running a war or an empire. The Canadian contribution to the war was a powerful argument for changing the imperial structure.

Major government decisions had to wait until Borden returned from Britain, where he was defending Canada{apos}s autonomy with Rowell{apos}s hearty approval. Since joining the cabinet, he had revised his initially tepid opinion of Borden, with whom he had worked well. They agreed on Canada{apos}s position within the empire, and Borden relied on Rowell to formulate much of the government{apos}s domestic agenda. In the prime minister{apos}s absence he had the unenviable task of trying to explain to a divided cabinet and a sceptical public the dispatch of 4,000 Canadian troops under James Harold Elmsley on an imperial venture to Siberia. Rowell changed his mind on the merit of the original decision, but after Borden{apos}s return he continued to carry publicly much of the burden for justifying an obscure action through the Department of Public Information, which had been created late in 1917 as part of the Privy Council Office.

In June 1919 Winnipeg workers made clear the force of their demands for a better world and staged a general strike, the biggest labour demonstration in Canadian history [see Mike Sokolowiski*]. Rowell, well known to be sympathetic to labour, was in a decidedly awkward position. He praised the democratic and law-abiding intentions of the majority of workers and their leaders, yet he also expressed the fears of the Winnipeg business community that the Bolshevik ideas of One Big Union had infiltrated the leadership of the strike and that a full-blown revolution was brewing in western Canada. Although the strike was remarkably peaceful, when violence erupted briefly he defended the use of the RNWMP to restore order. Quebec Liberals, especially Lucien Cannon and Ernest LAPOINTE, made sure that Rowell was vilified for both the temporary loss of order and the means used to deal with it. In the fall of 1919 Rowell had the opportunity to promise better relations between workers and employers on the international stage. Together with the minister of labour, Gideon Decker Robertson*, he spoke for the Canadian government at the founding conference of the International Labour Organization in Washington, where he was at loggerheads with Conservative Methodist Silas Richard Parsons*, a representative of Canadian business who would have nothing to do with unions of any type. Rowell made clear both his government{apos}s responsibility for setting workplace policy and his country{apos}s independence of American decisions.

Early in 1921 he returned to his old law firm and strengthened his connections within the business community; in 1925 he would become president of the Toronto General Trusts Company. Still an mp, he privately advised Meighen, and reported to the house on the significance of the league. Lucien Cannon once more attacked Rowell, this time with the charge that he was encouraging Canada to meddle in affairs that were none of its business. When Rowell urged the immediate appointment of a Canadian ambassador to Washington he was met by more {d-0}little Canadianism,{d-1} this time from William Stevens Fielding*. Irregularly attending the house, Rowell spent much of his time traversing the nation to speak on international affairs and what he saw as Canada{apos}s role. One of his strongest interests was creating support for the League of Nations, which led him to organize and help finance the League of Nations Society in Canada; it eventually had branches from Halifax to Victoria. Primarily on the strength of his service to the league, the University of Toronto conferred on him an honorary doctorate in June 1921. In November he delivered there the Burwash Memorial Lectures, established in honour of Nathanael Burwash. As always, he aimed to inspire as well as instruct. His approach was historical, his primary theme the conviction that the success of the League of Nations would depend on widespread recognition that a transnational political organization was essential for a peaceful world and human survival. The Christian church had a particular responsibility to foster solutions to international problems, especially through missionary work in education and medicine. The lectures were published as The British empire and world peace (Toronto, 1922).

On 1 July 1920 Borden announced his retirement and was succeeded by Meighen as prime minister and Conservative leader. Rowell believed that the Union government had enacted {d-0}more real progressive legislation ... than any other Government in Canadian history,{d-1} and he could not be part of the new administration. Foreseeing that Conservative policies would predominate and his attitudes towards social reform would be considered too {d-0}radical,{d-1} he had no difficulty in resisting Meighen{apos}s repeated urging to join his government, which assumed the name National Liberal and Conservative Party. Rowell resigned on 10 July, when the new administration took office. A few days later he and Nell sailed for a holiday in England. Their plans were radically altered by the suggestion of Leopold Charles Maurice Stennett Amery, undersecretary of state for the colonies, that they enjoy a relaxed tour of South Africa and the British colonies in eastern Africa, all arrangements to be made by him. After three months of observing fresh landscapes, varying forms of government, race relations, and Christian missions, Rowell, on Meighen{apos}s invitation, joined Sir George Eulas Foster* and Doherty in Geneva to represent Canada at the first assembly of the League of Nations in November.

As the new parliament opened on 18 March 1918, Rowell was under doctor{apos}s orders to take life more easily; his rather frail health had been taxed by chronic overwork. During the debate on the speech from the throne after he had gone home exhausted, Charles Murphy*, an Irish Catholic and former member of the Laurier cabinet, delivered a two-hour denunciation of Rowell{apos}s whole career, centring on a charge of {d-0}conspiracy{d-1} to overthrow Laurier on behalf of a {d-0}cult of commercialized Christianity.{d-1} Murphy{apos}s purpose was clear: he wanted to reduce Rowell{apos}s influence, ensure his exclusion from post-war politics, and make certain that the rift in the Liberal Party, both nationally and provincially, would be permanent. Rowell decided not to waste precious energy on a reply. All that mattered was prosecution of the war. The most urgent requirement was the enforcement of the Military Service Act. In the face of riots in Quebec City from 28 March to the night of 1-2 April [see Georges Demenle*; François-Louis Lessard*] and discontent everywhere with methods of granting exemptions, the government maintained that the act was being administered impartially. Returning to his responsibilities for the War Committee, Rowell pushed for greater cooperation from organized labour. He received only a lukewarm response. The voluntary mobilization of industry proved no easier, although the appointment of a War Trade Board and a Canadian War Mission in Washington had potential. His vow to levy substantial taxes on business profits brought him into sharp conflict with some of his friends such as Gundy, an investment dealer recently appointed to the board. Gundy resisted Rowell{apos}s determination to tax meat packers at the rate of 11 per cent on investment; their mutual friend, Flavelle, who had recently received a baronetcy, had also argued that the proposed rate was too high, although a royal commission had found that in 1916 Flavelle{apos}s enterprise, the William Davies Company, made an 80 per cent return on meat sales to Britain, a profit Flavelle contended was due to increased volume. In March 1918 an order-in-council limited packers{s-1-unknown} profits to Rowell{apos}s preferred rate. The increases in other taxes on business and in personal income tax were less than he had suggested; aware of growing unrest among labourers, he had hoped to equalize the financial sacrifices demanded by the war. However, as chairman of a special house committee on veterans{s-1-unknown} pensions, he was gratified by agreement to the most generous pension scale provided by any of the Allies. He applauded the government{apos}s extension of the operation of the Civil Service Commission to the 35,000 federal employees outside the national capital as {d-0}the most radical [reform of a civil service] ... that has ever been made at one stroke in any country.{d-1} This measure was a step towards eliminating patronage, as was the broadening of the War Purchasing Commission{apos}s jurisdiction to all government departments. He also rejoiced in parliament{apos}s request that the crown cease to confer hereditary titles on Canadians except by consent of the Canadian cabinet [see William Folger Nickle*].

No honour could compensate him for the greatest personal sorrow of his life. In the spring of 1923 his son Langford, an arts student and athlete at Victoria University, died of blood poisoning. He had planned to study law and enter his father{apos}s firm. Responding to Sir John Stephen Willison*{apos}s letter of sympathy, Rowell said that he took comfort in his faith and the duty to continue {d-0}helping all one can.{d-1}

Now leader of the opposition, Rowell took on the task of party reorganization. He had advice and considerable financial support from a group that included Alfred Ernest Ames*, Edward Rogers WOOD, James Henry Gundy*, William Edward RUNDLE, Frederick Herbert Deacon, and the publisher of the Toronto Daily Star, Joseph E. ATKINSON, Methodists all. The Liberals could do little except criticize the Whitney government{apos}s policies. These included Regulation 17, which limited the teaching of French in schools [see Philippe Landry*], and a workmen{apos}s compensation act. During the June 1914 election a better-run party made its slogan {d-0}abolish the bar.{d-1} Rowell declared that the battle was between {d-0}organized Christianity{d-1} and {d-0}the organized liquor interests.{d-1} The result was a gain of only four seats. As long as the wealthy could drink in their private clubs, most of Ontario{apos}s working-men were not prepared to give up their beer in return for promises of social insurance, nor did they wish to extend the franchise to women, who were believed to favour prohibition. But a little more than two years later the Ontario Temperance Act, unanimously passed, would end the sale of all liquor, and in February 1917 the government, now headed by Sir William Howard HEARST, would give women the vote, although not the right to sit in the legislature as a motion made by Rowell would have allowed.

After the election of December 1921 Rowell had observed from the sidelines as Liberal prime minister William Lyon Mackenzie KING learned to manage a minority government dependent on Quebec and the new farmer-labour Progressive Party. After winning a substantial majority in September 1926, King proposed to make Rowell minister of customs to clean up serious scandals in the Department of Customs and Excise [see Jacques Bureau*]. He hastily withdrew the offer when Ontario Liberal advisers registered their doubt that Rowell could be elected in any Ontario seat: the French and Irish Catholic vote, the German vote, the anti-prohibitionists, the anti-conscriptionists, and the continuing Presbyterians would all be against him. King recorded that Rowell {d-0}displayed a very nice spirit{d-1} and agreed to be counsel for the commission King would set up to investigate the department. That fall, while Rowell worked on this assignment, the prime minister was in London at the Imperial Conference, which turned the empire into a commonwealth of autonomous nations. Rowell approved of this result; he would also be satisfied with the commission{apos}s report, tabled early in 1928, containing proposals for the customs department{apos}s reorganization and a recommendation that liquor-export houses be closed.

Newton Wesley Rowell{apos}s success as a politician was limited by his belief that if reasonable men discussed issues they would reach reasonable decisions. Methodist Arminianism may have been the origin of his naive hope that businessmen of his time could be persuaded that, if not from a sense of social justice, then in their own interest they should practise concern for their employees, and that dictators could be stopped by exhortation. However circumscribed his public impact, his personal reward was in doing what he believed to be right.

His freedom from parliamentary duties meant that he had time for the travel he found so enjoyable and intellectually stimulating, with or without family members. In 1922 he had been in France, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands; later trips took him to China, Japan, Hawaii, Australia, New Zealand, and Russia. He was often in London because of legal judgements referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. One that received general public attention was the persons case. In 1928 the Supreme Court of Canada turned down his argument on behalf of Emily Gowan Murphy [Ferguson*] and four other Alberta women that the terms of section 24 of the British North America Act, which stated that the governor general was to appoint {d-0}qualified Persons{d-1} to the Senate, included women. A year later, following presentations by Rowell and others, the Privy Council declared that women were {d-0}persons,{d-1} Lord Sankey asserting that a constitution was {d-0}a living tree capable of growth.{d-1}

Newton Wesley Rowell is the author of The British empire and world peace: being the Burwash Memorial Lectures, delivered in Convocation Hall, University of Toronto, November, 1921 (Toronto, 1922); Canada, a nation: Canadian constitutional developments (Toronto, 1923); and {d-0}Canada and the empire, 1884-1921,{d-1} in The Cambridge history of the British empire, ed. J. H. Rose et al. (8v. in 9, Cambridge, Eng., 1929-59), 6: 704-37. Many of Rowell{apos}s speeches have been made available in microform.

ROWELL, NEWTON WESLEY, lawyer, churchman, politician, and judge; b. 1 Nov. 1867 on a farm near St John{apos}s (Arva), Ont., fourth child and second son of Joseph Rowell and Nancy Green; brother of Sarah Alice Rowell*; m. 27 June 1901 Nellie Langford in Owen Sound, Ont., and they had three sons and one daughter; d. 22 Nov. 1941 in Toronto.

Although Rowell had rarely appeared on political platforms after the defeat of Liberal premier George William Ross*{apos}s government in 1905, he had devoted much thought to political developments. What spurred him into active participation was Laurier{apos}s achievement, announced in the House of Commons on 26 Jan. 1911, of an agreement permitting free trade in natural products with the United States. A revolt by Liberal business leaders such as Sir Byron Edmund Walker* and John Craig Eaton* was based on the fear that reciprocity would eventually include manufactured goods. In the September election Rowell campaigned vigorously across Ontario for the agreement. A second issue was imperial defence; he fully supported Laurier{apos}s plan for a navy available to Britain with the consent of the Canadian parliament. In October, after the rout of the federal Liberals, Conservative premier Sir James Pliny Whitney* called an Ontario election. The head of the provincial opposition, Alexander Grant MacKay, had abruptly resigned because of scandalous accusations, and the Liberals turned to Rowell, regarded as incorruptible. He accepted on assurances that the party was ready {d-0}to take advanced ground on the question of temperance as well as other questions of social reform.{d-1} The press aptly portrayed the new leader as {d-0}Moses in the wilderness.{d-1} On 11 December he won a safe seat in Oxford North; his party secured 20 others, a gain of two.

The professional side of Rowell{apos}s life flourished. Appointed a kc in 1902, he had become the senior partner in his own law firm, Rowell, Reid, and Wood, in the following year. Most of his cases concerned the interests of companies financed by American capital invested in northern Ontario, some of them closely related to the Liberal Party. He had been a key figure in restructuring the businesses of entrepreneur Francis Hector Clergue* through the creation of the Consolidated Lake Superior Corporation and subsequently represented the Ontario government on its board of directors. Solicitor for the Algoma Central Railway and for the Nipigon Pulp and Paper Company, he had defended the expropriation procedures of the town of Kenora against the Keewatin Power Company and the Hudson{apos}s Bay Company in 1907-8.

In September, before he could leave for London, Rowell was offered the position of Chief Justice of Ontario, which he accepted after much deliberation. He was primarily engaged in cases of corporation law during his tenure, which had lasted for just under a year when King asked him to chair the royal commission on dominion-provincial relations. Its mandate was to examine the balance of powers and responsibilities between the federal and provincial governments. Among the commissioners were Rowell{apos}s friend John Wesley DAFOE and notary Joseph SIROIS. Rowell hesitated because he realized that he would have less time to give to his judiciary responsibilities and he had concerns about his health. After preparatory visits to provincial capitals in September and October, public hearings opened in Winnipeg on 29 Nov. 1937. As the commission moved through western Canada, the chairman displayed his vast knowledge and unfailing courtesy, winning the plaudits of critical journalists. The commission was in Toronto when, on 7 May 1938, Rowell suffered a heart attack, followed by a stroke that robbed him of speech. In November his resignations from the commission and from his position as chief justice were accepted, and Sirois took over as chairman. Rowell died three years later. The Rowell-Sirois report, as it is generally known, was completed in 1940. It had paid warm tribute to his intellect and character, recognizing his work in the commission{apos}s preparation and early stages. There is no doubt that he would have approved the recommendations for minimum standards of education and social services for all Canadians, an outline for the development of the welfare state that would come into being after World War II.

As he prepared for his role on a world stage he had never felt {d-0}less ... like saying of any nation it is Divinely called to lead the world.{d-1} He came to believe that the greatest impediments to peace were the instability caused by the Russian revolution, the failure of the United States to join the League of Nations, and the excessive reparations imposed on Germany. He soon acquired a prominent position in the league{apos}s assembly. As part of a consistent effort to assert Canadian autonomy and protect the interests of less powerful nations, he electrified the assembly by declaring that European policies had {d-0}drenched this world in blood.... Fifty thousand Canadians under the soil of France and Flanders is what Canada has paid for European statesmanship.{d-1} Such oratory offended many Europeans, but it raised Rowell{apos}s prestige at home, especially when leading British newspapers and the American press concurred that he was among {d-0}the eight or ten leading figures{d-1} at the assembly. Rowell would become certain that the most important achievements of the league were the establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Labour Organization.

At the war{apos}s end on 11 Nov. 1918 Rowell, as president of the Privy Council, led the service of thanksgiving on Parliament Hill. Borden was already on his way to Europe to ensure that Canada had a voice in the making of peace. Rowell told the quietly jubilant crowd: {d-0}To-day marks the close of the old order and dawn of the new. It is the coronation day of democracy.{d-1} During the next few weeks he made speeches hailing {d-0}the new order,{d-1} whose hallmarks would be the {d-0}defence of the weak in every walk of life{d-1} by governments and vastly more cooperation between employers and employees. Many of Rowell{apos}s Conservative colleagues in cabinet, such as minister of finance Sir William Thomas White*, were less than enthusiastic about much of this agenda, which included subsidized housing, health promotion, and improved educational opportunities. Methodist Conservatives were even more alarmed when pronouncements by their church began to sound as if it had become a socialist body. The report of the Committee on Evangelism and Social Service, for instance, had advocated a greater role for labour in managing industry, a national system of old-age insurance, and the nationalization of natural resources.

After an election was called for 17 December, Rowell had less time to give to the War Committee. A most difficult problem was deciding who would run for the Unionists in Ontario: at dissolution the Conservatives held 70 seats there, the Liberals 12. He tackled the problem with John Dowsley Reid*. The sincere commitment of Borden and Rowell to equality of party representation was rarely shared at local levels, a fact Rowell was slow to realize. He eventually ran in Durham, east of Toronto, where the sitting Conservative member, Robert Alexander Mulholland, was persuaded to withdraw on a promise of appointment to the Senate. In a campaign that was both ferocious and divisive Rowell{apos}s oratorical prowess reached its zenith. He declared that he was willing to accept any political label if he could help the men {d-0}fighting for Canada and pouring out their very life blood on the fields of France and Flanders.{d-1} Voters, he said, were deciding {d-0}the future of Canada, the future of our empire, and the cause of human liberty.... It is the struggle of the Pagan belief against the Christian.... A man in casting his ballot reveals to his God his own character.{d-1} The War-time Elections Act, passed in September [see Arthur Meighen*], had enfranchised the immediate female relatives of those actively serving in the armed forces, while {d-0}enemy aliens{d-1} naturalized since 1902 had been deprived of the vote unless they had close male relatives fighting abroad, a measure of which Rowell had disapproved. The Methodist Church, whose pulpits were widely used as recruiting platforms, strongly supported conscription of both men and wealth and cited Rowell as a patriotic Liberal and an example to be followed. The election results divided Canada between French and English as never before: Unionists held 153 seats and the Laurier Liberals 82, all but 20 of them in Quebec. Rowell, who won Durham with a substantial margin, declared that if French Canadians would now fight for their country, Canada would enjoy a unity previously unknown.

A group of Toronto Liberals wanted Rowell to assess Britain{apos}s situation and under Peter Charles Larkin* they raised the money for a two-month trip. Although reluctant to go for personal reasons - his third son, Frederick Newton Alexander, was only six weeks old and Nell was still recovering from the birth - he sailed for London at the end of June. There and in Paris he gained first-hand information about the war efforts of Britain and France and visited the front. He delivered his lengthy report in September, but had little hope that the prime minister would ensure {d-0}the radical change{d-1} needed in a government whose prosecution of the war was weakened by {d-0}indecision, incapacity, and graft.{d-1} Borden, who had to cope with the difficulties caused by Minister of Militia and Defence Sir Samuel Hughes*, was not particularly receptive. However, Rowell made no public criticism. He was convinced that an effective war effort demanded the cooperation of all parties. After repeated efforts to persuade Laurier and then Ontario Liberals such as George Perry GRAHAM to enter a coalition, Rowell finally accepted Borden{apos}s invitation to do so himself just before the formation of the Union government was announced on 13 Oct. 1917. Rowell had stipulated that leading Liberals from the west and the Maritimes must also join. Among those who were won over were James Alexander Calder*, Thomas Alexander Crerar*, Arthur Lewis Watkins Sifton*, Frank Broadstreet Carvell*, and Alexander Kenneth MACLEAN; regrettably, no French Liberal from Quebec could be found to support conscription. Although some, dubious that principles and policy could be more important than party, questioned his motives, the Toronto Liberals who supported Rowell remained solidly behind him. They had believed that they were coaching a future prime minister, but they understood that his commitment to conscription, which had come into effect in August, might limit his political prospects.

Early in 1909 Rowell engaged in public battle against the general superintendent of the church and chairman of the board of regents of Victoria University, Albert Carman*. The issue was whether George Jackson, a Methodist minister from Britain, was qualified to be professor of English Bible. In 1906 Rowell and Joseph Wesley Flavelle* had been instrumental in bringing Jackson to Canada as minister to the wealthy Sherbourne Street Church [see Nathanael Burwash*]. With other members of the board, they welcomed Jackson{apos}s understanding of the Bible as the revelation of spiritual truth and not as history or science. For 18 months Rowell prepared for {d-0}the Jackson case{d-1} as carefully as for any legal defence. At the General Conference of the church in 1910 Rowell, other Jackson supporters, and higher criticism carried the day. His most immediate concern had been that {d-0}a barren theological controversy{d-1} would damage the national congress of the Laymen{apos}s Missionary Movement in Canada, held in Toronto from 31 March to 4 April 1909. As the organization{apos}s moving spirit, Rowell had declared to an audience of some 4,000 that Canada had a providential mission in evangelizing the world. In June 1910 he had been in Edinburgh as a delegate to the World Missionary Conference, the largest ecumenical gathering in Christian history.

In 1881 Nichol became a reporter for the Hamilton Spectator under John Robson Cameron. There, he drew simple cartoons and demonstrated his literary skills by writing short poems and skits. He was just 15 when the first issue of Bicycle (Hamilton) appeared in September 1882. A small monthly journal devoted to cycling, it was the official organ of the Canadian Wheelmen{apos}s Association; Nichol was its editor and contributed humorous fiction. The journal seems to have ceased publication early in 1883. In 1886 Nichol left the Hamilton Spectator for Edmund Ernest Sheppard{apos}s Evening News (Toronto). The following year Nichol and Sheppard established a publication devoted to independent political criticism and social, musical, and theatrical commentary that promised to deal with the subjects {d-0}in a lighter vein than was habitual in the daily press.{d-1} With Sheppard as editor and manager, Nichol as assistant editor, and William E. Caiger as advertising manager they launched the weekly Saturday Night on 3 December. It was issued on Saturday evening because a municipal by-law prohibited publishing on Sunday. Differences soon arose between Sheppard and his partners, so Nichol and Caiger left to establish a rival, Life (Toronto), in February 1888. Under Nichol{apos}s editorship it was {d-0}a very witty and breezy sheet,{d-1} as Saturday Night would later acknowledge, but it ran for less than a year; the market could not bear two weeklies.

Returning to Hamilton in 1889, Nichol became a reporter for the newly established Hamilton Herald. Over the next seven years he rose from reporter to editor-in-chief. In 1896 he moved to London, Ont., where he was a founder of the News. The following year, excited by reports of mining booms in western Canada, he left the News and travelled to British Columbia. After spending about three months visiting the Kootenay mining district, he became editor of the Kootenaian (Kaslo) early in July. In mid August he accepted a post as editor of Hewitt Bostock{apos}s weekly Province (Victoria), which was modelled upon Henry Du Pré Labouchere{apos}s muckraking Truth (London, Eng.).

In late March 1898 a daily edition of the Province started in Vancouver with Nichol as its editor. A year later he claimed that its circulation of over 5,000 was {d-0}practically as great as that of all the other daily papers in the province put together.{d-1} With a loan from Thomas George Shaughnessy, president of the Canadian Pacific Railway, he was able to secure control of the paper in 1901. Although he was a Liberal, his support of the party was not unconditional. Accused of having {d-0}turned Tory{d-1} in May 1900 when he vehemently opposed the renegade Liberal Joseph Martin and supported his Conservative opponents, Nichol explained that he declined to {d-0}lend countenance to a person who, masquerading as a Liberal, has left no stone unturned to injure and embarrass the Liberal government both in public and in private.{d-1}

On 24 Dec. 1920 Nichol was appointed lieutenant governor of British Columbia, after Edward Gawler Prior died suddenly. On assuming office, he gave up all active connection with the Daily Province and in 1923 he sold controlling interest to William Southam*{apos}s firm for $1,000,000. In office he showed great interest in postgraduate education at the University of British Columbia and in 1925 established a travelling scholarship in French at the Université de Paris. For this gesture he received later that year one of the first honorary degrees conferred by the university and two years later he would be awarded the cross of the Legion of Honour from the French government. Although his term expired in December 1925, he remained in office until late February 1926 when his successor was sworn in. He retired to Miraloma, his country house in Sidney designed by Samuel Maclure. He died in Victoria less than three years later and left an estate worth over $2,700,000, much of it invested in government bonds.

AO, RG 80-5-0-247, no.9656. BCA, GR-2951, no.1928-09-397085; MS-1320; MS-2700. LAC, RG 31, C1, 1871, Bothwell, Ont., div.1: 46; 1901, Burrard, B.C., subdist.D: 30. Daily Colonist (Victoria), 20 Dec. 1928. Hamilton Herald (Hamilton, Ont.), 27 Dec. 1920. Vancouver Daily Province, 26-27 March 1899; 21 May 1900; 25 Oct. 1901; 28 Nov. 1903; 30 Sept. 1909; 20, 22 Dec. 1928; 7 March 1939. Vancouver Daily Times, 20 Dec. 1928, 4 Nov. 1968. Vancouver Daily World, 23 Sept., 20-21 Dec. 1897; 25 Oct. 1901; 18 Dec. 1920. Directories, Hamilton, 1878-80, 1882-87, 1890-97; London City and Middlesex County, Ont., 1896-98; Toronto, 1888-89; Vancouver, 1908. Canadian annual rev., 1925. Canadian men and women of the time (Morgan; 1912). S. W. Jackman, The men at Cary Castle; a series of portrait sketches of the lieutenant-governors of British Columbia from 1871 to 1971 (Victoria, 1972). Martin Segger, The buildings of Samuel Maclure: in search of appropriate form (Victoria, 1986). Standard dict. of Canadian biog. (Roberts and Tunnell). Who{apos}s who and why, 1915/16. Who{apos}s who in western Canada . . . (Vancouver), 1912-13.

Watson distinguished himself as an accomplished athlete. For several years he was one of the star players in the old capital{apos}s hockey club. His passion for amateur sports and his strong personality gave him an entry into the Quebec Athlete Association Company, which he would lead over a long period. At the time of his death, renowned businessman Sir William Price would speak of him as a great athlete. Watson also took an early interest in the military, and he would be successful in this sphere as well. He enlisted first as a private in the 8th Royal Rifles, a militia regiment of Quebec City, and then rose through the ranks, obtaining his commission in 1900. Given the rank of lieutenant, he was promoted captain in 1903 and major in 1910. In 1911 he was invited by the federal government to command the company of fusiliers that accompanied the Canadian delegation to the coronation of King George V in England. For this service, he was awarded the Coronation Medal. On 26 Feb. 1912 he took command of his militia regiment with the rank of lieutenant-colonel.

After an uneventful crossing in October, the battalion moved into Bustard camp on Salisbury Plain in England with the rest of the Canadian 1st Infantry Brigade. Foul weather made it difficult for Watson{apos}s unit to train. After disembarking in France at Le Havre on 11 Feb. 1915, Watson and his men set out for the deserted town of Armentières, which they reached on 17 February. Mightily impressed by the German artillery fire, Watson made an initial tour of the trenches. He was proud when his battalion took its place there officially on 1 March. As he noted in his diary, his unit was responsible for part of {d-0}the great line of defences for the Empire.{d-1}

The 2nd Infantry Battalion showed great courage a few weeks later, in the German attack on Saint-Julien (Sint Juliaan), Belgium. During the second battle of Ypres in the spring of 1915, the Germans tried to take this Flemish village and the surrounding area, which jutted into their lines. They attacked on 22 April. For the first time in the war, they resorted to poison gas. At 5:00 p.m. they released more than 160 tons of chlorine, which spread panic among the French troops of the 87th (Territorial) Division and the 45th (Algerian) Division. The soldiers of the 45th were on the front line to the left of the positions held by the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade. The retreat of the French troops imperilled the Canadian soldiers, leaving their left flank exposed. During this {d-0}great and terrible day,{d-1} as Colonel Archer Fortescue Duguid termed it, the soldiers of the 1st Canadian Division, and in particular those of the 3rd Brigade, showed great heroism in stopping the German advance. The 2nd Battalion was stationed near the village of Wieltje. At 9:00 p.m. it received the order to advance towards Saint-Julien, where it was to take part in operations to check the German thrust. The next day (Friday, 23 April), Watson wrote, {d-0}My God! What an awful night we have had. Lost about 200 men & 6 officers of no.1 Coy. . . . They are too embedded in my mind to be ever forgotten.{d-1} The following day Watson{apos}s men stood their ground in their trenches and inflicted {d-0}terrible casualties{d-1} on the attacking Germans. At 1:55 p.m. the 2nd Battalion received the order to withdraw. According to Captain Richard Douglas Ponton, {d-0}Col. Watson{apos}s gallantry, in remaining in that exposed position until every man had retired, will never be forgotten.{d-1} Watson was back at headquarters about 4:00 p.m., {d-0}very badly cut up & with less than ½ my battalion.{d-1} He noted, however, that his unit {d-0}saved all our wounded.{d-1} William Waldie Murray, the 2nd Battalion{apos}s official historian, records that the battle of Saint-Julien resulted in the loss of 544 men of all ranks. Only seven of the battalion{apos}s 22 officers came through unscathed. Watson had to reorganize his unit, but he was proud of the conduct of his men, who, in his view, comprised {d-0}the best Can. Battn.{d-1}

In June 1915 Samuel Hughes, the minister of militia and defence, offered Watson an opportunity to go back to Canada and give the troops the benefit of his experiences in the field. He refused point blank, saying that he {d-0}would desire nothing better in all the world than a return to Canada but my duty is here with 2nd Battalion who have been so loyal to me.{d-1} Edwin Alfred Hervey Alderson, commander of the 1st Canadian Division, congratulated him on his decision. Watson did accept a promotion, however, and on 30 Aug. 1915 he took command of the 5th Infantry Brigade, with the rank of brigadier-general, as a reward for his battalion{apos}s conduct during the second battle of Ypres. When he returned to the front in the spring of 1916, the machine-gunners of his brigade had to endure the terrible ordeal of the battle of the craters at Saint-Éloi (Sint-Elooi), in Belgium, on 5 and 6 April. This engagement, which lasted from 27 March to 16 April, was so named because of the mines exploded by the British under the German lines on the first day, in a vain attempt to recapture the Saint-Éloi salient. It was the 2nd Canadian Division{apos}s baptism of fire. All the machine-gunners of the 25th and 26th Infantry battalions were killed, while those of the 22nd (except for two) managed to withdraw to the rear, after a hard-fought hand-to-hand battle with the enemy.

Watson left his brigade on 22 April 1916 and returned to England to take command of the 4th Canadian Division. This was a new one in the Canadian Corps, and a few weeks earlier he had agreed to lead it at the invitation of Hughes. On this occasion, General Alderson (now Sir Edwin Alfred Hervey), mentioned in a letter to Colonel John Wallace Carson (the representative in England of the minister of militia and defence) that Watson {d-0}is a good fighting man and gets things done. I think too that he has the moral courage.{d-1} Watson would command the unit until the end of the war and, as its leader, he would have difficult duties to perform. The 4th Division underwent its initiation in the fall of 1916, when, after the rest of the Canadian Corps had left for the Vimy sector in France, he was ordered to capture Regina Trench. He succeeded in doing so on 11 Nov. 1916, after several weeks of efforts complicated by bad weather conditions.

It was, then, with a body of seasoned troops that Watson set out again within a few days to rejoin the Canadian Corps, which was defending a wide sector between Lens and Arras. On the first day of the battle of Vimy, 9 April 1917, the 4th Canadian Division was given the job of capturing Hill 145 and a nearby height known as the Pimple. Hill 145 was the highest and most strategically important position on the ridge. It was also the best protected, with two lines of defence. As Gerald William Lingen Nicholson, the historian of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, would later note, {d-0}It was thus a valuable prize, though the task of attaining it was formidable.{d-1} The 4th Division took three days to reach its objectives. On 12 April Major-General Watson was able to report, {d-0}Mission accomplished!{d-1}

Under Watson{apos}s command, the division took part next in the battles of Hill 70 (15–25 Aug. 1917) and Passchendaele (26 Oct.–10 Nov. 1917), in Belgium. In 1918 it fought, in France, in the battles of Amiens (8–11 August), Arras (26 August–2 September), and Cambrai (27 September–9 October), the last {d-0}the hardest in its career,{d-1} said Major Charles Bethune Lindsey, a member of Watson{apos}s staff. The division captured the town of Denain on 19 Oct. 1918 and it took part in the liberation of Valenciennes in November.

Murray noted that Watson had left an indelible impression as head of the 2nd Battalion. In his words, {d-0}{s-0}Davie{s-1-unknown} Watson became a legend in the Second. Occasionally a martinet, he was never unfair. Stern he was, and it was not always easy for him to unbend; but he was a competent, able commander, and a just one.{d-1} He was the only regimental commander in the militia to command a division in the Canadian Corps.

Watson was a Presbyterian and he belonged to a number of prestigious societies, including the Garrison Club of Quebec, the St James Club of Montreal, and the Royal Automobile Club of London, England. A member of the masonic St Andrew{apos}s Lodge No.6 at Quebec, he became deputy grand master for the District of Quebec and Three Rivers. In 1921 he was a member of the founding council of the Canadian Legion of Veterans and he was granted an honorary dcl by Bishop{apos}s College. His business career extended well beyond his work at the Quebec Chronicle, since he sat on a number of boards of directors, including those of the Canadian Bankers{s-1-unknown} Association, Mortgage, Discount and Finance Limited, Davie Shipbuilding and Repairing Company Limited, and the Prudential Trust Company Limited. Nonetheless, he remained a thoroughly modest man, according to Wood.

After an uneventful crossing in October, the battalion moved into Bustard camp on Salisbury Plain in England with the rest of the Canadian 1st Infantry Brigade. Foul weather made it difficult for Watson{apos}s unit to train. After disembarking in France at Le Havre on 11 Feb. 1915, Watson and his men set out for the deserted town of Armentières, which they reached on 17 February. Mightily impressed by the German artillery fire, Watson made an initial tour of the trenches. He was proud when his battalion took its place there officially on 1 March. As he noted in his diary, his unit was responsible for part of {d-0}the great line of defences for the Empire.{d-1}

The 2nd Infantry Battalion showed great courage a few weeks later, in the German attack on Saint-Julien (Sint Juliaan), Belgium. During the second battle of Ypres in the spring of 1915, the Germans tried to take this Flemish village and the surrounding area, which jutted into their lines. They attacked on 22 April. For the first time in the war, they resorted to poison gas. At 5:00 p.m. they released more than 160 tons of chlorine, which spread panic among the French troops of the 87th (Territorial) Division and the 45th (Algerian) Division. The soldiers of the 45th were on the front line to the left of the positions held by the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade. The retreat of the French troops imperilled the Canadian soldiers, leaving their left flank exposed. During this {d-0}great and terrible day,{d-1} as Colonel Archer Fortescue Duguid termed it, the soldiers of the 1st Canadian Division, and in particular those of the 3rd Brigade, showed great heroism in stopping the German advance. The 2nd Battalion was stationed near the village of Wieltje. At 9:00 p.m. it received the order to advance towards Saint-Julien, where it was to take part in operations to check the German thrust. The next day (Friday, 23 April), Watson wrote, {d-0}My God! What an awful night we have had. Lost about 200 men & 6 officers of no.1 Coy. . . . They are too embedded in my mind to be ever forgotten.{d-1} The following day Watson{apos}s men stood their ground in their trenches and inflicted {d-0}terrible casualties{d-1} on the attacking Germans. At 1:55 p.m. the 2nd Battalion received the order to withdraw. According to Captain Richard Douglas Ponton, {d-0}Col. Watson{apos}s gallantry, in remaining in that exposed position until every man had retired, will never be forgotten.{d-1} Watson was back at headquarters about 4:00 p.m., {d-0}very badly cut up & with less than ½ my battalion.{d-1} He noted, however, that his unit {d-0}saved all our wounded.{d-1} William Waldie Murray, the 2nd Battalion{apos}s official historian, records that the battle of Saint-Julien resulted in the loss of 544 men of all ranks. Only seven of the battalion{apos}s 22 officers came through unscathed. Watson had to reorganize his unit, but he was proud of the conduct of his men, who, in his view, comprised {d-0}the best Can. Battn.{d-1}

In June 1915 Samuel Hughes, the minister of militia and defence, offered Watson an opportunity to go back to Canada and give the troops the benefit of his experiences in the field. He refused point blank, saying that he {d-0}would desire nothing better in all the world than a return to Canada but my duty is here with 2nd Battalion who have been so loyal to me.{d-1} Edwin Alfred Hervey Alderson, commander of the 1st Canadian Division, congratulated him on his decision. Watson did accept a promotion, however, and on 30 Aug. 1915 he took command of the 5th Infantry Brigade, with the rank of brigadier-general, as a reward for his battalion{apos}s conduct during the second battle of Ypres. When he returned to the front in the spring of 1916, the machine-gunners of his brigade had to endure the terrible ordeal of the battle of the craters at Saint-Éloi (Sint-Elooi), in Belgium, on 5 and 6 April. This engagement, which lasted from 27 March to 16 April, was so named because of the mines exploded by the British under the German lines on the first day, in a vain attempt to recapture the Saint-Éloi salient. It was the 2nd Canadian Division{apos}s baptism of fire. All the machine-gunners of the 25th and 26th Infantry battalions were killed, while those of the 22nd (except for two) managed to withdraw to the rear, after a hard-fought hand-to-hand battle with the enemy.

It was, then, with a body of seasoned troops that Watson set out again within a few days to rejoin the Canadian Corps, which was defending a wide sector between Lens and Arras. On the first day of the battle of Vimy, 9 April 1917, the 4th Canadian Division was given the job of capturing Hill 145 and a nearby height known as the Pimple. Hill 145 was the highest and most strategically important position on the ridge. It was also the best protected, with two lines of defence. As Gerald William Lingen Nicholson, the historian of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, would later note, {d-0}It was thus a valuable prize, though the task of attaining it was formidable.{d-1} The 4th Division took three days to reach its objectives. On 12 April Major-General Watson was able to report, {d-0}Mission accomplished!{d-1}

On 21 May 1919 Watson presided over a dinner for 200 members of the 4th Division at the Savoy Hotel in London, England. This last meeting before going home was a source of pride to him. On 1 July 1919, with feelings of relief and joy, he saw his home town once again. {d-0}So,{d-1} his journal noted, {d-0}after nearly 5 years of active service, I have returned safe & secure home again. And after what terrible experiences & what fearful hardships & sufferings.{d-1} He would scarcely have time to resume his normal activities, however, since he was to die within three years. During that period he carried on his work at the Quebec Chronicle, in which he had purchased a majority of shares shortly after his return. He was also chairman of the Quebec Harbour Commission. According to Colonel William Charles Henry Wood*, the war had undermined his health. He had had heavy responsibilities and had shown great concern for the safety and welfare of his troops. For his bravery and distinguished conduct at the front, Watson was awarded the Croix de Guerre by both France and Belgium and was appointed a commander of the Legion of Honour and the Ordre de Léopold. On 4 June 1917 he had been made a cmg and on 1 Jan. 1918 a kcb. Two years earlier he had been honoured with a cb.

The principal repository of manuscript documents is the Walker papers at the Univ. of Toronto Library, Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library (ms coll. 1). The records of the Civic Guild of Toronto (formerly the Toronto Guild of Civic Art) are preserved in TRL, SC. Walker{apos}s involvement in the fine arts is documented in archival collections in the library of the Art Gallery of Ontario, Toronto, and in the B. E. Walker papers and Advisory Arts Council records in the National Gallery of Canada Library, Ottawa. Finally, both the CIBC [Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce] and the Canadian Bankers{s-1-unknown} Association possess institutional archives in their head offices in Toronto.

There are three biographies: George P. de T. Glazebrook{apos}s commissioned study, Sir Edmund Walker (London, 1933); C. W. Colby, “Sir Edmund Walker,” Canadian Banker (Toronto), 56 (1949): 93–101; and B. R. Marshall, “Sir Edmund Walker, servant of Canada” (ma thesis, Univ. of B.C., Vancouver, 1971). Marshall{apos}s dissertation is very good, but is not widely available. Hector Willoughby Charlesworth writes about Walker in More candid chronicles: further leaves from the note book of a Canadian journalist (Toronto, 1928), as does Augustus Bridle in Sons of Canada: short studies of characteristic Canadians (Toronto, 1916). The business side of his life can be culled from Victor Ross and A. St L. Trigge, A history of the Canadian Bank of Commerce, with an account of the other banks which now form part of its organization (3v., Toronto, 1920–34); R. T. Naylor, The history of Canadian business (2v., Toronto, 1975); and Christopher Armstrong and H. V. Nelles, Southern exposure: Canadian promoters in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1896–1930 (Toronto, 1988). On Walker{apos}s involvement in politics and public life, see the Canadian annual rev., 1901–24, and R. D. Cuff, “The Toronto Eighteen and the election of 1911,” OH, 58 (1965): 169–80, as well as A. B. McKillop, Matters of mind: the university in Ontario, 1791–1951 (Toronto, 1994).

[Many of Walker{apos}s addresses were published in professional journals or as pamphlets. A good sampler is Addresses delivered by Sir Edmund Walker, c.v.o., l.l.d., d.c.l., during the war ([Toronto, 1919]). A history of banking in Canada was originally presented to the Congress of Bankers and Financiers at Chicago on 23 June 1893, and appeared in the Canadian Bankers{s-1-unknown} Association Journal (Toronto), 1 (1893–94): 1–25, under the title “Banking in Canada.” The History went through numerous reissues and revisions, including the Toronto editions of 1899 and 1909. Walker’s contribution to the Dictionary of political economy . . . , ed. R. H. I. Palgrave (3v., London and New York, 1894–99), on “Canadian banking” also appeared in pamphlet form at Toronto sometime in the 1890s. The majority of Walker{apos}s publications have been made available on microfiche by the CIHM and are listed in its Reg. A chronological listing of Walker{apos}s addresses and publications is available in box 34A, file 3, of his papers at the Univ. of Toronto, infra. Also listed in both sources is a pamphlet issued by the Canadian Bank of Commerce under the title Jubilee of Sir Edmund Walker, c.v.o., l.l.d., d.c.l., 1868–1918 (Toronto, 1918), to commemmorate his 50th year of service.

K. A. Jordan, Sir Edmund Walker, print collector: a tribute to Sir Edmund Walker on the seventy-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Art Gallery of Ontario (exhibition catalogue, Art Gallery of Ontario, 1974), and Images of eighteenth-century Japan: ukiyoe prints from the Sir Edmund Walker collection, Royal Ontario Museum, Toronto, comp. David Waterhouse ([Toronto], 1975), discuss Walker the art connoisseur. Maria Tippett, Art at the service of war: Canada, art and the Great War (Toronto, 1984) and Making culture: English-Canadian institutions and the arts before the Massey commission (Toronto, 1990), Lovat Dickson, The museum makers: the story of the Royal Ontario Museum (Toronto, 1986), and David Kimmel, “Toronto gets a gallery: the origins and development of the city{apos}s permanent public art museum,” OH, 84 (1992): 195–210, survey some of his organizational contributions to Canadian cultural life. The best discussion of Walker{apos}s confrontations with critics is found in Ann Davis, “The Wembley controversy in Canadian art,” CHR, 44 (1973): 48–74. d.k.]§

Although André Nault{apos}s parents were of French Canadian origin, they had become integrated into the Métis community of the Red River settlement (Man.). As a young man, Nault accompanied his father on buffalo hunts to the Missouri plateau, excelling as a horseman and hunter. He obtained river lot 12 in St Vital and farmed there. On 17 May 1849, at age 19, he supported the Métis drive for free trade at the famous trial of Pierre-Guillaume Sayer* by marching {d-0}with a rifle at his shoulder.{d-1} Judge and historian Louis-Arthur Prud{apos}homme* states that this episode was his apprenticeship as a {d-0}defender of the rights and liberties of the country{apos}s population.{d-1}

The first event of the Métis resistance of 1869-70 to the transfer of Rupert{apos}s Land to the Canadian government was the stopping of the surveyors on 11 Oct. 1869. Oral history suggests that this event occurred on Nault{apos}s river lot in St Vital, but the notebook of surveyor Adam Clark Webbe would seem to indicate that it was on an adjoining lot. Nault{apos}s first name is not listed among those of the seven Naults who were present, but the one nicknamed Nanin is assumed to have been him. On the arrival of the surveyors, Nault is said to have gone for his first cousin Métis leader Louis Riel*, who spoke English. It seems likely that Nault played a significant role on this occasion since oral accounts of the event link it to his property.

According to Nault, at a meeting of the Métis on 21 Oct. 1869 Riel ordered him to construct a barrier at St Norbert to prevent the lieutenant governor designate, William McDougall*, from entering the Red River settlement or bringing in arms. Nault had about 250 to 300 men with him. On 1 November he and his brother Benjamin forced McDougall{apos}s representatives, Captain Donald Roderick Cameron and Joseph-Alfred-Norbert Provencher*, to return to Pembina (N.Dak.). The following day, under Riel{apos}s orders, he and his men captured Upper Fort Garry (Winnipeg) to prevent it from falling into the hands of John Christian Schultz* and his Canadian supporters. From 4 to 23 Dec. 1869 Nault occupied Fort Pembina, the HBC post just north of the international border, to watch the activities of McDougall. When McDougall headed back east, Nault returned to the Red River settlement.

Prud{apos}homme argues that in Riel{apos}s provisional government Nault was probably fourth in line of importance after Riel, Ambroise-Dydime Lépine, and Elzéar Goulet*. Nault was a member of the court martial that on 3 March 1870 tried Thomas Scott*, an Ontarian captured in mid February. Scott had proved to be a particularly troublesome prisoner and was sentenced to execution. Nault, who commanded the Métis firing squad, would report in 1923 to historian Auguste-Henri de Trémaudan that Scott {d-0}did not believe that we would have the pluck, as he called it, to go the whole length and to shoot him.{d-1} Scott {d-0}would pledge his word to keep the peace in order to be released, then break it as soon as he was free. We had no desire whatever to put him to death, he simply forced us to it.{d-1}

After troops arrived in August 1870 under the command of Colonel Garnet Joseph Wolseley*, numerous Métis suffered reprisals. In February 1871 Nault was attacked by soldiers at Pembina and left for dead. Prud{apos}homme observed that he carried the scar from this brutal incident until his death. Later in 1871 Nault played a significant role in obtaining information for Riel and the Métis on the movements of William Bernard O{apos}Donoghue*, who had asked Métis leaders, Nault included, for support in attacking Manitoba with a band of Fenians. Nault and Jean-Baptiste Lépine* went to Pembina on 2 October and returned four days later to report that O{apos}Donoghue was planning to attack Fort Pembina before approaching Fort Garry. The Métis under Riel stayed loyal to Canada and did not join O{apos}Donoghue.

In late 1871 Riel suggested the formation of an association of Métis to maintain their influence in the Red River parishes and he looked to Nault as one of the {d-0}principal Métis.{d-1} Nault was named a councillor of the new organization, the Union Saint-Alexandre. Despite the hopes of Métis leaders that their demonstration of loyalty in protecting the colony against the Fenians would help them obtain amnesty for acts carried out during the resistance, they remained disappointed. Nault was arrested in February 1874. He stood trial for the murder of Scott the following November, but the jury was unable to reach a verdict. He was in prison awaiting a second trial when the government of Alexander Mackenzie* granted a full amnesty to all except Riel, A. D. Lépine, and O{apos}Donoghue in February 1875. His imprisonment left him with heart and lung problems. After his release he returned to his St Vital farm, where he would live until age 94. He took no part in the events of 1885 in Saskatchewan [see Riel], but three of his sons did. He became a member of the Union Nationale Métisse Saint-Joseph du Manitoba, established in 1887 to preserve Métis heritage and culture. An example of his efforts to collect and document Métis history was his donation in 1910 of the original flag of the Union Nationale Métisse to the organization; it is now preserved in the Heritage Centre of the Société Historique de Saint-Boniface. The Métis and francophone communities of Manitoba and André Nault{apos}s numerous descendants continue to honour the memory of this man who was an eye-witness to, and participant in, many stirring events.

AM, MG 3, B18; NR 0157. {d-0}The execution of Thomas Scott,{d-1} ed. A.-H. de Trémaudan, CHR, 6 (1925): 222-36. A.-G. Morice, Dictionnaire historique des Canadiens et des Métis français de l{apos}Ouest (Québec et Montréal, 1908). L.-A. Prud{apos}homme, {d-0}André Nault,{d-1} RSC, Trans., 3rd ser., 22 (1928), sect.i: 99-111. Louis Riel, The collected writings of Louis Riel, ed. G. F. G. Stanley (5v., Edmonton, 1985). N. E. A. Ronaghan, {d-0}The Archibald administration in Manitoba - 1870-1872{d-1} (phd thesis, Univ. of Manitoba, Winnipeg, 1986). G. F. G. Stanley, Louis Riel (Toronto, 1963). A.-H. de Trémaudan, {d-0}Louis Riel and the Fenian raid of 1871,{d-1} CHR, 4 (1923): 132-44.

In return for their gifts, donors were permitted to sit on the institution{apos}s board of directors. This modus operandi had been conceived initially by Alfred Perry, who had collaborated with Cléophée Têtu*, named Thérèse de Jésus, in founding the Asile de Longue-Pointe. The board of directors gave Burgess full authority in the treatment of patients and the hiring of staff. He nonetheless experienced disappointments. He always found it very difficult to retain his most competent assistants and employees because of their heavy workloads and modest salaries. He was also faced with the problem of overpopulation in his hospital. During the first decade of the century, like many alienists of the time, Burgess identified heredity as the principal cause of the increased incidence of mental illness and he was drawn to eugenics. In his 1907 report, for instance, he suggested that the Quebec provincial government, like some American states, should forbid the marriage of carriers of defects considered hereditary, or should introduce compulsory sterilization of alcoholics and other {d-0}degenerates.{d-1} After noticing in 1905 that nearly 40 per cent of the patients admitted to the Protestant Hospital for the Insane in Verdun had not been born in Canada, he took a clear stand in favour of greater control over immigration. Following the enactment of more restrictive immigration laws in 1906 and 1910, Burgess annually listed numerous mental patients whom he considered candidates for deportation.

Burgess also devoted a great deal of time to promoting psychiatry as a medical specialty. In 1893 he gave a series of lectures on mental illnesses at McGill University (where he would become a full professor in 1899). He also undertook some research into mental diseases, with the help of Dr Macphail and his assistants, including an experimental study in 1895 on the treatment of mental deficiency by the use of thyroid extracts. In 1901 he would try to establish a link between epilepsy and glycosuria. These studies did not lead to conclusive results, however. In 1896 he set up a training school for nurses at the Verdun asylum, where he also taught, as did the rest of the institution{apos}s medical staff. That year he was honorary secretary of a section on nervous and mental illnesses and medical case-law at a pan-American medical congress held in Mexico City. In 1898, to advance their specialty, some 20 alienists from the province of Quebec came together to form the Société Médico-Psychologique de Québec. Burgess was its first vice-president and became its president in 1899. Completely at ease with his French-speaking colleagues and fluent in their language, he encouraged them to establish ties with other North American alienists. He undertook in June 1902 the task of organizing the meeting of the American Medico-Psychological Association, which was held in Montreal. In 1904-5 he became the third Canadian – after Daniel Clark* in 1891-92 (when the association was called the Association of Medical Superintendents of American Institutions for the Insane) and Bucke in 1897-98 – to serve as president of this organization, which was the forerunner of the current American Psychiatric Association. In 1918 he was a member of the Canadian National Committee for Mental Hygiene, whose objectives were to identify the various segments of the population that showed a high risk of mental illness, to organize research on the functioning of the brain and nervous system, and to conduct public information campaigns about insanity and ways of avoiding it.

AO, RG 80-5-0-54, no.11075. LAC, RG 31, C1, 1871, Toronto, St David{apos}s Ward, div.4: 8; 1891, Verdun, Que. Gazette (Montreal), 19 Jan. 1926. Montreal Daily Star, 19 Jan. 1926. La Presse, 20 janv. 1926. C. H. Cahn, Douglas Hospital: 100 years of history and progress (Verdun, 1981). Canadian men and women of the time (Morgan; 1912). Canadian who{apos}s who, 1910. Directory, Montreal, 1908-10. Denis Goulet et André Paradis, Trois siècles d{apos}histoire médicale au Québec; chronologie des institutions et des pratiques (1639-1939) (Montréal, 1992). Guy Grenier, {d-0}L{apos}implantation et les applications de la doctrine de la dégénérescence dans le champ de la médecine et de l{apos}hygiène mentales au Québec entre 1885 et 1930{inch} (mémoire de ma, univ. de Montréal, 1990). John Macoun, Autobiography of John Macoun, m.a. . . . , intro. E. T. Seton ([Ottawa], 1922). André Paradis, {d-0}Thomas J. W. Burgess et l{apos}administration du Verdun Protestant Hospital for the Insane (1890-1916),{d-1} Canadian Bull. of Medical Hist. (Waterloo, Ont.), 14 (1997): 5-35. Protestant Hospital for the Insane, Annual report (Verdun), 1891-1923. The roll of pupils of Upper Canada College, Toronto, January, 1830, to June, 1916, ed. A. H. Young (Kingston, Ont., 1917), 145. S. E. D. Shortt, Victorian lunacy: Richard M. Bucke and the practice of late nineteenth-century psychiatry (Cambridge, Eng., 1986).

ANQ-CN, CE901-S9, 23 nov. 1889; S10, 30 juill. 1848. ...ANQ-Q, ZQ6-S315, 14 juin 1871. ...L{apos}Événement, 19 nov. 1923. ...Pierre Frenette, Napoléon-Alexandre Comeau (Montréal, 1981). ...Pauline L[e Vallée] Boileau, La Côte-Nord contre vents et marées: biographie romancée de Napoléon-Alexandre Comeau (1848–1923) (Sillery, Qué., 1998). ...C. D. Melvill et al., Reports on fisheries investigations in Hudson and James bays and tributary waters in 1914 (Ottawa, 1915). ...Robert Parisé, Géants de la Côte-Nord (Québec, 1974).

His marriage in St Paul in 1890 had been a curious event: his fiancée, Letitia Attwood, died just before his arrival so he asked her sister, who, it was said, agreed because she {d-0}was so acutely overcome by his anguish.{d-1} Their home, Riverview (originally built by Charles Alexander Magrath*), featured stained-glass windows overlooking a courtyard and a large and famous library. The Conybeares also developed a seven-acre garden; its lawns and English-style maze were considered exceptional. Charles started all the trees, hedges, and shrubs from seeds and slips obtained from England.

An avid patron of the arts, Conybeare belonged to the Knights of Pythias – he was its chancellor as well – and the Dramatic Order of the Knights of Khorassan. In addition to producing libretti for unidentified musical comedies performed in Lethbridge and throughout the west, he wrote two books of poetry: Vahnfried (London, 1903) and Lyrics from the west (Toronto, 1907). The latter reveals his staunch attachment to both Canada and the British empire. {d-0}Canada{apos}s flag,{d-1} for example, asks

In {d-0}Britons all to-day{d-1} he was equally prosaic about Canadian support for the empire in the South African War: {d-0}Unfurl the Union banner, – let it wave across the seas; . . . Britons all to-day – linked across the sea, / Pealing out with joyous shout the chorus of the free.{d-1} His romantic side is revealed in {d-0}For my wife,{d-1} which ends {d-0}My heart-strings throb with a joy that reveals / The songs that can never be sung.{d-1} He would receive honorary dcls from Bishop{apos}s College in Lennoxville, Que., in 1907 and the University of Alberta in 1908 (ad eundem gradum). A stalwart of the Church of England, he had paid half the cost of building St Augustine{apos}s Church in Lethbridge in 1886-87. Archdeacon Cecil Swanson later considered him the rock of the parish. Appointed solicitor of the diocese of Calgary in 1900, he became its first chancellor in 1904, a position he would maintain until 1916. As a member of synod, he never missed a meeting, and he sat on the committee that edited a new hymnal in 1908. In matters of temperance, he did not take a hard line. Elected president of the Moderation League of Alberta in 1919 and 1923, he headed efforts to urge the province to repeal its Prohibition legislation and assume full control of liquor sales.

GA, M 1931. GRO, Reg. of births, Chiswick (London), 19 May 1860. Legal Arch. Soc. of Alta (Calgary), fonds 5, vol.60, file 923-vol.68, file 946 (Law Soc. of Alta, minutes of convocation, 1907-27); fonds 30 (Conybeare, Church, McArthur, and Davidson coll.). PAA, GR1978.235. Lethbridge Herald, 31 July 1927, 18 June 1985. Lethbridge News, 11 Dec. 1885; 8, 29 Dec. 1886; 30 March, 5, 13 April, 24 Aug., 19 Oct. 1887; 18 June, 2, 16 July 1890; 5 April, 12 Dec. 1894; 17 March 1897; 26 Jan. 1899. Canadian annual rev., 1921: 830. Canadian men and women of the time (Morgan; 1898 and 1912). Alex Johnston, Lethbridge, from coal town to commercial centre: a business history, ed. Irma Dogterom and L. G. Ellis (Lethbridge, 1997). L. A. Knafla, {d-0}From oral to written memory: the common law tradition in western Canada,{d-1} in Law & justice in a new land: essays in western Canadian legal history, ed. L. A. Knafla (Toronto, 1986), 31-77; {d-0}Report on the legal careers of Conybeare, Macleod and Scott{d-1} (paper prepared for Alta Culture, Historic Sites Service, Edmonton, 1985). M.-L. Loescher, {d-0}Dr. C. F. P. Conybeare, Lethbridge{apos}s pioneer lawyer,{d-1} Whoop-Up Country Chapter, Hist. Soc. of Alta, Newsletter (Lethbridge), no.1 (January 1990): [3-4]; {d-0}Dr. Conybeare {s-0}was the church{s-1-unknown}{d-1} (1966) (copy in the Sir Alexander Galt Museum and Arch.). A. O. MacRae, History of the province of Alberta (2v., [Calgary], 1912). The record of old Westminsters: a biographical list . . . , comp. G. F. R. Barker and A. H. Stenning (London, 1928). Who{apos}s who and why, 1919/20. Who was who . . . : a companion to {d-0}Who{apos}s who,{d-1} containing the biographies of those who died during the period [1897-2000] (10v. and an index to date, London, 1920-?), 2 (1916-28).

GRANDSAIGNES D{apos}HAUTERIVES, HENRY DE, Vicomte de GRANDSAIGNES D{apos}HAUTERIVES (named at birth Henri-Louis-Marie), itinerant projectionist and cinema operator; b. 28 July 1869 in Pont-l{apos}Abbé, France, son of Gustave de Grandsaignes d{apos}Hauterives, Comte de Grandsaignes d{apos}Hauterives, a customs collector, and Marie Tréourret de Kerstrat; m. first in June 1894 Charlotte Subé in Paris, and they had one son, Robert, who was the treasurer of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1950; m. secondly in 1922 in the same city Marguerite Holleville; d. there 26 Sept. 1929.

Arch. Départementales, Finistère, État civil, Pont-l{apos}Abbé, 28 juill. 1869. Arch. Municipales, Paris, État civil, 28 sept. 1929. Germain Lacasse et Serge Duigou, L{apos}Historiographe (les débuts du spectacle cinématographique au Québec) (Montréal, 1985); Marie de Kerstrat, l{apos}aristocrate du cinématographe (Quimper, 1987).

London Public Library and Art Museum (London, Ont.), Hist. ser. scrapbooks; London scrapbooks.— NA, MG 25, 175 (mfm.); MG 26, A, Macdonald to O{apos}Connor, 22 Feb. 1872; Meredith to Macdonald, 29 April 1879, 20 Oct. 1882; Lynch to Macdonald, 9 May 1882; D, Meredith to Thompson, 1 Oct. 1894.— Daily Mail and Empire, 22 Aug. 1923.— London Free Press, 29 April 1879.— Mail (Toronto), 10 Jan. 1879, continued by Toronto Daily Mail, 3, 20, 23 Dec. 1886.— Toronto Daily Star, 22–23 Aug. 1923.— F. H. Armstrong, The Forest City: an illustrated history of London, Canada ([Northridge, Calif.], 1986).— Canadian album (Cochrane and Hopkins), vol.1.— Canadian Bar Rev. (Toronto), 1 (1923): 557–58.— Canadian men and women of the time (Morgan; 1912).— Cyclopædia of Canadian biog. (Rose and Charlesworth), vol.1.— P. [E. P.] Dembski, “A matter of conscience: the origins of William Ralph Meredith{apos}s conflict with Archbishop John Joseph Lynch,” OH, 73 (1981): 131–44; “Political history from the opposition benches: William Ralph Meredith, Ontario federalist,” OH, 89 (1997): 199–217; “William Ralph Meredith: leader of the Conservative opposition in Ontario, 1878–1894” (phd thesis, Univ. of Guelph, Ont., 1977).— A. M. Evans, Sir Oliver Mowat (Toronto, 1992).— C. W. Humphries, “Honest enough to be bold”: the life and times of Sir James Pliny Whitney (Toronto, 1985).— J. R. Miller, Equal rights: the Jesuits{s-1-unknown} Estates Act controversy (Montreal, 1979).— National encyclopedia of Canadian biography, ed. J. E. Middleton and W. S. Downs (2v., Toronto, 1935–37).— Ont., Legislature, “Newspaper Hansard,” 1867–86.— R. C. B. Risk, “Sir William R. Meredith, c.j.o.: the search for authority,” Dalhousie Law Journal (Halifax), 7 (1982–83): 713–41.— Toronto, City Council, Minutes of proc., 1894: 53, 61, 224; app.A: 51–52, 69.— Eric Tucker, Administering danger in the workplace: the law and politics of occupational health and safety (Toronto, 1990).— Types of Canadian women . . . , ed. H. J. Morgan (Toronto, 1903).

Cochrane matured to become a conscientious and responsible rancher, always looking for ways to improve his stock and streamline production. Not only did he nurture a purebred herd on enclosed pastures, but he put up hay for calves and weak cattle from an early date. Later he pushed the stock association to keep the bulls separate from the cows until midway through the summer so that winter calving would be eliminated. Cochrane had thus brought with him attitudes towards stock rearing drawn from the British pastoral tradition. The geographer Terry G. Jordan has shown how these ideas fused with methods from the midwestern United States to ensure that ranching in the Canadian foothills differed markedly from the extensive open range methods of {d-0}the Anglo-Texan ranching complex.{d-1} Cochrane{apos}s leadership was felt far beyond the boundaries of his ranch. For several years he organized the cowboys who rode for the Mosquito Creek Wagon at the roundup, and when his neighbour Alfred Ernest Cross* was laid up after an accident Cochrane managed the A7 Ranche for him. He was a leading figure in the fight against predators, and, in 1904, it was he who built the huge dipping vat in which all the district{apos}s cattle were treated for mange.

Cochrane was one of a group of friends who provided capital for Cross{apos}s Calgary Brewing and Malting Company; he purchased $1,000 of stock in 1892 and later added another $500. Perhaps more important than his financial backing was his wholehearted personal support for his friend. When Cross was sick and beset with problems in the late 1890s, Billy wrote: {d-0}It seems hard that you should chuck up now, after bearing all the expense and trouble and considerable wear and tear. . . . I am quite willing to stay with the brewery as long as you do and as long as you control the management.{d-1} The company would continue to provide Cochrane with a modest income until his death.

William E. Cochrane, known as Billy, was a grand-nephew of the famous seaman Thomas Cochrane, 10th Earl of Dundonald. Among his other relatives were Sir Thomas John Cochrane*, an early governor of Newfoundland, and Douglas Mackinnon Baillie Hamilton Cochrane*, who as the 12th Earl of Dundonald would become commander of the Canadian militia. Billy was one of a number of well-to-do young Britons who came to the Alberta foothills in the 1880s in search of adventure. He stayed to play an important part in the economic and social development of the region. Although the historiography of the Canadian range has tended to emphasize the role of four or five large corporate ranch companies [see Matthew Henry Cochrane*; Frederick Smith Stimson*], more recently it has been argued that numerous smaller family ranches buttressed the cattle industry with capital and contributed enormously to innovation and adaptation in ranching. Cochrane{apos}s life in Alberta epitomized the achievements of this group.

The Little Bow Cattle Company, known as the CC Ranch because of its brand, was organized in 1884 by Cochrane, his cousin Thomas Belhaven Henry Cochrane, Hugh Graham, and brothers Ted and Frank Jenkins. A foundation herd of 359 head of cattle and 12 saddle-horses was imported from Montana in September 1884. A snugly sited ranch house was built on Mosquito Creek, a few miles west of Cayley. Early setbacks encouraged Billy{apos}s partners to pursue other options and Cochrane was left the sole boss of the CC. His pride and joy was a small herd of purebred Galloway cattle. From it he raised young bulls to sell to neighbouring ranchers. They were prized for their hardihood and foraging abilities. In addition, Cochrane ran a regular range herd of about 400 cows, which yielded 220-75 calves each year. The ranch reported a total of 800 head of cattle and 40 horses in 1890.

There was, however, another side to Billy Cochrane. One of his friends described him as having {d-0}a kiss from the devil on his cheek.{d-1} He enjoyed the physical demands of working an isolated ranch and earned the respect of his men by his willingness to turn his hand to any chore, but he expected to play as hard as he worked. During his first years in Alberta he was a leading member of the Wolves{s-1-unknown} Den, an extremely ungentlemanly {d-0}gentlemen{apos}s club,{d-1} which met in an old boxcar by the rail tracks in Calgary. Cochrane knew the Grant family, who produced Glen Grant Scotch whisky, and was able to ensure that there was always a barrel of ten-year-old whisky on hand to nourish their storytelling and poker games. While at their ranch, Billy and his wife, Evelyn, hunted coyotes on horseback, played and supported polo, shot and fished, and entertained frequently. Once Cochrane could rely on a trusted foreman, he adopted the habit of spending the winter in Britain, where he enjoyed fox-hunting from his family home in Leicestershire and shooting grouse in Scotland and pheasants in Dorset. The couple would also spend time in London, staying at the British Hotel, dining at the Café Royal, and catching up with the latest plays. In 1909, after Evelyn{apos}s death, Cochrane sold his ranch and retired to Scotland. He continued to hunt and fish, and travelled widely, making frequent visits to Alberta. During World War I he falsified his age to join the 1st Sportsman{apos}s Battalion of the Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment), but he did not see action. At his death his principal residence was Ravenstone Castle, near Whithorn, Scotland. He left an estate worth $1,250,000, which took some years to wind up.

AO, RG 22-354, 12212-310.— Commonwealth of Virginia, Dept. of Health, Div. of vital records (Richmond), Marriage certificate, Norfolk, 8 Sept. 1874.— NA, MG 9, D7-35, 113; MG 27, I, B5, 8–10; MG 28, I 32; I 37, 1–2; III 26, 719.— North York Public Library (Toronto), Canadiana Coll., Ontario Geneal. Soc. Library coll., cemetery transcripts, Beechwood Cemetery (Ottawa), sect.50: 44.— Ottawa Citizen, October 1899, 12 Feb. 1925.— Ottawa Evening Journal, October 1896, October 1898, November 1908, May 1909, February 1910, June 1912, December 1918, November 1922, 12 Feb. 1925.— Ottawa Free Press, June 1899.— S. A. Cook, “A helping hand and shelter: Anglo-Protestant social service agencies in Ottawa, 1880–1910” (ma thesis, Carleton Univ., Ottawa, 1987).— R. P. Gillis, “E. H. Bronson and corporate capitalism: a study in Canadian business thought and action, 1880–1910” (ma thesis, Queen{apos}s Univ., Kingston, Ont., 1975).— N. E. S. Griffiths, The splendid vision: centennial history of the National Council of Women of Canada, 1893–1993 (Ottawa, 1993).— Protestant Orphans{s-1-unknown} Home, Annual report (Ottawa), 1864–1925 (copies in City of Ottawa Arch.). [These reports reveal that secondary sources are wrong in claiming Ella Hobday Webster was known for her work with this home; it was her mother-in-law and sister-in-law who were involved in its management. s.a.c.]§.

Billy Cochrane displayed many of the characteristics of the reviled {d-0}remittance man.{d-1} He had a wild streak which he made no attempt to control even when he was a middle-aged family man. He expressed his support for Calgary Brewing and Malting by sampling beer copiously wherever he happened to be and then sending reports to Cross. He also made every effort to lure the overly conscientious Cross into a night or two on the town. Cochrane was a creature of his times during which money insulated the landowning class from many of the realities of life. His story is important because it demonstrates that the cultural baggage that well-off Britons brought to Alberta - customs which seemed bizarre and risible to others - in no way precluded these privileged immigrants from making substantial contributions to the settlement of what Billy often referred to as {d-0}the bald headed{d-1} prairie.

GA, M 289; M 6552. GRO, Reg. of births, Lichfield, 8 Sept. 1858; Newcastle upon Tyne, 8 Jan. 1858; Reg. of marriages, St George Hanover Square (Middlesex), 19 Feb. 1887. D. H. Breen, The Canadian prairie west and the ranching frontier, 1874-1924 (Toronto, 1983). Burke{apos}s genealogical and heraldic history of the peerage, baronetage and knightage, ed. Peter Townend (105th ed., London, 1970). Cayley Women{apos}s Institute, Under the chinook arch: a history of Cayley and surrounding areas ([Cayley, Alta], [1967?]). S. M. Evans et al., Cowboys, ranchers and the cattle business: cross-border perspectives on ranching history (Calgary, 2000). High River Pioneers{s-1-unknown} and Old Timers{s-1-unknown} Assoc., Leaves from the Medicine Tree . . . ([Lethbridge, Alta], 1960). T. G. Jordan, North American cattle ranching frontiers: origins, diffusion, and differentiation (Albuquerque, N.Mex., 1993). Sherrill MacLaren, Braehead: three founding families in nineteenth century Canada (Toronto, 1986). Nanton and District Hist. Soc., Mosquito Creek roundup: Nanton-Parkland (Nanton, Alta, 1975).

Soc. de Généalogie de Québec, Fichier Drouin, Saint-Denis (Montréal), 6 août 1921. Le Soleil (Québec), 28 mai 2000. Gérard Binette, Mariages de Notre-Dame du Très Saint-Sacrement (Montréal), 1926-1990 (Montréal, 1992). Roch Carrier, Our life with the Rocket: the Maurice Richard story, trans. Sheila Fischman (Toronto, 2001). Chrys Goyens et al., Maurice Richard, reluctant hero (Toronto, 2000). {d-0}Maurice Richard talks about . . . the Rocket,{d-1} Les Canadiens: Hockey Magazine (Montreal), 9 (1993-94), no.7: 22-66. Claude Mouton, Toute l{apos}histoire illustre et merveilleuse du Canadien de Montréal (2e éd., Montréal, 1986). Andy O{apos}Brien, Rocket Richard (Toronto, 1961). Rolland Ouellette, Les 100 plus grands Québécois du hockey (Montréal, 2000). J.-M. Pellerin, L{apos}idole d{apos}un peuple: Maurice Richard (Montréal, 1976). Total hockey: the official encyclopedia of the National Hockey League, ed. Dan Diamond (Toronto, 1998).

The Canadiens began the 1955-56 season with a new coach, Toe Blake, who replaced James Dickenson Irvin, and a new recruit, Henri Richard, who was the Rocket{apos}s brother. Another brother, Claude, would also try to join the Canadiens, but without success. Until 1959-60 the team would dominate the NHL in an extraordinary way, with five successive Stanley Cups and four Prince of Wales Trophies, awarded to the team finishing first in the NHL overall. Richard played an active part in these victories, but was slowed down again by injuries. During these years of triumph, there were few changes in the team{apos}s makeup; 12 players - nicknamed the 12 Apostles - remained at their posts, as did their coach. On 19 Oct. 1957, in a game against Chicago, Richard outmanoeuvred goalie Glenn Henry Hall to score his 500th career goal. He dedicated it to Dick Irvin, who had died a few months earlier.

Maurice Le Noblet Duplessis, who would be called {d-0}the Chief{d-1} or Maurice Duplessis, was to devote his life to politics, following in the footsteps of his father, a Conservative mla for the riding of Saint-Maurice from 1886 to 1900, town councillor and mayor of Trois-Rivières, and later judge of the Superior Court. From early childhood, Maurice, who would have four sisters, Marguerite, Jeanne, Étiennette, and Gabrielle, was steeped in an atmosphere of religious and political conservatism. The ultramontane Bishop Louis-François Laflèche* gave advice to his father, whom Maurice sometimes accompanied on election campaigns and to the Legislative Assembly. He also witnessed meetings with prominent members of the Conservative Party in his family home.

The election of 1927 had left the Conservatives with only nine mlas. During the party{apos}s convention on 9 and 10 July 1929, its head, Arthur Sauvé*, whose leadership was challenged by the rank and file, resigned and was replaced by Camillien Houde, the member for Montréal-Sainte-Marie, who was acclaimed. Houde, who had just become mayor of Montreal, was a rising star. Duplessis knew that Houde would be too undisciplined to be anything other than a shooting star in the sky of the capital: he would wait his turn. The two men were to be rivals for more than a decade. In the general election of 24 Aug. 1931, held in the midst of the Great Depression, and despite getting a larger share of votes than in the previous election, the Conservatives managed to add only two members to their caucus; even Houde lost his seat. He and Thomas Maher, an active Conservative supporter, wanted to contest the elections of 63 Liberal mlas. Duplessis, who had taken his riding by 41 votes, was one of the dissident members who did not want to risk having their own elections overturned, and he was criticized for his reluctance by his leader, Houde. Taschereau had the rules governing the judicial contesting of elections changed by legislation known as the Dillon act and frustrated the Conservative plan [see Henry George Carroll*]. Defeated in the Montreal mayoralty race on 4 April 1932, Houde resigned as leader of the Conservative Party on 19 September. On 7 November some Conservatives met in caucus and chose Duplessis as leader of the opposition over Houde{apos}s hand-picked heir apparent, Charles-Ernest Gault.

The testimony given before this committee was damning and created a scandal. On 11 June the premier asked for the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly (which precipitated an election), submitted his resignation, and handed power over to Adélard Godbout. As reported in the Quebec City Action catholique that day, Duplessis reacted sarcastically: {d-0}Mr Speaker, there is no need for me to tell you that with a regime so dissolute, dissolution was imperative.{d-1} During a meeting held at the Windsor Hotel in Montreal on 17 June, Duplessis refused to renew the 1935 agreement. The past year had confirmed him as leader of the opposition forces. The break was finalized three days later in Sherbrooke during a special caucus meeting of 33 opposition mlas, when some stalwarts of the Action Libérale Nationale backed Duplessis. Gouin{apos}s party was unable to get organized for the electoral contest. He himself so hesitated to stand that on 10 August he arrived at the registration office one hour after the closing time for nominations. The last of his supporters either declined to run or did so as independents. Not one of them was elected. During this campaign Duplessis posed as a reformer, committed himself to attacking the {d-0}moneyed powers,{d-1} suggested measures to clean up politics, and promised as well to rescue agriculture. But in the wake of the public accounts committee hearings, he especially emphasized the corruption of the Liberal regime. The Union Nationale published Le Catéchisme des électeurs d{apos}après l{apos}ouvrage de A. Gérin-Lajoie in Montreal, a pamphlet attributed to Louis Dupire, Louis Francœur, Roger Maillet, and Édouard Masson. Modelled on Catholic publications, it sought to extol the virtues of the party in opposition while stressing the shortcomings of the Liberal government.